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FORTY    YEARS 
OF   DIPLOMACY 


FORTY    YEARS 
OF  DIPLOMACY 

By    BARON    ROSEN 


VOL.   II 


NEW    YORK 
ALFRED    •    A    •    KNOPF 

MCMXXII 


First  published  m  igji 


(All  rights  reserved) 

Printed  in  Great  Britain  by 
UNWIN   BROTHERS,  LIMITED,  THE  GRESHAM  PRESS,   LONDON   AND  WOKINO 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER    XXVII 

PAGE 

The  First  Duma — Opening  by  the  Emperor — Reception  of  his  speech — 
Ambassador  Meyer's  report — The  Cadet  Party — Stolypin  becomes 
Prime  Minister — Government  incapacity — The  Wyborg  Manifesto 
— Political  inexperience — Iswolsky  and  the  Emperor — The 
Socialist  Revolutionaries — An  abominable  crime 9 

CHAPTER    XXVIII 

Stolypin  and  the  Agrarian  question — Revolutionary  movements — Dis- 
content of  the  peasantry — Communal  ownership — The  second 
Duma  —  Russian  expansion  —  Poland  —  Finland  —  The  Baltic 
Provinces — Diplomatic  achievements 29 

CHAPTER    XXIX 

Assassination  of  Stolypin — Am  appointed  member  of  the  Council  of 
the  Empire — The  situation  in  Europe — Historical  developments — 
Congress  of  Vienna — "  Balance  of  Power  " — Introduction  of  con- 
scription— The  League  of  Nations — Nationalism — Italy — Poland 
— Prussia — The  Balkans — Austria-Hungary 51 

CHAPTER   XXX 

Forebodings  of  a  European  war — Russia's  handicaps — Railways — 
Munition  factories — The  bureaucracy — Kokovtseff  as  Prime 
Minister  —  Iswolsky  —  The  Balkan  League  —  An  anonymous 
attack — My  secret  memorandum  to  the  Emperor — My  "  German" 
name — The  "  Great  Slav  Idea." 7-2 

CHAPTER    XXXI 

Pan-Slavism — Austrian  Slavs — Constantinople  and  the  Straits — British 
apprehensions  —  Folly    of    Russian    ambitions  —  Importance    of 


6  FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

PAGE 

neutralizing  the   Straits — Russia's  real  mission — Rivalry  of  the 
Great  Powers— -Fate  of  my  Memorandum — German  influence        .       96 


CHAPTER   XXXII 

The  principle  of  nationalities — The  Church — The  influence  of  lan- 
guage— Internationalism — Position  in  the  Balkans — The  London 
Conference — Mr.  Hartwig — Treaty  of  Bucharest — Finland — The 
Tsar  and  his  letter — Poland — Little  Russia — Ukraina — My  speech 
in  the  Upper  House 121 


CHAPTER    XXXIII 

On  the  brink — Satanism  and  the  world-order — Tsardom — Goremjkin 
as  Prime  Minister — Scene  in  the  Duma — Kerensky — A  Press 
campaign — Russo-German  antagonism — "  Deutschtum" — My  last 
interview  with  the  Emperor  Nicholas — Assassination  of  Archduke 
Franz  Ferdinand — Progress  of  events — A  glimmer  of  hope — The 
die  is  cast 144 


CHAPTER   XXXIV 

Earl  Lorebum's  views — The  situation  on  July  30,  1914 — Russian 
mobilization — Declaration  of  war — Feeling  in  Russia — Attack  on 
German  Embassy — Treatment  of  Poland  and  Finland — Invasion 
of  East  Prussia — Tannenberg — My  article  for  the  Associated  Press 
— A  letter  from  Roosevelt 166 


CHAPTER   XXXV 

The  question  of  mobilization — War  passions — War  propaganda — 
Declaration  of  London — Opportunity  for  a  League  of  Neutrals — 
Disorganization  in  Russia — The  Tsar  and  a  separate  peace — Ras- 
putin— The  Grand  Duke  Nicholas — The  "  Progressive  Bloc  "       ,     187 


CHAPTER    XXXVI 

Goremykin  is  succeeded  by  Stuermer — A  "  Peace  without  victory  " — 
My  political  faith — A  memorandum  for  the  Emperor — Attempt 
to  detach  Turkey — Visit  to  England — Talk  with  Mr.  Asquith — 
Importance  of  peace  to  Russia — Protopopoff — Situation  in 
Russia 205 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   XXXVII 


PAGE 


Foreign  influences  in  Russia — Trepoff  as  Prime  Minister — Interviews 
with  Pokroffsky — An  Imperial  order — Visit  of  Lord  Milner  and 
others — Causes  of  the  Revolution — The  Soviet — Interview  with 
Kerensky — Fruitless  efforts — American  mission  at  Petrograd         .      223 

CHAPTER    XXXVIII 

First  news  of  the  Revolution — Some  personal  experiences — Am  offered 
Governorship  of  Finland — Situation  in  Finland — BUnd  :e  3  of  the 
Allies — My  efforts  towards  peace 238 

CHAPTER    XXXIX 

Korniloff's  rising  and  its  failure — Russian  political  parties — The  Soviet 
and  the  Provisional  Government — The  Duma — Kerensky  and 
his  party — Communications  from  Allied  Ambassadors — The  two 
Socialist  parties — Allies'  attitude  to  Russia — Further  efforts 
towards  peace 262 

CHAPTER   XL 

Bolshevism — Its  origin  and  dangers — Trotzky's  statement — German 
influence — We  escape  from  Russia — At  Murmansk — Admiral 
Kemp — ^Visit  to  Berlin — Conditions  there — Privy  Councillor  Kriege 
— At  Stockholm — Reflections — The  End 284 


INDEX   OF    NAMES 307 


Forty  Years  of  Diplomacy 


CHAPTER   XXVII 

The  first  Duma — Opening  by  the  Emperor — Reception  of  his  speech — 
Ambassador  Meyer's  report — The  Cadet  Party — Stolypin  becomes 
Prime  Minister — Government  incapacity — The  Wyborg  Manifesto — 
PoUtical  inexperience — Iswolsky  and  the  Emperor — The  Socialist  Revo- 
lutionaries— An  abominable  crime. 

The  day  had  dawned  at  last — the  great  day  that  was  to 
mark  the  entry  of  Russia  into  a  new  phase  of  her  historic 
development;  the  day  that  was  to  see  the  reaUzation  of 
the  noblest  dreams  of  the  flower  of  Russia's  aristocracy, 
who,  in  December,  1825,  had  laid  down  their  hves  and  sacri- 
ficed their  hberty  in  the  cause  of  the  freedom  of  the  people 
and  of  what  they  thought  would  assure  the  welfare  and 
greatness  of  their  country.  Whether  friend  or  foe  of  the 
constitutional  reform,  no  thinking  being  could  be  unmoved 
by  the  momentous  import  of  the  event  which  was,  for  good 
or  for  evil,  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  nation. 

Detained  by  my  official  duties  at  Washington,  I  could 
only  follow  from  afar  with  profound  emotion  the  events 
of  those  historic  days  as  they  were  reported  in  the  Press. 

It  appears  from  all  accounts  that  April  27,  old  style 
(May  10),  1906,  was  one  of  those  radiantly  beautiful  spring 
days  that  in  northern  latitudes  sometimes  mark  the  awaken- 
ing of  nature  to  a  new  life  after  a  prolonged  winter's  sleep. 

As  reported  in  the  Press,  the  opening  of  the  first  Russian 
Parhament  went  off  without  a  hitch.  The  management 
of  the  impressive  ceremony  in  the  Winter  Palace,  where  the 
Emperor  delivered  his  Speech  from  the  Throne,  was  perfect. 
The  Emperor  and  Empress  had  arrived  from  Peterhof, 
where  they  were  in  residence  for  the  summer,  on  board  their 
yacht,  which  anchored  in  the  river  in  front  of  the  Winter 
Palace.  Their  Majesties  landed  at  once  and  proceeded  to 
their  apartments  in  the  Palace,  where  they  awaited  the 
announcement  that  the  Council  of  the  Empire  and  the 
Lower  House  of  Parliament  were  assembled  in  the  Throne 


10  FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

Room.  Preceded  by  the  bearers  of  the  insignia  of  Empire, 
the  Banner,  the  Sword  of  State,  the  Globe,  the  Sceptre 
and  the  Crown,  the  Emperor,  between  the  Empress  Mother 
and  the  reigning  Empress,  followed  by  the  Grand  Dukes 
and  Grand  Duchesses,  and  a  numerous  and  gorgeous  Court, 
moved  solemnly  through  the  endless  suite  of  magnificent 
halls  and  salons  to  St.  George's  Hall.  Received  by  the 
clergy,  the  Emperor  kissed  the  Holy  Cross  and  listened  to 
the  Te  Deum  sung  by  the  Court  choir.  The  religious  cere- 
mony over.  His  Majesty,  who  bore  himself  with  great  dignity, 
walked  slowly  to  the  raised  dais  and  seated  himself  on  the 
throne.  Having  taken  from  the  hands  of  an  attendant  the 
paper  containing  the  text  of  his  speech,  the  Emperor  rose 
and  delivered  his  address  to  the  representatives  of  the  nation 
in  a  firm  voice,  which  was  heard  distinctly  in  every  corner 
of  the  hall,  emphasizing  every  word.  The  admirable  and 
even  cordial  tone  of  the  Sovereign  in  renewing  his  pledges 
and  asking  the  co-operation  of  Parliament  for  the  regenera- 
tion of  the  country,  failed,  however,  to  evoke  from  the  Lower 
House  any  response  whatever.  The  enthusiastic  cheering 
which  broke  out  after  the  Emperor  had  finished  speaking 
was  confined  to  the  members  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire, 
the  Court  and  the  representatives  of  the  higher  bureaucracy, 
the  Duma  members  remaining  ominously  silent. 

One  of  the  Press  cablegrams  mentioned  Count  Witte, 
"  who — a  pathetic  figure — before  the  ceremony  was  seen 
pacing  the  corridor  entirely  alone.  Later  he  entered  the 
Throne  Room.  Clad  in  the  gold  and  black  uniform  of  a 
Secretary  of  State,  one  of  the  highest  dignities  of  the  Court 
which  still  remained  to  him,  and  with  the  broad  ribbon  of 
the  Alexander  Nevsky  Order  across  his  breast,  he  took  his 
place  in  the  ranks  of  the  old  bureaucracy.  Ex-Minister  of 
the  Interior  Durnovo  was  there  too,  chatting  with  his 
companions,  but  Witte  seemed  to  find  a  cold  welcome  from 
everyone.  Finally  he  wandered  away  and  stood  apart 
until  the  Imperial  procession  approached." 

Such  was,  if  this  report  is  to  be  believed,  the  attitude  of 
the  Court  and  the  bureaucracy,  at  this  historical  moment, 
toward  the  great  statesman  and  patriot  who  had  secured 
for  the  country  the  momentous  reform  which  alone,  if 
followed  up  in  the  spirit  intended  by  its  originator,  could 


THE   FIRST  DUMA  11 

have  averted  the  catastrophe,  the  approach  of  which  could 
be  felt  by  anyorxC  whose  senses  were  not  dulled  by  inveterate 
prejudice  and  purbhnd  obstinacy. 

Mr.  Iswolsky,  who  arrived  from  Copenhagen  just  in  time 
to  witness  the  ceremony  as  a  dignitary  of  the  Court — his 
appointment  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  not  yet  having 
been  gazetted — records  his  impressions  as  follows  : 

The  Emperor's  speech  was  Ustened  to  in  the  deepest  silence  ;  it 
produced  visibly  a  good  impression  on  the  deputies.  In  previous 
utterances  of  the  Emperor,  as  well  as  in  public  acts  recently  promul- 
gated by  the  Government,  every  allusion  to  a  "constitution"  or 
to  any  limitation  of  the  rights  of  the  Sovereign  had  been  carefully 
avoided  ;  it  might  have  been  apprehended  lest  the  Emperor  might 
seize  this  opportunity  to  proclaim  once  more  the  autocratic  character 
of  his  power  ;  the  members  of  the  Duma  were,  therefore,  agreeably 
surprised  when  they  listened  to  this  passage  of  the  Emperor's  speech  : 

"  As  for  me,  I  will  unalterably  maintain  the  institutions  I  have 
granted,  for  I  am  firmly  convinced  that  you  will  with  all  your  forces 
devotedly  serve  the  fatherland  in  order  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the 
peasantry  so  dear  to  my  heart,  of  the  enhghtenment  of  the  people 
and  of  the  development  of  its  prosperity,  mindful  that  for  its  veritable 
prosperity  a  State  needs  not  only  liberty,  but  also  order  founded  on 
the  principles  of  the  Constitution." 

The  discreet  warning  implied  in  the  last  words,  particularly  empha- 
sized by  the  Emperor,  did  not  prevent  the  deputies  appreciating  the 
fact  that  for  the  first  time  they  had  heard  from  the  hps  of  the  Sovereign 
the  word  "  Constitution."  In  spite,  however,  of  the  good  impression 
produced  by  the  Speech  from  the  Throne,  it  was  not  greeted  by  any 
acclamation  by  the  members  of  the  Duma. 

It  would,  I  think,  interest  the  reader  to  learn  of  the 
impression  produced  on  the  mind  of  a  judiciously  observant, 
impartial  and  not  unfriendly  foreign  witness  of  the  same 
spectacle.  This  is  what  Mr.  George  von  L.  Meyer,  American 
Ambassador  to  Russia, ^  has  to  say  on  the  subject  in  his  diary, 
under  date  of  May  lo,  1906  : 

The  entire  left  side  of  the  hall  was  occupied  by  the  members  of 
the  Duma,  and  they  were  peasants,  shopkeepers,  priests,  merchants, 
lawyers,  even  a  dentist  and  a  Catholic  bishop.  Perhaps  a  third  were 
in  dress-suits,  half  a  dozen  in  uniform,  and  many  in  simple  peasant 
costume  and  rough  clothes.  All  this  made  a  strange  contrast  with 
the  of&cers  in   their  silver  or    gold-lace    uniforms,   members   of  the 


'  I   quote   here   and   elsewhere   from  Mr.    Meyer's  Biography,  by  M.  A. 
de  Wolfe  Howe. 


12  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Council  and  members  of  the  Court.  On  one  side  were  the  representa- 
tives of  the  people  and  on  the  other  those  of  the  bureaucracy  past 
and  present.  Those  on  the  right  had  shown  themselves  unequal 
to  the  task  of  satisfactorily  governing  the  nation.  Would  the  left 
be  equal  to  the  occasion  ?  Judging  simply  from  appearances,  it  was 
not  encouraging.  ...  In  watching  the  deputies  I  was  surprised  to 
note  that  many  of  them  did  not  even  return  the  bows  of  His  Majesty, 
some  giving  an  awkward  nod,  others  staring  him  boldly  in  the  face, 
showing  no  enthusiasm,  and  even  sullen  indifference.  As  he  rose 
again  from  the  throne  there  was  an  absolute  stillness.  He  then  pro- 
ceeded in  a  firm  voice  to  read  his  address.  When  he  finished  there 
was  a  tremendous  outburst  of  applause,  but  limited  almost  entirely 
to  the  right  side  of  the  hall,  the  deputies  remaining  quiet.  As  he 
descended  from  the  throne  the  applause  and  shouting  on  the  right 
continued  and  increased,  but  the  marked  silence  on  the  left  was  ever 
noticeable.  The  Emperor  carried  himsulf  with  dignity  under  the 
trying  ordeal,  and  should  receive  credit  for  what  he  said  in  his  address 
to  the  members  of  the  Duma.  Judging  merely  from  appearances, 
it  was  difficult  to  recognize  any  marked  ability  or  distinguishing  trait 
among  the  members  of  the  Duma  which  would  specially  fit  them 
for  the  great  task  that  is  before  them  ;  but  the  contrast  between 
those  on  the  left  and  those  on  the  right  was  the  greatest  that  one 
could  possibly  imagine,  one  being  a  real  representation  of  different 
classes  of  this  great  Empire  and  the  others  of  what  the  autocracy 
and  bureaucracy  have  been. 

In  a  private  letter  to  President  Roosevelt  on  the  same 
subject  the  Ambassador  summarizes  his  impressions  in  the 
following  weighty  words  : 

Russia  is  entering  upon  a  great  experiment,  ill  prepared  and  un- 
educated. ...  I  cannot  help  but  take  a  pessimistic  view  as  to  the 
future,  when  I  see  evidences  everywhere  of  a  communistic  spirit 
among  the  workers  and  peasants.  .  .  .  From  the  above  I  do  not 
mean  to  imply  that  a  crash  is  coming  at  once,  but  that  sooner  or  later 
a  struggle  .  .  .  between  the  Crown  and  the  Duma,  unless  all  signs  fail, 
is  more  than  probable.  To-day  the  Government  is  in  possession  of 
funds  and  the  Army,  but  within  three  years  the  entire  Army  will 
have  been  recruited  and  with  the  new  ideas  and  doctrines  that  are 
permeating  the  minds  of  the  people,  who  can  tell  if  the  Government 
can  then  rely  upon  the  troops  to  obey  the  officers  and  quell  disturbances. 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  judicious  than  the  view 
taken  of  the  situation  by  this  level-headed  and  clear-sighted 
statesman.  On  the  other  hand,  nothing  could  have  been 
more  injudicious,  recklessly  injudicious  one  might  say, 
than  the  attitude  taken  up  by  the  Constitutional  Democratic 
(or    so-called    "  Cadet  ")    Party,    under    the    leadership    of 


THE   "CADET"   PARTY  13 

Professor  Miliukoff.  That  party,  although  its  leader,  for 
some  formal  reason,  could  not  be  elected  a  member,  wielded 
a  commanding  influence  in  the  Duma,  mainly  owing  to  the 
fact  that,  besides  being  the  only  really  well-organized  party, 
it  numbered  in  its  membership  the  strongest  intellectual 
forces  of  the  country.  From  the  very  first  sittings  of  the 
Duma  this  party  took  a  stand  violently  hostile  to  the  Govern- 
ment. On  its  initiative  an  address  to  the  Sovereign,  in 
response  to  the  Speech  from  the  Throne,  was  unanimously 
voted  by  the  Duma,  whereia  entirely  inadmissible  demands 
were  put  forward,  inadmissible  inasmuch  as  they  amounted 
to  a  demand  for  a  fundamental  revision  of  the  constitution 
granted  by  the  Sovereign  on  the  basis  of  his  October  manifesto. 
They  included  the  abolition  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire — 
that  is  to  say,  the  Upper  House  of  Parliament,  a  Ministry 
responsible  to  the  Duma  ;  forcible  expropriation  and  distribu- 
tion among  the  peasants  of  the  lands  of  estate  owners,  and 
so  forth ;  and,  lastly,  absolute  amnesty  for  all  political  crimes 
and  offences.  Some  of  the  leading  orators  of  the  Cadet  Party 
indulged  in  violent  attacks  on  the  Government  on  account 
of  the  severity  of  the  measures  adopted  for  the  repression 
of  the  revolutionary  movement,  and  clamoured  for  the 
immediate  liberation  of  all  prisoners  held  on  account  of 
participation  in  revolutionary  activities.  One  of  the  few 
members  of  the  moderate  Liberal  Party,  the  so-called 
"  Octobrist  "  Party,  offered  an  amendment  severely  con- 
demning the  countless  and  incessant  murders  of  officials  of 
every  grade  in  the  service  from  governors  down  to  poHcemen, 
but  this  amendment  was  voted  down  by  the  Cadet  Party 
and  their  Radical  alHes.  In  short,  the  Duma  began  from  the 
start  to  assume  the  part  of  something  like  a  Constituent 
Assembly,  an  attitude  that  was  bound  to  lead  to  a  rupture 
with  the  Government.  The  Emperor  declined  to  receive 
the  delegation  which  was  to  have  presented  the  address,  and 
the  Duma  was  directed  to  forward  its  address  to  the  Minister 
of  the  Household,  through  whom  it  was  to  be  submitted 
to  His  Majesty.  The  friction  caused  thereby  had  somehow 
been  smoothed  over,  when  the  Government,  or  rather  the 
Prime  Minister,  Goremykin,  against  the  ad\ace  of  the  only 
two  really  able  members  of  the  Cabinet,  Stolypin  and  Iswolsky, 
undertook  to  reply  to  the  address  by  a  declaration  couched 


14  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

in  haughty  terms  explaining  the  inadmissibility  of  the  Duma's 
demands,  with  the  result  that  after  a  heated  debate  a  vote 
of  censure  on  the  Government  was  passed  by  a  crushing 
majority,  coupled  with  a  demand  for  the  resignation  of  the 
Ministry.  But  the  great  and  final  stumbling-block  proved  to 
be  the  agrarian  question.  The  Labour  group,  a  small  group 
of  extreme  Radicals,  or  rather  camouflaged  Socialists,  who 
passed  as  representatives  of  Labour,  brought  in  a  Bill  to 
expropriate  all  land  and  allow  only  small  holdings  on  the 
basis  of  personal  labour.  The  Cadet  Party,  instead  of  frankly 
opposing  this  wild  scheme,  based  their  own  Bill  on  hardly 
dissimilar  principles,  including  forcible  expropriation  of 
the  lands  of  estate  owners,  although  not  entirely  without 
compensation,  and  one  of  their  orators,  a  Mr.  Hertzenstein, 
who  subsequently  was  murdered  by  agents  of  '*  The  Black 
Hundred,"  in  one  of  his  fiery  diatribes  alluded  to  the  number- 
less cases  of  burnings  of  country  mansions  as  "  illuminations  " 
and  a  proper  warning  to  the  country  gentry.  A  large  land 
committee  was  constituted  and  the  Duma  proposed  to 
organize  its  own  local  committees  to  collect  materials,  in 
other  words  to  carry  on  an  agrarian  agitation  on  a  large 
scale  all  over  the  country.  The  Government  responded  by 
publishing  an  official  communication  openly  combating  the 
propositions  introduced  in  the  Duma.  Thereupon  the  Duma 
by  a  majority  vote  adopted  an  address  to  the  people  in  reply 
to  the  Government  communication,  following  it  up  by  a  new 
demand  for  the  dismissal  of  the  Ministry. 

The  long-expected  crisis  had  come.  On  the  morning 
of  the  8/21  of  July  an  Imperial  manifesto  was  published  dis- 
solving the  Duma,  appointing  new  elections  and  summoning 
a  new  Duma  for  March  5th  of  the  following  year.  At  the 
same  time  Goremykin  resigned  and  Stolypin  was  appointed 
Prime  Minister,  retaining  his  post  as  Minister  of  the  Interior. 

Thus  the  first  attempt  at  parliamentary  institutions 
ended  in  failure,  furnishing  fresh  arms  to  the  reactionary 
enemies  of  constitutional  reforms,  from  the  introduction  of 
which  they  predicted  nothing  but  disaster  to  the  country. 

I  cannot  help  referring  again  to  the  views  which  Ambas- 
sador Meyer  knew  how  to  express  with  such  lucidity.  This 
is  what  he  wrote  in  his  diary  on  July  i8th,  three  days  before 
the  dissolution  of  the  Duma  : 


AMBASSADORIAL   VIEWS  15 

It  looks  to-day  as  though  the  Cadets  and  the  Crown  were  drifting 
farther  apart  again  and  that  the  present  Cabinet  would  be  compelled 
to  stay  in.  This  would  be  unfortunate  from  my  point  of  view.  I 
believe  the  Tsar  would  do  well  to  take  a  Cabinet  from  the  Constitu- 
tional Democratic  (Cadet)  Party,  put  them  in  power,  and  make  them 
responsible.  It  is  the  only  way  to  make  them  conservative,  and  for 
the  Crown  to  get  support  in  the  Duma  while  they  are  still  loyal  and 
in  a  majority.  The  Austrian  Ambassador,  who  has  been  quite  pessi- 
mistic, to-day  felt  more  encouraged.  He  looks  at  it  from  a  different 
point  of  view.  Does  not  beheve  in  recognizing  the  Constitutional 
Democrats,  thinks  the  Duma  should  be  dissolved  and  have  the  struggle 
now,  which  he  believes  would  be  short-lived,  as  the  majority  of  the 
troops  are  now  loyal.  This,  as  I  think,  would  not  solve  the  problem 
before  the  country,  and  would  mean  a  greater  and  worse  strife  later  on. 

Two  months  later  on,  on  September  2nd,  Ambassador 
Meyer,  in  a  private  letter  addressed  to  President  Roosevelt 
from  Kissingen,  writes  : 

If  the  Socialist  or  Anarchist  can  once  disabuse  the  minds  of  these 
eighty  milhon  peasants  of  the  idea  that  the  Tsar  is  their  Little  Father, 
and  that  they  can  expect  no  further  assistance  from  him,  but  must 
look  to  the  people  for  redress,  then  events  which  have  so  far  tran- 
spired would  appear  legitimate  in  comparison  to  what  would  probably 
take  place  throughout  the  land.  One  must  live  in  Russia  to  under- 
stand it.  It  is  impossible  to  draw  any  conclusions  from  experiences 
and  results  in  other  countries.  Every  step  or  attempt  that  has  been 
carried  on  in  a  revolutionary  way  has  been  made  without  reference 
to  what  has  gone  on  before  or  what  is  to  follow.  They  do  not  know 
what  they  want,  except  that  they  want  everything  at  once — what  has 
taken  other  nations  generations  to  acquire.  Professor  Vinogradoff  said 
the  other  day  : 

"  The  Russian  nation  will  realize,  as  other  nations  have  done 
before,  that  a  living  organism,  cannot  transform  bones  and  sinews  at 
pleasure,  that  the  future  has  deeper  roots  in  the  past  than  the  present 
is  inclined  to  grant.  .  .  ." 

The  Tsar  does  not  seem  to  realize  that  in  the  long  run  the  will 
of  the  people  will  eventually  assert  itself.  Everything  that  he 
grants  is  done  either  too  late  or  when  it  is  self-evident  that  it  is  forced 
from  him.  Unless  he  changes  his  course  and  adopts  a  policy  satis- 
factory to  the  nation  it  is  merely  a  question  of  how  long  the  Army 
remains  loyal. 

It  will  be  observed  from  these  extracts  that  not  only  Mr. 
Meyer,  but  also  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  Baron  Aehrenthal 
— that  is  to  say,  the  two  ablest  Ambassadors  at  the  time 
in  St.  Petersburg — were  taking  a  very  pessimistic  view  of  the 
situation  in  Russia  and  were  both  laying  special  stress  op 


16  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

the  question  of  hoiv  long  the  Army  would  remain  loyal.  This 
is  a  most  important  question,  to  which  I  shall  have  to  revert 
later  on.  As  to  the  divergence  of  opinion  between  these 
two  diplomats  in  regard  to  the  advisability  of  putting  in 
power  the  Cadet  Party,  Mr.  Meyer  would  perhaps  have  modi- 
fied his  opinion  if  he  had  seen  the  leaders  of  that  party  at 
work  when  the  March  Revolution,  which  they  had  themselves 
inspired,  hterally  thrust  power  upon  them  and  their  Octobrist 
aUies.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  idea  of  a  Ministry 
composed  exclusively  of  members  of  the  Cadet  Party  had 
been  taken  up  by  General  Trepoff,  the  Prefect  of  the  Palace, 
a  stanch  adherent  of  the  autocratic  regime  and  in  high 
favour  at  Court,  possibly  in  the  hope  that  a  Cadet  Ministry 
would,  by  the  intransigent  attitude  it  was  sure  to  adopt, 
very  soon  provoke  an  open  breach  with  the  Sovereign,  which 
might  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  temporary  military 
dictatorship  and  perhaps  the  repeal  of  the  Constitution. 
This  plan  was  defeated  by  Stolypin,  who  had  just  been 
appointed  Prime  Minister.  Although  his  endeavours  to 
form  a  Coalition  Ministry  with  representatives  of  the  Octobrist 
and  Cadet  Parties  had  failed  for  the  same  reason  which 
caused  the  failure  of  Witte's  attempt  in  the  same  direction, 
Stolypin  was  nevertheless  firmly  resolved  to  uphold  the 
Constitution   at   any   cost. 

"  Russia  is  entering  upon  a  great  experiment,  ill  prepared 
and  uneducated,"  said  Ambassador  Meyer,  in  his  letter  to 
President  Roosevelt.  The  truth  of  this  remark,  expressing 
a  most  judicious  and  clear-sighted  appreciation  of  existing 
conditions,  cannot  be  questioned.  It  relates  to  both  sides, 
to  the  Government  no  less  than  to  the  Duma. 

Inexperience  and  unpreparedness  for  the  practice  of 
representative  institutions,  as  well  as  non-comprehension 
of  the  mentality  of  the  peasantry,  showed  itself  on  the  part 
of  the  Government  before  even  the  opening  of  the  Duma 
in  the  quite  unreasonable  extension  of  the  suffrage  far 
beyond  the  limits  estabhshed  in  England  by  the  Reform  Bill 
of  1832,  in  the  expectation  that  by  filUng  as  many  seats 
as  possible  with  peasant  deputies  the  Government  would 
secure  a  soHd  block  of  Conservative  supporters. 

This  singular  illusion,  in  which  even  so  perspicacious  a 
statesman  as  Count  Witte  seems  to  have  shared,  was  very 


GOVERNMENT   INCAPACITY  17 

generally  entertained,  and  not  only  by  the  bureaucracy. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  solid  mass  of  two  hundred  peasant 
deputies  in  a  House  of  five  hundred  members,  solely  interested 
in  the  division  among  them  of  the  lands  of  the  estate  owners, 
was  ready  to  give  its  support  to  any  party  that  would  promise 
satisfaction  of  these  demands.  And  that  was  evidently  the 
reason  which  caused  the  Cadet  Party  to  adopt  as  one  of 
the  planks  of  its  platform  not  only  the  distribution  among 
the  peasantry  of  the  lands  belonging  to  the  State,  the 
Imperial  family  (the  so-called  appanages)  and  the  convents, 
but  also  the  forcible  expropriation  for  the  benefit  of  the 
peasants  of  the  lands  of  large  and  medium  estate  owners. 
In  this  connection  I  would  observe  that  it  is  not,  as  will  be 
shown  farther  on,  the  insufficiency  of  land  in  possession 
of  the  peasants  that  is  the  cause  of  their  poverty  and  distress 
and  that  the  division  among  them  of  the  lands  of  the  estate 
owners,  if  equitably  operated,  could  not  by  any  means  remove 
that  cause  by  appreciably  increasing  their  holdings.  In 
support  of  this  latter  contention  I  quote  from  memory 
some  statistical  data,  which,  I  believe,  will  be  found  sub- 
stantially correct. 

Of  all  the  land  in  European  Russia  43  per  cent,  is  held 
by  the  peasantry,  36  per  cent,  is  owned  by  the  State,  12  per 
cent,  belongs  to  the  estate  owners,  and  9  per  cent,  to  corpora- 
tions, to  the  appanages  of  the  Imperial  family,  to  towns, 
convents  and  churches. 

In  their  relations  to  the  Duma  the  Government  from  the 
very  beginning  displayed  its  utter  inexperience  in  parlia- 
mentary practice,  which,  of  course,  could  not  be  wondered 
at,  not  to  mention  Goremykin's  haughty  attitude  in  reading 
his  declaration  and  the  very  tone  of  that  document.  The 
Government  had  neglected  to  prepare  some  important  Bills 
to  be  at  once  submitted  to  the  Duma.  The  first,  and  for 
some  time  the  only.  Bill  introduced  was  a  demand  for  the 
appropriation  of  a  paltry  sum  for  the  installation  of  a  bathing 
establishment.  I  think  it  was  in  one  of  the  provincial  Univer- 
sities. This  extraordinary  attempt  at  starting  the  legislative 
machinery  was  perhaps  due  to  the  playful  initiative  of  some 
bureaucratic  underling,  thoughtlessly  endorsed  by  his  respon- 
sible chief,  but  it  must  have  produced  the  effect  of  an  inten- 
tional shght  to  the  Duma,  and  it  presumably  caused  not  a 

VOL.    II  2 


18  FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

little  irritation.  The  consequence  was  that,  the  legislative 
apparatus  having  once  been  started  without  anything 
important  to  work  on,  the  Duma  took  the  initiative  in  its 
own  hands  and  the  different  parties  introduced  each  its  own 
wild  scheme  for  the  settlement  of  the  agrarian  question. 

Meanwhile  the  rostrum  of  the  Duma  was  being  zealously 
utilized  as  a  tribune  from  which  to  launch  forth  to  the  world 
the  most  violent  diatribes  against  the  Government,  whose 
members  were  but  seldom  found  in  their  seats,  preferring 
to  be  represented  by  some  assistant  functionaries.  Allowance 
must,  of  course,  be  made  for  the  novelty  of  the  situation  offer- 
ing for  the  first  time  in  the  life  of  the  nation  an  opportunity 
for  blowing  off  long  pent-up  steam.  But  if  one  stops  to  con- 
sider the  absurd  inadmissibility  of  the  Duma's  demands  put 
forward  in  their  address  in  reply  to  the  Speech  from  the 
Throne,  one  cannot  help  agreeing  with  what  Ambassador 
Meyer  wrote  in  one  of  his  letters  to  President  Roosevelt  : 
"  They  do  not  know  what  they  want,  except  that  they  want 
everything  at  once — what  has  taken  other  nations  genera- 
tions to  acquire."  And  yet  one  should  be  loath  to  blame 
them  for  it.  What  more  natural,  what  more  laudable 
indeed,  than  that  the  leaders  of  Liberal  opinion  should  have 
deeply  felt  the  condition  of  inferiority  to  which  cultural 
and  political  backwardness  condemns  the  Russian  people, 
and  that  they  should  have  been  burning  with  an  ardent 
desire  to  raise  their  people  to  the  level  of  more  advanced 
nations  ! 

Is  it  not  excusable  that  lack  of  political  experience  which 
they  never  had  any  chance  of  acquiring  should  have  prevented 
their  realizing  that  their  noble  aim  could  never  be  reached 
by  any  short  cut,  but  by  slow  and  gradual  evolution,  the  path 
trodden  by  other  nations  in  the  course  of  centuries  !  Were 
they  not,  besides,  egged  on  by  the  powerful  stimulus  of 
enthusiastic  approbation  in  foreign  countries,  where  ignorance 
of  Russian  conditions  apparently  caused  people  to  believe 
that  all  that  Russia  needed  was  the  overthrow  of  "  Tsarism  " 
and  autocracy  in  order  to  be  turned  at  once  into  a  constitu- 
tional monarchy  like  England  or  a  democratic  republic  like 
France !  The  harm  done  on  these  lines  by  well-meaning 
friends  has  certainly  been  an  element  in  shaping  the  destinies 
of  our  unfortunate  country. 


1 


THE   WYBORG   MANIFESTO  19 

The  climax  of  absurdity  was  reached  when,  immediately 
after  the  dissolution  of  the  Duma — an  act  unquestionably 
within  the  rights  of  the  Sovereign  by  virtue  of  the  Constitu- 
tion— the  members  of  the  Cadet  Party,  with  the  President 
of  the  Duma,  Professor  Muromtseff,  at  their  head,  repaired 
to  Wyborg,  a  town  in  Finland  at  a  few  hours'  distance  from 
St.  Petersburg,  outside  the  limits  of  the  jurisdiction  of 
Russian  courts  and  police,  and  there  held  a  meeting  which, 
after  prolonged  and  heated  debates,  ended  in  the  adoption 
of  a  resolution  in  the  shape  of  an  appeal  to  the  people  to 
refuse  military  service  and  the  payment  of  taxes.  This 
appeal  was  embodied  in  a  document  which  was  signed  by 
all  the  deputies  present  and  became  known  as  the  "  Wyborg 
Manifesto."  As  an  illustration  of  the  simple-mindedness 
with  which  this  act  of,  to  say  the  least,  questionable  loyalty 
had  been  performed  by  the  participants  in  the  meeting, 
a  story  was  told  me  later  by  a  young  American,  who,  being 
an  excellent  Russian  scholar  and  personal  friend  of  some 
of  the  Duma  m.embers,  had  been  admitted  to  the  meeting. 
Returning  to  town  he  found  himself  in  the  train  alone  in  a 
compartment  with  a  member  of  the  Duma  who  seemed  to 
be  greatly  elated  by  what  had  passed  at  the  meeting  and 
what  he  evidently  considered  to  have  been  an  act  of  great 
civic  courage.  When,  however,  he  asked  my  Am.erican 
friend  what  he  thought  of  it  and  had  been  told  that  the  act 
of  inviting  the  people  to  refuse  military  service  and  the 
payment  of  taxes  seemed  perilously  near  an  act  of  high  treason, 
he  changed  colour,  and,  visibly  perturbed,  said  that  it  had 
never  occurred  to  him  to  look  upon  it  in  that  light. 

Dense  ignorance  of  constitutional  Hfe  and  politics  and 
of  the  play  of  parhamentary  institutions  was  by  no  means 
confined  to  new-born  legislators  and  the  general  pubHc  ; 
it  was  fully  shared  by  the  highest  circles  of  the  bureaucracy. 
A  curious  incident  illustrating  this  condition  is  mentioned  in 
his  "  Reminiscences  "  by  Mr.  Iswolsky,  himself  the  only  Russian 
statesman  of  the  period,  not  even  excluding  Stolypin,  who 
was  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  working  of  parhamentary 
institutions  in  Western  Europe.  This  incident  occurred 
in  connection  with  the  visit  to  England  of  a  deputation  of 
the  Duma  invited  to  take  part  in  the  Inter-Parliam-entary 
Conference  in  London.     In  receiving  this  delegation  on  the 


20  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

very  day  when  the  news  had  come  of  the  dissolution  of  the 
Duma,  the  British  Prime  Minister,  Sir  Henry  Campbell- 
Bannerman,  greeted  them  with  the  exclamation,  "  The 
Duma  is  dead,  long  live  the  Duma!  " — winged  words  which 
were  flashed  all  over  the  world  and  produced  quite  a  commo- 
tion in  St.  Petersburg.  Mr.  Iswolsky  avers  that  he  had  not 
a  little  difficulty  in  persuading  his  colleagues,  and  even  the 
Emperor  himself,  that  Campbell-Bannerman  had  certainly 
not  meant  any  offence  and  had  simply  been  paraphrasing 
the  traditional  formula  used  in  France  in  announcing  the 
demise  of  the  Crown.  "  Le  roi  est  mort,  vive  le  roi,"  meant 
to  accentuate  the  idea  of  the  continuity  of  the  monarchical 
principle. 

A  year  later  I  had  occasion  to  convince  myself  by  personal 
experience  to  what  extent  unripe  political  ideas  were  preva- 
lent with  us  even  in  circles  where  one  would  least  expect  it. 
It  happened  in  this  way  :  One  morning  at  the  Embassy  at 
Washington  a  card  was  brought  to  me  bearing  a  name 
which  I  recognized  as  belonging  to  one  of  the  oldest  famihes 

of    our  gentr}^  Mr.   S ,   Member  of  the  Council  of  the 

Empire,   with   a   line   drawn   through   these   words.     When 

Mr.  S was  shown  into  my  room  I  noticed  that,  in  spite 

of  the  early  hour,  he  was  dressed  as  for  some  solemn  official 
occasion,  and  he  approached  me  with  the  diffident  air  of  a 
person  not  quite  sure  of  the  kind  of  reception  he  is  to  meet 
with,  explaining  in  the  most  ceremonious  way  that  he  had 
ventured  to  intrude  only  because  he  deemed  it  his  duty 
as  a  loyal  subject  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  representative 
of  his  Sovereign,  and  so  forth.  Guessing  at  once  that  I  had  to 
deal  with  someone  who  was  prejudiced  against  me  as  a  possible 
political  adversary,  I  therefore  shook  hands  with  him  in  the 
most  cordial  manner,  made  him  sit  by  my  side  and  laughingly 
said  : 

"  Will  3/0U  permit  me  in  reply  to  your  ceremonious  speech 
to  ask  you  an  unceremonious  question  ?  Are  you  not  a 
'  Cadet,'  and  did  you  not  suspect  that  I  was  one  of  the 
dreadful  reactionaries  one  had  better  avoid  touching  even 
with  a  pair  of  tongs  ?  " 

That  made  him  laugh  in  his  turn  and  confess  that  I  had 
been  about  right  in  my  guess.  Once  the  ice  was  broken, 
we  fell  into  a  friendly  chat,  in  the  course  of  which  I  asked 


A   NATIONAL   CHARACTERISTIC  21 

him  why  he  had  ceased  to  be  a  member  of  the  Upper  House, 
as  his  card  seemed  to  indicate.  He  then  explained  that 
when  the  first  Duma  had  been  dissolved  he  had  immediately 
sent  in  his  resignation  because  he  considered  the  dissolution 
to  have  been  a  breach  of  the  Constitution,  against  which  he 
held  it  his  duty  to  protest  in  the  only  way  open  to  him. 

In  reply  to  this  I  felt  compelled  to  enter  a  vigorous  protest 
against  this  mode  of  manifesting  his  disapproval  of  the 
dissolution  of  the  Duma.  To  begin  with,  the  right  to  dissolve 
the  legislative  assembUes  being  one  of  the  prerogatives  of 
the  Crown  in  all  constitutional  monarchies,  the  Government's 
action  in  this  case  was  taken  in  unquestionable  conformity 
with  constitutional  law  and  practice.  It  could,  therefore,  be 
found  fault  with  solel}^  upon  the  ground  of  questionable 
timeliness  or  opportunity  under  existing  political  circum- 
stances. But  then,  however  great  and  even  justified  might 
have  been  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  Opposition  in  either  House 
with  the  Government's  pohcy  in  dissolving  the  Duma,  how 
in  the  world  could  the  voluntary  laying  down  of  his  legislative 
functions  as  an  elected  member  of  the  Upper  House  serve 
any  useful  purpose  whatever  in  the  struggle  for  the  supremacy 
of  Parliament  in  which  the  party  to  which  he  professed 
allegiance  was  engaged  ! 

In  trying  to  analyse  the  motives  of  my  visitor's  action 
in  resigning  his  seat  in  the  Upper  House,  one  is  in  the  presence 
of  a  mental  attitude  which,  although  in  this  case  purely 
individual,  yet  displayed  by  a  man  of  independent  means, 
unassailable  social  position,  highly  cultivated  mind,  and  in 
every  respect  representative  of  the  uppermost  layer  of  our 
"  IntelHgentzia,"  might  well  be  taken  as  a  fair  illustration  of 
that  trait  of  the  national  character  which  finds  expression 
in  Tolstoy's  doctrine  of  non-resistance  to  evil,  in  meek  renun- 
ciation and  in  weak-kneed  readiness  to  throw  up  the  sponge 
at  the  first  encounter  with  a  serious  obstacle — a  trait  which 
goes  a  long  way  towards  explaining  some  of  the  most  astound- 
ing features  of  subsequent  tragic  developments  in  the  nation's 
history. 

In  the  course  of  conversation  it  developed  furthermore 

that  Mr.  S was  an  enthusiastic  adherent  of  the  Cadet 

Party's  agrarian  programme,  including  the  forcible  expro- 
priation  of  the  lands  of   estate   owners,   he  himself   being 


22  FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

an  owner  of  very  large  ancestral  acres.  He  was  likewise  a 
believer  in  the  doctrine  that  all  land  should  belong  to  those 
who  till  it  themselves,  a  doctrine  which  he  had  put  into 
practice  by  distributing  all  his  land  among  his  peasants, 
retaining  merely  a  couple  of  hundred  acres,  surrounding  his 
mansion,  as  a  park.  Now,  such  a  proceeding  on  the  part 
of  an  individual  owner,  if  subjected  to  close  analysis,  is  either 
an  act  of  generosity  partly  at  the  expense  of  his  heirs  and 
successors,  or  else,  if  undertaken  for  reasons  of  public  pohcy, 
a  most  unwise  confession  of  waning  faith  in  the  inviolability 
of  property  in  land  and  therefore  an  indirect  admission 
of  its  doubtful  righteousness,  most  welcome  and  encouraging 
to  the  Socialist  parties  and  their  propaganda. 

Of  course,  similar  proceedings,  of  which  there  were  not 
a  few,  were  the  outcome  of  the  noble,  although  dreamy, 
idealism  which,  in  conjunction  with  that  characteristic  freedom 
of  spirit,  generous  unselfishness  and  fellow-feeling  for  suffering, 
contributed  so  much  to  create  the  indelinable  but  potent 
charm  of  Russian  life  as  it  was,  to  which  most  foreigners 
who  had  tasted  of  it  bore  willing  witness.  And  to  think 
that  an  immortal  artist  should  in  his  younger  days  have 
drawn  such  an  irresistibty  fascinating  pen-picture  of  that 
same  Russian  life  which  in  his  later  years,  by  his  anarchic 
teachings,  he  has  done  so  much  to  destroy  ! 

But  it  must  never  be  forgotten  that  dreamily  altruistic 
notions  regarding  basic  principles  on  which  civilization  has 
hitherto  been  founded,  and  consequent  weakening  of  the 
resistance  to  the  insidious  assaults  to  which  they  are  now- 
adays subject,  present  an  ever  more  threatening  danger. 
A  society  which  is  no  longer  unshaken  in  its  faith  in  the 
inviolability  of  its  rights  is  on  the  eve  of  being  shorn  of  the 
rights  which  it  has  no  longer  spirit  enough  to  defend  and 
therefore  does  not  deserve  to  retain. 

As  strongly  contrasting  with  the  rather  cloudy  nature 
of  certain  ideas  on  the  fundamentals  of  economic  doctrine 
which  one  would  occasionally  meet  with  among  our  intel- 
lectuals, I  cannot  help  recaUing  an  apparently  very  insig- 
nificant circumstance  I  had  occasion  to  observe  in  England 
some  thirty  years  ago.  I  had  arrived  with  my  family  at 
Shankhn,  in  the  Isle  of  Wight,  intending  to  spend  there  the 
summer  and  autumn,  and  I  was  house-hunting,  when  one 


STOLYPm   AND   THE   MANIFESTO        23 

day  on  my  way  to  the  land  agent  I  noticed  on  the  enclosure 
of  a  vacant  plot  of  ground  a  signboard  advertising  the  lot 
for  rent  on  a  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine  years'  lease. 
Having  transacted  my  business,  it  occurred  to  me  to  ask 
the  land  agent  whether  the  mention  of  nine  hundred  and 
ninety-nine  years  as  the  duration  of  the  lease  was  not  merely 
an  advertising  device  to  attract  attention.  Whereupon 
he  explained  that  that  was  by  no  means  the  case  ;  that  of 
course  such  a  lease  amounted  practically  to  an  outright 
sale,  but  that  there  was  nevertheless  what  one  might  call 
a  "  string  "  to  it ;  in  proof  of  which  he  told  me  that  in  the 
preceding  week  a  similar  lease  of  some  land  in  the  vicinity 
of  Shanklin,  concluded  in  the  reign  of  King  Alfred,  had  fallen 
due,  and  that  the  land  had  actually  reverted  to  a  lineal 
descendant  of  the  original  owner  of  the  property  ! 

I  mention  this  incident  because  it  illustrates  so  convincingly 
the  robust  and,  by  the  experience  of  centuries,  justified 
faith  of  the  English  people  in  the  inviolability  of  the  right 
of  property  and  in  the  stability  of  the  social  fabric  of  their 
country,  a  faith  the  lack  of  which  has  been  one  of  the  deter- 
mining factors  in  causing  another  great  Empire  to  collapse 
like  a  house  of  cards  at  the  first  assault  of  a  small  group  of 
demented  fanatics  and  murderous  bandits. 

But  to  cut  short  painful  reflections  such  as  these,  which 
naturally  haunt  my  waking  hours  and  keep  me  awake  at 
night,  and  to  take  up  again  the  thread  of  my  narrative.  The 
new  Prime  Minister,  Stolypin,  showed  great  good  sense  in 
not  attaching  any  tragic  importance  to  the  so-called  Wyborg 
Manifesto,  which  had  fallen  flat  and  had  failed  to  elicit  any 
response  whatever  from  the  people,  and  in  decHning  to 
gratify  the  ambition  of  its  authors  and  signatories  by  award- 
ing them  the  crown  of  martyrdom.  He  confined  himself 
to  having  legal  proceedings  instituted  against  them  under 
some  law  rendering  their  offence  punishable  as  a  simple 
misdemeanour.  They,  or  most  of  them,  were  in  the  end 
sentenced  to  short  terms  of  imprisonment,  which  they 
underwent  under  the  easiest  possible  conditions  as  privileged 
"  politicals."  None  of  them  were  any  the  worse  for  the 
experience  and  some  of  them  seemed  even  to  take  a  certain 
"  civic  "  pride  in  having  undergone  imprisonment  for  their 
political    convictions.     Some  of    the    leaders    of    the  Cadet 


24  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Party,  such  as  Mlliukoff  and  Rodicheff,  had  not  been  among 
the  culprits,  as  they  had  been  at  the  time  attending  the 
Inter-Parliamentary  Conference  in  London,  and  therefore 
escaped  responsibility  for  their  party's  vagaries  in  connection 
with  the  dissolution  of  the  Duma. 

From  his  very  first  days  as  Prime  Minister,  Stolypin  had 
to  face  a  very  perilous  situation  brought  about  by  mutinies 
in  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  which  were  evidently  widely 
contaminated  by  Socialistic  propaganda  in  their  ranks. 
The  military  authorities,  however,  succeeded  in  mastering 
the  movement  among  the  troops  without  having  recourse 
to  extreme  measures.  Iswolsky,  relates  an  experience 
he  had  in  these  perturbed  times  in  connection  with  one  of 
his  weekly  audiences  with  the  Emperor  for  the  presentation 
of  his  report  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  I  cannot  resist 
the  temptation  to  quote  his  most  interesting  account  of  it, 
as  it  sheds  the  light  of  truth  on  the  real  character  of  the 
unfortunate  Sovereign  who  was  destined  to  meet  such  an 
unspeakably  horrible  fate. 

It  happened  that  Mr.  Iswolsky  had  an  audience  on  the 
day  when  the  mutiny  among  the  sailors  and  garrison  at 
Kronstadt  was  at  its  height  and  a  regular  battle  was  being 
fought  between  the  loyal  troops  and  the  mutineers.  The 
audience  took  place  at  the  Imperial  family's  favourite  summer 
residence,  in  a  small  villa  in  the  park  of  Peterhof,  standing 
on  the  very  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland  opposite  Kronstadt 
and  its  many  forts,  distant  about  eight  or  nine  miles.  The 
Minister  was  seated,  facing  the  Emperor,  at  a  small  table 
placed  in  a  bay  window  overlooking  the  sea.  While  he 
was  making  his  report  continuous  discharges  of  heavy 
ordnance,  constantly  growing  in  intensity,  were  distinctly 
audible.  It  was  the  fate  of  the  Empire's  capital,  perhaps 
the  security  of  the  Sovereign  himself  and  his  family  that 
were  at  stake,  depending  on  the  issue  of  the  battle.  But 
the  Emperor  Hstened  to  the  report  of  his  Minister  with 
perfect  composure,  taking  the  keenest  interest  in  every 
detail  and  never  showing  the  slightest  sign  of  emotion. 
Struck  by  the  Emperor's  attitude,  himself  labouring  under 
the  strongest  emotion,  he  ventured  to  ask  what  it  was  that 
enabled  him  to  preserve  such  wonderful  composure.  The 
Emperor   gave   him   one   of   those   deeply   earnest,   kindly 


THE   EMPEROR'S   ATTITUDE  25 

looks  which  always  impressed  those  who  came  in  close 
contact  with  him,  and  said  : 

"  If  you  find  me  so  little  troubled,  it  is  because  I  have 
the  firm  and  absolute  faith  that  the  destiny  of  Russia,  my 
own  fate  and  that  of  my  family  are  in  the  hands  of  Almighty 
God,  who  has  placed  me  where  I  am.  Whatever  may  happen, 
I  shall  bow  to  His  will,  conscious  that  I  have  never  had  any 
other  thought  but  that  of  serving  the  country  He  has  entrusted 
to  me." 

He  must  be  callous  indeed  who,  in  the  light  of  the  fate 
that  has  overtaken  the  martyred  Sovereign,  husband  and 
father,  could  read  these  noble  words  without  being  stirred 
to  the  depths  of  his  soul  b}/  feelings  of  infinite  pity  and 
commiseration. 

During  the  session  of  the  first  Duma  the  Socialist 
Revolutionaries  had  suspended  the  interminable  series  of 
their  dastardly  assassinations  of  Government  functionaries 
of  all  classes,  down  to  the  humblest  ranks  of  the  police  force, 
who  were  heroically  dying  in  the  simple  performance  of 
their  sworn  duty.  It  seems  that  they  even  had  had  the 
unblushing  audacity  to  publish  in  the  foreign  Press  a  declara- 
tion to  the  effect  that 

In  the  presence  of  the  functioning  of  tlie  Duma  and  until  the 
political,  situation  should  have  become  clear  to  the  people  they  were 
discontinuing  their  terrorist  tactics  without,  however,  ceasing  to 
prepare  for  the  combat  ;  the  Central  Committee  of  the  party  would 
decide  at  what  moment  the  revolutionary  tactics  would  have  to 
recommence.* 

That  such  an  infamous  declaration  by  a  revolutionary 
party  in  a  friendly  State  should  have  been  pubHshed,  as  was 
said  to  have  been  the  case,  by  respectable  newspapers 
abroad,  unaccompanied  by  scathing  comments  on  its  criminal 
and  revolting  character,  shows  on  how  little  real  sympathy 
Russia  could  count  anywhere  in  the  world,  and  how  great 
was  the  general  ignorance  of  Russian  conditions  ;  for  it 
must  be  remembered — and  that,  I  hope,  after  the  experiences 
of  our  revolution,  can  no  longer  be  subject  to  doubt — that 
our    revolutionary    parties,     whatever    their    designations, 

'  Mr.  Iswolsky's  "  Reminiscences,"  in  the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes  ol 
July  I,   1919. 


26  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

whether  Bolshevists  or  Menshevists,  SociaHst  Revolutionaries 
or  Social  Democrats,  under  the  false  pretence  of  a  struggle 
for  liberty  and  constitutional  government,  never  really  aim.ed 
at  anything  but  the  destruction  of  the  political  and  social 
fabric  of  the  country  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  on  its  ruins 
the  Utopian  edifice  of  their  dreams. 

One  of  the  most  fatal  consequences  of  our  political 
backwardness  has  been  that  public  opinion  in  more  advanced 
countries  has  been  accustomed  to  look  upon  any  revolutionary 
activity  working  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Russian  Government 
as  a  rather  meritorious  undertaking  worthy  of  the  sympathy 
of  all  liberal-minded  men,  without  stopping  to  consider 
whether  the  existing  form  of  government  which  had  created 
one  of  the  greatest  Empires  in  the  world,  enjoying  perfect 
financial  credit,  well  deserved  by  scrupulous  fulfilment  of 
all  financial  obligations,  in  spite  even  of  being  at  war  with 
a  creditor  nation,  as  was  the  case  during  the  Crimean  War 
when  our  Government  never  failed  to  meet  the  payment  of 
interest  due  on  its  loans  placed  in  England  (by  the  way,  a 
curious  contrast  with  practices  adopted  by  the  foremost 
civilized  nations  in  the  recently  concluded  World  War) 
which  was  securing  law  and  order  and  perfect  safety  of  life 
and  property  in  every  part  of  the  immense  Empire,  and 
which  had  placed  the  countr}^  on  the  high  road  to  prosperity 
and  the  fullest  development  of  its  almost  boundless  natural 
resources — I  repeat,  without  stopping  to  consider  whether 
such  a  form  of  government  was  not,  after  all,  the  best  suited 
to  the  Russian  people  in  their  actual  state  of  cultural  and 
pohtical  development ;  nay,  whether  it  was  not  indeed  the 
only  possible  one  under  existing  circumstances ;  and  last, 
but  not  least,  without  stopping  to  consider  what  the  ultimate 
aims  of  the  Russian  revolutionists  really  were  and  whether 
these  aims  were  not  subversive  of  the  very  foundations  on 
which  their   own  social  structure  is   built. 

Incidentally  I  would  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  same  liberal  and  radical  opinion  which  never  had 
enough  condemnation  for  the  legitimate  Government  of 
Russia  is  now  seemingly  adopting  a  rather  lenient  attitude 
toward  the  most  t3Tannical  Government  the  world  has  ever 
seen,  maintained  by  a  small  band  of  usurping  adventurers 
with  a  ruthless  cruelty  which   puts   the  most   sanguinary 


TERRORISTIC   CRIMES  27 

misdeeds  of  a  Nero  or  an  Ivan  the  Terrible  entirely  in  the 
shade. 

It  could  hardly  be  denied  that  the  moral  support  which 
our  revolutionists  were  finding  in  radical,  and  to  some 
extent  even  in  liberal  pubhc  opinion  abroad,  was  bound  to 
encourage  them  in  their  nefarious  warfare  against  the 
Government  of  their  own  country.  This  warfare  had  its 
beginning  at  the  time  of  the  great  reforms  of  Alexander  II, 
whose  attempted  assassination  on  April  4,  1866,  was,  so  to 
speak,  the  first  gun  fired  in  a  contest  which  has  continued 
ever  since  in  a  vicious  circle  ;  revolutionary  attempts  pro- 
voking repression,  repression  provoking  redoubled  revolu- 
tionary activity,  and  so  on  until  the  final  victory  of  the 
revolution,  with  the  catastrophal  result  which  the  world  is 
witnessing  at  present. 

The  Sociahst  Revolutionaries  were  as  good  as  their  word. 
The  dissolution  of  the  Duma  was  followed  by  an  almost 
uninterrupted  series  of  terroristic  crimes  which  lasted  several 
months.  The  necessarily  stern  measures  resorted  to  in  the 
repression  of  these  outrages  were  made  the  subject  of  the 
usual  reproaches  directed  against  Stolypin  as  the  head  of 
the  Government  b}^  those  who  hold  that  the  right  to  the  use 
of  the  dagger,  the  pistol  and  the  bomb  is  the  privilege  of  the 
terrorists  fighting  for  an  "  idea,"  but  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  Governments  to  defend  themselves  solely  with  means  of 
persuasion,  because,  foresooth,  ideas  may  not  be  combated 
with  force  of  arms — except,  however,  the  idea  of  law  and 
order. 

The  most  abominable  of  these  terroristic  crimes  was 
committed  in  the  month  of  August  following  the  dissolution 
of  the  Duma.  A  formidable  explosion,  produced  by  an 
extremely  powerful  bomb  thrown  in  the  vestibule  of  the 
villa  which  served  as  the  Prime  Minister's  summer  residence, 
totally  wrecked  the  building,  which  was  a  wooden  one, 
destroying  about  one-third  of  it.  Among  the  sixty  victims 
of  the  explosion  were  some  forty  visitors  awaiting  audiences 
in  the  Minister's  reception-room.  About  one-half  of  them 
were  killed  outright,  the  rest  were  more  or  less  severely 
wounded.  Two  of  his  children  were  found  under  the  dfebris 
of  the  destroyed  part  of  the  building — his  daughter  very 
seriously   wounded,    his   little   son   less   so ;     Stolypin,   who 


28  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

had  been  in  his  study  adjoining  the  reception-room  when 
the  explosion  occurred,  escaping  unhurt. 

It  seems  that  the  three  criminals  who  had  brought  and 
thrown  the  bomb  in  the  antechamber,  shouting  "  Long  live 
the  Revolution  !  "  had  been  blown  to  pieces  themselves,  so 
that  their  identity  could  not  be  established. 

Mr.  Iswolsky  relates  in  his  "Reminiscences"  that  the 
Prime  Minister,  having  immediately  moved  with  his  family 
into  his  official  town  residence,  called  the  same  evening  a 
meeting  of  the  Cabinet.  He  opened  the  proceedings  declaring 
that  the  attempt  on  his  life,  in  which  two  of  his  children  had 
become  the  victims,  would  not  in  any  way  whatever  modify 
his  programme,  which  was :  pitiless  repression  of  any 
disorder  and  of  any  revolutionary  or  terroristic  act  ;  reahza- 
tion  with  the  co-operation  of  the  new  Duma  of  a  large  pro- 
gramme of  reforms  in  a  liberal  sense  ;  immediate  solution 
by  way  of  Imperial  decrees  (in  accordance  with  Article  Sy, 
of  the  Constitution)  of  the  most  pressing  problems,  and  first 
of  all  of  the  agrarian  question.  He  furthermore  expressed 
the  apprehension  lest  the  reactionary  party  might  seize  this 
opportunity  for  attempts  to  induce  the  Emperor  to  institute 
a  military  dictatorship,  or  even  to  abolish  the  Constitution, 
and  to  re-establish  the  autocratic  regime.  He  v/ound  up 
by  declaring  that  he  was  determined  to  oppose  with  all  his 
might  any  such  return  to  the  past  and  would  resign  rather 
than  swerve  from  his  constitutional  programme. 

This  was  the  man  whose  noble  character,  iron  will, 
undaunted  courage,  and  unswerving  loyalty,  had  he  lived, 
might  have  saved  the  country. 

But  he  was  destined  to  fall  a  victim,  five  years  later,  to 
a  dastardly  attempt  by  the  hand  of  a  vile  assassin,  the  vilest 
of  the  vile,  a  double  traitor,  a  revolutionist  and  at  the  same 
time  an  agent  of  the  secret  police. 


CHAPTER   XXVIII 

Stolypin  and  the  agrarian  question — Revolutionary  movements — Discontent 
of  the  peasantry — Communal  ownership — The  second  Duma — Russian 
expansion  —  Poland  —  Finland  —  The  Baltic  Provinces  —  Diplomatic 
achievements. 

Undeterred  by  terroristic  threats  and  the  abominable  crime 
to  which  so  many  visitors  in  his  house  had  fallen  victims, 
Stolypin  went  to  work  without  delay  at  the  important  tasks 
he  had  set  himself.  Among  them  the  most  important  and 
urgent  was  the  difficult  task  of  finding  a  satisfactory  solution 
of  the  agrarian  question. 

Before  proceeding  any  further  with  this  subject,  I  must 
request  my  American  readers  to  keep  in  mind  that  conditions 
as  they  existed  from  the  beginning  in  their  favoured  land, 
where  such  a  class  as  a  peasantry  in  the  European  sense  has 
never  existed  and  where  the  first  settlers  and  their  successors, 
even  to  within  recent  times,  found  awaiting  them  an  almost 
illimitable  expanse  of  unoccupied  virgin  soil;  in  short,  that 
'^ese  conditions  are  so  fundamentally  different  as  to  be 
totally  unfit  to  serve  as  a  point  of  comparison  with  the 
agrarian  problem  in  Russia. 

These  difficulties  are  the  outgrowth  of  historical  develop- 
ments dating  back  many  centuries.  They  are  not  to  be 
lightly  brushed  aside.  The  temptation  is  apparently  great 
to  attribute  them  mainly  to  a  reluctance  to  sacrifice  the 
vested  interests  of  estate  owners  to  appeasing  the  land 
hunger  of  the  peasantry,  and  to  seek  the  solution  of  the 
problem  in  a  simple  proposition  somewhat  like  this  :  The 
gradual  impoverishment  of  the  peasantr}/  is  a  fact  ;  its  cause 
is  the  insufficiency  of  their  land  holdings  ;  the  estate  owners 
are  in  possession  of  vast  tracts  of  land  which  should  belong 
to  the  actual  tillers  of  the  soil ;  the  expropriation  of  these 
lands  and  their  distribution  among  the  peasantry  would 
remove  the  cause  of  the  latter 's  impoverishment. 


30  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  such  a  proposition,  seemingly  logical, 
although  based — as  will  be  shown  later — on  erroneous  pre- 
mises, could  enlist  the  approval  of  even  friendly  outside 
observers,  ignorant  of  the  real  condition  of  things  in  Russia, 
not  to  mention  its  general  attractiveness  from  the  point  of 
view  of  those  who  look  upon  individual  property  and  the 
property-owning  classes  as  obstacles  to  the  advancement  of 
mankind.  The  high-priests  of  that  new  faith  are  now 
having  their  innings  and  are  demonstrating  to  a  still  half- 
incredulous  world  to  what  abject  state  of  chaos,  ruin  and 
desolation  a  once  great  and  prosperous  country  could  be 
reduced  by  the  abolition  of  individual  property  and  the 
spoliation,  scattering  and  to  some  extent  even  bodily  extirpa- 
tion of  the  property-owning  classes. 

I  must  further  request  the  indulgent  reader  to  give  me 
credit  for  being  free  from  the  influence  of  personal  interest 
or  class  feeling  in  endeavouring  to  shed  the  light  of  what  I 
conceive  to  be  the  truth  on  the  agrarian  question  in  Russia,  in 
regard  to  which  much  misapprehension  prevails  abroad  and 
which  has  been  greatly  obscured  by  partisanship  on  behalf 
of  both  the  interested  sides  as  well  as  of  believers  in  the 
respective  merits  of  rival  economic  and  sociological  doctrines. 

In  support  of  my  claim  to  independence  of  judgment 
and  personal  disinterestedness  in  this  matter,  I  beg  leave  to 
explain  that  it  is  now  just  over  a  century  since  the  last 
landed  estate  belonging  to  my  branch  of  the  family,  of  which 
I  am  the  last  male  descendant,  was  engulfed  in  the  ruin 
consequent  upon  Napoleon's  invasion  in  1812,  and  that 
therefore  I  am  in  no  way  personally  interested  in  any 
aspect  of  the  agrarian  question  in  the  past,  nor  can  I  expect 
any  personal  benefit  from  its  ultimate  solution. 

Stolypin  undoubtedly  realized  the  urgent  necessity  of 
finding  such  a  solution  of  the  problem  as  would  give  a  fair 
promise  of  cutting  the  ground  from  under  the  feet  of  the 
revolutionary  agitation,  inasmuch  as  it  was  playing  not  only 
on  the  greed,  but  also  on  the  real  distress  of  the  peasantry 
caused  by  its  undeniable  gradual  impoverishment. 

In  judging  of  the  importance  and  the  urgency  of  such  a 
solution  being  found,  it  is  necessary  not  to  lose  sight  of  the 
historical  development  of  the  revolutionary  movement 
in  Russia  from  its  very  inception  in  the  years  following 


THE   AGRARIAN   QUESTION  31 

the  Napoleonic  Wars  to  within  recent  times.  In  the  first 
quarter  of  the  last  centur}^  Russia  was  still  an  almost  exclu- 
sively agricultural  country,  and  the  nation  consisted  mainly 
of  the  ilhterate  and  totally  inarticulate  mass  of  the  peasantry, 
held  in  the  bondage  of  serfdom,  and  on  top  an  infinitesimally 
thin  layer  of  the  highest  grade  culture,  represented  by  the 
aristocracy,  heading  the  more  numerous  and  still  fairly 
cultivated  landed  gentry,  owners  of  medium-sized  and  small 
estates,  from  whose  ranks  were  recruited  the  bureaucracy 
and  the  officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy. 

Of  a  middle  class  or  "  bourgeoisie  "  in  the  Western  sense, 
there  was  none.  The  intermediate  class  between  the  gentry 
and  the  peasantry  comprised  the  merchants,  tradespeople 
and  other  city  dwellers,  who  culturally  were  not  far  removed 
from  the  peasantry  in  which  they  had  their  roots. 

Such  was  the  rather  primitive  structure  of  Russian 
society  in  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  such 
were  the  conditions  of  Russian  life  of  that  epoch  of  which 
Tolstoy's  genius  has  drawn  such  a  fascinating  picture  in 
his  celebrated  novel  War  and  Peace.  They  did  not  present 
a  favourable  soil  for  planting  the  seeds  of  revolution  brought 
back  from  the  Napoleonic  Wars  by  the  officers  who  had 
become  imbued,  during  our  occupation  of  parts  of  France, 
with  the  ideals  of  the  French  Revolution. 

The  revolutionary  movement  was  confined  to  a  narrow 
circle  of  higher  officers  of  the  guards  and  the  Army  and  of 
the  aristocractic  youths  of  the  capital.  It  culminated  in 
December  1825  in  an  attempt  at  a  military  revolt  in  St. 
Petersburg.  Its  aim  was  the  proclamation  of  a  constitution 
on  the  occasion  of  the  accession  to  the  throne  of  Nicholas  I, 
whose  elder  brother,  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine,  had  re- 
nounced his  rights  to  the  crown. 

The  attempted  revolt  was  easily  put  down  by  loyal 
regiments  of  the  guards  who  had  remained  faithful  to  their 
oath  ;  and  the  hopelessness  of  the  undertaking  was  best 
illustrated  by  the  fact  that  when  the  mutinous  troops  were 
ordered  by  their  officers  to  shout  "  Long  live  the  Constitu- 
tion !  "  they  were  said  to  have  done  so  with  great  enthusiasm 
in  the  conviction  that  "  Constitution  "  was  the  name  of  the 
Consort  of  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine,  in  whose  cause, 
as  the  legitimate  Sovereign,  they  imagined  they  had  revolted, 


32  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Five  or  six  of  the  ringleaders  paid  with  their  hves  for  their 
devotion  to  their  noble  ideal  of  liberty  and  progress  ;  the 
rest,  whose  list  read  like  an  extract  from  the  almanac  of 
the  Russian  nobihty,  were  deported  to  the  mines  in  Siberia, 
where  most  of  them  remained,  respected  even  by  their 
jailers,  until  pardoned  by  the  Emperor  Alexander  II  on  his 
accession  to  the  throne. 

The  nation  lost  the  priceless  services  of  some  of  the  best 
and  noblest  of  her  sons,  but  on  the  surface  of  her  stagnant 
life  their  heroic  self-sacrifice  caused  hardly  a  ripple. 

The  long  and  reactionary  reign  of  Nicholas  I  kept  the 
lid  firmly  down  on  whatever  elements  of  unrest  the  nation 
harboured,  and  it  was  not  until  the  first  half  of  Alexander  II's 
reign  that  a  revolutionary  movement  began  to  show  signs 
of  activity.  But  it  originated  in  quite  a  different  stratum 
of  Russian  society  and  was  confined  almost  exclusively  to  the 
"  Intelhgentzia  " — that  is  to  say,  the  intellectual  proletariat — 
to  the  causes  of  whose  birth  and  growth  I  have  already 
referred.  It  aimed,  moreover,  no  longer  at  a  poUtical 
revolution,  or  rather  it  worked  for  such  a  revolution  merely 
as  a  stepping-stone  to  the  reahzation  of  its  real  aim — 
the  destruction  of  the  social  fabric  of  the  State  and  the  erec- 
tion of  the  Utopian  edifice  of  socialistic  dreams. 

The  coincidence  of  the  reappearance  of  a  revolutionary 
movement  with  the  inauguration  by  the  Government  of 
far-reaching  reforms  may  be  explained  by  the  same  con- 
ditions that  determined  the  attitude  of  the  Sociahst  parties 
forty  years  later,  when  the  grant  of  a  limited  constitution 
seemed  to  have  given  liberal  opinion  sufficient  satisfaction 
to  ahenate  entirely  its  sympathy  from  any  attempt  to 
overthrow  the  existing  political  regime,  to  the  gradual  and 
peaceful  development  of  which  along  progressive  lines  all 
liberal-minded  and  truly  patriotic  elements  of  Russian 
society  were  justified  in  looking  forward  with  confidence. 

The  writer  of  these  pages  was  then  a  mere  youth,  but 
even  now,  in  his  dechning  years,  in  mourning  the  ruin  and 
destruction  of  his  country,  he  feels  deeply  moved  in  reviving 
the  imperishable  memories  of  those  stirring  times  when,  after 
a  long  period  of  reactionary  stagnation  culminating  in  the 
disastrous  issue  of  the  Crimean  War,  an  enlightened  Sovereign, 
with  the  ardent  support  of  all  the  best  in  the  land,  broke 


REVOLUTIONARY  MOVEMENTS  83 

the  chains  of  serfdom  that  held  in  bondage  tens  of  millions 
of  his  people  and  inaugurated  such  far-reaching  measures  as 
the  reform  of  the  judiciary  and  the  introduction  of  the  self- 
governing  institutions  of  the  Zemstvo — measures  profoundly 
affecting  the  hfe  of  the  nation  and  creating  an  all-pervading 
atmosphere  of  hopefulness  and  joyous  faith  in  the  country's 
future.  He  had  been  a  witness  also  of  the  stunning  shock 
to  the  people's  feehngs  caused  by  the  sound  of  the  first  shot 
aimed  at  the  hallowed  person  of  the  Sovereign,  and  of  the 
outburst  of  patriotic  rage  which,  had  it  not  been  restrained 
by  the  yet  unquestioned  power  of  the  Government,  would 
have  found  its  vent  in  savage  outrages  against  the  "  Intelli- 
gentzia," whom  the  people  seemed  to  feel  instinctively  to  be 
their  true  enemy  and  the  enemy  of  the  country. 

This  opening  gun  of  the  battle  waged  with  blind  fanaticism 
against  the  country's  welfare  by  an  infinitesimally  small 
group  of  her  deluded  sons  was  followed  by  a  series  of  dastardly 
attempts  on  the  hunted  Sovereign's  hfe,  until  the  final  catas- 
trophe, on  the  very  day  he  had  signed  a  manifesto  opening 
the  door  to  the  ardently  desired  constitutional  reforms. 

It  can  never  be  sufficiently  deplored  that,  instead  of 
persisting  in  this  progressive  policy  determined  upon  in  the 
last  days  of  Alexander  II's  reign,  the  new  Sovereign  was 
advised  that  salvation  was  to  be  found  solely  in  a  redoubled 
severity  of  repressive  measures  and  a  return  to  the  reactionary 
policy  of  the  second  half  of  his  predecessor's  reign.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  Alexander  II's 
firm  resolve  to  maintain  intact  the  principle  of  autocracy 
responded  fully  to  the  feehngs  of  the  overwhelming  majority 
of  the  nation,  whose  psychology,  incHned  to  extremes,  hesi- 
tates only  between  unquestioning  submissiveness  to  a  master 
and  anarchy. 

Nor  can  it  be  denied  that  the  thirteen  years  of  the  reign 
of  Alexander  III,  thanks  solely  to  the  unshakable  firmness 
of  his  will,  resulted  in  a  complete  restoration  of  confidence 
in  the  stabiUty  of  the  pohtical  and  social  fabric  of  the  State, 
in  a  material  prosperity  such  as  the  country  had  never  known 
before,  and  in  securing  for  Russia  an  international  position 
unequalled  in  all  her  history. 

Such  was  the  splendid  heritage  left  by  Alexander  III 
to  his  son  and  successor  on  the  throne.     What  seemed  to 

VOL.   II  3 


34  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

be  needed  to  keep  it  intact  was  an  autocrat ;  that  is  to  say, 
precisely  what  Nicholas  II  was  not. 

With  him  as  a  steersman  (wrote  a  very  able  and  observant 
EngUsh  journalist  in  a  London  weekly  paper)  the  ship  of  State  simply 
rolled  about  helpless  in  the  trough  of  the  sea — he  himself  being 
walloped  from  side  to  side  of  the  vessel  by  the  rudder,  which  he  had 
strength  enough  to  cling  to  but  not  to  control. 

Speaking  of  the  unpreparedness  of  the  Russian  people 
for  a  "  full-blown  "  constitution,  the  same  writer  says  : 

It  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose,  as  is  generally  done  in  England 
and  other  countries,  that  the  woes  of  Russia  were  due  to  the  fact  of 
her  living  under  an  autocratic  form  of  government.  For  the  God's 
truth  is  that  this  was,  and  is,  the  form  of  government  best  suited  to 
her  historical  development  and  her  present  wants. 

I  take  if  for  granted  that  the  enhghtened  English  writer 
here  meant  an  autocratic  form  of  government  limited  by 
a  constitution,  such  as  was  granted  by  the  manifesto  of 
October  17/30,  1905,  which,  as  I  have  endeavoured  to 
show,  responded  to  every  real  and  reasonable  need  of  the 
country  in  its  actual  state  of  poUtical  development  and  which 
Stolypin  was  determined  to  live  up  to  by  gradually  intro- 
ducing such  liberal  and  progressive  reforms  as  the  country 
needed  and  was  prepared  to  assimilate. 

Stolypin's  task,  as  he  understood  it,  was  that  of  a 
statesman  and  a  patriot.  In  his  earnest  endeavour  to  accom- 
plish it  he  had  to  contend  on  the  one  hand  against  influential 
reactionary  elements — at  Court  and  in  the  country — whose 
loyalty  and  patriotism  was  unquestioned  but  whose  lack  of 
political  experience  rendered  them  incapable  of  appreciating 
the  wisdom  of  Stolypin's  policy,  and  on  the  other  hand  against 
what  was  a  mere  handful,  but  a  dangerous  handful,  of  fanatical 
visionaries  whose  arms  are  the  pistol  and  the  bomb  and  whose 
unpardonable  intellectual  crime  consisted  in  their  entertaining 
the  delusion  that  they  were  called  upon  to  impose  at  any 
cost  their  fantastic  schemes  on  their  country. 

Their  criminal  folly  could  only  be  equalled  by  the  childlike 
faith  of  those  estimable,  simple-minded  doctrinaires  who 
believed  that  all  that  was  needed  was  the  overthrow  of  the 
autocracy  in  order  to  secure  to  the  nation  at  once — of  course 
under  their  guidance — the  supreme  benefit  of  an  orderly. 


THE  SOCIALIST  REVOLUTIONARY  PARTY    35 

democratic  and  civilized  Government  on  Western  lines. 
Alas,  we  have  seen  them  at  work,  and  the  history  of  the  last 
three  years  is  there  to  demonstrate  the  results  of  their  short- 
lived activity  during  the  few  months  that  the  Revolution 
left  the  reins  of  power  in  their  incompetent  hands  ! 

As  far  as  the  Socialist  Revolutionary  Party  concentrated 
its  activity  on  terroristic  crimes,  it  could  be,  and  indeed 
was,  dealt  with  successfully  by  the  police  and  the  courts 
(courts-martial  in  localities  which  had  been  placed  under  an 
exceptional  regime  akin  to  a  limited  state  of  siege).  But 
the  revolutionary  agitation  carried  on  among  the  peasantry, 
with  ever  more  telUng  effect,  was  of  a  far  more  dangerous 
character.  It  had  led  to  "  Jacqueries,"  murders,  burnings  of 
country  mansions,  of  which  more  than  two  thousand  went 
up  in  flames,  all  over  the  country.  So  long  as  the  bulk  of 
the  Army  still  remained  loyal  the  disorders  could  be,  and,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  were  in  the  end  successfully  suppressed. 

As  Stolypin  has  been  made  the  target  of  embittered 
attacks  both  at  home  and  abroad,  I  consider  it  to  be  due 
to  his  memory  to  quote  the  judgment  of  a  distinguished 
English  writer,  who  can  hardly  be  suspected  of  undue  par- 
tiahty  for  Russia  or  for  her  leading  statesmen  of  those  days. 
This  is  what  Mr.  E.  H.  Wilcox,  sometime  correspondent  of 
The  Daily  Telegraph  at  Petrograd,  has  to  say  on  this  subject 
in  his  interesting  volume,  Russia's  Ruin  : 

We  have  seen  since  then  what  both  the  Jacqueries  and  the  Soviet 
movement  of  1905-6  would  have  led  to  if  they  had  been  allowed  freely 
to  run  their  course  ;  and  doubtless  many  of  Stolypin's  bitterest 
enemies  in  Russia  have  to-day  revised  their  estimates  of  his  policy, 
if  not  of  the  methods  by  which  it  was  carried  out.  Stolypin  was 
certainly  a  man  of  character,  courage  and  energy,  but  he  was  denounced 
by  the  great  mass  of  his  fellow-countrymen  as  a  ruthless  reactionary 
and,  in  the  end,  paid  for  his  policy  with  his  life.  .  .  .  The  first  two 
Dumas  were  assemblies  of  excited  and  impracticable  visionaries, 
without  political  experience,  and  imbued  with  the  idea  that  all  the 
complex  wrongs  of  the  old  Russia  could  be  put  right  in  a  moment 
by  clothing  pious  intentions  in  statutory  forms.  Left  to  themselves, 
they  would  probably  have  reduced  the  Empire  to  chaos  in  six  months. 
The  chief  effect  of  their  intemperate  debates  was  to  encourage  dis- 
order. Anarchy  established  its  reign  in  many  parts  of  the  country, 
and  if  the  bulk  of  the  troops  had  not  stood  firm  to  the  Government, 
Russia  would  have  experienced  in  1905-6  what  was  her  unhappy 
destiny  in   1917-1S.     There  were   only  two  alternatives  :    either  to 


36  FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

let  disintegration  take  its  course,  in  the  vague  hope  that  something 
positive  would  somehow  be  born  of  it,  or  to  check  it  with  a  strong 
hand.     Stolypin  chose  the  latter  alternative. 

No  Russian  patriot  could  add  anything  to  this  sober  and 
deUberate  judgment,  and  it  will  not  fail,  I  think,  to  be  en- 
dorsed by  impartial  history. 

But  repressive  measures  alone,  however  energetically 
and  even  ruthlessly  applied,  could  not  conjure  the  most 
serious  danger  arising  from  the  chronic  discontent  of  the 
peasantry,  insidiously  and  skilfully  fomented  by  the  revo- 
lutionary parties.  With  a  statesman's  insight,  Stolypin, 
realizing  that  popular  discontent  can  only  be  effectually 
combated  by  removing  its  cause,  had  made  up  his  mind  that 
agrarian  reforms  of  a  sweeping  nature  had  to  be  taken  in 
hand  without  the  least  delay. 

The  reason  of  the  discontent  of  the  peasant  class,  inasmuch 
as  they  were  actual  tillers  of  the  soil,  was  a  twofold  one  : 
their  gradual  impoverishment  and  their  unappeased  land- 
hunger. 

In  determining  the  true  cause  of  the  undeniable  im- 
poverishment of  the  peasantry  in  most  parts  of  the  Empire, 
Stolypin  was  aided  by  his  experience  as  a  large  landowner 
who  had  for  years  personally  superintended  the  exploitation 
of  his  properties  and  been  in  constant  contact  with  his 
peasant  neighbours,  whereby  he  had  gained  a  true  insight 
into  their  real  needs  and  grievances,  as  well  as  into  the  way 
they  could  be  supplied  or  removed.  On  the  other  hand, 
however,  he  found  himself  in  conflict  with  the  pet  doctrines 
of  Slavophilism,  in  whose  fervent  cult  he  had  grown  up,  like 
most  young  men  of  his  generation. 

The  abolition  of  serfdom  in  Russia  was  achieved  upon  a 
plan  differing  in  one  essential  respect  from  the  way  the  same 
reform  had  been  introduced  in  Western  Europe,  and  also 
in  the  so-called  Baltic  Provinces  under  Russian  sway,  where 
the  serfs  had  been  liberated  in  the  beginning  of  the  last 
century. 

Contrary  to  what  had  been  the  case  in  all  these  countries, 
in  Russia  the  liberated  serfs  were  endowed  with  lands  expro- 
priated from  the  estates  of  their  former  masters,  the  latter 
receiving  more  or  less  adequate  compensation  in  the  shape 
of    interest-bearing    "  redemption    bonds "    issued    by    the 


COMMUNAL   OWNERSHIP  37 

Government,  subject  to  gradual  amortization  by  means  of 
a  special  "  redemption  tax  "  imposed  on  the  peasantry. 
From  the  political  point  of  view  the  wisdom  of  this  measure 
may  well  be  questioned,  because  it  established  in  principle 
the  right  of  the  serfs  to  the  ownership  of  some  part  of  the 
land  they  had  been  tilling  in  the  service  of  their  former 
masters — a  dangerous  principle  to  admit,  inasmuch  as  it 
sanctioned  the  idea  of  a  right  without  at  the  same  time 
establishing  its  limitation,  thereby  leaving  the  door  open  to 
future  indefinite  and  limitless  claims  of  the  peasantry  to 
more  land,  or  even  to  all  the  land  of  the  estate  owners. 

From  an  economic  point  of  view  this  measure  might  have 
met  with  a  certain  degree  of  success  in  securing  to  the  peasants 
economic  independence  from  their  fbrmer  masters  and  in  sub- 
stantially improving  their  material  well-being,  a  result  that 
was  actually  obtained  by  a  similar  measure  introduced  some 
years  later  in  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  after  the  suppression 
of  the  insurrection  of  1863 — not,  however,  without  a  pohtical 
aim,  that  of  encouraging  the  loyalty  of  the  PoUsh  peasantry 
at  the  expense  of  the  land-owning  gentry,  whose  loyalty  was 
regarded  as  doubtful. 

But  as  regards  Russia  proper,  the  economic  aims  which 
the  Government  must  undoubtedly  have  had  in  view  in 
introducing  their  agrarian  reform  were  defeated  by  the  very 
principle  on  the  basis  of  which  its  realization  was  worked 
out  ;  and  here  the  always  considerable  influence  of 
Slavophilism,  which  at  the  time  seems  to  have  had 
particular  hold  on  people's  minds,  made  itself  felt  with 
disastrous  effect. 

One  of  the  principal  tenets  of  the  Slavophile  doctrine, 
as  I  have  already  mentioned,  consisted  in  looking  upon 
the  rural  commune,  the  "  Mir,"  as  a  profoundly  original 
creation,  and  upon  communal  property  as  the  essential 
basis  of  the  social  and  economic  organization  of  the  country. 
It  was  evidently  mainly  the  influence  of  this  doctrine  that 
the  Government  determined  to  base  the  agrarian  reform 
not  on  the  principle  of  individual  ownership  of  land,  but  on 
that  of  communal  ownership  by  the  Mir. 

Thus  it  was  that  a  system  of  land  tenure  peculiar  to  the 
remote  ages  of  civilization,  came  to  be  legalized  and  praised 
as  an  outflow  of  the  particular  genius  of  the  Russian  people 


38  FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

and  a  saving  revelation  to  the  rotten  Occident  steeped  in 
materialism   and   bourgeois   narrow-mindedness. 

The  proximate  effect  of  the  agrarian  reform  introduced 
by  the  Government  was  to  place  the  peasants  in  a  condition 
of  bondage  to  the  village  commune  or  Mir,  in  some  respects 
more  onerous  and  more  galling  than  their  recent  condition 
of  servitude.  Its  disastrous  economic  effects,  however, 
although  not  immediately  noticeable,  were  bound  to  make 
themselves  felt  in  the  course  of  time  with  constantly  growing 
intensity.  They  were  due  mainly  to  two  causes  inherent 
in  the  system  of  communal  land  holding. 

First,  the  collective  responsibility  of  the  commune  for 
all  taxes.  The  effect  of  this  system,  evidently  devised  for 
fiscal  reasons  to  simplify  and  ensure  a  more  regular  collection 
of  taxes,  was  to  discourage  all  efforts  to  increase  the  pro- 
ductivity of  individual  parcels  of  land  allotted  by  the  commune 
since  the  pecuniary  results  of  such  efforts  would  merely  go 
to  make  up  the  deficiency  caused  by  the  lesser  productivity  of 
parcels  in  the  hands  of  less  efficient  members  of  the  commune. 

Second,  the  periodical  new  subdivision  of  the  land  and 
redistribution  of  individual  shares  of  members  of  the  commune 
necessitated  by  the  fact  that  the  holdings  allotted  to  the 
communes  at  the  time  of  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs  was 
a  fixed  quantity,  whereas  the  natural  growth  of  the  popula- 
tion was  continuous.  This  meant  that  at  every  successive 
subdivision  of  the  soil  the  individual  holder  was  allotted 
a  smaller  quantity.  Besides  the  necessity  of  equahzing 
individual  shares  of  equal  area  in  regard  to  the  varying 
quaUties  of  the  soil,  led  to  the  subdivision  of  each  share 
into  a  number  of  strips  of  land  situated  frequently  at  consider- 
able distances  from  each  other.  Thus,  for  example,  Mr. 
E.  H.  Wilcox,  in  his  Russia's  Ruin,  relates  that 

in  one  of  the  districts  of  the  Yaroslav  Government  the  average  indi- 
vidual holding  was  in  thirty-six  different  strips  of  land,  which  in 
12  per  cent,  of  the  communes  were  only  three  and  a  half  feet  in 
width.  In  conditions  such  as  these,  it  was  necessary  for  all  the 
members  of  the  Mir  to  do  their  sowing  and  harvesting  simxil- 
taneously.  There  were,  moreover,  cases  where  some  of  the  land  to 
be  thus  jointly  cultivated  was  situated  twelve  miles  or  more  from 
the  peasants'  cottages  ! 

Under  similar  conditions  cultivation  of  the  soil,  even  on 


STOLYPIN   AND   THE   "MIR"  39 

the  primitive  three-field  system  still  prevailing  in  Russia, 
was  bound  to  become  more  and  more  difficult,  to  the  total 
exclusion  of  any  possibility  of  introducing  intensive  culture, 
from  which  alone  an  increase  of  productivity  could  be 
expected.  It  was  plain,  therefore,  that  the  system  of 
communal  ownership  of  land  was  mainly  responsible  for  the 
gradually  progressing  impoverishment  of  the  peasantry. 
It  was  no  less  evident  that  the  land-hunger  of  the  peasantry 
could  not  be  appeased  by  expropriating  the  lands  of  the  estate- 
owning  gentry,  for  the  simple  reason  that  there  was  not  a 
sufficient  area  of  such  lands  in  existence,  which,  if  equitably 
distributed  among  all  the  peasantry,  would  have  increased 
their  individual  holdings  to  any  really  appreciable  extent. 

Stolypin  realized  that  the  only  way  to  remedy  the  evil 
would  be  to  attack  it  at  its  source,  and  that  its  real  source 
was  none  other  than  the  system  of  communal  ownership  of 
land.  It  required  not  only  true  statesmanship  but  also 
unflinching  moral  courage  to  attack  the  institution  of  the 
Mir,  hallowed  in  the  eyes  of  the  adherents  of  SlavophiHsm 
as  a  genuinely  Slav  institution  and  believed  in  by  the 
bulk  of  liberal  opinion  as  the  only  preservation  from  the 
danger  of  the  rise  and  growth  of  an  agricultural  proletariat. 

He  did,  however,  not  hesitate  to  declare  himself  firmly 
in  favour  of  the  system  of  individual  small  holdings  as 
opposed  to  that  of  communal  ownership  of  land,  and  made 
it  the  basis  of  the  agrarian  reform  which  he  took  in  hand 
with  his  wonted  energy  as  soon  as  the  first  Duma  had  been 
dissolved,  and  enacted  it  in  November  1906  as  a  law,  subject 
to  confirmation  or  rejection  by  the  legislature  on  its  re- 
assembhng  after  the  election  of  the  new  Duma. 

The  institution  of  the  Mir,  which  had  its  root  in  the 
times  of  serfdom  and  still  had  a  certain  hold  on  the  minds 
of  the  peasantry  in  many  parts  of  the  country,  could  not, 
of  course,  be  abolished  outright.  But  the  main  point  of 
Stolypin's  agrarian  Reform  Act  was  the  recognition  of  the 
right  of  every  village  commune  to  dissolve  itself,  should  it 
so  desire,  and  of  every  member  of  a  commune  to  withdraw 
from  its  membership,  to  claim  his  share  of  the  communal 
holdings  as  his  personal  property,  and  to  demand  that  his 
holding,  instead  of  being  as  usual  in  several  strips  of  land, 
should  be  united  in  one  place. 


40  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Under  the  fostering  care  of  the  Minister  of  Agriculture, 
Mr.  Krivoshein,  an  energetic  and  upright  statesman,  whose 
administration  of  his  department  stands  out  as  a  model  of 
efficiency,  foresight  and  honesty,  this  law,  designed  to  favour 
personal  initiative  and  a  higher  standard  of  cultivation, 
proved  a  great  and  constantly  growing  success,  denied  only 
by  blind  partisans  or  by  those  to  whom  its  success  was 
unwelcome  because,  by  creating  a  naturally  conservative 
class  of  small  landholders,  it  threatened  to  neutralize  their 
endeavours  to  revolutionize  the  peasantry. 

Provision  was  also  made  for  the  sale  of  lands  belonging 
to  the  State  and  the  "  appanages,"  as  well  as  for  the  purchase 
by  the  so-called  Peasants'  Bank  of  the  many  large  estates 
thrown  on  the  market  by  owners  apprehensive  of  agrarian 
unrest  and  "  Jacqueries,"  and  for  their  resale  to  peasants 
in  small  plots,  and,  last  but  not  least,  for  the  emigration  of 
the  landless  rural  population  to  Siberia  and  Turkestan. 

Now,  as  regards  the  question  of  the  "  land-hunger  "  of 
the  peasantry,  a  difference  should  be  made  between  "  land- 
hunger  "  as  a  desire  to  take  possession  of  all  the  land  of 
their  former  masters,  part  of  which  had  been  allotted  to  them 
at  the  time  of  the  emancipation,  and  the  legitimate  desire  of 
acquiring  new  lands  for  the  purpose  of  settling  on  them. 

Inasmuch  as  such  "  land-hunger  "  is  merely  a  form  of 
covetousness  of  other  people's  property,  it  deserves  no  more 
sympathy  than  would  any  other  claim  of  a  similar  nature, 
and  the  fact  that  it  is  an  outflow  of  the  traditional  feehng 
and  peculiar  mentality  of  an  ignorant  peasantry  could 
certainly  not  be  considered  a  sufhcient  ground  for  its  satis- 
faction at  the  cost  of  another  class  of  property  owners  whose 
holdings  happen  to  be  larger. 

Moreover,  wholesale  expropriation  of  the  lands  of  estate 
owners  would  result  in  incalculable  injury  to  the  economic 
interests  of  the  country,  inasmuch  as  the  bulk  of  our  enormous 
grain  export,  on  which  our  favourable  trade  balance  depended, 
hitherto  came  from  the  lands  of  estate  owners  on  account  of 
their  much  greater  productivity. 

To  talk  of  the  necessity  of  the  spohation  of  the  estate- 
owning  class  in  order  to  appease  the  "  land-hunger  "  of 
the  peasant  class  when  such  land-hunger  takes  the  form  of 
a  legitimate  desire  of  acquiring  new  land  for  the  purpose  of 


STOLYPIN'S  ACTIVITIES  41 

settling  on  it,  would  be  obviously  preposterous  in  a  country 
which  possesses  in  its  gigantic  Siberian  Empire  a  land  reserve 
sufhcient  for  the  accommodation  of  tens  of  millions  of  future 
settlers. 

By  his  policy  of  encouraging  and  organizing  on  a  large 
scale  emigration  to  Siberia,  Stolypin  had  unquestionably 
helped  powerfully  to  appease  this  kind  of  legitimate  land- 
hunger  as  well  as  to  relieve  the  distress  among  the  peasantry 
in  European  Russia,  in  whose  favour,  moreover,  the  payment 
of  the  oppressive  "  redemption  tax  "  had  been  entirely 
remitted.  He  had  at  the  same  time  created  in  what  might 
be  called  the  Russian  Canada  a  class  of  small  landholders 
whose  solid  and  increasing  prosperity  was  reflected  in  the 
phenomenal  growth  of  the  all-Russian  co-operative  move- 
ment, which  had  its  origin  in  co-operative  associations  for 
the  export  of  dairy  produce  founded  among  the  Siberian 
peasantry. 

There  is  little  doubt  that,  had  Stolypin  lived  and  had 
not  the  war  supervened,  his  great  agrarian  reform,  which 
implied  a  complete  reversal  of  the  traditional  pohcy  of  the 
Government,  would  have  been  carried  out  to  the  end,  its  aim 
would  have  been  attained  and  the  peasantry,  converted  into 
a  class  of  small  farmers,  instead  of  being  an  easy  prey  to 
revolutionary  propaganda,  would  have  become,  as  conserva- 
tive property  owners,  a  solid  and  reliable  support  of  the 
State. 

Stolypin  did  not  confine  his  activity  to  pushing  his  scheme 
of  agrarian  reform.  He  set  to  work  elaborating  various 
important  measures,  such  as  compulsory  insurance  of  work- 
men, regulation  of  child  labour,  etc.,  tending  to  improve  the 
condition  of  the  labouring  class,  whose  rapid  growth  had 
been  fostered  by  Witte's  policy  of  developing  industry  in 
Russia.  In  short,  when  the  second  Duma  met  in  March  1907, 
there  was  ample  material  provided  for  the  exercise  of  its 
legislative  activity. 

It  turned  out,  however,  that  the  second  Duma,  in  spite 
of  all  attempts  that  had  been  made  to  manipulate  the 
elections,  was  even  more  hostile  to  the  Government  than 
had  been  the  first.  Notably,  the  Socialist  parties,  who  had 
boycotted  the  first  Duma  on  the  assumption  that  parhamen- 
tary  methods  might  prejudice  the  cause  of  the  Revolution, 


42  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

had  managed  to  win  in  the  elections  a  large  number  of  seats 
at  the  expense  of  the  Liberal  Centre  parties  and  were  enabled 
to  exercise  considerable  influence.  They  had,  of  course,  not 
come  to  the  Duma  to  legislate  but  to  prepare  a  revolution, 
their  aim  being  a  Constituent  Assembly  and  eventually  a 
Socialistic  RepubHc. 

Under  these  conditions  co-operation  with  the  Government 
was  out  of  the  question.  A  suitable  pretext  was  soon  found, 
and  the  Duma  was  dissolved  in  the  middle  of  June.  At  the 
same  time  a  new  electoral  law  was  promulgated  considerably 
restricting  the  franchise  so  as  to  ensure  for  the  coming 
elections  a  preponderance  of  the  property-owning  classes. 
This  necessary  correction  of  the  original  error  committed 
in  introducing  a  franchise  bordering  on  universal  suffrage, 
for  which  the  nation  was  as  httle  ripe  as  would  have  been 
the  EngHsh  people  of  the  seventeenth  century,  was  regarded 
as  a  coup  d'etat  by  the  doctrinaires  of  constitutionahsm 
and  accordingly  denounced  with  extreme  violence.  It 
attained,  however,  its  object  in  rendering  possible  a  har- 
monious collaboration  between  the  Duma  and  the  Govern- 
ment and  in  enabhng  Stolypin  to  steer  a  middle  course  between 
the  demands  of  the  reactionaries  for  a  merely  consultative 
Duma  and  the  clamour  of  the  doctrinaires  for  a  Parliament 
with  complete  control  of  the  executive. 

His  course,  dictated  not  by  lust  of  power,  but  by  wise 
and  far-seeing  statesmanship,  represented  a  compromise 
between  autocracy  and  parliamentary  government.  Im- 
partial history  will,  I  feel  convinced,  recognize  that  his 
pohcy  was  not  only  best  suited  to  the  actual  condition  of 
the  country  and  to  the  state  of  poUtical  development  of  the 
people,  but  also  best  calculated  to  create  a  preparatory 
school,  so  to  speak,  for  the  pohtical  education  of  the  "  Intelli- 
gentzia," as  the  future  natural  leaders  of  the  nation,  and  their 
initiation  into  the  practice  of  constitutional  government. 

But  the  carrying  through  of  this  poHcy  required,  besides 
enlightened  statesmanship,  a  firm  will  and  undaunted  cour- 
age— qualities  which  none  of  Stolypin's  successors  seem  to 
have  possessed. 

Whilst  rendering  full  justice  to  the  eminent  quahty  and 
the  noble  and  patriotic  aims  of  Stolypin's  statesmanship, 
it  has  always  been  impossible  for  me  to  agree  with  some  of 


RUSSIAN  EXPANSION  43 

his  views,  which  were  manifestly  tainted  with  the  narrow- 
minded  nationahsm  of  the  Slavophile  school.  I  refer  to 
his  conception  of  what  the  true  interests  of  Russia  required 
in  regard  to  the  treatment  of  her  outlying  dominions  and 
her  subject  non-Russian  nationahties. 

Before  approaching  this  subject  it  will  be  necessary  to 
revert  to  a  theme  briefly  touched  upon  in  discussing  our  policy 
in  the  Far  East — the  question  of  the  gradual  expansion  of  the 
original  nucleus  of  the  Russian  Empire  in  various  directions, 
its  causes,  its  justification  and  the  policies  adopted  in  its 
pursuit. 

The  expansion  to  the  West  was  the  work  of  the  three 
greatest  Sovereigns  Russia  ever  had :  Peter  the  Great, 
Catherine  the  Great  and  Alexander  I.  When  Peter  the  Great 
had  determined  upon  the  thorough  Europeanization  of  his 
country,  Russia  was  an  inland  country  with  an  only  outlet 
to  the  Arctic  Ocean  by  the  White  Sea,  and  he  made  up  his 
mind  that  what  Russia  primarily  needed  was  a  "  window  " — 
as  he  liked  to  express  himself — looking  out  on  Europe. 

His  determination  to  secure  such  a  window  involved  him 
in  a  protracted  contest  with  Sweden  under  Charles  XII, 
which  resulted  finally  in  the  conquest  of  Esthonia  and 
Livonia  and  in  the  possibility  of  estabUshing  the  centre  of 
the  Government  at  the  mouth  of  the  Neva  River,  where  he 
founded  the  new  capital  of  his  Empire  and  christened  it,  not 
in  honour  of  himself  but  of  the  Apostle  Peter,  St.  Petersburg — 
a  name  since  hallowed  by  many  glorious  memories  of  the 
past  greatness  of  our  country.  The  strange  psychosis  born 
of  the  World  War  caused  it  to  be  replaced  by  the  more  Slav 
and  therefore  presumably  more  patriotic-sounding  designa- 
tion of  "  Petrograd  " — an  example  which  the  humbler  and 
probably  less  emotional  towns  of  Kronstadt,  Peterhof 
and  Oranjenbaum,  as  well  as  others  in  various  parts  of  the 
country  likewise  afflicted  with  German  or  Dutch  sounding 
names,  declined  to  follow. 

The  next  steps  in  the  policy  of  expansion  were  taken  by 
the  Empress  Catherine  the  Great.  Her  wars  with  Turkey 
secured  for  the  Empire  the  possession  of  New  Russia 
(Novorossiya)  down  to  the  Black  Sea  and  of  the  Crimean 
Peninsula.  Her  participation  in  what  her  son  and  successor, 
the  Emperor  Paul,  declared  to  have  been  a  crime — the  parti- 


44  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

tion  of  Poland — enabled  her  to  restore  to  Russia  her  Western 
Provinces,  and  the  Eastern  Provinces  of  Poland  from  Livonia 
down  to  Moldavia,  which  had  been  conquered  from  Russia 
by  the  Poles,  but  whose  population,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Polish  land-owning  gentry,  was  Russian,  belonging  to  the 
so-called  Little  Russian  and  White  Russian  branches  of  the 
Russian  nation,  and  in  a  small  part  Lithuanian. 

Lastly,  the  Emperor  Alexander  I,  as  the  result  of  a 
war  with  Turkey,  annexed  Bessarabia  with  the  connivance 
of  Napoleon,  a  short-lived  alhance  with  whom  likewise 
enabled  him  by  a  short  campaign  against  vSweden  to  conquer 
Finland.  By  the  final  act  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  after 
the  Napoleonic  Wars,  Poland  was  divided  between  Austria, 
Prussia  and  Russia.  Prussia  retained  Posen  and  Gnesen, 
Austria  remained  in  possession  of  Galicia  ;  Lithuania  and 
the  formerly  annexed  Eastern  Provinces  contmued  to  be  as 
"  Western  Provinces  "  incorporated  in  the  Russian  Empire, 
and  the  remnant  was  constituted  as  the  so-called  Congress- 
Kingdom  united  to  Russia  as  a  separate  entity  under  the 
Emperor  as  King  of  Poland. 

The  Emperor  Alexander  granted  to  Poland  a  constitution, 
which  remained  in  force  until  the  Revolution  of  1831.     By 
virtue  of  this  constitution  Poland  was  to  be  governed  by 
a  Lieutenant  of  the  Emperor,  who  must  be  a  member  of 
the  Imperial  House  or  a  Pole.     The  first  holder  of  the  office 
was  General  Zajonczek,   a   veteran  who  had  served  under 
Napoleon,  and  he  remained  in  office  until  his  death  in  1826 
when  he  was  succeeded  as  Lord-Lieutenant  by  the  Emperor 
Nicholas   I's   elder   brother,   the   Grand   Duke   Constantine 
who  had  renounced  his  right  to  the  Russian  throne  conse 
quent   upon   his   marriage   to   a   Polish   lady,   the   Princess 
Lowicz.     Poland   also   retained   her   flag   and   her   national 
army  based  on  that  which  had  been  raised  by  and  had  fought 
for  Napoleon. 

After  the  Revolution  of  1831,  and  its  reconquest  by  the 
Russian  Army,  the  Congress-Kingdom  was  reduced  to 
the  condition  of  a  Russian  province,  and  a  harsh  regime 
of  administration  was  inaugurated,  which  lasted  until  the 
accession  of  Alexander  II,  when  Poland  began  to  share  in 
the  new  era  of  milder  rule  which  began  in  Russia. 

The  Emperor  had  himself  crowned  in  Warsaw  as  King 


FINLAND  45 

of  Poland  and  addressed  to  his  Polish  subjects  a  flattering 
speech  in  French,  as  he  could  no  more  speak  their  language 
than  his  predecessors.  He  failed,  however,  to  win  their 
hearts,  and  his  liberal  policy,  whilst  perhaps  it  encouraged 
the  Poles  to  revolt,  produced  a  strong  reaction  against  it 
in  Russia,  with  the  result  that  the  suppression  of  the  revolt 
was  followed  by  a  return  to  the  sterner  methods  of  govern- 
ment in  use  under  Nicholas  I  after  the  Revolution  of  1831. 
If,  now,  we  turn  to  the  history  of  the  conquest  of  Finland, 
we  find  that  after  the  war  of  1808  with  Sweden  under 
Gustave  IV,  by  the  peace  concluded  in  the  following  year, 
Finland  and  the  Aland  Islands  were  ceded  to  Russia.  Finland, 
however,  was  not  treated  by  Alexander  I  as  a  conquered 
province,  but  thanks  to  his  wisdom  and  generosity  was 
allowed  to  retain  her  free  constitution  and  fundamental 
laws,  and  become  united  to  Russia  as  a  semi-independent 
Grand  Duchy  under  the  Emperor  as  Grand  Duke.  The 
States  were  summoned  to  a  diet  at  Borgo,  and  Alexander  I, 
as  Grand  Duke,  solemnly  promised  to  preserve  the  religion, 
laws  and  liberties  of  the  country. 

Finland  under  the  Emperors  of  Russia  retained  not  only 
her  own  laws  and  administration,  but  also  her  own  coinage 
and  complete  financial  independence  and  tariff  autonomy, 
so  that  at  a  distance  of  some  twenty  miles  from  St.  Peters- 
burg a  customs  frontier  divided  the  Grand  Duchy  and  the 
Empire.  Under  the  shelter  of  the  Russian  Crown,  Finland 
had  become  extremely  prosperous,  and  when  the  Emperor 
Alexander  II  in  1863  convoked  again  the  Diet,  which  had 
not  met  for  fifty-six  years,  he  was  received  with  unbounded 
enthusiasm  by  the  population.  His  beautiful  statue  erected 
in  the  square  in  front  of  the  Cathedral  and  the  Senate 
House  in  Helsingfors  testifies  to  the  regard  in  which  his 
memory  was  held  by  his  Finnish  subjects. 

A  further  proof  of  their  loyal  sentiments  I  came  near 
witnessing  myself  when,  in  one  of  the  first  months  of  the 
Revolution,  the  Emperor's  statue  was  defended  by  the 
Finnish  population  against  the  attempts  of  revolutionary 
Russian  sailors  and  soldiers  to  overturn  and  destroy  it. 
Unfortunately,  Alexander  III,  who  in  the  first  years  of  his 
reign  shared  the  great  popularity  of  his  father,  fell  under 
the  influence  of  the  reactionary  party  and  the  Slavophile 


46  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

and  Nationalist  movement  with  its  tendencies  towards  unifi- 
cation and  Russification,  which  under  Nicholas  II  in  1899 
led  to  a  virtual  abrogation  of  the  legislative  powers  of  the 
Diet  and  to  the  introduction  of  an  almost  dictatorial  regime 
under  General  Bobrikov, 

Without  attempting  to  follow  in  detail  the  seven-year 
struggle  between  the  Russian  bureaucracy  and  the  defenders 
of  the  Constitution  of  Finland,  I  might  mention  here  that 
politics  in  the  Grand  Duchy  were  complicated  by  the  rivalry 
between  the  Swedish  Party,  representing  mainly  the  property- 
owning  classes  of  Swedish  nationaHty,  which  had  hitherto 
been  dominant  although  comprising  less  than  one-sixth 
of  the  population,  and  the  Finnish  "  Nationalist  "  Party, 
which  during  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century 
had  been  asserting  its  linguistic  and  poHtical  importance, 
wherein  it  was  more  or  less  favoured  by  the  Russian  bureau- 
cracy. 

The  whole  country,  however,  united  in  the  most  deter- 
mined resistance  to  the  attempted  invasion  of  its  consti- 
tutional rights,  which  culminated  in  a  universal  "  National  " 
strike  coinciding  with  the  revolutionary  movement  in 
Russia  in  November  1905.  The  result  was  the  capitulation 
of  the  Government  and  the  re-estabhshment  of  the  status 
quo  before  1899. 

This  restored  order  of  things,  however,  was  not  destined 
to  be  a  lasting  one,  as  will  be  shown  later  on. 

In  his  pohcy  towards  Poland  and  Finland  the  Emperor 
Alexander  I  displayed,  as  we  have  seen,  not  only  a  spirit 
of  hberahsm  and  generosity,  but  also  statesmanlike  judg- 
ment and  far-seeing  wisdom. 

The  same  spirit  was  manifested  in  Peter  the  Great's 
treatment  of  Esthonia  and  Livonia,  the  two  Baltic  Provinces 
which  he  had  conquered  and  incorporated  in  the  Russian 
Empire  as  the  final  result  of  the  victorious  war  against 
Sweden,  under  whose  sway  they  had  been  since  the  six- 
teenth century.  The  native  population  of  these  two 
provinces,  aggregating  about  two  milHons,  consists,  in  the 
northern  part  of  Ehots  or  Esthonians,  a  Finnish  tribe 
belonging  to  the  Ural-Altai  or  Mongohan  division  of  the 
human  race,  and  in  the  southern  part  of  Letts,  a  people 
of  Indo-European  origin. 


THE   BALTIC  PROVINCES  47 

The  landowning  nobility  and  gentry,  however,  and 
almost  the  entire  "  bourgeoisie,"  were  of  German  origin, 
descendants  of  the  original  settlers,  who  had  invaded  the 
country  in  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries,  had  built 
the  towns,  taken  possession  of  the  lands.  Christianized  and 
reduced  the  natives  to  serfdom,  which  was  abolished  in 
1827  under  Alexander  I.  Although  constituting  but  a 
small  percentage  of  the  population,  the  government  of  the 
country  had  for  centuries  been  entirely  in  their  hands. 
Peter  the  Great,  reaUzing  that  the  two  provinces  had  reached 
a  comparatively  advanced  state  of  culture,  social  organiza- 
tion and  general  prosperity,  confirmed  them  in  the  possessions 
of  all  the  institutions,  rights  and  privileges  they  had  been 
enjoying  under  the  mild  rule  of  the  Kings  of  Sweden,  ap- 
pointed governors  from  the  ranks  of  the  local  nobility  and 
did  not  in  any  way  interfere  with  their  administration. 

Peter  the  Great's  policy  in  regard  to  these  possessions 
of  the  Russian  Empire,  with  the  subsequent  addition  of 
Courland,  effected  under  Catherine  the  Great,  was  continued 
by  her  and  her  successors  until  the  advent,  under  Alexander 
III,  of  the  era  of  forcible  Russification,  under  the  influence 
of  the  Slavophile  and  nationalistic  tendencies  of  the  Russian 
bureaucracy. 

The  time  had  come  when  the  traditions  of  the  wise 
policy  of  Peter  the  Great,  Catherine  the  Great  and  Alexander  I, 
the  three  greatest  Sovereigns  who  ever  sat  on  Russia's 
throne,  and  who  had  ruled  the  non-Russian  dominions  of 
the  Empire  without  interfering  with  their  institutions, 
language  and  religion  in  a  successful  endeavour  to  win  their 
goodwill  and  loyalty,  were  to  be  forgotten  and  to  give 
way  to  tendencies  and  practices  in  an  opposite  direction, 
with  the  result  that  the  revolutionary  movement  of  1905-6 
assumed  particularly  acute  forms  in  these  parts  of  the 
Empire,  foreshadowing  its  coming  disruption. 

The  elections  under  the  new  electoral  law  of  June  1907, 
which  had  considerably  restricted  the  franchise,  took  place 
in  October  1907,  and  resulted  in  a  victory  for  Stolypin's 
policy.  In  complexion  the  new  Duma  was  a  house  of  the 
upper  class,  with  a  predominance  of  country  gentlemen  who 
had  served  in  the  Army,  in  the  upper  branches  of  the  local 
administration,  or  in  the  ranks  of  the  bureaucracy  in  the 


48  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

capital.  There  were  a  few  merchants  and  a  few  prominent 
and  extreme  reactionaries.  The  moderate  Right  mostly 
voted  with  the  so-called  "  Octobrists  "  (from  the  October 
Manifesto  of  1905,  of  which  they  were  convinced  supporters), 
who,  under  the  leadership  of  Gutchkoff,  were  the  dominant 
party  in  the  Duma  and  with  the  moderate  Right  formed 
a  soUd  Government  majority.  Although  MiHukoff  had 
carried  St.  Petersburg,  the  Cadet  Party  ranked  in  numbers 
after  the  moderate  Right.  Fruitful  co-operation  between 
the  Duma  and  the  Government  became  possible  and  resulted 
in  the  passage  of  several  important  Acts,  among  them  the 
confirmation  of  the  temporary  land  laws  of  November  1906, 
the  regular  confirmation  of  the  estimates,  and  so  forth. 

So  far  Stolypin  had  been  working  in  perfect  harmony 
with  the  ablest  member  of  his  Cabinet,  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  Mr.  Iswolsky,  who,  himself  a  statesman 
of  liberal  views  and  imbued  with  Western  ideas  of  constitu- 
tionalism, supported  the  Prime  Minister  most  loyalh-  in 
his  endeavours  to  place  the  October  constitution  on  a  work- 
ing basis.  They  separated  only  when,  as  Mr.  Iswolsky 
relates  in  his  "  Reminiscences,"  he  could  no  longer  view  with- 
out concern  Stolypin's  too  frequent  and  too  high-handed 
resort  to  emergency  legislation  under  the  famous  Article  87 
of   the  Organic  Law. 

During  his  short  term  of  office  as  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Mr.  Iswolsky  undertook  three  diplomatic  actions, 
the  first  two  of  which,  much  needed  indeed  and  responding 
to  real  and  most  important  interests  of  Russia,  were 
crowned  with  a  complete  success  redounding  greatly  to  his 
credit,  and  the  third — in  my  opinion  entirely  uncalled  for, 
as  will  be  explained  in  the  next  chapter — ended  in  a  failure 
which  may  have  embittered  him  to  the  point  of  obscuring 
his  habitual  clearness  of  vision  when  the  course  of  events 
was  plainly  pointing  to  the  catastrophe  that  was  to  bring 
about  the  downfall  and  ruin  of  our  country. 

The  first  concerned  the  conclusion  of  a  friendly  under- 
standing with  Japan  which  supplemented  the  Portsmouth 
Treaty  in  a  manner  entirely  creditable  to  both  sides. 

The  second  ended  in  a  friendly  agreement  with  Great 
Britain  which,  although  it  dealt  with  Persia  in  the  tradi- 
tional imperialistic  way  of  estabUshing  zones  of  influence. 


DIPLOMATIC   ACHIEVEMENTS  49 

and  so  forth,  had  the  great  merit  of  putting  an  end  to  the 
era  of  rivalry  and  mutual  distrust  which  for  half  a  century 
had  been  poisoning  the  relations  between  the  two  great 
Empires. 

The  third  action  was  undertaken  apparently  in  the 
expectation  of  trading  off  our  consent  to  Austria-Hungary's 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  for  that  Power's 
consent  to  our  taking  possession  of  the  Straits,  a  proposition, 
which,  as  Iswolsky  found  out  to  his  chagrin,  was  not  even 
to  be  mooted  to  the  British  Cabinet,  English  public  opinion 
not  being  yet  considered  ripe  for  such  an  issue  running 
counter  to  all  traditions  of  British  policy.  Our  national- 
istic Press,  moreover,  taunted  him  with  having  been  willing 
to  betray  the  sacred  cause  of  Slavdom  for  a  mere  mess  of 
pottage. 

In  the  meantime  the  state  of  affairs  in  Finland  had 
become  disquieting.  A  revolutionary  movement,  in  full 
sympathy  with  its  Russian  counterpart,  had  made  much 
headway.  The  Diet  elected  under  the  new  radical  electoral 
laws,  under  the  pressure  of  a  large  Sociahst  opposition, 
had  shown  itself  quite  unruly  and  openly  hostile  to  the 
Russian  bureaucracy.  It  was  decided  to  resort  to  stringent 
measures  to  deal  with  unrest  in  Finland,  and,  on  Stolypin's 
insistence,  the  Duma,  in  June  1907,  passed  a  law  for  the 
better  regulation  of  affairs  common  to  the  Empire  and  the 
the  Grand  Duchy — in  effect  a  serious  infringement  of  the 
guaranteed  rights  of  lunland  which  the  Finnish  courts 
declared  unconstitutional  and  consistently  refused  to  appl3^ 

Another  proof  of  Stolypin's  leaning  towards  a  policy 
inspired  by  narrow-minded  nationalism  was  the  way  he 
dealt  with  the  question  of  the  creation,  in  obedience  to  the 
clamour  of  the  nationahstic  Press,  of  a  new  "  Gubernia  " 
out  of  the  district  of  Cholm,  which  had  formed  an  integral 
part  of  Poland  and  which  was  to  be  separated  from  the 
Kingdom  on  the  plea  that  the  peasantry  belonged  to  the 
Little  Russian  branch  of  the  Russian  family.  A  law  to 
that  effect  was  forced  through  the  legislature  and  naturally 
gave  great  offence  to  Polish  national  feeling. 

The  relations  between  the  Government  and  the  Duma 
during  Stolypin's  Premiership  were,  on  the  whole,  peaceful, 
although  several  conflicts  arose  over  constitutional  questions. 

VOL.   II  4 


50  FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

The  most  serious  of  these  occurred  in  March  1911,  when 
the  Council  of  the  Empire  (the  Upper  House  of  the  Russian 
Parhament)  rejected  a  Government  measure  providing  for 
the  creation  of  "  Zemstvos  "  (provisional  assemblies)  for 
the  Western  Provinces. 

Stolypin  prorogued  the  Council  and  the  Duma  for  a 
few  days  and  promulgated  the  Zemstvo  Law  under  Article  ^y 
of  the  fundamental  laws,  as  an  emergency  measure.  This 
arbitrary  step  raised  a  storm  in  both  Houses.  The  Duma 
pronounced  the  action  illegal  and  passed  a  vote  of  cen- 
sure on  the  Government,  while  the  President,  Gutchkoff, 
resigned  in  protest. 

In  the  following  September  Stolypin  fell  a  victim  to 
the  assassin's  bullet,  in  the  Emperor's  presence,  at  a  gala 
performance  in  the  Opera  House  at  Kiew,  and  with  him 
disappeared  the  last  strong  man  who  might  have  been  able 
to  arrest  the  country  on  the  road  to  ruin. 


CHAPTER   XXIX 

Assassination  of  Stolypin — Am  appointed  member  of  the  Council  of  the 
Empire — The  situation  in  Europe — Historical  developments — Congress 
of  Vienna — "  Balance  of  Power  "• — Introduction  of  Conscription — The 
League  of  Nations — Nationalism — Italy — Poland — Prussia — The  Balkans 
— Austria-Hungary. 

The  fatal  news  of  the  assassination  of  Stolypin  came  to 
me  by  wireless  when  I  was  on  board  the  Adriatic  on  my 
way  to  New  York  to  bid  good-bye  to  my  friends  there,  for 
I  had  been  informed  that  m  the  autumn  I  should  be  recalled 
from  my  post  of  Ambassador  to  the  United  States  and  be 
appointed  a  Hfe  member  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire — that 
is  to  say,  of  the  Upper  House  of  the  Russian  Parliament — 
under  the  Constitution  of  October  1905. 

My  appointment  as  member  of  the  Council  of  the 
Empire  having  taken  place  in  the  late  autumn  of  191 1,  we 
made  up  our  minds  to  settle  down  in  Paris,  the  haven  of 
refuge  of  most  retired  diplomats  of  all  nations.  This 
arrangement  did  not  interfere  with  my  attending  to  my 
parliamentary  duties,  for  which  purpose  I  used  to  go  every 
winter  to  St.  Petersburg,  where  I  kept  bachelor  quarters  at 
my  club.  Having  taken  my  seat  in  the  Council  in  December 
1911,  I  naturally,  during  my  first  session,  did  not  take  any 
active  part  in  the  business  of  the  House,  and  confined  myself 
to  studying,  so  to  speak,  the  lay  of  the  land. 

It  did  not  take  me  long  to  reahze  that,  under  the  rules 
of  the  House,  it  would  be  exceedingly  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible, to  obtain  a  chance  of  having  my  say  on  any 
question,  not  only  of  foreign  affairs,  but  even  of  the  general 
trend  of  the  domestic  policy  of  the  Government.  I  deter- 
mined, therefore,  to  refrain  for  the  time  being  from  any 
attempt  in  that  direction  and  to  devote  myself  to  the  study 
of  the  social  and  poUtical  conditions  responsible  for  the 
general  poUtical  situation  in  Europe,  the  disquieting  nature 

51 


52  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

of  which  could  not  but  be  felt  instinctively  by  even  the 
least  observant  public  in  all  European  countries.  No 
better  point  for  the  pursuit  of  such  studies  could  be  selected 
than  Paris,  where  I  had  decided  to  spend  most  of  my  time 
in  future,  and  I  hastened  to  rejoin  my  family  there  as  soon 
as  the  session  of  the  Council  was  concluded  in  the  late 
spring  of  1912, 

Those  of  my  American  readers  who  happened  to  be  in 
Europe  in   the   years   immediately  preceding   the  outbreak 
of  the  World  War  must  surely  have  been  conscious,  as  I 
was  myself,  of  the  presence  everywhere  of  a  certain  oppressive 
feeling,  a  vague  premonition  of  portentous  events.     It  was 
like   the  sultry  atmosphere   of   a   gathering   thunderstorm, 
the  distant  rumbUngs  of  which,  amidst  flashes  of  lightning, 
were  already  reaching  us  from  the   far-away  Balkans,  that 
perennial  storm  centre  of  Europe.     At  the  same  time  never 
was  the  social  life  in  European    capitals  gayer   and    more 
brilhant  ;     never   was   the   contrast    more   glaring   between 
the  extravagant  luxury  and    enchanted  freedom  of  enjoy- 
ment of   the  few  and  the  want  and  the  narrow  limitations 
of  the  many,  condemned  to  a  life  of  incessant  toil,  joyless 
monotony  and  anxious  insecurity  ;    never  were  conditions 
more  favourable  for  a  virulent  outbreak  of  that  old,  chronic 
and  incurable  disease  with  which  civihzed  mankind  is,  and 
probably  always  will  remain,  afflicted — the  everlasting  strife 
between  those  who  "  have  "  and  those  who  "  have  not." 
Incurable,  because  there  is  not,  and  there  never  will  be,  a 
sufficiency  of  the  good  things  of  this  world  to  go  round,  and 
therefore  their  enjoyment  will  always  be  limited  to  a  small 
minority,  whereas  the  thirst  for  such  enjoyment  among  the 
majority  is  constantly  growing,  as  the  spread  of  education 
and  enUghtenment  among  the  popular  masses  renders  them 
more   and   more  impatient   of   the   limitations  imposed  by 
their    material    dependence    and    social    inferiority.     But, 
apparently  bhnd  to  the  manifold  symptoms  of  ever-growing 
social  unrest  and  discontent,  and  deaf  to  the  subterranean 
rumbHngs  premonitory  of  impending  cataclysms,  the  ruhng 
Powers   of    the   leading    nations   of   Europe   were  pursuing 
their    frenzied    competition    in    ever-growing    armaments, 
instead  of  devoting  be  it  only  a  tenth  part  of  their  people's 
treasure  thus  wasted  for  aims  of  destruction,  to  the  better- 


CONDITIONS  BEFORE  THE  GREAT  WAR  53 

ing  of  the    lot  and   the   lightening   of    the     burden   of  the 
toihng  masses. 

They  seemed  to  be  solely  preoccupied  with  political 
combinations  and  calculations  in  view  of  the  general 
European  war,  which  all  those  in  the  know  saw  coming,  and 
to  which  all  their  peoples  undoubtedly  were  utterly  opposed. 
The  feeling  was  general  everywhere  that  a  European  war, 
if  it  ever  came,  would  mean  a  catastrophe  of  incalculable 
extent.  The  colossal  size  of  the  armies,  rendered  possible 
by  the  adoption  by  all  the  Great  Powers  of  the  Continent 
of  the  system  of  universal  compulsory  military  service  and 
the  unceasing  development  of  new  and  ever  more  perfected 
means  of  destruction  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  the 
extremely  dehcate  structure  of  credit,  with  its  ramifications 
embracing  the  whole  world,  on  the  foundation  of  which  the 
prosperity  of  the  leading  nations  is  built — these  were  condi- 
tions which  were  bound  to  lead  to  an  unparalleled  catastrophe 
if  a  general  war  was  suffered  to  break  out  in  Europe.  How 
then  was  it  possible  that  an  event  so  generally  and  so  justly 
dreaded  could  actually  take  place  without  any  serious  and 
really  efficient  attempt  apparently  having  been  made  to 
prevent  it  ? 

This  question  can  certainly  not  be  answered  off-hand 
by  the  simple  assertion  that  the  Great  War  was  as  unpre- 
ventable  by  human  means  as  an  earthquake,  upon  the  ground 
that,  as  in  the  physical  world,  so  also  in  the  social  world, 
although  great  changes  come  about  by  slow  and  imperceptible 
processes,  catastrophic  upheavals  usually  mark  the  advent 
of  a  new  age.  It  stands  to  reason  that,  however  great 
may  have  been  the  changes  in  the  poHtical,  economic  or 
moral  conditions  of  the  world  which  rendered  the  World 
War  seemingly  unavoidable,  the  fact  of  the  actual  outbreak 
of  that  war,  as  of  any  other  war,  must  be,  and  can  always 
be,  traced  back  to  the  direct  action  of  a  certain  number — 
and  that  a  very  limited  one — of  human  beings.  Before 
attempting  to  analyse  the  motives  which,  in  the  present  case, 
may  have  determined  the  action  of  these  human  beings  at 
the  critical  moment  when  the  fate  of  nations  depended 
on  their  decisions,  it  will  be  necessary  to  review  briefly 
the  historical  developments  which  led  up  to  the  conditions 
confronting  the  modern  world. 


54  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

History  shows  that,  ever  since  Europe  emerged  from 
the  Middle  Ages  and  became  crystallized  in  a  number  of 
independent  States,  wars,  with  the  exception  of  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  which  was  a  religious  war,  and  turned  devastated 
Germany  almost  into  a  desert,  were  brought  about  by  the 
personal  or  dynastic  ambitions,  the  lust  of  conquest  or 
domination  of  rulers,  in  all  of  which  their  peoples  had  no 
share.  If  no  longer  conducted  in  that  spirit  of  sportsman- 
like chivalry  which  caused  the  French  to  salute  their 
English  adversaries  with  the  cry,  "  Tirez  les  premiers. 
Messieurs  les  Anglais,"  wars  were  carried  on  by  comparatively 
small  professional  armies,  whose  operations  were  necessarily 
confined  to  correspondingly  limited  areas,  and  were  in  every 
sense  wars  between  rulers  and  Governments,  and  not  between 
peoples,  therefore  not  engendering  anything  like  the  formid- 
able volume  of  international  and  race  hatred  bred  by  the 
World  War  which  bodes  no  good  for  the  future  of  mankind. 

Indeed,  whilst  waging  war  against  some  German 
Powers,  Louis  XIV  had  in  his  service  a  German  regiment 
bearing  the  official  style  and  title  of  "  Royal  Allemand," 
and  the  Marshal  of  Saxe  was  one  of  the  greatest  leaders  of 
his  armies.  Just  as  Hessian  regiments,  hired  out  by  their 
ruler,  were  fighting  the  battles  of  King  George  III,  whilst 
other  Germans,  like  Steuben,  were  helping  to  organize  the 
American  forces. 

Two  things  were  not  born  as  yet,  two  things  destined  to 
prove  of  the  utmost  importance  in  shaping  the  destinies  of 
Europe,  and  both,  strangely  enough,  connected  with  the 
name  of  Napoleon.  I  mean  the  "  nation  in  arms,"  or 
universal  compulsory  military  service,  and  the  "  question 
of  nationalities."  The  birth  of  the  first  was  due  to  the 
crushing  defeat  inflicted  by  Napoleon  I  on  Prussia  after  the 
Battle  of  Jena,  when  a  strict  hmitation  of  his  miUtary 
forces  was  imposed  on  the  enemy  by  treaty  and  led  to  the 
systematic  evasion  of  its  stipulations  by  the  conversion  of 
the  much  reduced  long-service  Army  of  Prussia  into  a 
National  Army,  or  a  "  nation  in  arms  "  on  the  basis  of  a 
universal  short-term  service  as  we  knew  it  before  the  war. 
The  credit  of  having  been  the  first  to  raise  the  "  question  " 
of  nationahties  belongs  to  Napoleon  III,  who  made  it  the 
guiding  principle  of  his  foreign  policy. 


THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE  55 

A  third  circumstance  characteristic  of  the  epoch  of 
so-called  "  d3'nastic  wars  "  was  that  such  wars  could  be 
terminated  by  the  ruling  Powers  according  to  the  dictates 
of  reason  and  sound  statesmanship,  undeterred  by  popular 
passions  and  the  hysterical  clamour  of  yellow  journaHsm. 
Thus  the  Emperor  Alexander  I,  although  his  country  had 
been  invaded  by  the  hordes  of  Napoleon  and  his  aUies,  and 
his  ancient  capital  laid  in  ashes,  could,  when  at  last  he 
entered  Paris  as  a  triumphant  victor,  raise  his  authoritative 
voice  in  favour  of  defeated  France  and  by  his  powerful 
opposition  to  the  plans  of  some  of  his  alHes,  prevent  her 
dismemberment  and  humihation,  enabhng  her  representa- 
tive at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  to  play  a  part  worthy  of 
his  country  and  his  nation. 

Also,  that  Congress  was  led  by  statesmen  of  the  caHbre 
of  Alexander  I,  Talleyrand,  Castlereagh  and  Metternich. 
If  its  much  maligned  work  was  based  on  an  idea  repugnant 
to  contemporary  opinion,  that  of  a  Holy  Alhance  for  the 
defence  of  the  monarchical  principle  against  the  assaults 
of  the  revolution,  it  must  nevertheless  be  conceded  that 
its  other  principal  aim,  that  of  the  maintenance  of  peace, 
was  attained,  inasmuch  as  during  forty  years  until  1854 
there  was  no  war  between  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe. 
The  future  will  show  whether  it  will  be  possible  some  day 
to  claim  as  much  for  the  League  of  Nations,  from  which 
are  excluded  three  formerly  great  and  prosperous 
Empires  actually  destroyed  and  reduced  to  a  state  not 
only  of  impotence,  supposed  to  be  desirable,  but  also  of 
chaos,   obviously  dangerous  to  their  neighbours. 

The  work  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  however,  was 
no  more  perfect  than  any  other  work  of  men.  It  bore  in 
itself  the  germs  of  its  dissolution. 

To  begin  with,  the  idea  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  which 
corresponded  to  the  mystical  strain  in  the  Emperor 
Alexander's  mentahty,  inasmuch  as  it  was  meant  to  re- 
affirm and  fortify  the  monarchical  principle,  in  the  sense 
of  the  absolute  monarchy,  or  autocracy,  could,  of  course, 
not  be  unreservedly  adhered  to  by  Great  Britain.  It  was 
bound,  moreover,  to  come  into  conflict  in  its  practical 
appHcation  with  the  liberal  ideas  of  Alexander  I  himself. 
Thus  it  came  about  that,  whilst  the  rest  of  Europe  was  to 


56  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

remain  subject  to  autocratic  monarchies,  the  restoration 
of  the  Bourbons  to  the  throne  of  France  was  made  dependent 
upon  the  grant  by  Louis  XVIII  of  a  constitution  and  that 
the  newly  created  Kingdom  of  Poland  was  to  be  united  to 
the  Russian  Crown  as  a  semi-independent,  constitutionally 
governed  State,  with  the  Emperor  of  Russia  as  constitutional 
King  of  Poland. 

Furthermore,  in  reconstructing  the  system  of  the  com- 
munity of  European  States,  so  ruthlessly  destroyed  by 
Napoleon's  short  but  omnipotent  dictatorship,  exercised 
over  all  Europe  with  the  sole  exception  of  Russia  and  Great 
Britain,  the  Congress  of  Vienna  did  not  take  into  considera- 
tion at  all  the  question  of  nationalities  and  their  natural 
tendency  towards  unification — a  tendency,  obviously  dormant, 
which,  however,  had  not  yet  begun  to  assert  itself. 

And,  lastly,  the  leading  part  which  the  Emperor  Alexander 
had  been  playing  at  the  Congress  and  in  the  resettlement  of 
Europe  had  given  to  Russia  a  position  of  preponderance 
which,  being  felt  as  a  threat  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
European  equilibrium,  was  bound  to  lead  to  the  formation 
of  a  coalition  against  Russia  such  as  encompassed  her  defeat 
in  the  Crimean  War.  It  appears,  indeed,  that  the  founda- 
tion for  such  a  coalition  had  been  laid  already  at  the  time 
of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  by  a  secret  understanding  between 
Great  Britain,  France  and  Austria.  A  similar  motive  of 
hostility  to  any  Power  appearing  to  assume,  or  actually 
exercising,  preponderance  in  Europe  had  caused  in  the  past 
the  formation  of  powerful  coalitions  against  Louis  XIV, 
Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon.  When  after  the  Crimean 
War  Napoleon  III  began  to  assume  the  part  of  arbiter  of  the 
destinies  of  Europe,  it  was  this  same  feeling  that  caused 
public  opinion  in  most  neutral  countries,  not  excluding  the 
United  States,  to  side  with  Prussia  in  the  Franco-Prussian 
War — a  feeUng  that  was  soon  to  be  reversed  with  deadly 
effect,  when  the  megalomania  of  Junkerdom  and  Pan- 
Germanism,  coupled  with  a  tactlessly  pretentious  and 
offensively  provocative  diplomacy,  had  succeeded  in  con- 
centrating on  united  Germany  the  hostihty  of  almost  all 
mankind. 

In  trying  to  retrace  in  summary  outline  the  history  of 
the  changing  groupings  and  regroupings  of  European  Powers 


"BALANCE   OF   POWER"  57 

in  connection  with  the  idea  of  combating  the  preponderance 
of  any  one  of  them,  I  have  made  use  of  the  expression 
"  European  equiUbrium  "  as  a  hteral  translation  from  the 
French  "  equihbre  Europeen  " — an  expression  commonly 
used  in  diplomatic  parlance,  meaning  the  equilibrium  of 
forces  in  Europe,  a  thing  one  hears  frequently  spoken  of, 
sometimes  favourably  and  sometimes  disparagingl}^  but 
mostly  as  the  "  balance  of  power." 

Now,  in  this  connection  I  must  observe  that  these 
expressions  by  no  means  always  convey  the  same  idea.  Given 
two  groups  of  Powers  whose  forces  approximately  balance, 
and  who  therefore  represent  an  equilibrium  of  forces,  the 
"  balance  of  power  "  would  belong  to  any  Power  outside 
that  grouping  which,  being  strong  enough  for  that  purpose, 
could,  by  joining  one  or  the  other  side,  destroy  that  equili- 
brium and  secure  preponderance  and  victory  to  the  side  so 
favoured,  and  which,  on  the  other  hand,  by  holding  in  reserve 
its  potential  power,  could  control  the  situation  in  its  own 
interest  for  this  or  that  purpose,  or  in  the  common  interest 
for  the  preservation  or  restoration  of  peace. 

Such  was  the  position  of  Russia  under  Alexander  III 
before  she  concluded  her  alliance  with  France  and,  by 
joining  one  of  the  sides  in  the  coming  contest,  gave  up  her 
control  of  the  situation  which  was  the  surest  guarantee 
of  the  maintenance  of  peace,  because  her  still  unimpaired 
and  overshadowing  potential  power  was  obviously  sufficient 
to  discourage  either  side  from  attempting  the  enormous 
risk  of  a  resort  to  arms. 

Such  also  was  the  position  of  the  United  States  when 
they  had  the  choice  either  of  using  the  pressure  of  their 
immense  potential  power  and  the  great  weight  of  their 
moral  authority  for  the  purpose  of  compelhng  both  nearly 
exhausted  belligerent  sides  to  conclude  peace,  a  peace 
without  victory  (or  what  War  Propaganda  was  pleased  to 
call  a  "  premature  "  peace — as  if  the  restoration  of  peace 
could  ever  be  premature)  which,  by  demonstrating  the 
folly  and  wickedness  of  war  as  an  utterly  unprofitable 
sacrifice  of  lives  and  treasure,  would  have  been  the  best  and 
surest  way  of  discouraging  so-called  "  militarism  "  and  of 
securing  as  lasting  a  peace  as  mankind  ever  will  be  capable 
of  keeping  ;   or  else  of  joining  one  of  the  sides  in  the  war  and 


58  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

thereby  securing  to  it  the  triumph  of  victory  and  the  satis- 
faction of  a  "  knock-out  blow  "  administered  to  the  other 
side,  with  the  resultant  ruin  of  the  greater  part  of  Europe, 
replacement  of  a  defeated  "  militarism  "  by  a  triumphant 
one,  and  certainty  of  a  series  of  new  wars  in  the  more  or  less 
remote  future.  For  even  the  most  determined  optimist 
on  the  winning  side  will  hardly  be  able  to  bring  himself  to 
beheve  seriously  that  nations  of  the  white  race,  numbering 
between  two  and  three  hundred  millions,  will  never  rise 
from  the  profound  depth  of  ruin  and  degradation  in  which 
they  are  made  to  welter  at  present,  and  claim  the  "  place 
in  the  sun  "  which  is  theirs  by  birthright,  on  a  footing  of 
equality  with  their  present  victors. 

The  consequences  of  the  general  adoption  of  the  Prussian 
system  of  short-term  universal  service,  originally  devised  as 
a  means  of  circumventing  oppressive  treaty  stipulations, 
were  manifold  and  mostly  disastrous  from  many  points  of 
view.  The  best  that  can  be  said  for  this  system  is  that  it 
affords  a  means  of  training  the  youth  of  the  country  in 
discipline,  orderly  work  and  unquestioning  submission  to 
lawful  authority,  at  the  same  time  combating  illiteracy, 
spreading  some  elementary  instruction  and  greatly  benefiting 
the  physical  condition  of  the  conscripts.  The  advantages 
of  miUtary  training  are  self-evident  indeed,  and  may  be 
said  fully  to  compensate  the  conscripts  for  such  hardship 
as  may  be  entailed  in  removal  from  their  homes  and  in 
deprivation  of  liberty  for  a  short  term  of  years. 

The  question  may  be  asked,  whether  all  these  advantages 
might  not  be  secured  by  a  system  of  conscription,  not  for 
military  service,  but  simply  for  educational  purposes,  which 
would  confer  the  same  benefits  on  a  perhaps  even  greater 
number  of  youths  and  would  at  the  same  time  provide  ample 
human  material  for  a  volunteer  professional  army  of  such 
size  as  might  be  required  by  a  State  whose  aim  would  be, 
not  the  pursuit  of  an  imperialistic  foreign  pohcy,  but  solely 
the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  within  its  confines,  and 
defence  in  case  of  attack  by  a  foreign  enemy. 

I  can  see,  of  course,  the  reply  that  would  be  returned 
to  such  a  question,  namely,  that  the  proposed  plan  would 
answer  very  well  if  all  Powers,  without  exception,  were  to 
abjure  the  pursuit  of  what  is  generally  meant  by  the  term 


THE  LEAGUE   OF  NATIONS  59 

"  a  forward  foreign  policy,"  and  were  willing  to  settle  by 
negotiation  or  submit  to  arbitration  any  and  all  questions, 
not  excepting  so-called  questions  of  honour  or  of  vital 
interests,  which  might  arise  between  them,  but  that,  as 
long  as  any  one  of  the  Great  Powers  chooses  to  maintain 
the  system  of  universal  short-term  service,  enabling  it  to 
put  in  the  field  millions  of  trained  soldiers,  so  long  will  all 
other  Powers  have  to  do  the  same,  or  run  the  risk  of  finding 
themselves  in  case  of  attack  in  a  condition  of  perhaps  fatal 
numerical  inferiority. 

Far  be  it  from  me  to  contest  the  soundness  of  this  argu- 
ment. The  remedy  would  obviously  be  the  creation  of  some 
supreme  power  able  to  enforce  general  disarmament,  or 
rather  general  abolition  of  compulsory  universal  military 
service,  and  limitation  of  professional  standing  armies  ; 
able  also  to  curb  the  ambitions  of  individual  Powers  and 
to  compel  their  obedience  to  its  dictates.  It  is,  however, 
no  less  obvious  that  contemporary  mankind  will  never  submit 
to  such  enormous  power  being  entrusted  to  a  supreme 
Power  such  as  in  the  ancient  world  was  actually  exercised 
by  Rome  and  for  some  time  secured  indeed  the  peace  of 
the  world — the  Pax  Romana. 

The  only  chance,  therefore,  of  creating  such  a  supreme 
Power  would  lie  in  the  organization  of  all  civilized  man- 
kind as  a  League  of  Nations,  to  whose  supremacy  all  individual 
nations  would  render  voluntary  allegiance.  This  would 
undoubtedly  be  an  ideal  solution  of  the  problem.  Only, 
what  stands  in  the  way  of  its  realization  is  the  need  to 
which  President  Wilson  called  attention  in  his  address  to 
the  Italian  Parliament — the  need  of  a  new  international 
psychology. 

But  then  the  World  War,  with  its  accompaniment  of  a 
skilfully  organized  propaganda,  has  intensified  the  tradi- 
tional international  psychology  of  distrust,  of  hatred  and  of 
revenge,  and  one  would  indeed  be  embarrassed  in  trying 
to  discover  at  present  any  symptom  of  a  serious  abatement 
of  its  influence.  The  present  abortive  attempt  at  creating 
a  League  of  Nations  proved  abortive  for  the  very  reason 
that  it  was  plainly  an  outflow  of  that  same  international 
psychology,  and  that  it  had  created,  not  a  league  of  all 
nations,  but  a  coalition  of  two  principal  nations,  with  two 


60  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

others  admitted  on  a  footing  of,  so  to  speak,  limited  equality, 
and  a  numerous  following  of  minor  ones  relegated  to  the 
back  of  the  stage,  at  the  same  time  excluding  the  two  greatest 
nations,  numbering  more  than  two  hundred  million  souls 
and  occupying  by  far  the  greatest  part  of  the  European 
continent,  one  of  them  being  put  off  with  the  prospect  of  being 
admitted  to  the  League  after  an  indeterminate  probationary 
period — if  unanimously  awarded  by  its  members  the  requisite 
certificate  of  good  behaviour — and  the  other  completely 
ignored  and  having  her  territory  carved  up  without  even 
as  much  as  her  ex  post  factum  consent  having  been 
reserved. 

Whether  this  result  of  the  labours  of  the  Peace  Conference, 
as  embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  intertwined  with 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  is  to  be  considered 
an  achievement  of  far-seeing  statesmanship,  is  a  question 
which  need  not  be  here  discussed  As  a  Russian,  however, 
I  may  perhaps  be  permitted  to  express  my  sense  of  gratifica- 
tion in  finding  that  the  sound  and  generous  instinct  of  the 
American  people  seems  to  show  a  decided  reluctance  to 
endorse  a  settlement  sanctioning  among  other  things  the 
dismemberment  of  my  country. 

Whatever  may  be  the  likelihood  of  mankind  ever  ac- 
quiring a  psychology  receptive  of  the  ideal  of  a  true  League 
of  Nations,  there  is  one  way  in  which  the  danger  of  war  may 
be  successfully  eliminated  :  it  is  by  discarding  the  sinister 
and  fatal  fallacy  of  the  famous  dictum,  "  If  you  wish  for 
peace,  prepare  for  war." 

The  two  great  nations  to  whom  belongs  the  leadership 
of  mankind  have  shown  us  the  way,  by  preparing,  not  for 
war,  but  for  peace.  Ever  since  the  conclusion  between 
them  of  the  Convention  of  1817,  the  boundary-line  of  some 
three  thousand  miles  dividing  their  territories  has  remained 
absolutely  defenceless  on  either  side,  and  the  two  nations  have 
enjoyed  the  blessings  of  a  century  of  uninterrupted  peace, 
although  on  at  least  two  occasions  friction  has  arisen  between 
them  such  as  would  have  led  most  probably  to  an  armed 
conflict  if  they  had  been  prepared  for  war,  having  at  their 
command  conscript  armies  numbering  millions,  and  if  they 
had  had  in  their  respective  capitals  such  institutions  as 
"  Grand  General  Staffs  "  on  the  European  model,  with  their 


COMPULSORY  SERVICE  61 

pigeon-holes  full  of  elaborate  plans  for  the  invasion  of 
their  neighbour's  dominions. 

To  anyone  who  doubts  the  possibility  of  such  permanent 
peace  as  human  nature  ever  will  allow  being  secured  by  the 
aboHtion  of  universal  compulsory  military  service  and  the 
reduction  of  permanent  armies  to  such  dimensions  as  would 
be  required  for  maintaining  order  in  the  interior — to  anyone 
who  entertains  such  doubts,  it  would  be  sufficient  to  point 
to  the  shining  example  set  to  the  world  by  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  of  America.  In  following  this  example 
lies  the  best  hope  for  the  future  of  mankind. 

But  to  return,  after  this  somewhat  lengthy  digression, 
to  the  subject  of  universal  compulsory  military  service  and 
the  consequences  of  its  general  adoption. 

First  introduced  as  a  matter  of  necessity,  it  enabled  Prussia 
to  train  in  the  course  of  a  few  years  sufficient  men  to  form 
an  army  little  inferior  in  numbers  to  the  armies  of  her 
alHes,  Russia,  Great  Britain  and  Austria,  and  to  take  an  equal 
part  with  them  in  the  victorious  campaign  which  ended  with 
the  dethronement  of  Napoleon  and  the  entry  of  the  Allies 
into  Paris. 

However,  the  advantage  of  the  Prussian  system  did  not, 
apparently,  commend  itself  sufficiently  to  the  Allies  to  have 
caused  its  adoption  by  any  of  them.  It  was  only  after  the 
Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870-1  that  the  necessity  of  follow- 
ing Prussia's,  or  rather  since  then  united  Germany's,  example, 
in  order  to  keep  pace  with  her  armaments,  seems  to  have 
been  reahzed  by  the  other  Great  Powers.  But  once  launched 
on  the  road  of  emulation,  a  progressive  growth  of  armaments 
in  all  continental  countries  was  unavoidable,  and,  indeed, 
soon  began  to  assume  alarming  proportions,  naturally 
entailing  a  corresponding  growth  in  the  respective  Budgets 
of  military  expenditure.  The  increasing  burden  of  taxa- 
tion which  had  to  be  imposed  on  the  populations  to  meet 
these  expenditures  was  in  itself  an  evil  that  could  not  but 
contribute  very  materially  to  the  growth  of  discontent  and 
social  unrest  which  was  rife  among  the  masses  everywhere. 

Besides,  in  constitutionally  governed  countries,  where  the 
consent  of  Parliaments  to  increase  military  expenditures  had 
to  be  secured.  Governments  were  led,  in  order  to  obtain  such 
consent,  to  resort  to  such  devices  as  manoeuvring  with  the 


62  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

spectre  of  threatening  international  complications.  This,  in 
its  turn,  meant  the  systematic  keeping  alive  and  embittering 
of  national  animosities,  or  the  creation  of  new  ones  when 
none  had  existed  before ;  in  short,  the  ministering  to  that 
same  international  psychology  which  President  Wilson 
declared  was  the  prime  necessity  of  our  troubled  times  to 
change. 

Another  consequence  of  the  adoption  of  the  short-term 
universal  service  system  was  the  possibility,  considered 
by  some  as  a  great  advantage,  to  have  always  in  reserve 
millions  of  men  partially  trained  for  military  service,  who 
could  be  mobilized  at  any  time.  But  the  huge  dimensions 
of  the  armies  which  under  this  system  could  be  put  in  the 
field  in  case  of  war  rendered  necessary  the  maintenance — apart 
from  the  reserve  officers  who  could  be  again  withdrawn 
from  civil  life  and  mobilized  for  the  war — of  a  greatly  enlarged 
corps  of  professional  officers  on  permanent  service.  Thus 
in  every  country  was  being  maintained  at  the  public  expense 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  whose  sole  aim  and  business 
in  life  was  war  and  preparation  for  war.  Let  alone  the 
evident  loss  to  a  nation  resulting  from  the  permanent  with- 
drawal from  civil  life  of  such  large  numbers  of  the  educated 
classes,  it  is  easy  to  see  what  a  powerful  influence  this  must 
have  had  on  the  creation  of  that  peculiar  mentality  of  the 
public  mind,  commonly  termed  "  militarism,"  which  was,  of 
course,  by  no  means  confined  to  any  one  country,  and 
whose  extermination  was  supposed  to  be  one  of  the  principal 
aims  of  the  World  War. 

Moreover,  the  constant  irresistible  growth  of  formid- 
able armaments  was  bound  to  reach  a  point  where  the 
temptation  to  utilize  them  for  what  was  indeed  the  only 
justification  of  their  existence,  must  become  irresistible, 
leaving  open  only  the  question  as  to  the  precise  moment 
when  it  would  be  most  advantageous  to  resort  to  war, 
or  in  other  words,  when  there  would  be  the  best  chance  to 
surprise  the  potential  adversary  in  a  state  of  less  complete 
preparedness.  There  we  have  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  a 
"  preventive  war,"  such  as  the  World  War  was  undoubtedly 
meant  to  be  in  the  mind  of  the  German  military  authorities. 

But  the  most  far-reaching  consequence  of  the  general  adop- 
tion  of  conscription  was  that  it  fundamentally  altered  the 


NATIONALISM  63 

character  of  future  wars.  Whilst  theretofore  wars  had 
been  fought  by  small  professional  armies  at  the  bidding 
of  rulers  whose  aims  and  ambitions  they  had  to  serve  un- 
reasoning! y,  without  the  life  of  the  nations  concerned  being 
thereby  profoundly  affected,  henceforth  wars  carried  on  by 
whole  nations  in  arms  were  bound  to  become  truly  wars 
between  peoples,  with  all  the  ruinous  consequences  that 
would  imply. 

Thus  it  became  necessary  to  raise  the  naturally  peaceful 
disposition  of  the  peoples  who  had  no  quarrel  with  one 
another  to  the  required  fighting  pitch  and  to  excite  them 
by  artificial  instigation  to  hatred  and  to  fear.  Hence  the 
birth  of  an  institution  upon  which  the  nations,  returned  to 
sanity,  will  look  back  with  confusion  and  shame — propa- 
ganda, that  sinister  Moloch,  on  whose  altar  millions  of  lives 
have  been  ruthlessly  sacrificed,  and  whose  degrading  influence 
has  poisoned  the  minds  of  whole  peoples  for  a  generation 
with  the  ignoble  virus  of  hatred  and  revenge. 

If,  now,  we  proceed  to  an  analysis  of  the  second  of  the 
conditions  mentioned  above,  which  were  absent  in  the 
beginning  of  the  last  century — that  is  to  say,  of  the  European 
situation  as  affected  by  the  appearance  in  an  acute  form 
of  the  question  of  nationalities — we  shall  at  once  perceive 
that  it  meant — although  Napoleon  III  was  the  first  to 
proclaim  it  as  the  guiding  principle  of  his  policy — the  awaken- 
ing of  elemental  forces,  theretofore  dormant,  which  were 
destined  to  play  a  part  of  ever-growing  importance  in  the 
development  of  events.  This  awakening  manifested  itself 
in  two  well-defined  but  apparently  contradictory  tendencies 
among  the  nationalities  concerned,  either  as  a  tendency 
towards  unification,  or  as  a  tendency  towards  disruption  of 
the  political  organisms  or  States  of  which  they  were  forming 
parts.  The  form  in  which  the  community  of  European 
States  had  found  itself  crystallized  after  the  Congress  of 
Vienna  had  left  two  great  countries,  Germany  and  Italy, 
in  a  condition  of  merely  geographical  entities,  politically 
divided  up  into  a  number  of  States,  which  in  Germany  formed 
a  confederation  under  the  headship  of  Austria,  and  which 
in  Italy  were  quite  independent  of  one  another,  apart  from 
Lombardy  and  Venetia,  which  remained  in  the  possession 
of  Austria.     Poland  had  been  partitioned  between  Russia, 


64  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Prussia  and  Austria.  The  population  of  Austria,  or  as  it 
later  became,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  was  composed 
in  the  main  of  three  nationalities  as  follows,  in  the  order 
of  their  numerical  importance  :  Slavs,  Germans  and  Magyars, 
the  Germans,  however,  being  the  dominant  nationality  ; 
besides  Italians  in  Lombardy,  Venetia,  part  of  Tyrol,  Istria 
and  Dalmatia,  and  Roumanians  in  Transylvania. 

In  the  Balkan  Peninsula  the  Christian  populations  of 
various — mostly  Slav — nationalities  were  in  an  overwhelm- 
ing majority  but  subject  to  the  domination  of  the  Turks. 
All  these  heterogeneous  elements  in  the  countries  of  South- 
Eastern  Europe  constituted  naturally  centrifugal  forces  in 
the  States  of  which  they  were  component  parts  and  in  the 
eventual  disruption  of  which  lay  their  only  hope  of  achieving 
independence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  political  ideal  of 
the  homogeneous  populations  of  the  numerous  German  and 
Italian  States  was  their  unification  and  organization  as  a 
German  Empire  and  a  Kingdom  of  Italy.  It  was  plain, 
however,  that  these  conflicting  tendencies  among  the  European 
nationalities  and  their  aims,  which  could  only  be  realized 
by  war  or  revolution,  were  bound  to  keep  Europe  in  a  state  of 
perpetual  turmoil  if  there  had  not  been  some  element  of 
control  strong  enough  to  prevent  or  restrain  reckless  attempts 
at  breaking  the  peace. 

This  restraining  influence  had  been  the  so-called  Holy 
Alliance,  of  which  Alexander  I  had  been  the  originator, 
and  which  later  was  reconstructed  by  his  successor, 
Nicholas  I,  on  a  narrower  basis,  as  the  "  Grand  Alliance." 
But  after  the  French  Revolutions  of  1830  and  1848,  and 
the  revolutionary  movements  in  Germany,  Austria  and 
Italy,  followed  by  the  Crimean  War,  nothing,  of  course, 
survived  of  these  alliances  but  a  vague  something  known 
as  the  "  Concert  Europeen,"  the  Concert  of  Europe.  This 
"  Concert,"  as  its  name  alone  would  imply,  was  nothing  but 
a  loose,  or  even  simply  tacit,  understanding  between  the 
five  so-called  Great  Powers  of  Europe — Russia,  Prussia, 
Austria,  France  and  Great  Britain — to  consult  together  on 
questions  of  common  interest  as  they  might  arise  with  a  view 
to   their   settlement   by  some   kind   of  concerted  action. 

Napoleon  III,  who  was  said  to  have  become  in  his  youth 
a  member  of  the  Italian  secret  society  of  the  Carbonari, 


PRUSSIA  65 

whose  aim  was  the  liberation  of  Italy,  was  the  first  to  deal 
a  decisive  blow  to  the  shaky  edifice  of  the  Concert,  whose 
object  was  the  maintenance  of  the  order  established  by  the 
Treaties  of  Vienna,  by  raising  the  question  of  Italian  unity 
on  the  basis  of  the  rights  of  nationalities,  and  by  declaring 
war  on  Austria  in  1859  with  the  object  of  her  expulsion  from 
Italy.  The  serious  condition  of  Europe  and  the  likelihood 
of  its  ultimate  tragic  outcome  had  already  impressed  itself 
on  the  far-seeing  mind  of  that  great,  perhaps  greatest,  British 
statesman  of  the  century,  Benjamin  Disraeli.  In  a  speech 
to  his  constituents  shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  France  and  Austria,  he  expressed  in  eloquent 
and  verily  prophetic  language  his  fears  for  the  fate  of  Europe, 
fears  which  have  all  come  true. 

His  words  of  wisdom,  worthy  of  a  great  statesman, 
went  unheeded.  And  yet  those  were  times  when  states- 
manship had  not  yet  been  hopelessly  swamped  by  demagogy, 
propaganda  and  the  Yellow  Press  ! 

Soon  after  the  establishment  of  the  nucleus  of  the  King- 
dom of  united  Italy,  which  was  the  result  of  the  war  of 
1859,  an  event  occurred  which  was  to  start  Prussia  on  her 
ambitious  career  aiming  at  the  unification  of  Germany  by 
a  policy  of  "  blood  and  iron,"  as  Bismarck  used  to  express 
it,  an  event  which  might  have  been  prevented,  and  the 
history  of  the  world  shaped  differently,  if  the  "  European 
Concert  "  had  been  more  than  an  empty  sound  and  had 
been  willing  to  uphold  the  public  law  of  Europe,  and  the 
principle  of  right  against  the  unwarranted  assault  of  might. 
It  was  the  invasion  of  the  so-called  Elbe  duchies,  Schleswig- 
Holstein,  by  the  joint  forces  of  Prussia  and  Austria  and  their 
ultimate  annexation  by  Prussia,  all  of  which  took  place  under 
the  eyes  of  the  other  three  participants  of  the  Concert  of 
the  Great  Powers,  Russia,  France  and  Great  Britain.  Of 
these  three,  Russia  alone — I  mention  this  as  a  tribute  to 
the  memory  of  her  Chancellor,  Prince  Gortschakoff — was 
willing  to  protest,  the  other  two  for  various  reasons  holding 
aloof.  Part  of  the  inside  history  of  this  episode  in  European 
diplomatic  history  is  related  in  Lord  Redesdale's  Memories, 
to  which  most  interesting  and  charmingly  written  book  I  beg 
to  refer  those  of  my  readers  who  wish  for  fuller  information 
on  this  subject. 

VOL.    II  5 


66         FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

Those  who  looked  upon  the  permanent  weakness  of  a 
divided  Germany  as  best  suited  to  their  own  interests,  and 
who  held  it  to  be  a  wise  and  feasible  policy  indefinitely  to 
oppose  the  realization  by  a  great  nation  of  some  fifty  millions 
of  her  ideal  of  the  political  unification  of  her  country,  should 
have  prevented  when  there  was  still  time  this  first  step 
towards  its  realization. 

The  next  step  was  taken  by  Prussia  barely  two  years 
later  by  declaring  war  on  Austria  with  the  view  of  ousting 
her  from  participation  in  the  German  Confederation.  This 
result  was  obtained  by  a  brief  and  victorious  campaign, 
wound  up  by  a  peace  which  left  the  defeated  adversary 
unhumiliated  and  unharmed  and  the  door  open  not  only 
for  reconciliation  but  for  a  possible  future  alliance  as  well. 
The  complete  unification  of  Germany,  however,  was  not 
accomplished,  the  newly  erected  North  German  Confedera- 
tion not  including  the  South  German  States,  Bavaria,  Wiir- 
temberg  and  Baden.  Nevertheless,  French  public  opinion 
being  seriously  alarmed  by  the  sudden  increase  of  the  power 
of  Prussia,  Napoleon  III  found  himself  in  a  position  where 
it  became  incumbent  on  him,  in  disregard  of  his  own  favourite 
idea  of  the  rights  of  nationalities,  to  oppose  any  further 
aggrandizement  of  Prussia  by  the  absorption  of  South 
Germany. 

The  situation  thus  created  was  fraught  with  danger  to  the 
peace  of  Europe.  Napoleon  III,  after  his  victorious  Crimean 
campaign,  followed  up  by  his  victory  over  Austria  in  1859, 
had  become  the  most  influential  personage  in  Europe,  and  the 
preponderance  of  France  in  European  affairs  appeared  to 
be  well  established,  with  the  resultant  tendency  of  the  public 
mind  in  France  to  regard  any  event  apparently  threatening 
such  preponderance  as  a  grave  national  peril. 

On  the  other  side  there  was  a  strong  military  power, 
flushed  with  victory,  bent  on  achieving  the  realization  of 
a  great  national  political  ideal. 

In  these  conditions  of  public  feeling  on  both  sides  a 
clash  between  the  two  Powers  was  unavoidable,  as  in  similar 
circumstances  will  presumably  always  be  the  case  between 
Powers  similarly  situated,  until  the  reign  of  reason  shall  be 
established  among  mankind — if  such  a  happy  consumma- 
tion may  ever  be  hoped  for. 


THE   GERMAN   EMPIRE  67 

The  result  of  Prussia's  victory  was  the  unification  of 
Germany  and  the  creation  of  the  German  Empire.  The  right 
of  the  German  people  to  form  a  national  State,  as  that  of 
the  Italian  people,  had  been  vindicated.  But  in  both  cases 
the  recognition  of  this  elemental  right  had  to  be  conquered  by 
force  of  arms — in  the  case  of  Italy  mainly  with  the  aid  of 
France,  which  had  to  be  paid  for  by  the  cession  of  Nice  and 
Savoy,  the  cradle  of  the  Italian  dynasty  ;  and  in  the  case 
of  Germany  mainly  by  the  military  efficiency  of  Prussia, 
an  apparently  complete  vindication  of  Bismarck's  policy  of 
"  blood  and  iron." 

In  the  settlement  of  the  war,  however,  statesmanship 
on  the  victor's  side  had  to  give  way  to  the  inspirations  of 
the  military  mind,  preoccupied  with  the  idea  of  the  necessity 
of  pushing  home  the  "  knock-out  blow,"  the  result  being 
that,  instead  of  leaving  a  door  open  to  the  possibility  of 
converting  a  defeated  adversary  into  a  potential  friend 
and  ally,  as  had  been  the  case  in  the  settlement  of  the  war 
with  Austria,  that  door  was  closed,  perchance  for  ever, 
by  the  infliction  of  conditions  which  added  to  the  bitter- 
ness of  military  defeat  the  loss  of  territory  originally  indeed 
conquered  from  Germany,  but  since  become  a  part  of  the 
living  body  of  France,  thereby  creating  an  ever  open  sore, 
never  to  be  healed  until  the  day  of  revenge  and  restitution, 
and  apparently  not  even  then.  Moreover,  the  phenomenal 
success  of  Bismarck's  policy  of  "  blood  and  iron,"  which 
in  the  short  space  of  seven  years  had  raised  the  small  King- 
dom of  Prussia  from  the  rank  of  a  merely  "  honorary  "  Great 
Power  to  one  of  the  greatest  and  most  powerful  Empires, 
had  produced  a  disastrous  effect  on  the  psychology  of  the 
German  people,  or  rather  of  their  officer  and  Junker  caste, 
and  even  more  pronouncedly,  of  their  "  Intellectuals,"  by 
developing  among  them  a  spirit  of  overbearing  pretentious- 
ness and  megalomania,  which  rendered  Germany  and  her 
people  more  and  more  intensely  disliked  by  all  the  world. 

The  perennial  historical  struggle  for  supremacy  between 
the  Teuton  and  the  Gaul  had  thus  been  temporarily  decided 
in  favour  of  the  former,  but  under  conditions  which  rendered 
its  reopening  in  the  future  merely  a  question  of  time.  The 
latent  antagonism  between  France  and  Germany  became 
the  dominant  element  in  European  politics,  consciously  or 


68  FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

subconsciously  influencing  the  policies  of  statesmen  every- 
where and  keeping  alive  the  spark  which  some  day  was  bound 
to  be  fanned  into  the  flame  of  a  general  European  war. 

We  have  seen  how  and  by  what  means  two  great  nations 
achieved  their  unification,  although  one  of  them,  Italy, 
had  not  been  completely  successful,  inasmuch  as  some  Italian 
populations  in  Southern  Tyrol,  Istria  with  Trieste  and  partly 
Dalmatia,  still  remained  under  the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy, constituting  what  was  known  as  "  Unredeemed  Italy  " 
— Italia  Irredenta,  the  watchword  of  militant  patriotism — 
the  conquest  of  which  was  manifestly  the  object  of  Italy's 
participation  in  the  World  War. 

The  numerous  nationalities  inhabiting  the  Balkan 
Peninsula — Slavs  (Serbs,  Croatians  and  Bulgarians),  Greeks, 
Roumanians  (Moldo-Wallachians)  and  Albanians — had  been 
for  centuries  in  a  state  of  latent  revolt  against  their  Turkish 
masters.  The  process  of  their  liberation  had  been  very 
gradual  and  had  been  achieved  mainly  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  Russia,  whose  claim  to  intervention  was  based 
partly  on  racial  affinity  with  the  Slavs,  who  constituted  the 
majority  of  the  population,  partly  on  community  of  reli- 
gious faith,  not  only  the  Slavs  but  also  the  Greeks  and  the 
Roumanians  belonging  to  the  Greco-Orthodox  Church. 

The  liberation  of  the  Greeks  was  the  first  to  be  com- 
pleted by  the  creation  of  the  independent  Kingdom  of  Greece 
under  the  Treaty  of  Adrianople,  concluded  in  1829  after 
Russia's  victory  over  Turkey  and  by  the  London  Convention 
of  1832,  by  which  Greece  was  declared  to  be  an  independent 
kingdom  under  the  protectorate  of  Russia,  Great  Britain 
and  France,  who  had  been  acting  more  or  less  in  concert 
throughout  and  whose  united  fleets,  by  the  destruction  of 
the  Turkish  fleet  at  Navarino,  had  dealt  the  first  blow  to 
Turkish  power  in  the  Peninsula. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  jealousies  and  bickerings  pre- 
vailing among  the  three  Allied  Powers,  I  would  mention 
that  a  foremost  British  statesman,  in  announcing  to  the 
House  of  Commons  the  annihilation  of  the  Turkish  fleet 
by  the  united  squadrons  of  the  three  Powers,  called  it  "  an 
untoward  event." 

The  liberation  of  the  Slavs  from  Turkish  domination 
was  entirely  the  work  of  Russia,  not  only  unaided  by  any 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  69 

of  the  other  Powers,  but  even  to  some  extent  opposed  by 
some  of  them,  from  the  general  apprehension  lest  Russia's 
influence  might  become  too  powerful  on  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 
Thus  when  Russia,  by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  had  secured 
the  liberation  from  Turkish  vassalage  of  the  principalities 
of  Roumania,  Serbia  and  Montenegro  and  the  organization 
of  Bulgaria  with  what  became  known  as  Eastern  Rumelia 
and  part  of  Macedonia  as  a  vassel  principality,  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  convened  for  the  purpose  of  revising  the  Treaty 
of  San  Stefano  at  the  instigation  of  Austria-Hungary  and 
Great  Britain,  cut  in  half  the  newly  created  principality 
of  Bulgaria  and  abandoned  Macedonia  again  to  Turkish 
misrule,  thereby  creating  in  the  Macedonian  question  a 
perennial  ferment  liable  at  any  time  to  inflame  the  passions 
of  the  rival  nationalities  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  fur- 
nishing food  for  the  latent  Austro- Russian  antagonism. 

Another  composite  State  presenting  a  conglomerate  of 
various  nationalities  was  Austria,  or  rather,  as  she  was 
known  until  lately,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  since 
Hungary,  after  Austria's  defeat  by  Prussia  in  1866,  secured 
its  semi-independence  as  a  separate  kingdom,  united  to 
Austria  merely  in  the  person  of  the  common  Sovereign, 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  as  King  of  Hungary. 

The  majority  of  the  population  of  the  non-Hungarian 
half  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  was  composed  of  Slavs  belonging 
to  various  branches  of  the  Slav  race  :  Poles,  Ruthenes, 
Czechs,  Moravians,  Slovaks,  Serbs,  Croatians,  Slovenes, 
some  of  them  Roman  Catholics  like  the  Czechs  and  Poles, 
some  belonging  to  the  Greco-Orthodox  Church,  politically 
mostly  at  odds  with  each  other,  a  circumstance  which  the 
Austrian  Government's  policy  used  to  exploit  in  its  own 
interest,  practising  with  more  or  less,  mostly  less,  skill 
the  ancient  rule,  "Divide  et  imperia."  The  result  was  that 
most  of  the  Austrian  Slavs,  except,  of  course,  the  Poles, 
even  the  Roman  Catholics  like  the  Czechs,  took  to  coquetting 
with  Russian  Slavophiles,  finding  willing  response  from  that 
particular  element  of  the  Russian  "  Intelligentzia,"  to  some 
extent  even  favoured  by  popularity-hunting  parts  of  the 
ruling  bureaucracy. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  as  might  have 
been  expected,  retaliated    by  entertaining   underhand  rela- 


70  FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

tions  with  so-called  Mazeppists,  or  Ukrainophiles  in  Russia, 
ready  to  conspire  against  the  unity  and  welfare  of  their 
fatherland.  These  conditions,  superadded  to  the  forward 
policy  pursued  by  Russian  agents  with  the  connivance 
or  the  toleration  of  their  Government  in  the  Slav  countries 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  which  was  considered  to  create  a 
perennial  menace  to  the  security  of  the  Dual  Monarchy, 
contributed  not  a  little  towards  embittering  Austro-Russian 
relations. 

The  populations  of  Polish  nationality,  owing  official  alle- 
giance to  three  different  States,  were  placed  in  a  peculiarly 
difficult  situation,  always  exposed  to  the  danger  in  case  of 
a  falling-out   among  themselves   of  the  three   Empires,   of 
having  to  fight  their  own  kin  in  the  armies  of  the  warring 
Powers.     The   Poles   of   Galicia,   enjoying   exclusively   con- 
siderate treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment,   because    they  were    usually    willing  to    support  the 
Government's  policy  in  its  contentions  with  their  rivals,  the 
Czechs,  were  as  a  rule  loyal  to  Austria,  the  Vienna  Govern- 
ment in  its  turn  leaving  them  a  free  hand  and  even  favouring 
them  in  their  oppression  of  the  "  Ruthenian,"  or  as  they 
would  now  be  called  "  Ukrainian,"  part  of  the  population 
of  Eastern  Galicia.     The  Poles  of  the  Kingdom  and  of  the 
Polish  provinces  of  Prussia  were  divided  in  their  antipathies 
— there    could    hardly    be    any    question    of    sympathies — 
between  Germany  and  Russia — the  balance  being  perhaps 
in  favour  of  Russia,  because  the  process  of  denationaliza- 
tion of  the  Poles  was  being  carried  on  under  Prussian  rule 
with  infinitely  more  energy  and  harshness  than  in  Russian 
Poland,   where  the  methods  of  Russification    practised  by 
our  bureaucracy  was  mitigated  always  by  their  inefficacy, 
sometimes    by    their    ludicrous    clumsiness    and    generally 
by  the   inefficiency  of  the   personnel   entrusted   with   their 
application. 

From  whichever  point  of  view  one  chose  to  regard  the 
question  of  Poland  and  the  Polish  nationality,  it  should 
have  been  perfectly  plain  even  to  the  most  blundering  in- 
competence that  this  question  was  destined  to  play  a  most 
important  part  in  the  development  of  coming  events  and 
demanded  the  most  careful  consideration  and  the  most 
enlightened  treatment  at  the  hands  of  Russian  statesmen. 


THE  AUSTRO-GERMAN  ALLIANCE        71 

if  there  had  been  any  such  at  the  head  of  affairs  in  the 
supreme  crisis  of  the  country's  history. 

Another  condition  connected  with  the  question  of  nation- 
alities was  the  growing  estrangement  between  Russia  and 
Germany,  which  had  its  source  in  the  development  of  intellec- 
tual movements  in  both  countries — Pan-Slavism  and  Pan- 
Germanism — which,  unchecked,  were  plainly  destined  to 
become  equally  fatal  to  both.  The  growing  influence  in 
both  countries  of  these  movements,  supported  by  militaristic 
statesmanship,  led  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Austro-German 
Alliance  aimed  at  Russia  and  joined  later  by  Italy,  and 
then  as  a  counterpoise  directed  against  Germany,  of  the 
Franco-Russian  Alliance. 

Thus  was  created  the  system  of  alliances  completed 
by  the  entente  with  Great  Britain,  Germany's  commercial, 
industrial  and  naval  rival,  which  rendered  the  final  outbreak 
of  a  general  war,  as  soon  as  any  two  of  the  Powers  concerned 
should  fall  out,  automatically  unavoidable.  Inasmuch  as 
the  Russia-haters  in  Germany  and  the  Germany-haters  in 
Russia — both  parties  representing  small  but  noisy  and 
powerful  minorities — had  contributed  to  bring  about  this 
result,  they  may  both  lay  claim  to  having  achieved  the  ruin 
of  their  respective  countries,  whose  greatness  and  prosperity 
a  century  and  a  half  of  peace  and  goodwill  between  them 
had  helped  to  build  up. 

I  hope  that  in  thus  briefly  reviewing  the  condition  of 
things  in  Europe  as  I  found  it  at  the  time  when  I  was  about 
to  settle  down  in  Paris,  I  have  succeeded  in  making  my 
readers  see  the  reason  why  I  was  so  profoundly  impressed 
with  the  proximity  of  the  outbreak  of  the  general  European 
war  as  to  make  up  my  mind  to  attempt  the  Quixotic  task 
of  trying,  single-handed  and  alone,  to  arrest  the  fatal  tendencies 
in  our  Government  circles  which  I  felt  convinced  would  end 
by  landing  us  in  an  irreparable  catastrophe. 


CHAPTER   XXX 

Forebodings  of  a  European  war — Russia's  handicaps — Railways — Munition 
factories — The  bureaucracy — Kokovtseff  as  Prime  Minister — Isvvolsky — 
The  Balkan  League — An  anonymous  attack — My  secret  memorandum 
to  the   Emperor — My  "  German  "  name — The   "  Great  Slav  Idea." 

Before  endeavouring  to  explain  why  I  looked  upon  the 
participation  of  Russia  in  a  general  European  war,  which 
I  felt  to  be  impending,  as  being  bound  to  end  in  a  catastrophe, 
I  must  state  that  these  sinister  forebodings,  from  which  I 
could  not  free  myself,  were  not  solely  connected  with  appre- 
hensions of  a  military  defeat.  They  covered  a  far  wider  field ; 
they  were  shared  by  many  ardent  patriots  trembling  for 
the  fate  of  our  country,  they  should  have  been  ever  present 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  controlled  the  destiny  of  a  great 
Empire,  and  they  should  have  halted  them  on  the  brink  of 
the  precipice  over  which  they  were  about  to  plunge  with 
purblind  and  reckless  improvidence. 

In  the  first  place,  in  weighing  the  chances  of  success  or 
failure  in  a  prospective  war  it  would  have  been  the  prime 
duty  of  circumspect  statesmanship  to  consider  the  entirely 
novel  conditions  of  warfare  as  determined  by  the  colossal 
size  of  modern  armies  and  by  the  corresponding  development 
of  ever  more  perfected  means  of  destruction.  To  meet 
these  novel  conditions  two  things  were  obviously  needed  : 
a  highly  efficient  organization  in  all  activities  of  the  State 
directed  towards  carrying  on  such  a  war,  and  the  highest 
grade  of  technical  development  and  the  greatest  possible 
number  of  industrial  establishments  capable  of  being 
immediately  adapted  to  the  production  of  war  material  in 
almost  unlimited  quantities.  Our  manifest  deficiency  in 
both  these  respects  could  not  possibly  be  unknown  to  the 
Government.  To  begin  with,  a  talent  for  organization 
has  never  been  among  the  characteristics  of  an  otherwise 

72 


RUSSIA'S   HANDICAPS  73 

much-gifted  nation.  Not  only  that,  but  some  of  the  funda- 
mental qualities  making  for  efficiency  in  organization — 
painstaking  attention  to  detail,  precision  in  planning  and 
accuracy  in  execution — -are  with  us  somehow  less  appreciated 
in  practice  than  they  deserve.  To  anyone  possessing  but 
the  slightest  acquaintance  with  the  clumsy  slowness  and 
limited  efficiency  of  the  working  of  our  huge  bureaucratic 
apparatus,  the  hope  of  its  ever  proving  capable  of  meeting 
the  formidable  demands  which  would  be  made  upon  it 
by  the  conduct  of  a  general  European  war  must  have 
appeared  rather  illusory. 

Nor  were  the  material  conditions  in  which  that  apparatus 
would  have  to  function  at  all  commensurate  to  the  task 
of  feeding  and  supplying  with  war  material  the  millions  of 
men  we  should  have  to  send  to  the  front  to  invade  our 
potential  enemies'  dominions.  A  glance  at  a  map  of  our 
net  of  railways  and  another  at  the  railway  maps  of  Germany 
and  France  would  have  revealed  our  fatal  inferiority  in  this 
respect  to  our  adversaries  as  well  as  to  our  allies.  This 
deficiency  alone,  which  could  only  be  remedied  in  the  course 
of  time,  was  certainly  sufficient  to  have  constituted  a  most 
serious  handicap  in  the  event  of  a  war  with  any  Power  better 
equipped  in  this  respect,  let  alone  a  Power  like  Germany 
whose  most  complete  network  of  Government  railways 
was  specially  designed  to  serve  strategic  ends,  besides  satis- 
fying the  needs  of  commerce  and  circulation. 

As  far  as  I  am  aware,  this  momentous  defect  in  our  arma- 
ment was  repeatedly  pointed  out  to  our  Government,  and 
the  necessity  of  its  being  remedied  as  speedily  as  possible 
was  pressed  upon  it  by  the  French  Government  as  a  duty  we 
owed  to  our  ally  no  less  than  to  ourselves.  The  experience 
of  the  Crimean  War,  when  the  absence  of  railway  com- 
munications rendered  it  impossible  for  us  to  concentrate 
our  troops  in  the  Crimea  in  time  to  prevent  the  landing  of 
the  French  and  English  Armies,  should  have  taught  us  the 
lesson  of  the  danger  of  cultural  backwardness  in  an  armed 
conflict  with  highly  civilized  nations. 

The  failure  to  take  in  hand  betimes  the  construction  of 
strategic  railways  may  have  been  due  simply  to  the  usual 
inertness  and  slow-moving  deliberateness  of  our  bureaucratic 
machinery,  or,  perhaps,  to  a  desire  to  give  the  preference 


74  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

to  the  building  of  such  railways  as  were  sorely  needed  for 
the  peaceful  development  of  the  country,  over  the  satis- 
faction of  the  claims  of  strategy.  This  would,  indeed, 
have  been  an  economically  sound  and  truly  patriotic  policy 
to  pursue  in  the  matter  of  railway  construction,  but  for 
the  fact  that  we  had  tied  our  hands  by  an  alliance  which 
sooner  or  later  was  bound  to  involve  us  in  a  war  with  our 
Western  neighbours,  and  which  gave  unquestionably  to  our 
ally  and,  moreover,  creditor  to  the  tune  of  many  billions 
of  francs,  the  right  to  claim  that  we  should  at  all  times  be 
ready  to  take  a  really  efficient  part  by  his  side  in  the  expected 
contest.  Nothing,  however,  at  the  time  to  which  I  refer, 
had  been  done  to  supply  adequately  this  most  important 
deficiency,  which  was  liable  to,  and  in  the  sequel  actually 
did,  play  a  very  disastrous  part  in  the  development  of 
military  events. 

Another  and  no  less  glaring  deficiency  was  the  very 
limited  capacity  of  our  Government,  as  well  as  private 
establishments,  for  the  production  of  war  material  of  any 
kind  and  the  unlikelihood  of  its  being  possible  to  remedy 
it  as  quickly  as  it  might  have  become  necessary.  To  rely 
on  being  supplied  with  war  material  by  our  allies  would  be 
possible  only  if  they  experienced  no  pressing  need  of  such 
material  themselves  and  if  our  communications  with  the 
outer  world  by  way  of  the  Black  Sea  were  not  closed,  as 
they  would  surely  be  by  way  of  the  Baltic — a  circumstance 
entirely  dependent  on  the  attitude  which  Turkey  might 
adopt  in  the  coming  war. 

These  handicaps  were  serious  enough  to  raise  grave 
doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  successful  campaign  against 
our  Western  neighbours,  so  greatly  superior  to  us  in  all 
preliminary  conditions  making  for  success  in  war,  such  as 
organization,  ways  of  communication  and  armament.  But 
still  graver  doubts  in  this  regard  could  not  but  be  felt  by  those 
who  had  followed  the  course  of  military  events  in  our  war 
with  Japan,  which  had  not  produced  a  single  leader  of  more 
than  average  capacity  and  had  not  given  us  a  single  victory 
over  our  adversary,  who,  whatever  his  conspicuous  bravery, 
his  perfect  discipline  and  all-round  efficiency,  would  hardly 
be  accounted  superior  to  the  principal  enemy  we  should 
have  to  encounter  in  a  general  war  in  Europe.     (As  to  this 


LESSON  OF  THE   JAPANESE  WAR       75 

failure  to  win  a  single  victory  I  may  possibly  be  mistaken, 
if  the  story  related  by  General  Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  in  his  book 
on  the  Russo-Japanese  War  is  to  be  believed  — how  the 
battle  of  Laoyang,  of  which  he  was  an  eye-witness,  had  been 
won  by  the  Japanese  solely  because  our  Commander-in- 
Chief,  for  some  unaccountable  reason,  ordered  a  retreat  at 
the  very  moment  when  the  battle  had  been  practically 
won  by  us,  and  that  the  part  of  the  book  containing  this 
account  of  the  battle  had  been  suppressed  at  the  request 
of  the  Japanese  Government.) 

The  most  important  lesson,  however,  to  be  derived  from 
our  experience  in  the  Japanese  War  which  should  have 
been  most  earnestly  taken  to  heart  by  our  ruling  spheres — 
military  as  well  as  political — was  that  nowadays,  with 
armies  raised  under  the  system  of  universal  compulsory 
short-term  service,  wars  may  not  be  waged  successfully 
when  the  soldiery  are  not  conscious  of  nor  understand 
the  cause  for  which  they  are  called  upon  to  risk  their 
lives. 

That  this  lesson  would  apply  in  the  fullest  measure 
to  our  eventual  participation  in  the  general  European  war 
which  I  saw  coming  was  my  firm  conviction,  as  well  as  that 
we  should  rue  the  day  when  we  had  recklessly  cast  to  the 
winds  the  solemn  warning  it  conveyed.  My  conviction  was 
based  on  the  following  reasoning  : 

The  coming  war,  whatever  the  immediate  cause,  or  rather 
pretext,  of  its  outbreak,  and  whether  or  not  begun  by  only 
two  of  the  six  Powers  participating  in  the  two  hostile  alliances, 
would,  by  the  play  of  this  system  of  alliances,  automatically 
at  once  involve  them  all. 

The  war,  therefore,  whose  real  meaning,  whatever  its 
ostensible  aims,  would  be  a  renewal  of  the  perennial  historic 
struggle  between  Gaul  and  Teuton  for  supremacy  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe,  would  imply  the  employment  by  the 
chief  contestants  as  well  as  by  their  allies  of  all  the  armed 
forces  at  their  disposal ;  that  is  to  say,  of  millions  upon 
millions  of  combatants. 

In  these  conditions  a  war  could  never  be  quickly  won  by 
either  side  by  a  military  event  such  as  a  Jena,  a  Waterloo, 
a  Sadowa  or  a  Sedan  ;    it  could  only  be  ended  by  the  tota 
material  or  moral  exhaustion  or  collapse  of  one  of  the  sides 


76  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

or  of  both,  after  a  long  protracted  struggle  whose  duration 
it  would  be  impossible  to  foresee. 

Such  a  war  could  only  be  carried  on  for  any  length  of 
time  with  any  hope  of  victory  by  armies  fully  comprehending 
the  cause  for  which  they  were  fighting,  or  else  animated  by 
passionate  feelings  of  hatred  of  the  enemy  or  capable  of  having 
these  feelings  excited  by  skilful  propaganda  to  the  necessary 
fighting  pitch. 

In  both  these  respects  the  millions  of  Russian  peasants 
to  be  mobilized  would  undoubtedly  be  found  entirely  defi- 
cient, as  our  experience  in  the  war  with  Japan  should  have 
taught  us. 

My  doubts,  therefore,  were  well  grounded  as  regards 
our  being  in  a  position  to  count  on  a  victory  in  the  event  of 
our  participation  in  a  general  war  in  Europe.  I  might  men- 
tion here,  by  the  way,  that  similar  doubts  seemed  to  haunt 
the  minds  of  those  who  were  responsible  for  the  destiny 
of  the  Empire  at  the  very  moment  when  war  had  just 
been  declared.  At  any  rate,  at  a  solemn  reception  held  at 
the  Winter  Palace  two  or  three  days  after  the  beginning 
of  hostilities,  when  our  troops  were  already  advancing  into 
East  Prussia,  I  remember  the  Emperor  winding  up  his  address 
to  the  Members  of  the  Council  and  Duma  of  the  Court 
and  of  the  highest  bureaucracy  with  the  vow  that,  having 
drawn  the  sword,  he  would  not  lay  it  down  as  long  as  a 
single  enemy  soldier  remained  on  Russian  soil — or  words 
to  that  effect,  similar  to  those  used  by  the  Emperor 
Alexander  I  when  Napoleon's  armies  had  invaded  Russian 
territory  in  1812.  On  the  same  occasion  I  remember  having 
incidentally  asked  one  of  the  members  of  the  Government 
whether  he  knew  what  was  intended  to  be  done  in  regard 
to  the  gold  reserve  of  the  Bank  of  Russia,  to  which  the 
Minister  replied  that  it  was  already  being  transferred  to 
Kasan  for  safety.  All  of  which  did  not  betoken  much 
confidence  in  a  victorious  issue  of  the  campaign  just  opened. 

Although,  of  course,  the  question  of  victory  or  defeat  was 
a  matter  of  the  gravest  concern  to  me,  I  was  profoundly 
convinced  that  what  was  really  at  stake  in  either  case  was 
infinitely  more  than  a  mere  question  of  military  success  or 
failure,  that  it  was  the  very  existence  of  the  Empire  that 
was  hanging  in  the  balance,  because  the  fact  alone  of  our 


THE   BUREAUCRACY  77 

participation  in  a  war  on  the  scale  of  a  general  European  war 
was  bound  to  create  conditions  which  could  not  fail  to  open 
the  floodgates  to  the  rising  tide  of  revolution. 

First  among  these  conditions  would  be  the  breakdown 
of  the  bureaucratic  apparatus  under  the  strain  of  the  demands 
which  the  conduct  of  a  war  on  so  vast  a  scale  would  necessarily 
make  on  almost  all  its  branches.  I  do  not  propose  to  join 
the  popular  chorus  of  systematic  detractors  of  the  Russian 
bureaucracy,  nor  do  I  wish  to  minimize  its  many  sins  and 
shortcomings.  There  is  one  thing,  however,  which  even 
its  most  uncompromising  enemies  may  not  deny,  and  that 
is  that  the  whole  social  and  political  fabric  of  the  State  was 
the  result  of,  and  had  been  built  up  by,  two  centuries  of 
patient,  sometimes  blundering,  but  unremitting,  effort  put 
forth  by  this  same  much-decried  bureaucracy.  Now  that 
its  complete  destruction  has  been  accomplished  by  two  short 
years  of  the  sanguinary  tyranny  of  Bolshevism,  the  inestimable 
value  of  the  work  of  the  bureaucracy  is  beginning  to  be 
realized  and  regretfully  acknowledged,  even  by  those  who 
welcomed  its  downfall  as  the  dawn  of  a  new  and  happier  era. 

But  what  is  said  here  is  not  meant  to  suggest  that  the 
bureaucratic  apparatus,  if  it  had  not  been  first  completely 
disorganized  and  finally  demolished  by  the  Revolution, 
would  have  been  able  to  bear  the  enormous  strain  of  the 
war.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  the  utter  breakdown  of 
such  parts  of  that  apparatus  as  the  railway  administration 
and  the  supply  of  food  and  war  material  to  such  enormous 
armies  as  would  have  to  be  put  in  the  field — it  was  just  this 
breakdown  which,  in  my  opinion,  was  primarily  to  be 
apprehended,  not  merely  as  certain  to  imperil  the  success 
of  a  campaign,  but  as  Ukely  to  lead  to  a  state  of  chaos  of 
which  the  revolutionary  parties  would  not  fail  to  take 
advantage  for  the  furtherance  of  their  plans. 

In  judging  of  the  possibility  of  our  bureaucracy  being 
able  to  withstand  the  enormous  pressure  of  a  war  it  should 
always  have  been  kept  in  view  that  the  bureaucratic 
apparatus,  however  enormous  in  size  and  imposing  in 
appearance,  was  no  longer  capable  of  successfully  coping  with 
the  task  of  giving  the  one  hundred  and  seventy  millions  of 
the  heterogeneous  populations  of  an  immensely  overgrown 
Empire  the  really  efficient  government  they  required.     The 


78  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

bureaucracy,  being  part  and  parcel  of  the  "  Intelligentzia/' 
no  less  than  the  political  parties,  "  bourgeois  "  as  well  as 
revolutionary,  who  were  aiming  at  its  overthrow,  was 
labouring  under  the  same  fundamental  disadvantage  which 
has  been  the  curse  of  Russia  ever  since  her  entry  under  Peter 
the  Great  into  the  community  of  European  nations  as  a 
member  on  a  footing  of  equality — the  fatal  separation  of 
the  educated  classes  from  the  enormous  bulk  of  the  nation 
by  an  unbridgeable  gulf  of  mutual  non-comprehension. 

And  that  is  the  reason  why  the  pride  and  glory  of  the 
bureaucracy,  its  handiwork  and  creation,  the  superb  edifice 
of  the  State,  however  imposing  and  solid  in  appearance,  was 
not  nor  could  have  been  an  organic  growth  having  its  roots 
deep  in  the  soil  upon  which  it  was  erected,  but  was  an  artificial 
superstructure  that  could  be  tumbled  down  like  a  house 
of  cards  by  a  sufficiently  powerful  shock  from  without  or 
from  within.  In  the  minds  of  the  people,  however,  it  was 
still  surrounded  like  its  builder  and  sole  support,  the  bureau- 
cracy, with  the  halo  of  legitimacy  as  an  emanation  of  the 
will  of  the  only  legitimate  source  of  authority,  the  will  of 
the  Lord's  Anointed,  of  the  Tsar.  So  long  as  this  ideal 
of  the  divine  origin  of  the  Sovereign  Power  was  still  a  living 
force,  was  not  undermined  and  destroyed  in  the  minds  of 
the  people,  so  long  the  edifice  would  stand.  It  certainly 
required  fundamental  alterations  and  improvements.  Its 
perfectibility  had  been  amply  demonstrated  by  its  history 
in  the  past.  Its  perfectibility  in  the  future  could  be  questioned 
only  by  those  who  were  bent  on  its  destruction.  With  its 
standing  erect  and  unshaken  was  bound  up  all  the  future 
of  the  country,  its  unity,  safety  and  greatness.  Its  fall 
would  mean — and  did  mean,  as  subsequent  events  have 
shown — disruption,  anarchy  and  chaos.  Its  preservation, 
therefore,  from  the  danger  of  war  and  revolution  should 
have  been  the  prime  duty  of  Russian  statesmanship. 

War,  for  Russia,  whatever  its  course  and  outcome, 
meant  the  certainty  of  the  advent  of  revolution.  The 
lesson  of  the  Japanese  War  should  never  have  been  forgotten. 
It  certainly  had  not  been  forgotten  by  the  revolutionary 
parties.  Justly  attributing  the  failure  of  the  Revolution  of 
1905  to  the  fact  that  not  only  the  guards  but  a  sufficiently 
large  part  of  the  Army  had  remained  faithful  to  their  oath, 


THE   "STEAM  ROLLER"  79 

they  had  directed  with  redoubled  energy  their  efforts 
among  the  soldiery  of  the  regular  Army,  as  far  as  preventive 
measures  and  more  strictly  enforced  discipline  would  allow, 
and  principally  among  the  millions  of  the  peasantry  who  as 
soldiers  of  the  reserve  would  be  mobilized  in  case  of  war. 

It  was  easy  to  see,  one  would  have  thought,  what  a 
formidable  danger,  not  to  the  foreign  enemy,  but  to  their 
own  country,  these  hordes  of  armed  peasantry  might  become, 
seething  with  discontent  and  hatred  of  the  educated  and 
ruling  classes,  with  their  baser  instincts  of  envy  and  greed 
inflamed  by  the  promise  held  out  to  them  by  the  revolu- 
tionary propaganda  of  the  coming  distribution  among  them 
of  the  estate  owners'  lands. 

That  foreign  statesmen,  ignorant  of  real  conditions  in 
our  country,  and  looking  upon  Russia  mainly  as  a  purveyor 
of  an  unlimited  supply  of  cannon  fodder,  should  have  based 
an}^  calculations  and  placed  any  reliance  upon  the  so-called 
"  Russian  steam  roller  "  may  be  comprehensible  to  some 
extent.  But  what  seemed  to  be  difftcult  to  understand  was 
how  it  could  be  possible  that  there  should  be  found  thinking 
Russians  so  blind  to  the  reality  of  things  as  to  entertain 
any  illusions  whatever  in  this  regard.  Yet  there  were  such 
among  the  Duma  leaders  and  their  following,  of  the  Octobrist 
no  less  than  of  the  Cadet  Parties,  who  were  stanch  sup- 
porters of  the  Government's  foreign  policy,  which,  if  persisted 
in,  could  only  lead  to  a  general  European  war,  and  who 
presumably  failed  to  realize  that  our  participation  in  such 
a  war  would  be  bound  to  open  the  door  to  revolution. 

Whether  this  was  so,  or  whether  they  hoped  to  be  borne 
into  power  on  the  crest  of  the  wave  of  the  revolution,  which 
could  then  be  dealt  with  as  easily  as  was  that  of  1905,  I 
am  unable  to  say  and  prefer  not  to  express  a  surmise  which 
might  do  injustice  to  their  intelligence  or  their  good  faith. 
There  were  also  those — I  cannot  believe  there  were  many 
— who  were  willing  to  stake  the  very  existence  of  the  Empire 
on  the  chances  of  war  in  the  hope  that  a  victorious  out- 
come would  strengthen  the  position  of  the  Government  and 
prevent  the  possibility  of  a  revolution. 

All  these  momentous  questions,  lightly  touched  upon 
in  the  preceding  pages,  had  been  the  subject  of  frequent 
exhaustive  and  earnest  discussions  between  the  late  Count 


80  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Witte  and  myself  in  our  daily  walks  and  drives  during  the 
Peace  Conference  at  Portsmouth.  Barring  some  divergences 
of  opinion  on  diplomatic  matters — to  which  I  have  referred 
at  some  length  in  a  preceding  chapter — we  were  entirely  of 
one  mind  in  regard  to  all  main  points  and  above  all  in  regard 
to  the  absolute  necessity  for  Russia  to  remain  at  peace  with 
all  the  world. 

But  then  Count  Witte  had  been,  like  myself,  relegated 
to  the  innocuous  inactivity  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire  or 
Upper  House  of  the  Russian  Parliament  ;  he  was  notoriously 
disliked  personally  and  even  distrusted  by  the  Sovereign, 
and  he  had  no  means  whatever  of  influencing  the  policy  of 
the  Government. 

His  successor,  Stolypin,  was  the  last  really  strong  man 
we  ever  had  at  the  helm  of  the  ship  of  State.  Had  he  lived, 
he  might  have  saved  the  country. 

But  it  was  not  to  be.  Stolypin  fell  a  victim  to  the 
assassin's  bullet,  and  he  was  succeeded  in  the  office  of  Prime 
Minister  by  a  man  who  himself  would  hardly  have  claimed 
to  be  a  strong  man. 

The  new  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  (created  later  Count) 
Kokovtseff,  was  a  typical  bureaucrat  in  the  best  sense  of 
the  word.  He  had  rendered  invaluable  services  to  the 
State  as  Minister  of  Finance,  an  office  which  he  continued 
to  hold  in  conjunction  with  that  of  Prime  Minister.  It 
was  owing  to  his  cautious  and  skilful  administration  of  our 
finances  that  Russia  had  been  able  to  traverse  unaffected 
in  her  credit  the  double  crisis  of  the  Japanese  War  and  the 
subsequent  Revolution.  He  was  a  man  of  the  highest  per- 
sonal character,  of  spotless  integrity  and  enlightened  views. 
I  also  believe  his  views  in  matters  of  foreign  policy  to  have 
been  entirely  sound.  But  he  did  not  seem  to  have  been  in 
a  position  to  exercise  the  influence  which  one  usually  associates 
with  the  idea  of  the  Premiership.  Besides,  he  was  retired  from 
his  offices,  both  as  Premier  and  as  Minister  of  Finance, 
five  months  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  cannot  be 
held  responsible  in  any  way  whatever  for  the  fatal  results 
of  a  policy  which  he  had  never  been  in  a  position  to  control, 

I  regret  not  to  be  able  to  say  as  much  of  Mr.  Sazonoff, 
who  had  succeeded  Mr.  Iswolsky  as  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  on  the   appointment  of    the  latter,  whose   assistant 


RUSSIAN   STATESMEN  81 

he  had  been,  to  the  post  of  Ambassador  in  Paris.  In  render- 
ing a  willing  tribute  to  his  honourable  character  as  a  gentleman 
and  to  the  purity  of  his  intentions,  I  can  only  say  that  it 
was  not  his  fault,  but  his  misfortune,  as  it  was  the  evil  star 
of  Russia,  that  he  should  have  been  fated  to  play  one  of  the 
leading  parts  in  the  most  awful  tragedy  the  world  has  ever 
seen. 

He  had,  moreover,  the  additional  misfortune  to  succeed 
at  the  head  of  the  Foreign  Department  the  last  really  com- 
petent Minister  we  ever  had,  and  to  become  in  the  sequel 
the  object  of  egregious  flattery  in  the  Press  of  the  allied 
countries,  such  as  was  subsequently  and  for  the  same  motive 
showered  on  the  mulish  Miliukoff,  the  sinister  Kerensky  and 
the  preposterous  Terestchenko. 

I  have  previously  expressed  the  high  regard  I  always 
entertained  for  Mr.  Iswolsky  as  a  real  statesman  in  the 
European  sense,  competent  to  deal  with  his  colleagues  of 
Western  nations  on  a  footing  of  equality.  Although  I  have 
always  been  a  confirmed  opponent  of  the  political  system 
of  which  he  was  an  adept,  and  the  fatal  results  of  which  it 
was  his  tragic  destiny  to  realize  before  his  untimely  end,  I 
feel  bound,  as  a  last  tribute  to  his  memory,  to  give  expression 
to  my  conviction  that  had  he  continued  at  the  head  of  our 
Foreign  Department  he  would  never  have  become  a  tool  in 
the  hands  of  others  ;  and  my  belief  that  when  in  the  winter 
of  1916-17  it  had  become  abundantly  evident  that  the 
salvation  of  Russia,  and  for  the  matter  of  that  of  the  whole 
world,  depended  on  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  he 
would  have  insisted — and  he  would  have  assuredly  known 
how  to  insist — on  the  recognition  by  the  Allies  of  Russia's 
right  to  have  her  voice  listened  to  with  the  respect  to  which 
she  was  entitled  in  a  matter  that  was  for  her  a  matter  of 
life  or  death. 

At  the  time  to  which  I  refer  in  this  chapter — that  is  to 
say,  in  the  summer  of  1912 — it  was  perfectly  evident  to  any- 
one who  followed  in  the  reports  of  the  Press  the  course  of 
events  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula — and,  having  severed  my 
connection  with  the  Foreign  Department,  there  were  no 
other  sources  of  information  accessible  to  me — that  the 
weakening  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  consequent  upon  the 
perturbed     internal     condition     created     by     the     Turkish 

VOL.    II  G 


82  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Revolution  of  1908  and  the  military  reverses  suffered  in 
the  war  with  Italy,  was  certain  to  embolden  the  several 
Christian  States  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  Serbia,  Bulgaria, 
Greece  and  Montenegro,  to  unite  in  an  effort  to  satisfy  their 
various  territorial  claims  by  force  of  arms  and  in  the  complete 
dismemberment  of  European  Turkey. 

The  formation  of  this  Balkan  League  was  said  to  have 
been  favoured  by  our  diplomacy  in  the  somewhat  naive 
belief  that  it  would  be  directed  against  Austria-Hungary. 
Whether  there  was  any  truth  in  this  story  I  am  unable 
to  say.  Meanwhile  the  Great  Powers  had  been  seriously 
concerned  about  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  Balkans, 
and  after  due  deliberation  had  determined  upon  a  concerted 
diplomatic  action  in  the  shape  of  representations  by  the 
Ministers  of  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary,  acting  as  man- 
datories of  the  Powers,  to  be  made  at  the  Balkan  capitals 
on  October  8th,  to  the  effect  (i)  that  the  Powers  would 
reprove  any  belligerent  action  ;  (2)  that  they  would  assist 
in  securing  reforms  in  the  administration  of  European 
Turkey  which  would  not  infringe  on  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Sultan  or  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  ;  (3)  that 
in  case  of  war  they  would  not  permit  at  the  end  of  the  conflict 
any  modification  of  the  territorial  status  quo  in  European 
Turkey. 

For  their  superior  wisdom  in  attempting  to  lecture  four 
independent — albeit  only  Balkan — Powers  disposing  jointly 
of  armed  forces  numbering  about  half  a  million  men  and 
bent  on  attacking  Turkey  for  the  very  purpose  of  its  dis- 
memberment, to  lecture  them  on  the  subject  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Sultan  and  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  and  to  threaten  them  with  the  formidable  spectre 
of  the  status  quo,  that  p07is  asinorum  of  embarrassed  diplo- 
macy in  the  presence  of  ticklish  problems,  the  originators, 
whoever  they  may  have  been,  of  this  remarkable  plan  of 
concerted  diplomatic  action  were  rewarded  by  the  receipt 
of  telegraphic  intelligence  to  the  effect  that  on  that  very 
same  day — October  8,  1912 — the  Prince  of  Montenegro  had 
severed  diplomatic  relations  with  Turkey  and  declared 
war  ! 

It  was  plain  that  once  a  burning  match  had  been  thrown 
into  that  powder  magazine  of  the  Balkans  it  would  not  take 


THE  DANGER  OF  THE  BALKANS   83 

long  for  the  train  of  powder  laid  from  there  to  the  two 
nearest  European  capitals  to  explode  the  gigantic  mine 
which  was  to  shake  a  continent,  and  in  the  planting  of  which 
all  the  Great  Powers  had  had  their  share,  until,  by  the 
conclusion  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  and  the  entente 
with  Great  Britain,  the  division  of  Europe  in  two  irrecon- 
cilably hostile  camps  had  been  completed. 

The  danger  seemed  imminent.  If  anything  could  be 
attempted  to  avert  it,  it  would  have  to  be  done  without 
delay. 

That  is  why  I  made  up  my  mind,  then  and  there,  to  do 
what  will  be  succinctly  related  below.  Before  proceeding 
with  my  narrative,  however,  I  beg  to  apologize  to  my  readers 
for  having  had,  and  for  being  obliged  to  continue,  to  introduce 
so  frequently  the  personal  pronoun  in  the  tale  I  have  to  tell. 
The  fact  that  these  pages  contain  merely  personal  reminis- 
cences and  lay  no  claim  whatever  to  pass  for  history,  may 
perhaps  serve  as  an  excuse,  if  not  a  justification,  for  my 
abuse  of  a  form  of  speech  which  sounds  more  egotistical 
than  it  is  meant  to  be. 

The  task  I  had  determined  to  undertake,  the  task  of 
sounding  a  warning  and  of  pointing  out  the  imminence  of 
the  danger  to  which  would  lead  the  course  of  policy  we  had 
been  pursuing  for  the  last  twenty-five  years,  was  not  only 
an  ungrateful  but  also  a  hopeless  one.  Both  ungrateful 
and  hopeless  because  it  meant  swimming  against  a  powerful 
current,  not  only  of  official  policy  but  likewise  of  what  passes 
for  public  opinion.  It  had  been  initiated  by  the  Court, 
and  the  Court  was  wedded  to  it.  Fashion  had  sanctioned 
it.  Society  had  adopted  it  as  its  fetish.  Those  who  under- 
stood how  little  it  corresponded  to  the  real  interests  of  the 
country  and  foresaw  how  catastrophal  for  Russia  would  be 
the  outcome  of  the  war  it  was  leading  up  to,  dared  not  oppose 
it  for  fear  of  being  considered  "  pro-German,"  especially  if 
they  bore  a  German  name,  and  had  sufficient  self-respect 
not  to  plead  that  they  were  of  Dutch,  or  Swedish,  or  Danish, 
or  Norwegian  descent.  It  is  one  of  the  peculiar  and  regret- 
table characteristics  of  our  society  that  no  one  is  supposed 
to  be  simply  and  solely  "  pro-Russian  "  and  to  be  in  his 
views  in  matters  of  foreign  policy  unbiased  by  any  senti- 
mental leanings  "  pro  "   this  or  "  pro  "  that  country. 


84  FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

In  no  country  that  I  know  of  has  this  singular  predomi- 
nance of  the  question  of  "  orientation,"  as  they  call  it,  in  the 
direction  of  some  foreign  country  or  other,  any  existence 
comparable,  in  the  intensity  and  bitterness  it  engenders, 
to  conditions  existing  in  contemporary  Russia.  This  pre- 
dominance was,  indeed,  characteristic  of  the  state  of  society 
in  the  Poland  of  the  eighteenth  century,  where  the  feelings 
it  summoned  forth  were  raging  with  particular  virulence, 
and  it  led  in  the  end  to  the  downfall  and  partition  of  the 
country  among  its  neighbours. 

As  far  as  I  was  personally  concerned  this  state  of  things 
meant  a  serious  handicap  in  my  endeavours  to  make  the 
ruling  Powers  realize  the  dangerous  character  of  the  policy 
they  were  pursuing,  since  whatever  I  might  have  to  say 
would  be  attributed  to  the  fact  of  my  bearing  a  German 
name.  This  was,  indeed,  the  conclusive  argument  brought 
forward  by  a  very  distinguished  Polish  gentleman,  who 
in  an  anonymous  article  in  a  French  review  attacked  me — 
in  perfectly  courteous  terms,  I  am  pleased  to  say — on  the 
subject  of  my  views  on  the  international  situation  and  the 
policy  of  Russia  as  developed  in  a  secret  memorandum 
submitted  to  the  Emperor  which  I  had  had  printed  as  a 
secret  document  at  the  Government  printing  office,  for  dis- 
tribution among  the  leading  personages  of  the  Government 
and  of  the  Houses  of  Parliament,  and  the  proof  sheets  of 
which  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  my  critic,  as  he  mentions 
himself  in  his  article. 

There  was,  of  course,  nothing  new  for  me  in  such  an 
argument.  When  I  had  advocated  avoidance  of  a  conflict 
with  Japan,  I  had  been  accused  of  being  pro-Japanese  ; 
when  at  the  time  of  the  Boer  War  I  had  been  in  favour  of 
a  friendly  understanding  with  Great  Britain  instead  of 
joining  the  chorus  of  senseless  vituperation  against  her 
which  was  then  prevalent  all  over  the  world,  I  was  suspected 
of  being  pro-English,  just  as  now  if  I  tried  to  oppose  a  policy 
which  was  bound  to  lead  to  a  war  with  our  Western  neigh- 
bours I  would  be  reproached  with  being  "  pro-German." 
The  difference  would  be  only  that  in  the  two  former  cases, 
my  name  being  neither  Japanese  nor  English,  it  could  not 
be  used  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  the  disinterestedness 
of  my  political  opinions,  whereas  in  the  latter  case,  my  name 


AN  ANONYMOUS  ATTACK  85 

being  unquestionably  German,  my  opponents  would  be  sure 
to  utilize  it  to  invalidate  my  arguments  with  what  they  would 
think  crushing  effect. 

Against  similar  insinuations  I  was,  of  course,  defenceless. 
They  were  not,  however,  to  be  considered  a  quite  negligible 
quantity,  because  already  the  peculiar  mentality  was  preva- 
lent in  Russia  which  made  our  Government  change  the  name 
of  the  capital  of  the  country  from  St.  Petersburg  to  Petro- 
grad,  a  mentality  which  one  would  hardly  consider  to  fit 
its  possessors  for  the  task  of  presiding  over  the  destinies  of 
a  great  nation. 

Whilst  in  a  sense  my  name  alone  was  a  serious  handi- 
cap, it  was  rendered  even  more  so  by  the  fact  that  it  was 
accompanied  by  the  nowadays  entirely  meaningless  title  of 
"  Baron,"  which  stamped  me  as  a  descendant  of  a  long 
line  of  Knights  who  seven  centuries  ago  had  invaded  what 
is  now  Esthonia  and  Livonia.  First,  as  an  independent 
order  of  Knighthood,  then  under  the  Sovereignty  of  Denmark, 
further  of  Sweden,  and  lastly,  since  Peter  the  Great  of 
Russia,  they  had  administered  the  country  more  or  less 
autonomously,  had  raised  it  to  a  comparatively  high  degree 
of  civilization  and  prosperity,  and  had  always  been  counted 
among  the  most  loyal  subjects  of  their  Sovereigns — all  of 
which  brands  their  unfortunate  descendants  with  the  mys- 
terious odium  of  "  feudalism,"  although  they  may  have 
long  ceased  to  have  any  connection  whatever  with  the  lands 
so  "  iniquitously  "  possessed  by  their  ancestors  for  many 
centuries. 

On  the  other  hand,  this  very  handicap  protected  me 
from  the  suspicion  of  entertaining  any  views  of  personal 
ambition  whatever.  The  same  Polish  gentleman,  himself 
a  former  member  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire  (a  member 
by  election  having  served  his  term),  alludes  to  this  circum- 
stance in  a  playful  but  entirely  convincing  and  conclusive 
way  in  the  following  sentences,  which  I  quote  from  his 
above-mentioned  article  : 

If  an  old  and  malicious  member  of  the  Council  is  to  be  believed, 
the  members  of  the  noble  Assembly  (of  course  those  appointed  by 
the  Crown)  are  divided  into  two  categories  :  those  who  are  "  seated  " 
and  those  who  are  still  "  climbing."  Has  M.  de  Rosen  definitively 
"  seated  "  himself  ?     During  the  last  session  he  has  appeared  on  the 


86  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

tribune  with  distinction.  Nevertheless  there  is  no  reason  to  beUeve 
that  he  is  "  cUmbing."  He  is  too  well  advised  not  to  know  that  in 
these  times  of  morbid  nationalism  to  be  appointed  to  a  post  of  first- 
class  importance  it  is  first  of  all  necessary  to  be  in  possession  of  a 
name  ending  in  "  off,"  "  eff,"  or  "in."  [These  are  terminations  of 
purely  Russian  names  ;  the  author  of  the  article  does  not  even 
mention  terminations  in  "  o,"  "  e,"  or  "  sky,"  all  of  which  cast  on 
a  name  the  suspicion  of  "  Little  Russianism,"  or  even,  more  dreadful 
still,  of  "  Polonism."]  I  believe  that  he  simply  takes  an  interest  in 
world  events  :  Quorum  pars  magna  fuit.  No  one  is  more  entitled  to 
do  it,  nor  is  more  competent. 

I  have  quoted  this  unexceptionable  testimony  of  a  dis- 
tinguished Pohsh  gentleman,  who  hardly  could  be  suspected 
of  not  being  a  sufficiently  ardent  adherent  of  the  "  Entente," 
because  it  controverts  one  of  the  favourite  legends  indus- 
triously spread  abroad  by  the  war  propaganda,  namely, 
that  of  the  predominance  of  "  German  influence  "  supposed 
to  have  existed  in  Russia,  at  Court  and  in  the  Government, 
and  to  have  been  exercised  by  "  Baltic  Barons  "  and  other 
Russian  subjects  of  German  descent,  inasmuch  as  it  points 
so  plainly  to  the  reason  why  it  would  have  been  impossible 
even  for  a  man  like  myself,  with  nothing  German  about  him 
but  his  name,  to  aspire  to  any  really  important  and  influen- 
tial position  in  the  Government. 

Moreover,  when  the  Polish  gentleman  in  question,  in 
the  above-quoted  passage  of  his  article,  refers  to  "  these  times 
of  morbid  nationalism,"  he  alludes  to  the  unquestionable 
predominance  of  a  specifically  Great  Russian  nationalism 
hostile  to  all  the  numerous  nationalities  composing  the 
population  of  the  Russian  Empire  and  its  outlying  dominions  : 
Poles,  German  Baits,  Finlanders  (both  Finns  and  Swedes), 
Jews,  Georgians,  Armenians,  and  even  including  Little 
Russians  or  so-called  "  Ukrainians."  This  hostility  had 
latterly  assumed  a  markedly  concentrated  character  specially 
directed  against  Germany,  partly  under  the  influence  of  the 
Pan-Slavistic  belief  in  the  imminent  clash  between  the 
Slav  and  the  Teuton  worlds,  and  partly  in  reliance  on 
the  encouragement  derived  from  the  latent  hostility  of  the 
Entente  towards  Germany. 

To  this  strongly  pronounced  anti-German  current  in 
Russia  corresponded  a  no  less  marked  and  influential  anti- 
Russian  current  in  Germany,  in  both  cases  mostly  confined 


THE  SECRET  MEMORANDUM  87 

to  the  middle-class  "  Intelligentzia  "  and  to  military  circles 
always  eager  for  a  clash  of  arms,  to  a  limited  degree  only 
affecting  the  upper  classes,  hardly  at  all  the  aristocracy, 
and  not  at  all  the  popular  masses,  in  spite  of  all  the  efforts 
of  "  propaganda  "  to  make  it  appear  in  a  different  light. 
Between  them  these  two  currents  were  mainly  instrumental 
in  undermining  the  dam  that  held  back  the  threatening 
flood  of  the  world  catastrophe,  and  the  leaders  of  these 
movements,  both  in  Russia  and  in  Germany  may  justly  lay 
claim — I  repeat  it  once  more — to  the  glory  of  having  effectu- 
ally contributed  to  bring  about  the  World  War,  and  to  have 
thereby  succeeded  in  achieving,  in  four  short  years,  the  ruin 
and  destruction  of  their  respective  countries,  whose  greatness 
and  prosperity  a  century  and  a  half  of  undisturbed  peace  and 
friendly  relations  between  them  had  helped  to  build  up. 

But  this  is  an  all-important  subject,  to  which  I  shall 
have  to  revert  in  another  chapter,  when  endeavouring  to 
contribute  my  modest  share  to  the  elucidation  of  the  com- 
plicated causes  and  conditions  which  led  up  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  World  War — a  matter  treated  with  consummate  skill 
and  a  great  judge's  lofty  impartiality  by  Earl  Loreburn  in 
his  admirable  book  How  the  War  Came,  which  I  may  perhaps 
be  able  to  supplement  with  some  data  theretofore  unknown 
to  its  author. 

For  the  present,  before  I  proceed  to  give  a  brief  synopsis 
of  the  secret  memorandum  I  had  prepared  for  submission 
to  the  Sovereign,  I  can  only  repeat  that  in  taking  this  step 
I  had  in  view  no  end  but  that  of  serving  to  the  best  of  my 
understanding  what  I  held  to  be  the  true  interests  of  my 
Sovereign  and  my  country. 

I  likewise  venture  to  hope  that  I  may  be  allowed  some 
indulgence  if,  in  the  sequel  of  my  narrative,  when  dealing 
with  the  acts  of  men  whose  cruel  fate  it  has  been  to  become 
unwittingly  the  artisans  of  their  country's  ruin,  it  will  not 
always  have  been  possible  for  me  to  repress  entirely  the 
bitterness  that  cannot  but  fill  the  soul  of  one  who,  after 
half  a  century's  devoted  service  to  his  country,  finds  himself 
a  fugitive  from  his  native  land,  having  had  to  witness  in 
helpless  rage  the  destruction  of  all  he  has  lived  and  worked 
for  as  a  result  of  policies  he  has  always  opposed  with  word 
and  with  pen  to  the  best  of  his  ability. 


88  FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

Having  explained  the  reason  which  prompted  me  to 
undertake  the  dehcate  and  difficult  task  of  laying  before  the 
Sovereign  a  sufficiently  lucid  and  unbiased  exposfe  of  the 
international  situation  resultant  from  the  policy  hitherto 
pursued,  so  as  to  enable  him  to  draw  therefrom,  without 
being  prompted,  his  own  conclusions,  I  may  now  state  in 
a  few  propositions  my  own  point  of  view,  as  regards  the  true 
interests  of  Russia,  from  which  I  intended  to  illuminate 
the  situation  in  my  memorandum  : 

Russia  occupying  geographically  the  greater  part  of  the 
Continent  of  Europe  and  the  whole  northern  part  of  the 
Continent  of  Asia,  should  be  considered  politically  as  a 
continent  by  itself,  situated  between  the  two,  self-contained 
and  self-sufficient,  like  the  United  States  ; 

She  has  reached  the  extreme  limits  of  her  possible  expan- 
sion in  Europe  ; 

She  has  no  political  nor  cultural  mission  to  perform  in 
Europe,  being  culturally  inferior  to  older  nations  ; 

Russia's  size  and  potential  power  alone  serve  her  as  a 
perfectly  sufficient  guarantee  of  her  territorial  integrity 
and  commanding  political  position  as  long  as  she  does  not 
herself  attempt  an  aggressive  policy,  for  the  successful 
pursuit  of  which  she  lacks  the  aptitude  and  to  which  the 
genius  of  the  Russian  people  is  averse  ; 

Russia's  cultural  mission  lies  exclusively  in  Asia,  in  the 
development  of  her  gigantic  Siberian  Empire,  and  in  the 
spread  of  her  culture,  which  is  inferior  to  Western  European 
culture,  but  vastly  superior  to  that  of  her  Central  Asiatic 
neighbours,  to  whom  Russian  domination  has  been  of  un- 
questionable  benefit ; 

Russia  is  strong  enough  not  only  to  stand  alone  by 
herself,  but  also,  so  long  as  her  hands  are  untied,  to  hold 
the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  no  general  war  being  possible 
without  her  participation  or  connivance  ; 

The  only  rational  policy  for  Russia  to  pursue  is  that  which 
Washington,  in  his  Farewell  Address,  recommended  to  his 
countrymen  :  abstention  from  entangling  alliances  of  what- 
soever kind  with  whomsoever. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  these  views  could  provoke  the  dis- 
satisfaction of  those  who  expected  to  derive  from  the  outcome 
of  a  general  war  in  Europe  some  substantial  benefit  for  their 


MY   SECRET  MEMORANDUM  89 

cause.  That  seems  to  have  been  the  reason  why  the  same 
Pohsh  gentleman,  at  the  end  of  his  article  dissecting  my 
memorandum,  in  speaking  of  his  conversations  with  some 
personages  having  access  to  the  highest  circles  and  being 
acquainted  with  the  contents  of  that  document,  relates  that, 
barring  some  matters  of  detail,  they  were  in  full  accord  with 
my  ideas,  adding  the  indignant  exclamation  :  "  And  yet  they 
are  all  patriots  !  " 

This  sarcastic  remark,  applied  to  some  few  evidently 
distinguished  Russians,  who  presumed  to  be  "  patriots  " 
of  their  own  country,  is  rather  illuminating,  it  seems  to 
me.  It  reflects  the  real  attitude  toward  Russia  and  the 
Russian  people  of  all  those  who  apprehended  lest  their 
expectation  of  a  war  between  Russia  and  her  Western 
neighbours  might  fail  of  realization  through  a  reluctance  of 
the  Russian  Government  to  engage  in  such  an  adventure 
from  motives  of  mere  "  Russian  patriotism." 

It  must  be  owned,  however,  that  the  bulk  of  Russian 
society  was  not  without  deserving  such  treatment  at  the 
hands  of  those  in  whose  cause  its  leaders  and  representatives 
were  ready  to  risk  the  welfare  and  the  very  existence  of  their 
country — a  treatment  the  cruel  humiliation  of  which  is  now 
brought  home  to  them  with  a  vengeance  by  these  same 
hands. 

The  work  I  had  determined  to  take  in  hand  was  by 
no  means  an  easy  one.  It  occupied  all  my  time  during 
the  summer  of  1912,  which  we  were  spending  at  Dinard, 
on  the  picturesque  coast  of  Brittany.  My  object  being, 
naturally,  to  produce  the  impression  I  desired  on  the 
Emperor's  mind,  and  knowing  his  character  given  to  jealousy 
of  his  authority  and  suspiciousness  of  people's  motives,  I 
had  to  be  most  careful  to  avoid  even  the  faintest  appearance 
of  wishing  to  tender  unsought  advice,  which  would  have 
been  sure  to  indispose  him  and  to  defeat  the  very  object 
I  had  in  view. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  had  to  guard  against  the  possibility 
of  being  suspected  of  some  ulterior  motive  or  ambitious 
design  of  my  own  in  having  my  memorandum  submitted  to 
him.  I  therefore  decided  to  give  it  as  near  as  possible  the 
form  and  the  character  of  a  historical  treatise  on  the  subject 
of  "  The  European  policy  of  Russia."     It  was  furthermore 


90  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

necessary,  in  regard  to  questions  not  essential  to  the  aim 
I  had  in  view,  to  avoid  anything  that  might  needlessly 
shock  the  Emperor's  prejudices  or  preconceived  ideas ; 
wherefore  I  had  either  to  tone  down  my  own  opinions  or 
else  to  avoid  touching  upon  them  at  all. 

All  this,  obviously,  could  not  but  impair  to  some  extent 
not  only  the  literary,  but  also  the  political  value  of  my 
dissertation.  But  I  had  to  sacrifice  it  to  the  importance 
of  gaining  the  main  point,  that  of  arousing  the  Emperor  to 
a  realization  of  the  danger  to  which  his  policy  was  exposing 
his  throne  and  the  country. 

The  memorandum  deals  first  with  the  history  of  the 
European  policy  of  Russia  in  as  summary  a  way  as  possible. 
Next  it  analyses  the  two  principal  ideas  which  have  been 
influencing  this  policy.  Then  it  deals  with  the  international 
situation  in  Europe,  the  genesis,  development  and  aims  of 
the  two  hostile  alliances  which  confront  each  other,  and 
lastly  with  the  Balkan  Peninsula  as  the  danger-spot  of 
Europe. 

A  cursory  glance  at  the  history  of  the  European  policy 
of  Russia  will  show  that  "  as  long  as  Russia  pursued  only 
well-defined  aims  which  conformed  to  the  real  needs  of  the 
State  and  which  were  practicably  attainable,  this  policy 
was  entirely  successful.  All  the  tasks  which  the  far-seeing 
genius  of  Peter  the  Great  had  sketched  out  for  Russia  and 
the  realization  of  which  he  had  begun  himself,  were  carried 
to  completion  by  his  successors,  Catherine  the  Great  and 
Alexander  the  First.  The  shores  not  only  of  the  Gulf  of 
Finland  and  of  the  Baltic,  but  also  of  the  Black  Sea, 
became  Russian,  and  with  the  territories  peopled  by  Russians 
reconquered  from  Poland,  and  with  the  inclusion  in  the 
confines  of  the  Empire  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Finland,  the 
Kingdom  of  Poland  and  of  Bessarabia,  it  would  seem  that 
the  natural  limit  of  Russia's  expansion  on  the  Continent 
of  Europe  had  been  reached,  with  the  exception,  perhaps, 
of  a  part  of  Galicia,  with  a  population  mainly  of  '  Little 
Russian  '  stock,  which  was  made  over  to  Austria  at  the 
Partition  of  Poland.  One  might  even  question  whether 
it  served  the  best  interest  of  Russia  to  have  included  in 
the  confines  of  the  Empire  the  Kingdom  of  Poland.  It 
could  not  be  doubted,  however,  that  any  further  territorial 


THE   "GREAT  SLAV  IDEA"  91 

acquisitions  in  Europe  would  have  been  for  Russia  merely 
a  source  of  weakness  and  perhaps  might  have  threatened 
the  disruption  of  the  overgrown  Empire," 

The  disastrous  Crimean  War  was  brought  on  through  the 
overweening  ambition  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas  I  to  play 
a  leading  part  in  the  Near  East.  The  dominant  position 
which  Russia  had  been  occupying  in  Europe  since  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  had  encouraged  such  an  ambition,  but 
it  also  caused  the  formation  of  a  coalition  of  England, 
France,  Turkey  and  even  Sardinia,  against  Russia,  which 
inflicted  on  her  a  humiliating  defeat. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  on  conditions 
humiliating  to  the  dignity  of  Russia,  our  policy  assumed 
for  a  time  an  attitude  of  reserve  aptly  characterized  by 
the  Chancellor  Prince  Gortschakoff's  well-known  saying  : 
"  Russia  does  not  sulk,  she  collects  herself."  It  was  the 
beginning  of  the  era  of  wide  and  beneficent  reforms,  such 
as  the  liberation  of  the  serfs,  the  judiciary  reform,  the 
introduction  of  the  self-governing  "  Zemstvos,"  and  so  forth, 
inaugurated  by  the  Emperor  Alexander  II, 

But  in  the  seventies  of  last  century  began  the  preoccu- 
pation of  our  pubHc  opinion  with  the  idea  of  the  so-called 
tasks  cut  out  for  Russia  in  the  Near  East  in  connection 
partly  with  the  "  Great  Slav  Idea,"  partly  with  dreams  of 
the  conquest  of  Tsargrad  (Constantinople)  and  the 
Straits. 

The  influence  of  this  idea  on  the  direction  of  our  policy 
had,   directly  or  indirectly,   the  following  consequences  : 

"  It  led  to  the  war  with  Turkey  in  iSyy-yS,  the  outcome 
of  which,  aside  from  the  satisfaction  derived  from  having 
accomplished  an  act  of  disinterested  magnanimity  in  the 
liberation  of  Bulgaria  from  the  Turkish  yoke,  did  not  give 
the  Russian  people  anything  but  disillusionment  as  to  the 
results  achieved  at  the  cost  of  so  much  blood  and  treasure. 
And  this  disillusionment,  in  its  turn,  created  most  favour- 
able conditions  for  the  development  of  the  germs  of  revolu- 
tion sown  by  the  internal  enemies  of  Russia  ; 

"  It  was  the  cause  of  the  attribution  to  Russia  of  far- 
reaching  plans  in  relation  to  the  conquest  of  the  Straits 
and  the  bugbear  of  '  Pan-Slavism,'  at  the  same  time  inten- 
sifying the  general  suspicion  with  which  her  policy  has  always 


92  FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

been  regarded,  which  suspicion  made  itself  felt  in  the  general 
opposition  she  met  with  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  ; 

"  It  was  the  cause  of  the  rupture  of  the  friendly  under- 
standing with  Germany  and  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Austro- 
German  alliance,  and  also  of  the  disruption  of  the  alhance 
of  the  Three  Emperors,  which  had  been  the  guarantee  of 
the  security  of  Russia's  western  frontiers  ; 

"  It  led  to  the  conclusion  of  an  alhance  with  France, 
which  entangled  us  in  a  sphere  of  interests  entirely  alien 
to  Russia,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  interests  of  the  French 
revanche  for  Sedan  and  of  the  reconquest  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  and  later  on  also  of  the  Anglo-German  antagonism  ; 
in  other  words,  of  the  conflicting  interests  which  are  bound 
to  bring  about  the  future  general  war  in  Europe  ; 

"  It  was  also  indirectly  the  cause  of  our  armed  conflict 
with  Japan,  because  it  prevented  us  from  giving  due  mihtary 
support  in  time,  with  all  the  power  of  the  State,  to  our  Far 
Eastern  pohcy,  by  which  alone  that  conflict  could  have  been 
prevented,  and  at  the  same  time  it  caused  us  to  keep  our 
best  troops  inactive  on  our  western  frontier,  whilst  our 
reserve  troops  were  being  defeated  in  far-away  Manchuria  ; 

"  Finally,  it  is  this  influence  alone  that  could  have  induced 
us  to  raise  quite  gratuitously  the  question  of  the  annexa- 
tion by  Austria  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  to  which  we  had 
already  in  principle  assented  at  the  Congress  of  Berhn," 
a  proceeding  the  negative  result  of  which  caused  much 
bad  blood  in  Russia  and  embittered  our  relations  with  the 
neighbouring  Monarchy. 

Considering  how  great,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  the 
influence  of  this  idea  of  Russia's  supposed  tasks  in  the 
Near  East,  it  will  not  come  amiss  to  examine  the  question 
how  far  these  tasks  could  possibly  correspond  to  the  true 
interests  of  Russia  and  how  far  they  are  susceptible  of  practical 
realization. 

Here  we  find  ourselves  at  once  in  the  presence  of  the 
so-called  "  Great  Slav  Idea,"  which  in  the  opinion  of  our 
Slavophiles  should  serve  as  a  guiding  star  for  our  foreign 
policy. 

"  To  begin  with,  it  must  be  said  that  the  Great  Slav 
Idea  originated  in  Moscow  about  the  middle  of  last  century 
in  literary  and  not  at  all  in  political  circles,  and  that  not 


RUSSIA   AND    SLAVDOM  93 

one  of  the  adepts  of  this  idea  has  ever  been  able  to  bring 
it  down  from  the  clouds  of  dreamy  sentimentalism  into  the 
region  of  clearly  defined  propositions  which  conld  serve  as  a 
basis  for  rational  political  calculations.  Poetic  notions  of 
an  ideal  future  when  the  '  Slav  rivers  will  all  come  together 
in  the  Russian  Sea,'  as  well  as  the  contemporary  lucubra- 
tions of  our  writers  and  orators  of  the  Slavophile  camp  as 
regards  the  '  pacific  cultural  unification  of  Slavdom  under 
the  headship  of  Russia,'  all  float  in  the  clouds  of  phantasy 
and  are  bare  of  any  substantial  foundation.  Likewise  all 
enterprises  based  on  similar  ideas,  as  for  instance  a  United 
Slav  Bank,  exhibitions  of  Russian  wares,  Russian  bookstores 
in  Slav  countries,  either  do  not  materialize  at  all  or  else  are 
barely  kept  alive.  It  must  also  be  said  that  all  attempts 
at  artificially  creating  a  '  cultural  unification  '  (whatever 
may  be  understood  under  this  somewhat  vague  expression) 
between  Russia  and  Slavdom,  are  doomed  in  advance, 
for  the  simple  reason  that  such  a  '  unification,'  however 
desirable  it  may  appear  from  an  ideal  point  of  view,  does 
not  correspond  to  any  concrete  interest  either  of  Russia  or 
of  Slavdom. 

"  As  far  as  material  culture  is  concerned,  Russia  stands 
in  as  little  need  of  Slavdom  as  Slavdom  does  of  Russia. 
Culture  in  the  Slav  countries  of  Austria  stands  by  no  means 
on  a  lower  plane  than  in  Russia,  and  in  Bohemia,  for  instance, 
one  might  say  on  a  higher  one.  In  the  Slav  States  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  our  commerce  and  industry  could  not 
compete  with  those  of  Austria  and  Germany  otherwise  than 
at  a  loss,  because  in  Russia  they  are  protected  by  an  extremely 
high  tariff,  and  the  southern  Slav  countries  will  always 
find  commerical  relations  with  the  neighbouring  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy  more  convenient  as  well  as  more  pro- 
fitable than  commercial  relations  with  far-away  Russia. 

"  As  far  as  intellectual  culture  is  concerned  the  Balkan 
Slavs  (not  to  mention,  of  course,  the  Austrian  Slavs)  will 
unquestionably  prefer,  in  spite  of  their  apparent  '  Germano- 
phobia,'  to  go  in  search  of  it  to  its  western — and  preferably 
even  German  as  the  nearest — fountain-head. 

"  But  even  from  a  purely  sentimental  point  of  view 
there  can  be  no  question  of  a  unification  of  Slavdom  under 
the  headship  of  Russia,  as  long  as  the  PoHsh  branch  of  the 


94  FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

race — that  is  to  say,  the  most  numerous  and  culturally  most 
developed  of  all  the  non-Russian  Slav  nations — shows  itself, 
as  it  has  always  done,  irrevocably  hostile  not  only  to  the 
Russian  State,  but  to  the  Russian  people.  As  regards 
the  irresistible  sympathies  said  to  be  drawing  the  Austrian 
Slavs  towards  Russia,  it  is  sufficiently  evident  that  their 
flirtations  with  her  pursue  a  plainly  selfish  end ;  that  is  to 
say,  to  obtain  from  the  Austrian  Government  the  concessions 
they  want  by  threatening  that  Government  with  the  spectre 
of  Pan-Slavism  under  the  leadership  of  Russia.  And  the 
new-fangled  Austro-Slavism,  which  has  caused  so  much 
disillusionment  of  our  Slavophiles,  is  certainly  not  treason 
to  the  '  cause  of  United  Slavdom,'  which  exists  only  m  the 
imagination  of  dreamy  ideologues,  but  is  based  on  a 
rational  appreciation  of  their  own  material  interests. 

"  But  our  flirtations  with  the  Austrian  Slavs  by  means 
of  the  Press  and  the  oratorical  exertions  of  some  of  our 
volunteer  pohticians  have  at  last  caused  Austria  to  begin 
extremely  undesirable,  if  not  dangerous,  flirtations  with  our 
own  '  Ukrainophiles,'  and  other  elements  hostile  to  the 
Russian  State  and  treasonably  dreaming  of  the  dismember- 
ment of  Russia. 

"  The  sympathy  of  the  Balkan  Slavs  for  Russia  is  un- 
questionably more  sincere.  But  this  sympathy  is  not  so 
much  based  on  racial  afiinity  as  on  sentiments  of  gratitude 
for  great  and  disinterested  benefactions  conferred  in  the 
past  and  on  the  expectation  of  their  continuance  in  the  future. 
But  even  these  sympathies  have  their  limits.  The  author 
of  this  memorandum,  when  he  was  Minister  at  Belgrade, 
has  had  more  than  once  to  listen  to  expressions  of  soreness 
and  disappointment  from  the  lips  of  Pan-Serbian  patriots 
on  the  subject  of  the  preference  shown  by  Russia  at  the 
Berhn  Congress  for  Bulgarian  interests,  and  of  the  sacrifice 
of  Serbian  interests  in  favour  of  Austria.  I  have  had  to 
explain  that  the  war  for  the  Hberation  of  Bulgaria  could 
not  have  been  undertaken  by  us  if  we  had  not  in  advance 
secured  the  neutrality  of  Austria  by  consenting  to  the 
occupation  by  her  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  further- 
more that  it  was  only  thanks  to  our  victory  in  this  war  that 
Serbia  herself  was  enabled  to  throw  off  the  suzerainty  of 
Turkey,  whose  vassal    she    had    been,  and  that  therefore 


THE   BALKAN   SLAVS  95 

we  did  not  deserve  such  reproaches.  And  even  Bulgaria, 
which  had  just  been  hberated  by  us  at  the  cost  of  rivers  of 
the  Russian  people's  blood  and  treasure,  did  not  hesitate 
to  oppose  most  energetically  our  attempts  to  exploit  our 
newly  acquired  influence  for  some  purpose  of  which  we 
ourselves  did  not  have  any  clear  conception,  and  to  seek  the 
support  of  our  political  adversaries.  It  would,  however, 
have  been  unjust  to  consider  this  to  have  been  a  demonstra- 
tion of  ingratitude  on  the  part  of  a  people  who  undoubtedly 
highly  prized  the  benefaction  conferred  on  her  by  Russia. 
They  merel}/  showed  themselves  possessed  of  the  sound 
political  instinct  which  placed  the  safeguarding  of  the  true 
independence  of  the  newly  created  State  above  sentimental 
considerations. 

"  Such  was  the  true  nature  of  our  relations  with  the 
world  of  Slavdom  as  it  appeared  to  every  unprejudiced 
observer. 

"  Our  society  has  always  been  too  much  inclined  to 
attach  to  the  element  of  racial  affinity  an  exaggerated 
importance,  which,  as  historj''  amply  demonstrates,  it  has 
never  had  nor  ever  can  have  in  international  pohtics.  It 
is  to  this  tendency,  and  hkewise  to  the  inveterate  habit  of 
our  society  to  mix  up  the  domain  of  sympathies  and  anti- 
pathies with  that  of  pohtics,  that  must  be  attributed  the 
hypnotic  influence  which  the  Great  Slav  Idea  has  exercised 
over  the  public  mind,  reflected  in  the  vacillating  and  some- 
times contradictory  policies  pursued  by  our  diplomacy  in 
the  Near  East." 

An  analysis  of  these  pohcies  and  their  effect  on  the  general 
international  situation  in  Europe  I  shall  have  to  reserve  for 
the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER    XXXI 

Pan-Slavism — Austrian  Slavs — Constantinople  and  the  Straits — British 
apprehensions — Folly  of  Russian  ambitions — Importance  of  neutralizing 
the  Straits — Russia's  real  mission — Rivalry  of  the  Great  Powers — 
Fate  nf   my  memorandum — German  influence. 

I  HAVE  endeavoured,  following  the  lines  of  my  memoran- 
dum to  the  Emperor,  to  demonstrate  the  unreality  of  the 
so-called  "  Great  Slav  Idea,"  alias  "  Pan-Slavism,"  as  a 
possible  factor  in  practical  politics,  and  consequently  the 
inadvisability  of  adopting  it  as  a  guiding  star  in  the  con- 
duct of  Russia's  foreign  policy.  I  shall  now  have  to  ex- 
plain why  it  was  that  this  idea,  inasmuch  as  it  influenced 
the  policy  of  our  Government,  or  even  merely  the  attitude 
of  our  diplomatic  or  consular  agents  who  frequently  acted 
without  authority  in  reliance  on  the  unfailing  support  of 
the  Slavophile  Press,  had  become  a  stumbling-block  on  the 
road  to  a  friendly  understanding  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  and  a  constant  source  of  mutual  irritation. 

In  order  to  understand  the  situation,  it  is  necessary  to 
remember  that  of  the  three  principal  nationalities  com- 
posing the  population  of  the  Monarchy  the  Slavs  were 
numerically  the  strongest  element  ;  next  came  the  Germans, 
and  last  the  Hungarians  or  Magyars.  Politically,  however, 
the  Germans  as  the  dominant  nationality  occupied  the 
first  place  ;  next  came  the  Magyars,  and  last  the  Slavs. 
Although  since  1867  Hungary  had  become  a  semi-inde- 
pendent kingdom  united  to  Austria  only  in  the  person  of 
the  monarch,  the  influence  of  the  Magyars  on  the  policy 
of  the  dualistic  Monarchy  was  predominant  because  the 
Austrian  Government  in  its  domestic  policy  had  adopted 
the  system  of  relying  on  Hungarian  support  as  a  counter- 
poise to  the  Slav  element,  which  in  the  Austrian  half  of 
the  Monarchy  was  numerically  in  a  considerable  majority, 

96 


PAN-SLAVISM  97 

but  which  it  was  thought  necessary  to  keep  down  poHti- 
cally.  This  policy,  on  the  face  of  it  unreasonable  and,  as 
events  have  shown,  fatal  in  its  consequences,  was  based, 
however,  on  two  considerations,  which  in  the  eyes  of  its 
advocates  among  Austrian  statesmen  were  not  unnaturally 
held  to  be  extremely  weighty  ones  : 

First,  it  responded  to  the  strongly  developed  national- 
istic feeling  of  the  German-Austrian  population  used  to 
age-long  predominance  and  reluctant  to  renounce  it  in 
favour  of  the  Slav  element.  The  second  consideration  was 
a  more  complicated  and,  in  the  eyes  of  Austrian  statesmen 
probably,  a  more  important  one.  It  was  connected  with 
the  situation  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  and  with  the  policy 
Russia  was  pursuing  or  was  supposed  to  pursue  in  regard 
to  the  Balkan  States  of  Slav  nationality. 

In  a  previous  chapter  relating  to  the  time  when  I  was 
Minister  to  Serbia  I  have  referred  to  the  curious  effect 
produced  on  the  policies  of  the  Slav  States  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  by  the  rival  influences  of  Russia  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  Thus  Bulgaria  would  seek  the  support  of  the 
former  against  the  latter,  and  Serbia  the  support  of  Russia 
against  Austria-Hungary,  and  vice  versa  as  circumstances 
might  require  ;  the  result  being  that  the  Vienna  Govern- 
ment would  consider  one  or  the  other  of  the  Balkan  Slav 
States  as  potentially  most  dangerous  outposts  of  Russia 
against  Austria-Hungary,  the  more  so  as  the  Southern 
Slavs  would  naturally  be  in  full  sympathy  with  the  Slav 
populations  of  the  Monarchy  and  would  always  be  willing 
as  well  as  able  to  foment  among  them  discontent  and  a 
rebellious  spirit. 

On  the  other  hand,  Russia's  policy — as  far  as  our  Govern- 
ment could  be  said  to  have  had  any  well-defined  and  con- 
sistent pohcy — in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  was  supposed  to 
pursue  a  double  aim  :  first,  to  prevent  the  spread  of 
Austro-Hungarian  influence  in  the  Slav  States,  or,  as  Pan- 
Slavistic  doctrine  would  have  it,  to  protect  these  States 
from  the  pressure  of  Germanism  in  the  shape  of  Austria 
and  to  foil  her  supposed  aim  of  gaining  an  outlet  to  the 
.^gean  Sea  at  Salonika  ;  and,  secondly,  to  secure  in  the 
rear  of  Austria-Hungary  an  ally  who  might  prove  of  use 
in  case  of  war  with  the  Monarchy. 

VOL.   II  7 


98  FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

This  policy,  inasmuch  as  it  was  inspiring  the  activity 
of  our  diplomacy  in  the  Near  East,  was  evidently  moving 
in  a  vicious  circle.  We  were  to  antagonize  Austria-Hun- 
gary's policy  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  in  the  hope  of  thereby 
securing  an  ally  against  her  in  case  of  war,  whereas  this 
very  antagonism  was  in  reality  the  only  cause  that  could 
or  was  at  all  likely  to  lead  to  an  armed  conflict  with  the 
Dual  Monarchy. 

Treating  this  subject  in  the  above-mentioned  memoran- 
dum, I  wrote  :  "If  this  policy  is  inspired  less  by  concern 
for  the  interests  of  Russia  than  by  altruistic  considerations 
regarding  the  interests  of  the  Slavs  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula, 
the  adherents  of  this  policy  are  losing  sight  of  the  fact  that 
the  unfortunate  population  of  Madeconia,  already  liberated 
at  the  cost  of  Russian  blood  and  treasure,  was  replaced 
under  the  yoke  of  Turkey  by  the  Berlin  Congress  solely 
because  the  dread  of  the  spectre  of  '  Pan-Slavism  '  in  con- 
nection with  the  far-reaching  plans  attributed  to  Russia  on 
the  basis  of  the  '  Great  Slav  Idea  '  had  arraigned  against 
us  not  only  Austria,  but  also  the  other  Great  Powers  of 
Europe." 

Thus,  the  unfortunate  Macedonian  Slavs  had  become 
the  innocent  victims  of  Austro-Russian  antagonism,  born 
of  a  policy  dear  to  the  hearts  of  our  Slavophiles.  But  this 
antagonism  had  still  more  fatal  results.  It  had  created  a 
situation  pregnant  with  the  most  serious  consequences,  not 
for  Russia  only,  but  for  the  world,  inasmuch  as  in  case  of 
trouble  occurring  in  the  Balkans,  the  possibility  of  the 
intervention  of  Austria-Hungary  as  the  Power  most  nearly 
interested  in  Balkan  affairs  would  always  have  to  be 
reckoned  with,  and  consequently  the  likelihood  of  Russia, 
unless  guided  by  a  policy  of  reason  and  competent  states- 
manship, becoming  involved  in  a  conflict  which  would 
automatically  lead  to  a  general  war  in  Europe  owing  to 
the  play  of  existing  alliances. 

If  however,  we  could  bring  ourselves  to  renounce  the 
fetish  of  the  "  Great  Slav  Idea,"  the  question  of  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Dual  Monarchy  would  present  itself  in  quite 
another  light.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  security  of 
our  Western  frontier,  these  relations  were  of  no  less  impor- 
tance than  those  with  our  other  neighbour,  Germany,  and 


AUSTRIAN  SLAVS  99 

the  maintenance  of  friendly  relations  with  both,  as  they 
had  existed  for  a  century  and  a  half,  should  have  been 
the  first  duty  of  Russian  statesmanship,  Russia  was 
certainly  not  coveting  any  territorial  acquisitions  at  the 
expense  of  Austria-Hungary,  nor  could  the  latter  Power 
be  suspected  of  any  covetousness  in  regard  to  Russian 
possessions.  The  Austrian  flirtations  with  our  Ukraino- 
philes,  barring  some  encouragement  of  their  disloyalty  to 
Russia,  were  not  of  any  more  practical  importance  than 
our  flirtations  with  Austria's  Slav  subjects  and  our  academic 
encouragements  of  their  potential  disloyalty  to  the  Austrian 
Crown.  Both  Powers  would  certainly  have  acted  wisely  if 
they  had  put  a  damper  on  the  exertions  of  their  nation- 
alistic agitators.  But  there  existed  no  rational  ground 
whatever  for  us  to  look  askance  at  Austria's  efforts  to 
expand  her  political  influence,  after  having  been  ousted 
from  Germany,  in  the  direction  of  Southern  Slavdom. 

It  was  high  time  for  us  to  realize  that  Russia  was  not 
the  only  great  Slav  Power  in  the  world,  that  Austria  was 
another — no  more,  indeed,  exclusively  Slav  than  Russia 
herself,  but  since  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, about  two-thirds  Slav,  and  that  the  more  Slav 
countries  she  could  succeed  in  bringing  within  her  sphere 
of  interest,  the  greater  and  the  more  powerful  would  become 
the  Slav  element,  and  consequently  the  influence  of  Slavdom 
in  the  Monarchy.  The  incongruity,  therefore,  of  our  mani- 
festing in  the  supposed  interest  of  the  "  Great  Slav  Idea  "  any 
jealousy  of  our  neighbour  on  account  of  his  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  of  his  tendency  to  seek  expan- 
sion of  his  influence  southwards,  would  seem  to  be  evident. 
In  short,  there  was  no  rational  ground  whatever  for  sup- 
posing that  two  great  Slav  Powers  could  not  exist  side  by 
side  and  Uve  in  peace  and  amity  without  attempting  to 
encroach  upon  one  another's  domains  or  spheres  of  influence. 

Moreover,  such  a  consummation  would  have  had  the 
great  merit  of  having  laid  for  ever  the  ghost  of  Pan-Slavism 
under  the  headship  of  Russia,  which  for  so  long  has  been 
held  to  be  a  grave  menace  to  the  rest  of  Europe,  although 
it  has  only  been  kept  alive  by  the  empty  vapourings  of  our 
Slavophile  Press,  noisy  agitations  of  our  Slav  Benevolent 
Societies,  and  more  or  less  insubordinate  activities  of  our 


100         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

popularity-seeking  diplomats  and  consuls  in  Slav  countries. 
Pan-Slavism  under  the  headship  of  Russia  never  could 
have  become  a  reaUty  for  the  simple  reason  that  Slavdom, 
divided  itself  against  itself  by  more  than  one  deadly  feud, 
was  united  only  in  its  reluctance  to  submit  to  the  supre- 
macy, let  alone  domination,  of  Russia  in  any  shape  or 
form.  Of  this  we  had  an  enlightening  experience  when  we 
tried  our  domineering  policies  on  the  Bulgarians  we  had 
just  liberated  from  the  Turkish  yoke. 

Having  thus  exposed  in  my  memorandum  the  unwisdom 
of  suffering  our  policy  to  be  guided  by  popular  conceptions 
of  the  "Great  Slav  Idea,"  I  proceeded  to  examine  the 
other  so-called  historic  task  Russia  was  supposed  to  have 
had  cut  out  for  her  by  her  obvious  destiny  as  well  as  by 
the  unanimous  traditional  longing  of  the  Russian  people — 
the  acquisition  of  Constantinople  (Tsargrad)  and  the  Straits. 
I  first  of  all  pointed  out  that  all  the  vague  and  irresponsible 
talk  so  popular  in  our  society,  from  the  highest  circles  down 
to  the  lowest,  about  this  so-called  historic  task  of  Russia, 
had  been  the  cause  of  similar  actual  intentions  of  conquest 
being  very  generally  attributed  to  our  Government  in  spite 
of  repeated  denials  and  assurances  to  the  contrary  to  which 
neither  friend  nor  foe  seemed  to  give  any  credence.  At  the 
same  time  inveterate  and,  it  must  be  confessed,  not  quite 
groundless  suspicions  in  this  regard  had  given  rise  in  England 
in  the  public  mind  and  even  in  the  councils  of  statesmen 
to  natural  but  entirely  groundless  apprehensions  lest  the 
possession  by  Russia  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits 
might  constitute  a  serious  menace  to  England's  communi- 
cations with  India  and  to  the  safety  of  her  Indian  Empire. 
The  result,  however,  of  all  this  had  been  a  state  of  latent 
hostility  which  for  more  than  half  a  century  had  pro- 
foundly affected  the  relations  between  the  two  great 
Empires  to  the  lasting  advantage  of  neither  of  them. 

This  supposedly  "  historic  "  task  of  our  policy  in  the 
Near  East  did  not  by  any  means,  as  I  pointed  out  in  my 
memorandum,  deserve  this  qualification,  "  unless  we  were 
to  accept  as  a  reason  therefor  the  legendary  raid  on  Con- 
stantinople undertaken  by  Oleg,  Prince  of  Kiev,  in  the 
beginning  of  the  tenth  century.  Neither  Peter  the  Great 
nor  Catherine   the   Great   ever  pursued  a  similar  chimera. 


THE  DARDANELLES  101 

They  set  themselves  only  such  tasks  as  could  be  practically 
fulfilled,  and  accomplished  them,  covering  Russia's  arms 
with  undying  glory.  Catherine  the  Great  never  as  much 
as  dreamed  of  the  conquest  of  Constantinople — her  imagi- 
nation was  concerned  merely  with  the  restoration  of  the 
Byzantine  Empire  under  the  sceptre  of  a  Russian  Grand 
Duke — the  celebrated  so-called  '  Greek  Project.'  " 

"  As  regards  the  question  of  the  Straits  " — to  quote 
from  the  aforesaid  memorandum — "  it  is  high  time  to 
abandon  the  idea  that  they  represent  the  key  to  our  house 
which  we  should  put  into  our  pocket.  This  is  one  of  those 
phrases  which  convey  no  precise  meaning,  but,  being 
thoughtlessly  repeated  by  milhons  of  people,  end  by  acquir- 
ing a  hypnotic  influence  over  people's  minds."  In  reality 
these  Straits  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles  can 
just  as  little  be  considered  to  represent  the  key  to  our 
house  as  could  the  strait  known  as  the  Sound  (Oresund) 
giving  access  to  the  Baltic  Sea  from  the  North  Sea  or 
German  Ocean.  Moreover,  in  the  Black  Sea  we  still  hold 
the  superiority  of  naval  forces  as  against  Turkey,  whereas 
in  the  Baltic  it  has  already,  and,  to  all  appearances,  defi- 
nitively, passed  into  the  hands  of  a  neighbouring  Power 
whose  Navy  ranks  as  second  only  to  that  of  Great 
Britain. 

The  navigation  of  the  Straits  in  time  of  peace — that  is 
to  say  in  normal  times — being  free  to  merchantmen,  is 
closed  only  to  naval  vessels  of  all  Powers  save  Turkey, 
under  the  treaties  of  1841  and  1856.  This  latter  stipula- 
tion, depriving  our  Navy  of  the  right  of  free  egress  from 
the  Black  Sea  into  the  Mediterranean  and  free  ingress  from 
the  Mediterranean  into  the  Black  Sea,  would  seem,  indeed, 
to  constitute  a  serious  disadvantage  if  we  were  in  a  posi- 
tion to  consider  our  Black  Sea  ports  as  a  naval  base  for  a 
considerable  fleet  destined  to  operate  beyond  the  hmits  of 
that  Sea. 

Such  an  ambition,  however,  it  would  be  folly  for  us  to 
entertain,  for  the  simple  reason  that  in  case  of  a  war  with 
a  maritime  Power  the  Dardanelles,  whether  in  our  posses- 
sion or  not,  could  always  be  blockaded  and  closed  to  us 
by  a  superior  naval  force  of  the  enemy.  All  that  we  really 
needed  in  the  Black  Sea  was  a  fleet  sufficiently  strong  to 


102        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

cope  with  any  naval  force  Turkey  could  possibly  be  able 
to  put  to  sea  against  us.  To  go  beyond  that  on  the  plea 
that,  the  Straits  not  being  in  our  possession  and  therefore 
open — with  the  consent  of  Turkey — to  the  passage  of  an 
enemy  fleet,  we  needed  a  strong  naval  force  in  the  Black 
Sea  for  defensive  purposes,  would,  in  the  first  place,  be 
neglecting  what  a  recent  writer  defined  as  "  the  general  rule 
that  lesser  navies  are  but  concentrated  national  wealth  and 
power  in  bundles  convenient  for  destruction,"  a  rule  the 
wisdom  of  which  our  own  experience  in  the  Crimean  and 
Japanese  Wars  should  have  taught  us  to  respect,  and 
furthermore  would  be  objectless,  considering  that  under 
modern  conditions  coast  defence  can  be  best  assured  from 
the  shore  and  the  landing  of  considerable  forces  prevented 
or  repulsed  with  disastrous  effect  to  the  invader. 

"  It  stands  to  reason,  therefore,  that  the  whole  question 
of  the  freedom  of  the  Straits  is  for  us  more  a  matter  of 
sentiment  than  of  any  practical  importance.  Besides,  we 
may  rest  assured  that  Great  Britain  would  never  consent 
to  a  modification  to  suit  our  wishes  of  the  status  of  the 
Straits  as  established  by  the  treaties." 

(I  must  observe  here  that  this  was  written  in  the  summer 
of  1912 ;  that  is  to  say,  three  years  before  Great  Britain 
and  France  had  agreed  to  the  acquisition  by  Russia  of 
Constantinople,  the  Western  Coast  of  the  Bosphorus,  the 
Sea  of  Marmora,  the  Dardanelles,  Southern  Thrace  as  far 
as  the  Enos-Midia  line,  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  between 
the  Bosphorus  and  the  River  Sakaria,  and  a  point  on  the 
Gulf  of  Ismia  to  be  defined  later,  the  islands  in  the  vSea 
of  Marmora  and  the  islands  of  Imbros  and  Tenedos — an 
agreement  which  only  simple-minded  incompetence  could 
have  taken  for  anything  else  but  an  empty  promise  given 
in  order  to  enable  Russian  diplomacy  to  parade  before  the 
Russian  people  at  least  a  semblance  of  justification  for 
having  brought  upon  Russia  the  catastrophe  of  this  war, 
and  easy  enough  to  give  because  the  actual  reahzation  of 
any  such  combination  must  have  appeared  more  than 
doubtful.  The  value  they  attached  to  this  justification  the 
Russian  people  have  demonstrated  with  sufficient  clearness 
by  their  revolt  against  the  continuation  of  the  war,  which 
was  the  true  underlying  meaning  of  the  Russian  Revolu- 


NEUTRALIZATION  OF  THE   STRAITS     103 

tion,  in  spite  of  all  endeavours  to  obscure  this  plain  truth 
put  forward  by  war  propaganda.) 

The  taking  permanent  possession  by  us  of  the  Straits 
and  surrounding  territories  would  necessarily  involve  the 
final  liquidation  of  the  inheritance  of  the  "  Sick  Man  of 
Europe,"  which  would  be  opposed  by  all  those  laying  claim 
to  parts  of  his  estate.  Of  course  the  military  authorities 
alone  would  be  competent  to  pronounce  judgment  on  the 
question  whether  it  would  be  at  all  possible  from  a 
strategical  point  of  view  to  take  and  to  retain  permanent 
possession  of  these  Straits,  and,  if  possible,  at  what  cost  to 
the  State  and  to  the  nation.  But  this  pseudo-patriotic 
talk  about  the  necessity  for  us  of  taking  possession  of  the 
Straits  was  indulged  in  by  thousands  of  people  who  are 
either  unable  or  unwilling  to  study  closely  the  question 
whether  this  supposedly  most  important  task  of  our  foreign 
policy  was  really  susceptible  of  accomplishment  and  what 
would  be  the  consequences  for  Russia  of  the  realization,  if 
such  were  possible,  of  their  patriotic  dreams. 

There  is,  however,  one  really  most  important  interest 
of  Russia — and,  for  the  matter  of  that,  not  alone  of  Russia 
but  of  all  countries  trading  in  the  Black  Sea — connected 
with  this  question  of  the  Straits,  and  that  is  that  they 
should  at  all  times,  whether  in  peace  or  in  war,  be  free 
and  open  to  merchant  shipping  of  all  nations — a  point  that 
could  be  secured  only  by  their  neutralization  on  the  same 
lines  as  the  neutralization  of  the  Suez  Canal,  as  an  inter- 
national waterway  of  prime  importance,  under  the  joint 
guarantee  of  all  the  Great  Powers.  Only  such  a  guarantee 
assuring  the  safety  of  its  capital  could  possibly  induce  the 
Porte  to  renounce  its  unquestionable  right  to  close  the 
Straits  in  self-defence,  as  she  quite  recently  had  been  com- 
pelled to  close  them  for  a  short  time  in  view  of  a  demon- 
stration made  by  the  Itahan  fleet  during  the  Turko-Italian 
War  and  undertaken,  perhaps,  not  without  some  hope  of 
thereby  provoking  the  intervention  in  the  conflict  of  Russia 
as  the  Power  most  seriously  and  directly  affected  by  the 
closing  of  the  Dardanelles  to  navigation. 

Having  dealt  at  length  with  the  question  of  the — in 
my  opinion — dangerous  character  of  the  influence  on  our 
European   poHcy   of   the   "  Great   Slav   Idea  "   and   of   the 


104         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

dreams  of  our  would-be  conquerors  of  Constantinople  and 
the  Straits,  and  having  pointed  out  another  objectionable 
feature  of  this  influence,  namely,  that  it  distracted  our 
attention  from  the  only  real  mission  cut  out  for  Russia  by 
destiny — the  all-important  cultural  mission  in  connection 
with  our  Siberian  Empire  and  our  dominions  in  Central 
Asia,  I  next  sought  in  my  memorandum  an  answer  to  the 
query  :  In  what,  then,  consisted  really  the  task  we  had 
to  accompUsh  in  the  Near  East  ? 

The  only  possible  answer  to  this  query  was  bound  to 
be  that  the  task  we  would  have  to  set  ourselves  could  only 
be  determined,  not  by  any  fantastic  conceptions  of  the 
so-called  Great  Slav  cause,  but  by  the  real  interests  of 
Russia  as  far  as  they  were  involved  in  Balkan  affairs. 
These  interests,  in  view  of  the  manifestly  impending  crisis 
— this  was  written  in  the  summer  of  igi2 — demanded, 
first,  that  the  work  of  the  liberation  of  the  Balkan  popula- 
tions from  the  Turkish  yoke,  as  far  as  it  had  already  been 
accompUshed  at  the  cost  of  so  much  Russian  blood  and 
treasure,  should  not  be  undone  but  should  this  time  be 
carried  through  to  the  end  ;  and  lastly,  that  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  should  cease  to  be  a  storm  centre,  periodically 
disturbing  the  tranquillity  of  Europe  and  for  us  a  perennial 
menace  of  complications,  capable  of  bringing  us  into  an 
armed  conflict  with  Austria  and  consequently  of  involving 
us  in  a  general  European  war. 

It  is  evident  that  such  a  settlement  of  Balkan  affairs 
could  never  be  reached  by  agreements  about  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  status  quo  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan, 
considering  that  it  was  this  very  status  quo  that  was  the 
source  of  all  the  trouble  and  that  all  the  Balkan  States 
had  already  unitedly  determined  not  to  tolerate  it  any 
longer,  nor  to  sacrifice  any  longer  their  vital  interests  to  a 
principle  established  by  the  Great  Powers  mainly  for  the 
purpose  of  covering  up  the  rivalries  which  divided  them. 

The  impending  serious  crisis  in  Balkan  affairs  acquired  a 
character  particularly  dangerous  not  only  for  Russia  but 
for  all  Europe  in  consequence  of  the  existing  system  of 
alHances  by  which  the  Great  Powers  were  divided  into  two 
camps  in  principle — whatever  may  be  affirmed  to  the  con- 
trary— hostile  one  to  another.     There  existed  three  motives 


INTERNATIONAL  HOSTILITY  105 

for   such   hostility,   two   of   them,   however,   being   entirely- 
alien  to  Russia  ;    they  were  : 

First,  and  most  important  of  all  because  ineradicable, 
the  Franco-German  antagonism  in  connection  with  the 
question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  of  revenge  for  the  French 
defeat  in  1870-71. 

Second,  the  Anglo-German  antagonism,  born  of  com- 
mercial and  industrial  competition  and  of  rivalry  in  ever- 
growing naval  armaments — that  is  to  say,  of  causes  quite 
susceptible  of  peaceful  adjustment. 

In  neither  of  these  sources  of .  hostility  could  Russia 
have  had  any  legitimate  concern  whatever. 

And  last,  but  not  least,  the  Austro-Russian  antagonism, 
growing  out  of  our  fancied  right  of  interference  in  the  affairs 
of  the  Slav  States  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  or  the  basis  of 
the  "  Great  Slav  Idea,"  involving  our  fancied  duty  of  pro- 
tecting them  from  Austrian  influence. 

"  The  removal  of  this  last  cause  of  international  hostility 
was  entirely  within  our  power.  In  case  of  our  failure  to 
remove  it  we  might  expect  with  certainty  that  out  of  the 
impending  Balkan  crisis  would  grow  the  sanguinary  wind- 
ing up  of  the  European  drama,  in  which  we  would  unavoid- 
ably be  involved  by  the  inexorable  logic  of  events,  in  spite 
of  all  our  love  of  peace. 

"  The  believers  in  the  saving  virtue  of  the  existing 
system  of  alUances  held  that  the  equilibrium  of  forces 
which  it  had  estabhshed  was  the  best  guarantee  of  Euro- 
pean peace.  Leaving  aside  the  question  of  the  greater  or 
lesser  sincerity  of  the  believers  in  this  doctrine,  it  remained 
to  verify  its  appUcabiUty  to  the  then  existing  situation  in 
Europe  by  the  light  of  the  historic  developments  of  the 
last  forty  years. 

"  During  the  first  two  decades  after  the  Franco-Prussian 
War  nothing  threatened  the  peace  of  Europe,  neither  on 
the  part  of  Germany  nor  on  the  part  of  France,  The  inci- 
dent of  1875  in  connection  with  the  plan  of  a  new  invasion 
of  France,  whether  justly  or  gratuitously  attributed  to  the 
German  General  Staff,  but  in  any  case  abandoned  before 
maturity,  had  been  skilfully  exploited  as  a  means  of  sow- 
ing discord  between  Russia  and  Germany,  had,  indeed,  led 
to  a  marked  coolness  between  the  two  Chancellors,  Gortscha- 


106        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

koff   and   Bismarck,    but    had   not    otherwise   affected   the 
prevailing  peaceful  disposition  of  all  Europe. 

"  It  was  the  epoch  when  Germany,  first  alone,  then  in 
alliance  with  Austria-Hungary,  and  finally  with  Italy  as 
well,  disposed  of  a  superiority  of  forces  sufficient  to  rele- 
gate any  idea  of  revenge  on  the  part  of  France  to  the 
domain  of  unattainable  desiderata,  of  which — as  Gambetta 
was  supposed  to  have  said — one  might  alwa37s  think  but 
should  never  speak. 

"  But  then  this  idea  of  revenge  experienced  a  revival 
with  the  entry  of  France  into  an  alliance  with  Russia, 
having,  indeed,  furnished  the  principal  motive  for  its  con- 
clusion. At  the  same  time  the  conflict  of  interests  between 
the  two  countries  assumed  a  more  pronounced  character. 
Germany  considered  her  chief  and  vital  interest  to  lie  in 
the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  the  German  Empire,  in- 
cluding in  its  confines  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  reconquered  from 
France,  who,  under  Louis  XIV,  had  annexed  these  origin- 
ally German  provinces  in  the  seventeenth  century.  France 
on  her  part  refused  to  recognize  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  as 
having  definitively  fixed  the  frontier  between  the  two 
countries,  and  considered  the  question  of  revenge  and  of 
the  reconquest  of  the  lost  provinces  as  a  national  ideal 
which  the  French  nation  could  not  renounce  without  loss 
of  self-respect.  There  we  had  a  fundamental  conflict  whose 
solution  was  only  possible  in  two  ways  :  either  by  the 
renunciation  by  one  or  the  other  side  of  its  national  ideal — 
which,  of  course,  was  not  to  be  thought  of,  neither  side 
showing  any  inclination  in  such  a  direction,  nor  even  towards 
some  possible  compromise — or  else  by  the  arbitrament  of 
war. 

"  But  this  conflict — the  real,  basic  cause  of  the  per- 
turbed state  of  Europe — could  have  remained  a  chronic  one 
without  threatening  a  proximate  clash  of  arms  as  long  as, 
owing  to  the  manifest  superiority  of  the  forces  of  one  of 
the  sides,  a  resort  to  the  risk  of  war  was  bound  to  appear 
unnecessary  to  the  stronger  side  and  undesirable  to  the 
weaker.  It  was.  therefore,  the  establishment  of  an  equili- 
brium of  forces  that  alone  could  create  the  potentiahty  of 
a  war  between  the  two.  The  only  possible  logical  deduction 
from  these  premises  "would  necessarily  be  that  the  equili- 


"  HEGEMONY  "  107 

brium  of  forces,  established  by  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance,  far  from  being  a  safeguard  against  the 
danger  of  its  being  broken,  was  the  real  and  standing 
menace  to  the  world's  peace. 

"  However,  even  the  believers  in  the  doctrine  of  the 
equilibrium  of  forces  could  not  but  realize  that  an  equili- 
brium based  on  two  hostile  alliances,  one  of  which,  so  to 
speak,  encircles  the  other  on  two  sides  and  therefore  repre- 
sents a  standing  menace  to  the  latter,  could  at  best  serve 
as  a  guarantee  of  peace  only  so  long  as  the  encircled  party 
had  not  made  up  its  mind  to  seek  an  issue  from  such  a 
situation  at  the  cost  of  a  war,  if  need  be  even  on  two  fronts. 

"  The  adherents  of  the  political  system  which  had 
created  this  unquestionably  perilous  situation  saw  its  justi- 
fication in  the  supposed  necessity  for  Russia  to  oppose 
the  tendency  to  establish  her  hegemony  in  Europe  which 
was  attributed  to  Germany.  Whatever  may  be  understood 
by  the  sufficiently  indefinite  term  '  hegemony,'  such  a 
hegemony  as  that  established  by  the  great  Napoleon  over 
all  Europe  except  Russia  and  Great  Britain — nowadays 
practically  impossible — could  hardly  have  been  meant  by 
that  term :  the  necessity  of  opposing  it  could  evidently 
arise  for  Russia  only  in  case  such  hegemony  threatened 
any  of  her  vital  interests. 

"  No  definite  explanation  has  ever  been  forthcoming  as 
to  what  particular  interests  of  Russia,  and  in  what  way, 
could  have  been  threatened  by  such  a  hegemony  of  Ger- 
many, if  it  had  been  possible  to  establish  it  in  reality. 
Russia  has  no  real  interests  to  safeguard  in  Europe  beyond 
the  defence  of  the  integrity  of  her  territory,  which  no  one 
shows  the  least  disposition  to  attack.  Russia  has  no  call 
to  pledge  the  lives  of  her  sons  and  to  imperil  her  prosperity 
for  the  defence  of  the  interests  or  the  satisfaction  of  the 
grievances  of  any  other  Power. 

"  Russia,  occupying  the  greater  part  of  the  European 
Continent,  may  be  assimilated  to  a  continent  by  itself, 
standing  between  Europe  and  Asia,  self-contained  and  self- 
sufficient,  like  the  United  States.  Russia's  only  cultural 
mission  is  confined  to  Asia.  Her  paramount  interest  is 
peace  with  all  the  world,  and  the  only  rational  policy  for 
her  to  pursue  must  be  freedom  from  entangling  alliances  of 


108        FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

any  kind  and  abstention  from  participation  in  any  of  the 
rivalries  and  conflicting  policies  of  the  Powers  of  Central 
and  Western  Europe. 

"  The  most  superficial  observer  and  the  veriest  tyro  in 
diplomacy  could  not  have  helped  noticing  the  efforts  being 
made  by  our  policy  to  keep  the  balance  even  between 
France,  our  ally,  and  Germany,  our  potential  enemy — a 
policy  which  could  not  possibly  satisfy  either  the  one  or 
the  other  and  was  bound  to  deprive  us  of  the  confidence 
of  both." 

For  reasons  already  explained  I  refrained  from  winding 
up  my  memorandum  with  any  conclusions  beyond  pointing 
to  the  alarming  character  of  the  events  which  were  then 
taking  place  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  and  to  the  failure  of 
European  diplomacy  to  have  gauged  aright  the  condition 
of  things  there  and  the  pyschology  of  the  Balkan  peoples, 
besides  expressing  at  the  same  time  some  doubt  as  to  the 
efftcacy  of  the  means  by  which  that  same  diplomacy  expected 
to  localize  the  war  and  to  prevent  collisions  between  the 
Great  Powers  in  reliance  on  the  miraculous  power  of  the 
system  of  alliances,  in  spite  of  its  containing  in  itself  the 
germs  of  such  collisions  unavoidable  in  the  more  or  less 
remote  future. 

Having  finished  in  Paris  my  work  on  this  memorandum 
some  time  in  October,  1912,  I  sent  it  to  St.  Petersburg 
and,  through  the  good  offices  of  a  kind  friend,  had  a  type- 
written copy  of  it  prepared  and  handed  to  the  Prime 
Minister,  Mr.  Kokovtseff,  with  the  request  to  submit  it  to 
the  Emperor.  In  the  following  month  of  December  I  went 
to  St.  Petersburg  to  resume  my  duties  as  Member  of  the 
Council  of  the  Empire,  and,  being  anxious  to  learn  the  fate 
of  my  memorandum,  called  at  once  upon  the  Prime 
Minister.  He  told  me  that  he  had  taken  it  to  Spala,  a 
shooting-box  in  Poland,  where  the  Emperor  was  in  tem- 
porary residence  at  the  time,  and  had  handed  it  to  His 
Majesty,  that  the  Emperor  had  looked  at  the  rather  bulky 
document  and  had  asked  to  be  told  in  a  few  words  the 
substance  of  its  contents,  and  that  he,  Mr.  Kokovtseff,  had 
explained  that  the  fundamental  idea  of  the  memorandum 
concerned  the  necessity  for  Russia  to  come  to  some  agree- 
ment with  Austria.     Thereupon  the  Emperor  had  expressed 


A   BESETTING   SIN  109 

his  entire  concurrence  in  this  idea,  but  had  remarked  that 
the  difficulty  in  the  way  of  reaching  such  an  agreement 
was  that  he  was  unable  to  find  out  what  it  was  exactly 
that  Austria  wanted. 

The  only  inference  I  could  draw  from  what  Mr. 
Kokovtseff  had  imparted  to  me  of  his  conversation  with 
the  Emperor  was  that  neither  the  Sovereign  himself  nor 
the  Chief  of  his  Government  thought  it  worth  his  while 
to  go  any  deeper  into  the  matter,  which  I  considered  to 
be  one  of  supreme  importance  and  to  which  I  had  hoped 
to  draw  their  most  serious  attention.  This,  of  course,  was 
sufficiently  discouraging,  and  would  have  been  more  so  had 
I  not  been  used  to  meeting  with  nothing  but  supercilious 
indifference  at  the  hands  of  the  men  in  power  whenever  I 
had  attempted  to  express  to  any  one  of  them  my  humble 
opinion  on  matters  of  public  poUcy.  The  only  one  of  all 
our  statesmen  in  power  who  ever  had  condescended  to 
listen  to  what  I  had  to  say  had  been  the  late  Prince 
Lobanoff,  when,  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  he  had 
appointed  me  to  the  post  of  Minister  to  Serbia,  and  then 
perhaps  mainly  because  my  ideas  on  the  subject  of  our 
Balkan  policy  entirely  coincided  with  his  own  views. 

Altogether  my  experience  with  our  various  Governments, 
Imperial  as  well  as  "  provisional,"  after  the  Revolution, 
and  lastly  "  coalition  "  under  Kerensk}^  has  convinced 
me  of  the  truth  of  what  a  distinguished  English  writer, 
discussing  in  his  own  review  the  question  "  Could  the  war 
have  been  prevented  ?  "  has  to  say  in  regard  to  con- 
ditions in  Germany,  and  what  is  quite  as  applicable  to 
our  own  ruhng  powers  of  all  parties,  namely  : 

"  That  infallibiUty  is  the  besetting  sin  of  men  in  autho- 
rity, who,  even  when  surrounded  by  the  ruins  they  created, 
have  no  misgivings  concerning  their  own  role,  no  twinges 
of  remorse  for  the  havoc  they  have  wrought  and  the  limit- 
less suffering  their  insane  ambitions  and  stupendous  inca- 
pacity have  infficted,  not  merely  on  their  own  people  and 
their  own  generation,  but  on  countless  generations  that 
are  unborn." 

But  I  feel  bound  to  mention  here  an  exception  to  the 
rule.  It  so  happened  that  at  some  official  function  I  met 
a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  head  of  a  less  conspicuous  but 


110        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

in  its  special  sphere  most  efficient  department  of  the  Govern- 
ment, who  engaged  me  in  a  conversation  on  some  tri\ial 
subject  of  social  gossip  and,  abruptly  dropping  this  sub- 
ject, asked  me  what  I  thought  of  the  political  situation  in 
Europe.  I  told  him  that  I  looked  upon  it  as  extremely 
serious,  and  was  just  going  to  explain  as  briefly  as  circum- 
stances would  permit  some  of  the  reasons  why  I  took  such 
a  pessimistic  view  of  the  situation,  when  dinner  was 
announced  and  I  could  only  offer  to  let  him  see,  if  it  inter- 
ested him,  something  which  I  had  written  on  the  subject 
and  had  had  submitted  to  the  Emperor.  My  offer  was 
eagerly  accepted,  and  the  following  morning  I  sent  him 
the  manuscript  of  my  secret  memorandum.  The  Minister 
returned  it  to  me  a  couple  of  da3's  later  with  a  little  note 
in  which  he  expressed  his  concurrence  with  my  views  on 
all  essential  points,  reserving  a  few  matters  of  detail  for 
further  discussion  with  me. 

That  was  the  only  relation  I  ever  had  with  the  Govern- 
ment in  regard  to  a  matter  of  life  or  death  for  our  country. 
I  prefer  not  to  mention  the  name  of  that  only  member  of 
the  Government  who  had  shown  some  serious  interest  in 
this  matter,  as  he  may  have  escaped  from  Bolshevist  Russia 
and  may,  on  account  of  my  having  marked  him  as  a  sharer 
of  my  views,  experience  some  difficulty  in  obtaining  the 
requisite  visds  for  visiting  countries  where  persons  of  my 
way  of  looking  upon  the  vital  interests  of  Russia  are  not 
welcome.  He  had,  besides,  under  our  governmental  regime, 
no  influence  whatever  in  matters  of  foreign  policy. 

I  have  frequently  pointed  out  the  fundamental  defect 
of  the  organization  of  our  Government  as  it  was  before  the 
constitutional  reform  of  1905,  namely,  the  absence  of  unity, 
inasmuch  as  each  separate  department  of  the  Government 
was  functioning  quite  independently  of  all  the  others  under 
the  immediate  direction  of  the  Sovereign.  The  constitu- 
tional reform  of  1905,  although  it  created  a  simulacrum  of 
a  "  Cabinet  "  under  the  headship  of  a  Prime  Minister,  had 
left  things  very  much  in  the  same  condition,  the  more  so 
as  by  the  new  organic  laws  all  foreign,  military  and  naval 
affairs  were  specially  reserved  as  the  exclusive  domain  of 
the  Sovereign. 

In   this   last   respect,   therefore,    even   bj/   the   constitu- 


THE   MEMORANDUM   PRINTED         111 

tional  reform  nothing  was  changed  in  the  old  order  of 
things.  At  the  time  when  a  momentous  and  decisive 
crisis  was  evidently  approaching,  this  condition  was  one 
which  no  patriot  could  contemplate  otherwise  than  with 
the  most  sinister  misgivings,  especially  as  the  most  important 
department  of  the  Government  was  in  the  hands  of  a  man 
who,  however  honourable  as  a  private  individual,  was  not, 
either  by  capacity  or  by  experience,  quahfied,  any  more 
than  the  Sovereign  himself,  to  direct  at  a  critical  time  the 
foreign  pohcy  of  a  great  Empire.  Thus  it  was  to  come 
about  that  the  ultimate  decision  which  was  to  sound  the 
death-knell  of  Russia  depended  on  the  self-sulhcient  incom- 
petence of  a  Minister,  the  vacillating  weakness  of  his 
master,  and  their  unthinking  impulses. 

Determined  to  leave  no  stone  unturned  in  endeavouring 
to  call  the  attention  of  the  powers  that  were  to  the  rocks 
ahead  on  the  perilous  course  the  ship  of  State  was  steer- 
ing, I  had  my  memorandum  printed  at  the  Government 
printing  office  as  a  secret  document,  in  hfty  numbered 
copies,  forty-seven  of  which  I  distributed  confidentially 
among  the  members  of  the  Government,  past  and  present, 
the  highest  dignitaries  of  the  Empire,  and  some  pohtical 
personages  of  the  Council  and  of  the  Duma.  I  took  steps, 
through  a  channel  I  held  to  be  entirely  reliable,  to  have 
one  copy  presented  to  the  Emperor  and  kept  one  for 
myself,  plus  one  in  reserve  for  use  in  an  eventuahty  to 
which  I  shall  refer  later  on.  I  did  not,  of  course,  succeed 
in  ehciting  any  expressions  of  opinion  from  any  member 
of  the  Government,  save  the  one  mentioned  above,  but 
from  almost  all  the  other  recipients  of  my  memorandum  I 
received  verbal  assurances  of  concurrence  in  my  views. 
Not  one,  however,  was  either  wilhng  or  able  to  give  me 
any  support  in  trying  to  press  this  supremely  important 
matter  on  the  serious  attention  of  the  Sovereign  and  the 
Government. 

This  apparent  indifference  to  the  fate  of  the  country, 
whose  destiny  was  evidently  being  made  the  sport  of 
interests  with  which  the  Russian  people  had  no  concern, 
finds  its  explanation  partly  in  the  fatahstic  strain  in  the 
national  character,  partly  in  the  total  absence  of  that  feel- 
ing of  personal  responsibility  for  the  condition  of  public 


112        FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

affairs,  to  whose  free  development  centuries  of  humble 
submissiveness  to  autocratic  rule  could  never  have  given 
sufficient  scope. 

There  was,  however,  another  reason  why  any  endeavour 
aiming  at  the  avoidance  of  an  expected  and  even  hoped- 
for  rupture  with  our  Western  neighbours  could  only  meet 
with  some  discreet  sympathy,  but  not  with  openly  pro- 
fessed support.  Here  again  I  feel  compelled  to  controvert 
one  of  the  legends  industriously  spread  by  the  "  War  Pro- 
paganda," by  means  of  its  usual  stock  in  trade — suppressio 
vert,  suggestio  falsi — namely,  the  entirely  groundless  legend 
about  the  prevalence  at  the  Russian  Court  and  in  Russian 
Government  circles  of  "  German  "  influence. 

As  regards  this  question  of  "  influence,"  I  must  define, 
once  for  all,  my  own  standpoint,  from  which  I  have  never 
swerved,  and  which  is  :  that  for  a  great  country  to  suffer 
itself  to  be  treated,  as  Turkey  used  to  be,  as  a  battle 
ground  for  rival  foreign  influences  is  a  shame  and  a  dis- 
grace, and  that  therefore,  viewed  from  this  purely  Russian 
standpoint,  "  German  influence,"  if  it  had  had  any  real 
existence,  would  not  have  been  one  whit  less  degrading 
than  that  of  the  Entente,  even  though  its  obvious  object 
would  have  coincided  with  the  true  interest  of  Russia,  that 
of  keeping  out  of  a  war  in  which  she  could  have  no  legiti- 
mate end  to  gain  by  victory  and  would  stand  to  lose  every- 
thing in  case  of  defeat. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  there  existed  no  means  by  which 
such  German  influence  could  have  made  itself  felt  at  the 
Russian  Court,  where  a  marked  anti-German  current  had 
set  in  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  reign  of  Alexander  III. 
His  consort,  the  Empress  Marie  Feodorovna,  as  a  Danish 
princess,  brought  to  Russia  very  pronounced  anti-German 
feelings  which  the  Emperor  shared  and  which  were,  per- 
haps, aggravated  through  his  hardly  concealed  antipathy 
toward  the  Emperor  WilHam  II,  the  characteristics  of  whose 
personality  were  the  very  opposite  of  his  own.  These  feelings 
were  inherited  by  his  son  and  successor,  Nicholas  II,  whose 
consort,  the  late  Empress  Alexandra  Feodorovna,  although 
the  daughter  of  a  German  prince,  was  also  the  daughter  of 
an  English  princess  and  who  certainly  was  more  English 
then  German  in  her  feelings. 


FOREIGN   INFLUENCE  113 

The  Imperial  couple,  barring"  some  very  rare  brilliant 
functions  at  the  Winter  Palace  during  the  season,  led  the 
most  retired  family  life.  There  really  was  no  Court  at  all 
in  the  sense  this  expression  is  generally  used.  The  few 
Court  functionaries  who  through  the  duties  of  their  offices 
were  brought  into  daily  contact  with  the  Imperial  family 
could  hardly  be  considered  to  compose  a  "  Court  "  in  that 
sense.  There  was  not  one  personage  of  mark  among 
them,  no  one  who  could  have  exercised  any  influence  on 
the  policy  of  the  State.  The  times  were  no  more  when, 
as  in  the  eighteenth  century,  at  the  Court  of  Russia  rival 
diplomacies — Anglo- Prussian  on  one  side  and  Austro-French 
on  the  other — were  contending  against  each  other  for  the 
coveted  prize  :  the  legions  of  the  despised  "  Moujik," 
good  enough  to  be  utilized  as  cannon  fodder  on  the  battle- 
fields of  Europe,  in  their  struggles  for  supremacy. 

Nor  had  the  influence  which  Entente  diplomacy  was 
exercising  on  our  policy  been  acquired  by  any  devious 
ways  of  Court  intrigue.  It  was  simply  exploiting  for  its 
own  purposes  the  naive  self-sufficiency  of  the  human 
material  in  charge  of  our  foreign  affairs,  and  their  failure 
to  reahze  that  the  Russia  of  our  days  was  still  regarded 
by  Western  nations  very  much  in  the  same  light  as  the 
Russia  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  that  they  were  being 
flatteringly  treated  on  a  footing  of  equality  as  "  states- 
men," mainly  in  order  to  make  better  use  of  them  as  pawns 
in  the  game  of  European  politics. 

Not  only  had  Entente  diplomacy  no  occasion  to  counter- 
act any  adverse  influence  at  Court  or  in  the  Government — 
their  constant  apprehensiveness  lest  such  influences  might 
make  their  appearance  merely  disclosed  their  consciousness 
of  the  fact  that  their  policy  was  at  bottom  opposed  to  the 
true  interests  of  Russia — but  on  the  contrary,  all  the  forces 
of  pubhc  opinion  were  working  in  their  favour  and  would 
have  drowned  the  voice  of  anyone  bold  enough  to  utter  an 
open  warning  against  the  grave  peril  to  which  the  country 
was  being  exposed  by  the  pursuit  of  such  a  pohcy,  popular 
precisely  because  of  its  uncompromisingly  anti-German 
character. 

To  account  for  the  existence  of  such  a  strong  anti- 
German  current  one  must  revert  to  the  first  year  of  the 

VOL.    II  8 


114        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

reign  of  the  Liberator,  Alexander  II,  when  Russian  society, 
under  the  spell  of  that  great  epoch  of  reforms,  first  awoke 
to  national  self-consciousness.  The  new-born  nationalism, 
however,  took  at  first  the  form  of  a  most  violent  anti- 
Polonism,  provoked  by  the  Polish  insurrection  of  1863  and 
fostered  by  the  ultra-nationalistic  Press,  headed  by  the 
Moscow  Gazette  under  the  editorship  of  the  famous  Katkoff 
— a  Press  organ  which  in  those  days  wielded  an  influence 
comparable  only  to  that  of  the  London  Tunes,  the 
Thunderer  of  the  days  of  the  Crimean  War — who  knew 
how  to  enflame  the  dormant  patriotism  of  the  nation  when 
threatened  with  foreign  intervention  in  the  shape  of  col- 
lective diplomatic  representations  in  favour  of  Poland, 
undertaken  by  all  European  Powers  except  Prussia  and 
Austria. 

The  non-participation  of  Prussia  in  that  diplomatic 
campaign  against  Russia,  her  particularly  friendly  and 
helpful  attitude  at  the  time  of  the  Polish  insurrection,  her 
friendly  neutrality  in  the  Crimean  War,  when  we  had  to 
fight  a  coalition  headed  by  France  and  England,  and 
Austria  had  taken  up  a  threatening  position  on  our  flank — 
all  this  enhsted  our  sympathy  on  the  side  of  Prussia  in  her 
war  with  Austria  and  later  with  France.  The  growth  of 
the  Slavophile  movement,  which  led  to  the  war  with 
Turkey  in  id,yy-S  for  the  liberation  of  Bulgaria,  followed 
by  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  and  the  bitterness  caused  by 
its  deceptive  results,  which  were  generally  attributed  to 
the  lukewarmness  of  Germany's  support,  were  sufficient  to 
damp  the  feelings  of  Russian  society  toward  German)^ 
Moreover,  during  the  second  half  of  Alexander  IPs  reign, 
when  reaction  had  gained  the  upper  hand,  he  himself  being 
known  as  a  warm  and  devoted  friend  of  his  uncle,  the 
Emperor  William  I,  much  of  the  reactionary  tendencies  of 
the  time  was  attributed  by  liberal  opinion  to  German 
influence,  just  as  in  Germany,  and  with  as  little  reason, 
Russian  reactionary  influence  was  supposed  to  have  been 
paramount  before  the  Revolution  of  1848  and  after  its 
suppression. 

Thus  in  both  countries,  in  certain  circles  of  the  "  Intelli- 
gentzia," feelings  of  animosity  against  each  other's  ruhng 
classes  began  to   develop.     These  feelings  were  intensified 


ANTI-GERMANISM  115 

by  the  growth  of  Slavophile  or  Pan-Slavistic  tendencies  in 
Russia,  and  on  the  other  side  of  Pan-Germanism  as  the 
fruit  of  the  unification  of  the  German  Empire  and  the 
victories  of  German  arms. 

Gradually  the  idea  of  the  unavoidable  character  of  the 
feud  between  Slavdom  and  Germanism  began  to  gain 
ground  in  the  popular  mind,  or  rather,  in  the  minds  of  the 
"  Intelligentzia,"  the  real  people  remaining  entirely  indif- 
ferent to  similar  ideas,  which  indeed  were  quite  beyond 
their  mental  horizon.  Meanwhile,  however,  militant 
nationahsm  had  been  adopted  by  the  reaction  evidently 
as  a  device  of  popularization  of  the  regime  with  the  masses 
— another  demonstration  of  the  non-comprehension  by  the 
ruling  classes  of  the  real  mentahty  of  the  people. 

At  first  this  extreme  nationahsm  was  directed  against 
the  Poles  as  a  natural  consequence  of  the  suppressed  insur- 
rection, and,  where  efforts  of  Russification  proved  unavail- 
ing, German  penetration,  curiously  enough,  was  favoured 
as  offering  better  guarantees  of  loyalty  to  the  Government. 
At  the  same  time  efforts  at  Russification  were  inaugurated 
and  with  more  or  less  consistency  pursued  against  the 
German  element  in  the  Baltic  Provinces,  whose  loyalty  to 
the  Government  had  never  been  questioned  and  had 
rendered  it  rather  unpopular  in  Liberal  circles  on  this  very 
account. 

The  ground  for  the  growth  of  anti-Germanism  was 
therefore  well  prepared,  inasmuch  as  it  had  been  adopted, 
except  in  Poland,  as  a  pohtical  weapon  both  by  the 
bureaucracy  and  by  the  opposition.  And  when  the  rap- 
prochement with  repubhcan  France  took  place  it  was 
enthusiastically  hailed  by  the  "  Intelligentzia  "  as  a  mani- 
festation of  anti-Germanism  no  less  than  as  a  promise  of 
things  to  come,  of  which  it  was  at  last  permissible  to 
dream  in  the  expectation  of  reahzation  in  the  future. 
Although  the  initiative  had  come  beyond  question  from 
above,  it  was  also  hailed  as  a  popular  victory,  as  a  rap- 
prochement effected  by  two  peoples  above  the  heads  of 
their  rulers. 

Across  the  frontier,  to  the  development  of  anti-German 
fceUngs  with  us  had  corresponded  a  similar  tendency  of 
hostihty  to  Russia,  mainly  confined,  as  in  Russia,  to  certain 


116         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

circles  of  the  "  Intelligentzia."  In  both  countries,  however, 
these  feelings  and  their  growing  intensity  were  obviously 
not  unwelcome  to  the  niihtary  element,  always  preoccupied 
with  the  idea  of  possible  wars.  It  would,  however,  be 
impossible  to  exaggerate  the  fatal  importance  which  this 
latent  Russo-German  antagonism,  upon  reaching  an  acute 
stage,  acquired  in  bringing  about  the  actual  outbreak  of 
the  war  ;  nor  would  it  be  just  to  attempt  to  minimize  the 
monstrously  heavy  responsibility  in  this  respect  resting  on 
the  shoulders  of  the  immediately  guilty  parties  on  both 
sides  ;  I  say  emphatically  "on  both  sides,"  and  not  by  any 
means  on  one  side  alone,  as  will  be  shown  later  on. 

The  rapprochement  with  France  took  place  by  an  exchange 
of  visits  by  the  respective  fleets  to  Kronstadt  and  Toulon, 
and  was  sealed  by  an  exchange  of  ministerial  declarations, 
in  August  i8gi,  formulating  the  following  two  points  : 

I.  In  order  to  define  and  consecrate  the  entente  cordiale  which 
unites  them,  and  desirous  of  contributing  by  a  common  agreement 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  which  forms  the  object  of  their 
sincerest  wishes,  the  two  Governments  declare  that  they  will  concert 
upon  every  question  of  a  nature  to  bring  the  general  peace  into 
question. 

II.  For  the  case  where  this  peace  should  be  in  fact  endangered, 
especially  if  one  of  the  two  parties  should  be  menaced  by  an  aggres- 
sion, the  two  parties  agree  to  reach  an  understanding  on  the  measures 
which  the  two  Governments  would  ha\'e  immediately  and  simul- 
taneously to  adopt  upon  the  occurrence  of  this  eventuality. 

These  declarations  were  completed  b}-  the  conclusion  in 
August  1892  of  a  military  convention  signed  by  General 
Obrucheff,  Chief  of  the  Russian  General  Staff  and  General 
of  Division  De  Boisdeffre,  of  the  French  General  Staff — 
the  text  of  which,  subsequently  slightly  amended  in  imma- 
terial points,  ran  as  follows  : 

I.  If  France  is  attacked  by  Germany,  or  by  Italy  supported  by 
Germany,  Russia  will  employ  all  her  available  forces  to  fight  Germany. 

If  Russia  is  attacked  by  Germany,  or  by  Austria  supported  by 
Germany,  France  will  employ  all  her  available  forces  to  fight  Germany. 

II.  In  the  event  of  the  forces  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  or  of  one  of 
the  Powers  composing  it,  being  mobilized,  France  and  Russia,  at  the 
first  news  of  the  event  and  without  any  preliminary  arrangement 
being  necessary,  shall  mobilize  immediately  and  simultaneously  the 
whole  of  their  forces  and  move  them  as  near  as  possible  to  their 
frontiers. 


THE  MILITARY   CONVENTION  117 

III.  The  available  forces  to  be  employed  against  Germany  shall 
be,  on  the  side  of  France  1,200,000  to  1,300,000  ;  on  the  side  of 
Russia,  700,000  or  800,000  men. 

These  forces  shall  engage  to  the  full,  with  all  speed,  in  order  that 
Germany  may  have  to  fight  on  the  east  and  west  at  once. 

IV.  The  General  Staffs  of  the  armies  of  the  two  countries  will 
confer  at  all  times  to  prepare  and  facilitate  the  execution  of  the 
rneasures  contemplated. 

They  will  communicate  to  each  other  during  the  time  of  peace 
all  information  relative  to  the  armies  of  the  Triple  Alliance  which 
is  or  will  be  known  to  them.  Ways  and  means  of  corresponding  in 
times  of  war  will  be  studied  and  arranged  in  advance. 

V.  France  and  Russia  will  not  conclude  peace  separately. 

VI.  The  present  convention  shall  have  the  same  duration  as  the 
Triple  Alliance. 

VII.  All  the  clauses  enumerated  above  shall  be  kept  rigorously  secret. 

This  military  convention  was  approved  and  declared  to 
be  adopted  by  an  exchange  of  notes  between  Mr.  de  Giers, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Russia,  and  Mr.  de  Montebello, 
Ambassador  of  France,  in  December  1893. 

Furthermore,  on  July  28  (August  9),  1899,  an 
exchange  of  notes  between  Count  Mouravieff,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  Russia,  and  Mr.  Delcasse,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  French  Republic,  took  place,  estab- 
lishing the  following  : 

The  Imperial  Government  of  Russia  and  the  Government  of  the 
French  Republic,  always  solicitous  for  the  maintenance  of  the  general 
peace  and  of  equilibrium  among  European  forces, 

Confirm  the  diplomatic  arrangement  formulated  in  the  letter  of 
August  9/21,  1891,  of  Mr.  de  Giers,  that  of  August  15/27,  1891,  to 
Baron  Mohrcnheim,  and  the  letter  in  reply  of  Mr.  Ribot,  likewise 
bearing  the  date  of  August  15/27,  1891. 

They  have  decided  that  the  project  of  military  convention,  which 
is  the  complement  thereof  and  which  is  mentioned  in  the  letter  of 
Mr.  de  Giers  of  December  15/27,  1893,  and  that  of  Count  Mouravieff 
of  December  23rd/ January  4th,  1894,  will  remain  in  force  as  long 
as  the  diplomatic  agreement  concluded  for  safeguarding  the  common 
and  permanent  interests  of  the  two  countries. 

The  most  absolute  secrecy  as  to  the  tenor  and  even  as  to  the 
existence  of  the  said  arrangements  must  be  scrupulously  observed  on 
both  sides. 

Beyond  these  secret  papers  published  by  the  "  World's 
Peace  Foundation,"  including  two  conventions  concluded 
between  the  Russian  and  French  naval  departments  con- 
cerning exchanges  of  information,  I  have  not  been  able  to 


118        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

discover  any  secret  document  embodying  a  formal  treaty 
of  alliance  between  Russia  and  France.  I  note,  however, 
that  Earl  Loreburn,  in  his  admirable  book  How  the  War 
Came,  on  page  64,  writes  :  "  Whatever  the  motive,  in 
1896  Russia  contracted  a  Treaty  of  Alliance  with  France," 
and  then  on  page  65  he  states  that  "  this  Franco- 
Russiaji  Treaty  of  1896  is  one  of  the  most  important 
in  all  history."  Maybe  the  author  here  meant  to  refer 
to  the  fact  that  it  was,  I  think,  in  the  summer  of 
1896  that  the  Emperor  Nicholas,  on  a  visit  to  the  French 
flagship  at  Kronstadt,  pronounced  for  the  first  time 
the  word  "  alliance  "  in  an  official  toast  to  the  French 
Republic,  which  may  have  been,  so  to  speak,  an  oificial 
acknowledgment  of  an  alliance  already  existing  or  sup- 
posed to  exist  on  the  basis  of  the  above-quoted  documents. 
However  that  may  be,  in  commenting  on  the  significance 
of  this  treaty  of  alliance  Earl  Loreburn  makes  a  series  of 
exceedingly  pertinent  remarks,  the  truth  of  which  may  not 
be  questioned. 

He  says  :  "  Thenceforth  the  feud  between  German  and 
Slav  was  linked  up  with  the  feud  between  German  and 
French."  This  was  indeed  the  real  crux  of  the  whole  situ- 
ation and  rendered  the  outbreak  of  war  between  the  three 
races,  of  whom  two  were  definitely  arraigned  against  the 
third,  merely  a  question  of  time  and  opportunity,  unless 
prevented  by  wise  statesmanship,  the  tradition  of  which 
seems  to  be  lost  in  this  age  of  demagogy,  propaganda  and 
hysteria.  That  such  a  conflict,  once  opened,  would  involve 
all  the  other  Great  Powers  was  a  matter  of  certainty  owing 
to  the  existing  chain  of  alliances,  for,  as  Earl  Loreburn 
remarks,  "  they  were  like  Alpine  climbers  who  are  roped 
to  one  another.  If  one  stumbles  fatally,  all  must  perish. 
...  To  walk  alone  on  the  edge  of  a  precipice  is  dangerous. 
To  be  fastened  to  a  comrade  who  may  stumble  is  still  more 
dangerous." 

In  discussing  in  my  memorandum  the  state  of  opinion 
in  France  regarding  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  I  had 
stated  that,  so  far  as  I  could  see,  opinion  was  not  as 
unanimous  in  its  favour  as  was  generally  supposed,  and  in 
support  of  this  contention  I  had  quoted  an  article  which 
had   appeared   in   the   Echo   de  Paris,   one   of   the   leading 


UNREALITY  OF  THE  ALLIANCE       119 

Parisian  newspapers,  over  the  signature  of  a  very  distin- 
guished member  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  basic 
idea  of  this  article  was  the  following  :  The  Franco-Russian 
Treaty,  in  principle  and  in  intention,  is  directed  against 
Germany  ;  but  Russia  has  not  the  same  reasons  as  France 
for  hostility  to  Germany  ;  she  is,  moreover,  united  to  Ger- 
many by  traditions  of  friendship  dating  back  to  more  than 
a  century  and  by  family  ties  of  the  reigning  dynasties. 
The  relation  of  Russia  to  the  Treaty,  therefore,  could  not 
partake  of  the  same  character  of  intensity  as  that  of  France. 

Having  quoted  this  opinion  of  the  author  of  the  article 
in  question,  I  recorded  my  impression  that  his  evident 
consciousness  of  the  one-sided  and  hollow  unreality  of  the 
Alliance  was  shared  by  many  earnest  and  thinking  patriots 
in  France,  and  that  this  consciousness  was  not  absent  even 
in  the  jfirst  days  of  the  enthusiasm  provoked  by  the  festi- 
vities at  Kronstadt  and  at  Toulon,  where  the  word  "peace" 
was  on  all  lips  but  all  hearts  flamed  with  the  hope  of 
revenge.  The  author  of  the  article,  however,  tries  to  per- 
suade himself  that  Russia,  after  all,  is  bound  to  entertain 
feelings  of  racial  antagonism  towards  Germany,  and  that 
her  closer  approach  to  Germany  would  be  impossible, 
because  such  a  treason  to  "  Slavism  "  would  provoke  in 
all  the  Slavic  world  a  shout  of  indignation  from  the  Adriatic 
to  the  Gulf  of  Finland. 

As  a  counterfoil  to  this  opinion  I  would  quote  another, 
expressed  to  me  some  time  in  the  summer  of  1913  by  a 
very  distinguished  Frenchman,  a  retired  diplomat  and 
patriot  but  a  believer  in  peace,  in  the  following  words  : 
"  I  have  never  been  able  to  comprehend  why  it  was  that 
Russia's  statesmen  have  not  been  able  to  come  to  a  friendly 
understanding  with  Germany,  the  desirabiHty  of  which  was 
so  plainly  indicated  by  the  situation."  To  this  I  could 
only  reply  that  it  may  have  been  for  the  reason  that 
Russia  found  herself  in  the  same  quandary  as  Ireland,  where, 
it  is  said,  there  are  no  snakes. 

I  have  often  asked  myself  how  it  was  that  the  Emperor 
Alexander  III,  who  had  had  the  wisdom  to  cut  loose  from 
the  Alliance  of  the  Three  Emperors,  who  had  viewed  with 
hardly  concealed  satisfaction  the  refusal  of  Germany  to 
renew    Bismarck's    famous    treaty    of    "  reassurance,"    and 


120         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

who  had  as  adviser  so  prudent  a  statesman  as  Mr.  de  Giers, 
could  have  consented  to  enter  into  another  and  far  more 
dangerously  entangling  alliance. 

The  text  of  the  secret  dispatch  of  Mr.  de  Giers,  addressed 
to  our  Ambassador  at  Paris  on  the  9/21  of  August,  1891, 
formulating  the  two  points  of  an  entente  cordiale  with 
France,  to  which  I  have  referred  above,  may  perhaps 
solve  this  enigma.     This  is  its  opening  sentence : 

The  situation  created  in  Europe  by  the  open  renewal  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  and  the  more  or  less  probable  adhesion  by  Great  Britain  to 
the  objects  which  that  alliance  pursues,  caused,  during  the  recent  stay 
here  of  M.  Laboulaye,  between  the  former  Ambassador  of  France 
and  myself  an  exchange  of  ideas  tending  to  define  the  attitude  which 
in  present  junctures  and  in  the  presence  of  certain  eventualities  might 
seem  best  to  our  respective  Governments,  which,  henceforth  in  complete 
league,  are  none  the  less  sincerely  desirous  of  surrounding  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  with  the  most  efficacious  guarantees. 

The  apprehension  of  Great  Britain's  possible  adhesion 
to  the  Triple  Alhance,  and  the  objects  it  pursued,  would 
seem  rather  astonishing  in  the  light  of  recent  events.  But 
one  should  not  forget  that  in  those  days  "  perfidious 
Albion  "  was  the  bugbear  of  continental  diplomacy  and 
was  considered  our  arch  enemy.  I  mention  this  merely  as 
a  "  curiosum  "  which  I  discovered  in  examining  these 
recently  published  secret  documents.  I  wonder  whether 
the  Emperor  Alexander  in  his  conscious  strength  realized 
that  by  entering  into  this  Entente  or  Alliance,  albeit 
secret,  and  in  tying  his  hands,  he  was  seriously  weakening 
the  splendid  position  his  isolation  had  given  him  as  the 
arbiter  of  the  peace  of  the  world  and  was  leaving  to  his 
son  and  successor  the  heritage  of  a  policy  which  his  weaker 
hands  might  not  be  able  to  direct. 

If  any  of  my  readers  wish  to  go  deeper  into  the  question 
of  the  origin  of  the  World  War,  I  could  only  recommend 
to  them  the  perusal  of  Earl  Loreburn's  remarkable  book, 
How  the  War  Came.  It  is  the  masteily  summing  up  of  a  great 
judge  whose  lofty  sense  of  impartiality  and  right  is  deaUng 
even  justice  to  all  parties  concerned.  It  will  destroy  many 
illusions  created  and  fostered  by  the  war  propaganda  on 
both  sides.  But  it  is  addressed  to  the  jury  of  posterity, 
whose  verdict  cannot  be  doubtful. 


CHAPTER   XXXII 

The  principle  of  nationalities — The  Church — The  influence  of  language — 
Internationalism — Position  in  the  Balkans — -The  London  Conferenre — 
Mr.  Hartwig — Treaty  of  Bucharest — Finland — The  Tsar  and  his  letter — 
Poland — Little  Russia — Uliraina — My  speech  in  the  Upper  House. 

In  attempting  to  analyse  the  political  motives  which 
inspired  the  governing  bodies  and  the  passions  and 
tendencies  which  swayed  the  minds  of  the  ruling  classes  of 
the  leading  nations  of  Europe  in  the  years  preceding  the 
world  catastrophe  I  shall  have  to  begin  with  a  few  reflec- 
tions in  regard  to  the  two  contending  forces  of  the  modern 
world  of  the  white  race — the  principle  of  nationalities  and 
the  principle  of  internationalism — at  present  engaged  in  a 
struggle  for  supremacy  the  issue  of  which  will  determine 
the  future  destiny  of  mankind. 

The  principle  of  nationalities  as  a  guiding  principle  of 
world  politics  and  a  source  of  armed  conflicts  between 
States  is  of  very  recent  origin,  as  I  have  already  endeavoured 
to  show.  The  world  of  the  Middle  Ages,  as  it  emerged 
from  the  chaotic  condition  subsequent  to  the  downfall 
and  ruin  of  the  Roman  Empire  and  the  disappearance  of 
the  highly  developed  and  refined  civilization  of  the  Graeco- 
Roman  world  swamped  by  the  tidal  wave  of  barbarism, 
was  a  world  unified  under  the  all-powerful  aegis  of  the 
victorious  Christian  Church.  The  power  of  the  Church  as 
exemplified  by  the  penance  imposed  on  the  then  most 
powerful  monarch,  Emperor  Henry  IV,  when,  after  three 
days'  profound  humihation  and  penitent  wait  at  the  gates 
of  the  Castle  of  Canossa,  he  was  granted  absolution  by 
Pops  Gregory  VII,  was  supreme  in  all  the  Christian  States 
of  Europe. 

The  supremacy  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  which 
had   saved   from   total   destruction   what   remained   of   the 

121 


122        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

ancient  Latin  civilization,  brought  in  its  train  another 
and  a  most  potent  element  of  unity — the  element  of  language. 
Latin,  which  had  been  the  universal  language  of  the  ancient 
Roman  world  and  which  was  also  the  language  of  the 
Church,  became  and  remained  for  centuries  the  ecclesi- 
astical, political  and  official  language  of  Europe,  so  much  so 
that  in  Hungary  until  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century 
it  remained  the  language  of  the  Court,  the  administration 
and  the  educated  and  privileged  classes. 

The  unity  of  the  Christian  world  of  Western  Europe 
was  broken  by  the  advent  of  the  Reformation.  The  medi- 
aeval Church  has  been  essentially  an  international  super- 
State,  and  the  character  of  the  Protestant  secession  from  it 
was  largely  determined  by  this  fact.  After  the  Reformation 
the  division  of  the  Churches  corresponded  roughly  to  the 
two  principal  racial  and  linguistic  areas  of  Western  Europe 
— the  Latin  and  the  Teutonic.  But  in  the  ensuing  san- 
guinary religious  and  dynastic  wars  the  principle  of  national- 
ities had  no  part,  nor  had  the  question  of  languages  as  yet 
acquired  any  importance  as  an  element  of  discord  between 
nationalities  included  in  the  same  political  entity.  The 
supremacy  of  the  five  great  cultural  languages — English, 
French,  German,  Italian  and  Spanish — was  given  unques- 
tioned and  willing  recognition  by  minor  nationalities  within 
the  confines  of  their  respective  spheres.  It  never  would 
occur  to  a  Scotchman,  a  Welshman,  an  Irishman,  or  to 
any  representative  of  the  numerous  nationalities  settled  in 
America,  to  resent  using  the  English  language  in  their 
official,  business  or  social  intercourse  with  their  fellow- 
citizens.  The  same,  of  course,  may  be  said  of  the  Pro- 
vengal,  the  Basque,  the  Breton  and  the  German-Alsatian 
elements  composing  the  population  of  France.  Similarly, 
the  coexistence  on  a  footing  of  perfect  equality  of  three  of 
the  principal  cultural  languages  in  Switzerland  has  never 
given  rise  to  any  discord  or  friction  among  the  population 
of  German,  French  and  Italian  nationality. 

Not  so,  however,  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy, 
where  in  the  Austrian  half  the  dominant  State  language, 
German,  was  confronted  with  three  branches  of  the  Slav 
language,  Polish,  Czecho-Slavak  and  Serbo-Croatian,  neither 
of  which  could  claim  cultural  equality  with  German  ;    and 


THE  LANGUAGE   QUESTION  123 

in  Hungary  the  dominant  State  language,  Magyar,  could 
not  lay  claim  to  cultural  superiority  over  the  Slav  and 
Roumanian  languages  spoken  by  Serbians  and  Moldo-Wal- 
lachian  subjects  of  the  Kingdom. 

With  the  awakening  in  a  militant  form  of  national  self- 
consciousness  among  minor  nationahties  in  the  second  half 
of  the  last  century  this  question  of  languages  acquired  a 
momentous  importance.  When  language  ceased  to  be  a 
welcome  and  willingly  accepted  unifying  element  it  was  apt 
to  become  on  one  side  an  instrument  of  oppression,  and  on 
the  other  a  palladium  of  nationaHty  and  a  standard  of 
revolt.  It  is  easy  to  see  what  a  powerful  disruptive  ele- 
ment this  language  question  was  bound  to  prove  in  a  State 
composed  of  many  different  and  mostly  mutually  antago- 
nistic nationalities.  In  this  respect  Austria-Hungary  pre- 
sented, indeed,  a  strange  anomaly  among  European  States. 
But  it  was  an  anomaly  that  represented  the  growth  of 
centuries  of  historical  development  and  that  had  its  justi- 
fication in  the  common  good  of  all  the  heterogeneous 
nationalities  concerned,  on  whom  it  conferred  the  invalu- 
able benefits,  cultural,  economic  and  political,  derived  from 
the  advantage  of  being  united  under  the  shelter  of  a  great 
and  powerful  State. 

It  was,  therefore,  the  obvious  interest  of  the  popula- 
tions themselves  that  was  primarily  concerned  in  the 
existence  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  Its  con- 
tinued existence  as  a  political  entity  was  no  less  desirable 
in  the  interest  of  the  family  of  European  States,  and  it  was 
this  weighty  consideration  which  caused  that  truly  great 
French  statesman,  Talleyrand,  to  say  that  "  If  there  had 
not  been  an  Austria  it  would  have  been  necessary  to 
invent  one."  He  v/ould  turn  in  his  grave  could  he  see 
the  utter  ruin  and  threatening  chaos  which  has  turned 
South-Eastern  Europe  into  a  bear-garden  of  warring 
nationalities. 

The  unintelligent  handling  of  this  language  question  by 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  has  evidently  been  the 
principal,  if  not  the  only  serious  cause  of  the  discontent 
and  even  hatred  of  its  subjects  of  Slav  nationality  ;  for  it 
is  difficult  to  understand  in  what  other  way  oppression 
could  possibly  manifest  itself  in   a  modern  civilized   State 


124        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

such  as  even  its  quondam  enemies  will  concede  Austria- 
Hungary  to  have  been. 

However,  the  potent  influence  of  this  disruptive  tendency 
in  the  Austro-Hungarian  body  politic  has  powerfully  con- 
tributed to  the  genesis  and  growth  of  that  "  feud  between 
Slav  and  German  "  the  linking  of  which  with  the  "  feud 
between  German  and  French  "  Earl  Loreburn  rightly  con- 
siders to  have  been  brought  about  by  the  Franco-Russian 
Alliance,  and  which,  therefore,  has  been  the  really  deter- 
mining element  rendering  likely  an  armed  conflict  between 
the  leading  nations  of  Europe. 

In  trying  to  account  for  the  undeniable  existence  of 
these  feuds  one  would  naturally  ask  oneself  whether 
there  is  something  in  the  very  nature  of  man,  as  a  zoo- 
logical specimen  of  the  genus  homo  sapiens,  which  impels 
him  to  look  upon  his  fellow-man  as  a  natural  enemy  as 
soon  as  he  belongs  to  a  different  family  of  the  same  race, 
or  whether  such  feuds  are  the  product  of  artificial,  and 
consequently  removable,  conditions,  dependent  on  the  will 
of  man.  In  the  first  case  one  would  have  to  recognize  the 
presence  of  a  superior  force,  a  biological  law  of  nature, 
from  the  influence  of  which  escape  is  as  impossible  as  a 
refusal  to  submit  to  the  law  of  gravitation,  and  therefore 
any  hope  of  mankind  ever  freeing  itself  from  the  curse  of 
war  would  have  to  be  relegated  to  the  domain  of  idle 
dreams.  In  the  second  case,  one  would  have  to  inquire 
into  the  conditions  favouring  the  genesis  and  growth  of 
that  psychology  which  finds  expression  in  international 
feuds,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  weigh  the  forces  which 
counteract  its  influence. 

As  long  as  political  power  was  concentrated  in  the 
hands  of  the  few,  there  could  be,  between  dynasties  and 
States,  feuds  of  varying  complexion  according  to  circum- 
stances, as  combinations  of  statecraft  or  objects  of  the 
ambition  of  rulers  would  necessitate.  They  might  even 
assume  the  character  of  long-standing  feuds,  such  as  that 
between  England  and  France,  or  France  and  Germany. 
But  they  were  feuds  between  rulers  and  between  States, 
not,  however,  strictly  speaking,  feuds  between  nationalities. 
They  could  assume  the  latter  nature  only  since  political 
power  and  influence  had  practically  passed  from  the  narrow 


NATIONAL   FEUDS  125 

circles  of  Courts  and  aristocracies  into  the  hands  of  the 
middle  classes,  without  whose  support  no  Government, 
however  autocratic,  could  pursue  an  active  foreign  policy. 
It  was  the  educated  middle  classes,  the  "  Intelligentzia," 
who  were  the  moulders  of  that  public  opinion  on  the  sup- 
port of  which  every  Government  had  to  rely.  They  had 
it  in  their  power  to  impart  to  what  had  been  feuds 
between  States  the  character  of  truly  national  feuds,  or  to 
create  such  feuds  where  none  had  existed  before,  because 
they  had  command  of  the  most  powerful  influence  of 
modern  times,  by  the  printed  word  in  book,  periodical 
and  daily  Press,  an  influence  most  beneficent  when  used  in 
the  cause  of  reason  and  justice,  and  most  dangerous  when 
misused  for  the  creation  and  promotion  of  national  or  race 
hatreds  and  animosities. 

Such  movements  as  Pan-Germanism  and  Pan-Slavism^ — 
whose  baleful  influence  finally  brought  on  the  outbreak  of 
the  World  War  and  the  ruin  of  both  the  Empires  of  Russia 
and  of  Germany — originated  in,  and  were  fostered  by,  the 
middle-class  "Intelligentzia"  in  both  countries.  They  were 
exploited  as  powerful  political  weapons  by  ambitious  poli- 
ticians and  militant  general  staffs.  But  the  popular  masses 
had  no  part  in  these  movements,  nor  in  the  acutely  hostile 
feelings  they  generated.  Similarity  of  conditions  and  of 
outlook  on  life  would  tend  to  create  between  the  toiling 
masses  of  all  nations  a  bond  of  sympathy,  just  as  in  the 
highest  circles  of  European  society  similarity  of  tastes 
and  pursuits,  the  command  and  habitual  use  of  English 
or  French  as  a  common  language,  constant  intercourse  in 
such  centres  of  international  high  life  as  London,  Paris, 
Rome  or  the  Riviera,  not  to  mention  frequent  inter- 
marriages, had  created  a  sort  of  freemasonry  excluding 
the  indulgence  in  national  or  race  hatreds,  which  would 
be  apt  to  be  looked  upon  not  merely  as  irrational  but 
simply  as  "  bad  form." 

To  the  passive  resistance  of  these  two  elements  situ- 
ated at  the  extremities  of  the  social  scale  will  have  to  be 
added  a  very  potent  active  element  tending  to  neutralize 
the  influence  of  militant  psychology  favouring  international 
strife  and  animosity,  and  that  is  the  influence  of  inter- 
national   trade     and     finance.     Their     network     nowadays 


126        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

embraces  the  whole  globe  and  their  prosperity  is  depen- 
dent on  the  solidity  of  the  vast  structure  of  credit,  whose 
delicate  fabric  in  its  turn  is  closely  linked  up  with  the 
maintenance  of  the  world's  peace. 

Nothing,  therefore,  could  be  more  unfounded  and  in- 
congruous than  the  accusation  persistently  hurled  at 
international  capital  and  finance  by  the  Socialist  parties 
of  being  mainly  responsible  for  the  origin  and  outbreak  of 
what  they  are  pleased  to  describe  as  the  "  capitalists' 
war."  Nor  can  the  growth  of  gigantic  armaments  works 
be  justly  held  to  have  tended  to  bring  about  the  World 
War.  It  is  not  the  supply  that  creates  the  demand,  but 
the  demand  that  brings  forth  the  supply.  And  the  demand 
was  not  created  by  the  greed  of  capitalists  or  of  expectant 
"  profiteers,"  whose  fantastic  enrichment  has  been  rendered 
possible  mainly  as  a  consequence  of  the  reckless  finance 
practised  by  all  belligerent  Governments  during  the  war. 
The  demand  was  created  by  that  same  international  psy- 
chology for  the  genesis  and  development  of  which  the 
responsibility  must  be  laid  in  all  countries  to  the  charge 
of  the  "Intelligentzia,"  the  writers,  professors,  preachers  and 
other  "  intellectuals  "  of  the  educated  middle  classes,  the 
moulders  of  public  opinion,  whose  support  enables  the 
ruling  politicians  and  strategists  to  pursue  in  the  dark 
their  nefarious  schemes  of  hegemony,  of  supremacy,  of 
conquest,  of  revenge,  at  the  expense  of  the  deluded 
millions,  who  are  expected  to  lay  down  their  lives  for  their 
rulers'  triumph  and  glory  in  which  they  can  have  no  share. 

But  the  ruling  classes  of  the  leading  Powers  of  Europe 
were  apparently  blind  to  the  multiplying  symptoms  of  a 
sinister  movement,  led  by  renegades  from  their  own  ranks, 
from  the  ranks  of  the  "Intelligentzia,"  whose  slogan,  "  Pro- 
letarians of  all  countries,  unite  !  "  meant  the  menace  of  a 
coming  war  of  the  proletariat  against  the  propertied  classes 
— a  menace  to  the  very  existence  of  the  civilization  of  the 
modern  world,  whose  fundamental  principles  were  assailed 
with  the  blind  fury  of  demented  fanaticism.  Instead  of 
making  ready  to  oppose  a  united  front  to  the  common 
enemy  of  them  all,  these  ruling  classes  were  absorbed  in 
preparations  for  cutting  each  other's  throats  in  a  titanic 
contest    that    could  only,  whichever  side  won,  leave  Europe 


POSITION   IN  THE  BALKANS  127 

a   bleeding   victim — as    Romain   Rolland,    one   of    France's 
noblest  minds,  predicted. 

And  yet  there  is  at  the  bottom  of  this  International  of 
Hate  and  of  Revolt  the  same  idea  of  the  essential  brother- 
hood of  man  which  governs  what  may  be  called  the  Inter- 
national of  Thought,  represented  by  the  highest  and  noblest 
minds  in  the  leading  nations  of  the  world,  the  same  idea 
also  which  unconsciously  sways  the  minds  of  the  multitudes 
in  all  countries  who  clamour  for  a  League  of  Nations,  and 
desperately  cling  to  the  hybrid  product  under  that  name 
upon  which  they  are  invited  to  pin  their  faith  for  the 
future  of  mankind. 

In  the  meantime  events  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  had 
taken  a  turn  little  expected  by  the  diplomacy  of  the  Great 
Powers.  The  collapse  of  Turkey,  weakened  by  the  Young 
Turk  Revolution  and  by  the  war  with  Italy,  had  been 
unexpectedly  rapid  and  complete  ;  and  the  victory  of  the 
four  allied  Balkan  Powers,  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  Greece  and 
Montenegro,  had  given  each  of  them  more  than  they  had 
dared  to  hope  for — a  result  which  was  not  at  all  to  the 
liking  of  the  Great  Powers,  whose  solemn  warning  about 
the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  had  been  thrown  to  the 
winds  by  the  exultant  victors.  Besides,  the  division  of 
the  spoils  threatened  to  become  a  problem  difficult  to  solve. 

The  probabilities  were,  indeed,  that  a  peaceful  solution 
of  the  problem  might  have  been  found  if  the  four  victorious 
Balkan  Powers  had  been  left  to  settle  it  between  them- 
selves without  any  outside  interference.  But,  of  course, 
such  a  disinterestedness  on  the  part  of  Russia  and  Austria- 
Hungary  was  not  to  be  hoped  for,  although  it  was  mani- 
festly the  only  sensible  policy  to  adopt.  In  both  countries 
light-headed  incompetence  and  dreamy  conceptions  of 
"  manifest  destiny  "  and  "  vital  interests  "  had  control  of 
foreign  policies.  A  solid  and  powerful  federation  of  Balkan 
States  would  have  stood  in  the  way  both  of  Russian  ambi- 
tions in  the  direction  of  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles 
and  of  Austro-Hungarian  aims  at  reaching  an  outlet  to 
the  iEgean  Sea  at  Salonika.  Therefore  such  a  simple  and, 
indeed,  the  only  rational  solution  of  the  vexed  problem, 
even  if  the  four  Balkan  Powers  concerned  had  been  found 
wilhng  to  sink  their  growing  differences  and  to  maintain 


128         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

and     consolidate     their     alliance,     would     not     have     been 
attainable. 

Considered  separately,  and  in  view  of  the  needless 
antagonism  between  the  two  Empires  unfortunately  exist- 
ing and  cultivated  on  both  sides  by  ambitious  politicians, 
a  too  powerful  Bulgaria  would  have  been  contrary  to 
Russian  policy,  and  on  the  other  hand  a  greatly  strengthened 
Serbia  with  access  to  the  Adriatic  would  have  been  con- 
sidered as  a  Russian  outpost  constituting  a  most  serious 
menace  to  the  very  existence  of  the  Dual  Monarchy. 

This  Austro-Russian  antagonism  and  rivalry  gave  the 
tone  to  the  discussions  of  the  London  Conference  of  the 
Great  Powers  assembled  to  adjudicate  the  division  of  the 
spoils  among  the  victors  of  the  first  Balkan  War,  and 
necessarily  influenced  its  ultimate  decisions.  The  result 
was  that  this  grave  problem,  on  whose  equitable  solution 
depended  the  establishment  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  of 
conditions  which  would,  at  least  to  some  extent,  have  been 
a  guarantee  of  lasting  peace  between  the  Balkan  nation- 
alities, was  handled  by  the  Conference  not  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  vital  interests  of  these  nationalities,  but 
exclusively  with  a  view  to  bring  about  some  settlement 
that  would  in  a  measure  conciliate  the  conflicting  preten- 
sions of  Russian  and  Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy.  I 
advisedly  use  the  expression  "conflicting  pretensions"  and 
avoid  speaking  of  "  conflicting  interests  "  of  Russia  and 
Austria-Hungary,  since  there  was  not,  nor  could  there  be, 
any  conflict  between  the  real  vital  interests  of  both,  which 
could  only  be  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  which  there- 
fore demanded  the  sinking  of  all  differences  based  on 
rivalry  of  imperialistic  policies  and  pretensions  to  supre- 
macy in  Balkan  affairs. 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  such  a  policy  of 
renunciation  was  rendered  somewhat  more  difficult  to 
Austria-Hungar}^  than  to  Russia  by  the  apparent  pre- 
dominance in  Russia  of  Pan-Slavistic  tendencies,  which, 
indeed,  presented  a  serious  menace  to  an  Empire  the 
majority  of  whose  population  belonged  to  the  Slav  race. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  predominance  of  Pan-Slavism  in 
Russia,  in  the  sense  of  its  suspected  controlling  influence 
over   the   policy   of   the   Government,    was   certainly    more 


THE   LONDON  CONFERENCE  129 

apparent  than  real,  although  it  could  not  be  denied  that 
the  activities  of  some  of  our  diplomatic  and  consular  agents 
were  lending  colour  to  such  suspicions.  The  chief  sinner  in 
this  respect  was  our  Minister  at  Belgrade,  Mr.  Hartwig,  a 
most  honourable,  capable  and  hard-working  functionary 
but  the  last  man  to  be  entrusted  with  such  a  post  at  a 
time  when  the  world's  peace  was  hanging  by  the  slenderest 
thread  and  depended  on  the  avoidance  of  serious  compli- 
cations in  the  Balkans.  He  had  ever  since  the  beginning 
of  his  diplomatic  career  been  in  contact  with  Balkan  poli- 
cies and  intrigues,  and,  like  most  ambitious  diplomats, 
had  become  an  adept  of  Slavophilism  as  the  surest  way  to 
earn  early  promotion,  a  reputation  of  live  patriotism  and 
the  powerful  support  of  the  Nationalist  and  Slavophile 
Press  ensuring  considerable  latitude  and  impunity  in  the 
pursuit  of  lines  of  policy  rather  independent  of,  and  even 
opposed  to,  the  policies  of  the  central  authority  for  the 
time  being. 

By  his  open  encouragement  of  Pan-Serbian  ambitions — 
that  is  to  say,  of  tendencies  aiming  at  nothing  less  than 
the  disruption  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy — he  had 
become  a  most  influential  personage  in  Serbian  political 
circles  and  had  acquired  the  widest  popularity,  so  much 
so  that  after  his  sudden  death,  shortly  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  World  War,  it  seems  to  have  been  intended  to 
honour  his  memory  as  a  friend  of  Serbia  by  the  erection 
by  public  subscription  of  a  monument  in  one  of  the  squares 
of  the  capital — a  project  which  probably  will  elicit  less 
enthusiasm  now  that  the  Serbian  people  are  in  a  position 
to  count  the  cost  at  which  their  dreams  of  national 
aggrandizement  have  been  realized. 

It  is  hardly  to  be  wondered  at  that  Austro-Hungarian 
statesmen,  however  cognizant  of  the  absence  of  political 
discipline  in  Russian  diplomatic  circles,  especially  in  the 
East,  should  have  taken  serious  alarm  at  the  attitude  of 
Russia's  representative  at  Belgrade,  which  they  had  every 
reason  to  consider  as  being,  if  not  inspired,  in  any  case 
openly  tolerated,  by  the  Russian  Government. 

Russia's  case  before  the  London  Conference  does  not 
seem  to  have  elicited  sufficiently  strong  support  from  her 
friends   and   allies — maybe   on  account  of  their  conscious- 

VOL.   II  9 


130        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

ness  of  its  inherent  weakness  and  of  the  not  unreasonable 
nature  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government's  apprehen- 
sions, maybe  because  they  did  not  consider  the  time  and 
occasion  to  be  favourable  for  allowing  the  long-expected 
wind-up  of  the  European  drama  to  begin.  Russian  diplo- 
macy had  to  submit  with  what  good  grace  it  could  to 
letting  her  proteg6,  Serbia,  be  shorn  of  the  principal  fruit 
of  her  victories — access  to  the  Adriatic ;  and  Austria- 
Hungary  was  allowed  to  compel  the  evacuation  by  Serbia 
of  Durazzo  and  the  other  ports  conquered  by  her,  as  well 
as  the  abandonment  by  Montenegro  of  her  conquest — 
Scutari.  Why  the  loss  by  the  Mountain  Kingdom  of  that 
latter  point  should  have  been  particularly  resented  by  our 
Slavophiles  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  out.  But  I  remem- 
ber, being  at  the  time  in  St.  Petersburg,  having  met  on 
the  Nevsky  Prospect  a  procession  of  Slavophile  "  Intelli- 
gentzia " — not  very  numerous  and  headed  by  a  General 
whose  name  I  forget — carrying  national  flags  and  placards, 
one  with  the  inscription  "  Scutari  to  Montenegro,"  and 
another  proclaiming  "  The  Cross  on  St.  Sophia  " — amidst 
palpable  indifference  of  the  upper  classes  as  well  as  of  the 
people. 

If  this  demonstration  was  intended  as  a  means  of  inti- 
midation, it  lamentably  failed  of  its  effect  upon  those  against 
whom  it  seemed  to  have  been  aimed.  At  least  Mr.  Sazonoff, 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  against  whom  the  wrath  of 
the  Slavophiles  and  the  abuse  of  the  Nationalist  Press  were 
mainly  directed,  treated  these  manifestations  with  com- 
mendable indifference,  to  his  credit  be  it  said. 

Not  satisfied  with  having  inflicted  upon  Serbia  the 
humiliation  of  having  to  renounce  the  hard-earned  access 
to  the  Adriatic,  gallantly  won  by  the  victory  of  her  arms, 
Austria-Hungary,  with  the  support  of  her  alhes,  obtained 
the  Conference's  sanction  for  the  creation  of  an  independent 
principality  or  Kingdom  of  Albania,  with  a  scion  of  one 
of  the  minor  German  dynasties  as  Sovereign  under  the 
fantastic  title  of  "  Mpret."  The  creation  of  this  new  inde- 
pendent State  was  obviously  directed  against  the  interests 
and  ambitions  of  Serbia  as  well  as  of  Greece,  the  result 
being  that  both  these  Powers  were  eager  to  compensate 
themselves  in  Macedonia  at   Bulgaria's  expense  for  what 


THE   TREATY   OF   BUCHAREST         131 

they  had  lost  or  missed  in  Albania.  This  situation  could 
not  but  lead  to  an  armed  conflict  between  the  former 
allies.  Serbia  and  Greece  joined  hands,  and  with  the  help 
of  the  unprovoked  intervention  of  Roumania,  succeeded  in 
inflicting  on  Bulgaria  a  crushing  defeat,  reflected  in  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace  which  terminated  the  war 
and  was  negotiated  at  Bucharest — this  time  by  the  belli- 
gerents alone  without  assistance  or  interference  by  the 
Great  Powers.  It  was  one  of  those  transactions  which 
bear  in  themselves  the  germs  of  conflicts  to  come. 

Whatever  view  one  takes  of  the  settlement  of  the  second 
Balkan  War  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  it  was  plain  that 
it  had  left  affairs  in  the  Peninsula  in  a  state  of  unstable 
equilibrium,  which  was  bound  to  react  on  the  general 
political  situation  in  Europe.  The  greatly  strengthened 
position  of  Serbia  as  a  consequence  of  her  victory  in  the 
war  and  the  enhanced  prestige  she  had  thereby  acquired 
in  the  eyes  of  Austria's  Slav  population,  however  gratifying 
to  Russian  diplomacy,  could  not  but  appear  to  the  Vienna 
Government,  for  this  very  reason,  in  the  light  of  a  serious 
and  growing  menace  to  the  safety  of  the  Dual  Monarchy. 
The  resulting  tension  in  Austrc-Russian  relations  added  a 
new  element  of  danger  to  the  all-pervading  atmosphere  of 
unrest  which  could  bode  no  good  to  the  cause  of  European 
peace. 

Profoundly  convinced  of  the  near  approach  of  the 
crisis,  I  could  not  help  feeling  greatly  alarmed  in  watching 
the  course  of  the  Government's  domestic  policy.  Appa- 
rently oblivious  of  the  threatening  danger  of  a  war  of 
unprecedented  magnitude  in  which  we  were  bound  to  become 
involved,  and  at  a  time  when  it  was  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  make  sure  of  the  loyalty  and  devotion  to  the 
Empire  of  the  populations  of  our  borderlands  and  outlying 
dominions  and  of  all  the  various  non-Russian  nationalities 
included  in  its  confines,  the  Government  continued,  as  if 
on  purpose,  to  irritate  in  many,  sometimes  even  ludicrous, 
ways  the  populations  whom  it  was  manifestly  desirable  to 
conciliate  by  every  means  in  its  power. 

Take  the  case  of  Finland.  A  glance  at  the  map  is 
sufficient  to  show  the  importance  for  Russia  to  be  able,  in 
case  of  war,  to  rely  on  the  loyalty  of  the  population  of  the 


132        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Grand  Duchy  from  which  the  Empire  was  divided  by  a 
border-line  distant  barely  some  twenty  miles  from  St, 
Petersburg.  It  was,  therefore,  the  prime  duty  of  Russian 
statesmanship  to  make  sure  of  the  loyalty  of  the  Finnish 
population  by  a  loyal  observance  of  their  constitutional 
rights,  secured  to  the  country  by  the  will  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander  I  and  subsequently  solemnly  guaranteed  by 
every  one  of  his  successors  at  their  accession  to  the  throne 
of  Russia, 

Ever  since  its  union  with  Russia  in  1809  Finland  had 
been  governed  by  the  Russian  Emperors  as  Grand  Dukes 
of  Finland,  practically  as  a  separate  State  enjoying  the 
fullest  possible  autonomy,  war  and  foreign  affairs  alone 
being  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Imperial  Government.  Under 
the  shelter  of  the  Russian  Crown,  and  thanks  to  its  close 
connection  with  an  enormous  Empire  open  to  its  com- 
merce, industry  and  enterprise,  Finland  had  prospered 
exceedingly  and  had  reached  an  unquestionably  higher 
plane  of  civilization  and  culture  than  the  Empire  itself.  Its 
population,  the  upper  crust  of  which  (some  13  per  cent,)  was 
of  Swedish  nationality,  bred  in  an  atmosphere  of  ingrained 
respect  for  law  and  order  and  profoundly  attached  to  the 
country's  free  constitution,  had  never  given  any  reason  to 
question  its  loyalty  to  the  Empire.  Nothing  more  was 
required  of  sensible  Russian  policy  than  to  adhere  faith- 
fully to  the  course  followed  by  the  first  three  Sovereigns, 
Alexander  I,  Nicholas  I  and  Alexander  II,  who  as  Grand 
Dukes  of  Finland  had  governed  the  country  to  the  entire 
satisfaction  of  its  population  and  to  the  best  advantage  of 
the  Empire,  as  well  as  of  its  most  important  dependency. 

The  wisdom  of  such  a  course  failed,  however,  to  com- 
mend itself  to  the  narrow-minded  and  militant  nationalism 
which,  from  the  early  days  of  Alexander  Ill's  reign,  had 
begun  to  dominate  the  Government's  domestic  policy.  It 
is  likely  that  Finland  might  have  escaped  for  some  time 
longer  the  effect  of  the  new  tendencies  which  had  gained 
the  upper  hand  in  Government  circles  and  were  enthusi- 
astically supported  by  the  nationalistic  Press,  because  the 
Emperor  and  the  Empress,  Marie  Feodorovna,  a  Danish 
sea  king's  daughter,  both  lovers  of  the  sea,  had  taken  to 
spending    part    of    each    summer    among    the    picturesque 


THE   TSAR'S   LETTER  133 

islands  of  the  Finnish  archipelago,  the  so-called  "  Skerries," 
had  purchased  a  small  island  for  use  as  a  camping-out 
ground  for  picnics,  fishing,  etc.,  had  come  in  contact  with 
the  local  population  and  were  said  to  have  acquired  a 
strong  liking  for  Finland  and  their  Finnish  subjects. 

Unfortunately  a  most  insignificant  incident — so  the 
story  goes,  and  I  repeat  it  as  told  to  me  by  several  persons 
who  were  in  a  position  to  know  more  about  it  than  reached 
the  pubUc's  ears — brought  about  not,  perhaps,  a  change  in 
the  Sovereign's  sentiments,  but  a  disposition  to  lend  a 
more  complaisant  ear  to  insidious  insinuations  regarding 
the  desirability  of  curbing  Finland's  too  markedly  inde- 
pendent attitude  and  suspected  separatistic  tendencies.  It 
happened  in  this  way  :  One  morning  the  Emperor,  on 
board  his  yacht  anchored  off  a  little  village  on  one  of  the 
numerous  islands,  had  written  a  letter,  enclosed  it  in  an 
envelope,  had  himself  pasted  on  it  a  Russian  postage  stamp 
and  had  ordered  it  to  be  mailed  at  the  local  post  office. 
The  sailor  sent  to  the  post  office  with  this  letter  brought 
it  back  and  reported  that  the  postmaster  had  refused  to 
accept  it,  saying  that  no  letters  could  be  mailed  in  Finland 
bearing  other  than  Finnish  postage  stamps,  and  had  insisted 
on  his  refusal  in  spite  of  having  been  told  that  the  sender 
of  the  letter  was  the  Sovereign  himself.  This  report,  when 
it  reached  the  Emperor,  perhaps  not  without  some  added 
colouring  of  patriotic  indignation,  may  have  ruffled  his 
temper  and  have  caused  him  to  attach  to  this  small  matter 
more  importance  than  it  evidently  deserved.  At  any  rate 
His  Majesty  was  said  to  have  ordered  that  steps  be  taken 
to  remedy  a  state  of  affairs  which  presumed  to  prevent 
the  use  of  Russian  postage  stamps  anywhere  within  the 
confines  of  the  Empire. 

Although  the  constitutional  right  of  the  Grand  Duchy 
to  have  its  own  postal  organization  and  its  own  postage 
stamps  had  never  been  questioned  before,  nor,  indeed, 
could  be  questioned  any  more  than  its  constitutional  right 
to  its  own  coinage  and  to  its  tariff  economy,  the  Finnish 
Senate  or  Diet,  or  both,  were  found  willing,  presumably 
from  a  sincere  desire  to  avoid  friction,  to  waive  the  ques- 
tion of  principle,  to  withdraw  Finnish  and  to  introduce 
Russian  postage  stamps  for  exclusive  use  in  Finland.     This 


134        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

was  in  itself  a  matter  of  small  importance,  but  it  proved 
the  entering  wedge  which  in  the  course  of  time  led  to 
further  encroachments  by  the  Imperial  bureaucracy  on  the 
constitutional  rights  of  Finland,  until  the  beginning  of  a 
prolonged  constitutional  conflict  in  1899,  when  under 
Governor-General  Bobrikoff's  administration  the  country 
had  to  submit  to  a  dictatorial  regime  which  culminated  in 
General  Bobrikoff's  assassination  and  the  outbreak  of 
something  like  a  revolution  in  1905. 

In  the  following  year  the  status  quo  ante  annum  1899 
was  re-established,  a  new  Diet  was  convoked  and  adopted 
an  extremely  radical  system  of  representation  on  the  basis 
of  universal  and  direct  suffrage,  the  franchise  being  ex- 
tended to  all  men  and  women  of  twenty-four  years  of  age 
and  over.  The  parliamentary  regime  introduced  at  the 
same  time  in  Russia  proved,  however,  very  hostile  to  Fin- 
land's autonomy.  Russia's  only  really  powerful  and  effi- 
cient Prime  Minister — whether  from  a  mistaken  belief  in 
the  necessity  in  the  Empire's  interest  of  such  a  measure, 
or  from  subserviency  to  the  influential  nationalist  group  in 
the  Duma,  whose  support  he  may  have  thought  it  neces- 
sary to  secure  to  the  Government — caused  the  Duma  to 
pass  the  notorious  law  of  June  17/30,  1910,  stipulating 
that  the  Russian  Duma  and  Council  of  the  Empire  have 
sole  legislative  power  in  matters  affecting  Russia  and 
Finland  jointly,  a  law  which  was  resented  by  the  whole 
population  of  Finland  as  a  most  serious  encroachment  on 
Finland's  constitution  and  an  attempt  at  depriving  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  its  autonomy. 

On  the  basis  of  this  law  another  one  was  passed  by 
the  Russian  Legislative  Assemblies  in  the  following  year 
placing  Russians  on  an  equality  with  Finlanders  in  the 
Grand  Duchy.  This  law  in  itself  was  perfectly  just.  It 
did  away,  indeed,  with  an  anomaly  which,  although  it  had 
always  existed,  had  never  before  attracted  any  particular 
attention,  presumably  because  it  had  never  caused  any 
great  practical  inconvenience.  One  of  the  most  important 
points,  or  perhaps  the  most  important  point,  in  this  ques- 
tion of  the  equality  of  rights  between  Russians  and  Fin- 
landers,  concerned  the  right  to  enter  the  Government 
service,  a  point  of  much  greater  importance  to  natives  of 


FINLAND  135 

Finland  than  to  natives  of  Russia.  There  have  always 
been  great  numbers  of  Finlanders  in  the  service  of  the 
Imperial  Government — some  of  them  having  occupied 
ministerial  posts,  such  as  Admirals  Possiette  and  Avelan, 
or  General  Riedigers,  and  other  high  military  commands 
such  as  General  Grippenberg  in  the  war  with  Japan  and 
General  Baron  Mannerheim  in  the  late  World  War,  all  of 
them  having  served  our  common  Fatherland  with  never- 
questioned  loyalty  and  great  distinction — whereas  there 
could  hardly  have  been  any  apprehension  of  Finland  being 
overrun  with  Russian  candidates  for  admission  to  the 
Finnish  Government  service.  There  could,  anyway,  be  no 
practical,  any  more  than  theoretical,  objection  on  the  part 
of  Finland  to  the  setting  aside  of  the  existing  anomaly. 
Nor  was  there  any.  It  was  simply  a  question  of  how  to 
do  it.  And  that  is  where  the  difference  in  the  mentality 
of  the  two  sides  came  into  play  and  caused  a  needless  con- 
flict which  embittered  the  relations  between  them  to  a 
considerable  and  particularly  regrettable  extent  at  a  time 
when  it  was  most  important  to  avoid  any  such  undesirable 
friction. 

The  Finnish  Diet  obviously  would  have  been  willing 
lO  pass  the  required  legislation.  This,  however,  would  not 
have  satisfied  our  reactionary  nationalists.  Finland  was  to 
be  taught  that  its  autonomy  had  been  granted  as  an  act 
of  grace  by  the  Emperor  Alexander  I,  revokable  at  any  time, 
and  that  Finland  had  really  no  constitutional  rights  which 
Russia  was  bound  to  respect.  It  was  considered  necessary 
to  impose  the  law  of  equality  on  Finland  by  an  Act  passed 
by  the  Russian  Legislative  Assemblies  based  on  the  law  of 
June  17/30,  1910,  which  the  population  of  Finland  con- 
sidered to  be  a  violation  of  the  Finnish  constitution. 

The  result  was  the  flat  refusal  of  the  Finnish  courts  to 
apply  the  law  held  to  be  unconstitutional.  This  led  to 
quite  unjustifiable  measures  of  coercion  openl}'  violating 
the  rights  guaranteed  to  Finland  and  confirmed  by  a  suc- 
cession of  Russian  monarchs.  Judges  of  the  Finnish  courts 
were  arrested  manu  militari,  carried  off  to  St.  Petersburg, 
sentenced  to  terms  of  imprisonment  by  a  Russian  court  ; 
the  president  of  the  refractory  Diet,  Mr.  Svenhufvud,  wa 
exiled  to  Siberia  ;  and  so  forth. 


136        FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

The  effect  which  these  arbitrary  proceedings  was  bound 
to  produce  on  a  peaceable,  law-abiding  people,  bred  in 
reverence  for  the  country's  constitution  and  determined  to 
stand  up  for  what  they  held  to  be  their  rights  under  it, 
may  be  imagined.  The  failure  to  foresee  and  realize  this 
effect  can  only  be  explained  by  the  prevalence  of  a 
mentality  labouring  under  the  atavistic  influence  of  centuries 
of  slavery  under  the  Mongolian  yoke  and  inaccessible  to  a 
conception  of  the  supremacy  of  right  over  might. 

If,  now,  we  turn  to  Poland  we  shall  find  that  ever  since 
the  Polish  insurrection  of  1863  our  Government  had  been 
pursuing  a  policy  inspired  by  tendencies  no  less  destructive 
of  any  hope  of  bridging  the  gulf  of  mutual  antagonism 
created  by  a  centuries-old  feud  between  the  two  branches 
of  the  Slav  race,  and  no  less  unreasonable  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  right  interests  of  the  Empire  than  our  recent 
policy  in  regard  to  Finland.  The  pursuit  of  such  a  policy 
in  respect  to  Poland  was  rendered  easier  by  the  fact  that 
there  even  constitutional  scruples  could  not  stand  in  the 
way  of  our  bureaucracy's  arbitrary  proceedings,  little  as 
such  scruples  would  have  carried  weight,  as  we  have  seen 
in  the  case  of  Finland, 

The  Polish  constitution  had  been  abolished  after  the 
insurrection  of  1830  and  the  last  vestige  of  Polish  autonomy 
had  disappeared  after  the  insurrection  of  1863.  Although 
the  Emperor  retained  the  title  of  King  (Tsar)  of  Poland, 
even  the  name  "  Kingdom  of  Poland  "  disappeared  from 
the  official  language  and  was  replaced  by  the  absurd  appel- 
lation "  Pri-Vislinsky  Kray  "  (which  means  "  Region  situ- 
ated on  the  Vistula  "),  a  designation  particularly  offensive 
to  Polish  national  feeling. 

The  system  of  forcible  Russification  inaugurated  after 
the  first  insurrection  had  acquired  a  particularly  harsh 
complexion  after  that  of  1863.  For  instance,  the  com- 
pulsory exclusive  use  of  the  Russian  language  in  all 
Government  and  public  institutions  of  every  kind,  in  the 
University  of  Warsaw,  in  all  public  and  even  private 
schools,  was  insisted  upon  apparently  in  the  belief  that  it 
would  prove  an  efficacious  means  of  Russification,  although 
it  was  plainly  bound  to  be  resented  as  a  most  odious 
measure  of  oppression. 


POLAND  137 

But  then  the  very  idea  of  attempting  to  denationalize 
an  intensely  patriotic,  chivalrous  people,  proud  of  its  his- 
toric past,  its  language,  its  literature  and  its  Western 
culture,  assimilated  long  before  Russia  had  emerged  from 
barbarism,  could  only  have  germinated  in  a  mentality 
such  as,  in  the  beginning  of  the  World  War,  bethought 
itself  of  the  advisability  of  changing  the  name  of  the 
Empire's  capital  by  giving  it  a  Slavic  sound,  presumably 
for  the  purpose  of  stimulating  the  people's  patriotism  or 
of  demonstrating  its  own. 

It  appears,  however,  that  the  danger  of  persisting  in 
a  policy  so  exasperating  to  the  Polish  people,  at  a  time 
when  all  the  world  was  living  in  the  apprehension  of  a 
general  European  war,  at  last  dawned  on  our  ruling 
bureaucracy.  A  Bill  was  introduced  and  duly  passed  by 
the  Duma  authorizing  the  use  of  the  Polish  language  in 
their  deliberations  by  the  Municipal  Councils  in  all  towns 
in  Poland  !  This  measure — in  the  light  of  recent  events 
simply  ludicrous  in  its  hesitating  and  timid  liberalism — 
was  nevertheless  not  destined  to  become  law.  Rejected  by 
the  Council  of  the  Empire  by  a  small  majority,  the  Bill  was, 
by  the  Emperor's  command,  reintroduced  in  the  Duma, 
was  duly  passed  again  only  to  be  rejected  a  second  time 
by  the  Upper  House,  this  time  by  a  slightly  larger  majority 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  all  the  Ministers  entitled  to  sit  in 
the  House  came  to  vote  for  it,  and  in  spite  of  its  being 
known  that  the  Emperor  desired  its  passage. 

In  this  affair  the  ruling  bureaucracy  had  certainly 
shown  some  goodwill  and  a  modicum  of  statesmanship, 
but  had  been  unable  to  overcome  the  obscurantist  opposi- 
tion of  reactionary  nationalism  which  dominated  our 
Upper  House.  The  Emperor  did  not  conceal  his  annoy- 
ance, and  in  the  course  of  a  farewell  audience  which  I  had 
requested,  as  usual,  and  been  honoured  with  after  the 
close  of  the  session  before  going  abroad.  His  Majesty 
expressed  himself  very  freely  on  the  subject  and  asked  me 
whether  I  could  explain  the  reason  why  a  measure,  in  the 
passage  of  which  he  was  known  to  take  a  personal  interest, 
could  have  been  twice  rejected  by  the  Council  of  the 
Empire  and  apparently  by  the  votes  of  the  right  side  of 
the  House,  composed  mostly  of  life  members  appointed  by 


138        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

the  Crown.  I  could  only  assure  the  Emperor  that  no  oppo- 
sition to  his  personal  wishes  could  possibly  have  been 
intended  and  that  the  votes  of  the  majority  could  have 
been  inspired  only  by  motives  of  mistaken  patriotism  and 
apprehensions  of  the  possible  consequences  of  any  departure 
from  the  traditional  policy  that  had  been  pursued  in  regard 
to  Poland  ever  since  the  insurrection  of  1863. 

I  availed  myself  of  the  occasion  to  remind  His  Majesty 
of  the  fact  that  the  wise  policy  of  his  great  ancestor,  the 
Emperor  Alexander  I — the  only  policy  that  could  really 
serve  the  best  interests  of  Russia  as  well  as  of  Poland — had 
been  similarly  opposed  by  Karamzine,  Russia's  greatest 
historian,  in  a  celebrated  memorandum,  which  also  could 
have  been  inspired  only  by  the  purest  patriotic,  albeit 
palpably  mistaken,  motives. 

If  in  the  case  of  Poland  the  traditions  of  Alexander  I's 
statesmanlike  policy  had  been  discarded,  it  might  be 
claimed  that  two  formidable  insurrections  had  furnished  a 
colourable  pretext  if  not  a  compelling  reason  therefor. 
No  such  reason,  or  even  pretext,  however,  could  have 
been  invoked  to  explain  a  departure  from  the  traditions 
of  the  policy  which  Peter  the  Great  and  all  his  successors 
until  the  reign  of  Alexander  III  had  followed  in  regard  to 
the  so-called  Baltic  Provinces,  Esthonia,  Livonia  and,  since 
1795,  Courland.  The  landowning  nobility  and  the  bulk  of 
the  bourgeoisie  of  the  towns,  forming  about  7  or  8  per  cent, 
of  the  population  of  these  provinces,  were  of  German 
descent.  Their  loyalty  to  the  Empire  of  which  these  pro- 
vinces formed  an  integral  part,  had  never  been  questioned. 
All  their  interests,  no  less  than  those  of  the  native  popu- 
lations, were  identical  with  those  of  the  Russian  nation. 
No  separatistic  tendencies  had  ever  existed  before,  neither 
among  the  German  minority  nor  among  the  Esthonian 
and  Lettish  majority ;  nor  was  there  any  conceivable 
reason  why  such  tendencies  should  have  existed. 

Geographically  these  provinces  are  a  part  of  the  great 
Russian  plain  forming  its  natural  outlet  to  the  Baltic  Sea  ; 
economically  they  are  dependent  on  this  immense  "  hinter- 
land "  with  its  unbounded  resources ;  their  connection 
with  Russia  has  built  up  their  prosperity,  considerably 
outdistancing  the  economic  development  of  the  neighbour- 


ESTHONIA   AND   "  LATIVA  "  139 

ing  Russian  provinces  ;  and  last,  but  not  least,  strategically 
and  politically — as  a  glance  at  the  map  will  show — the  only 
political  entity  in  which  they  could  possibly  be  included 
with  regard  for  their  own  safety  and  advantage,  was  bound 
to  be  the  Russian  State. 

As  far  as  the  other  alternative  is  concerned,  the  creation 
of  "  independent  "  republics  of  Esthonia  and  "  Lativa,"  as 
favoured  by  those  who  appear  to  see  their  interest  in  the 
dismemberment  of  Russia,  I  make  bold  to  say  that  no 
such  eventuality  could  ever  have  been  dreamed  of  by  even 
the  most  disgruntled  and  irreconcilable  opponent  of  Russian 
rule  in  these  parts.  That  there  should  be  no  lack  of  such 
would  almost  seem  to  have  been  the  aim,  and  had  certainly 
been  the  result,  of  the  policy  of  forcible  Russification  inau- 
gurated by  the  Russian  bureaucracy.  It  took  the  form  of 
proselytism  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church  among  the 
peasantry  with  the  powerful  aid  and  encouragement  of 
the  State  ;  of  the  introduction  of  the  compulsory  exclusive 
use  of  the  Russian  language  in  the  courts,  the  University 
of  Dorpat,  nationalized  under  the  name  of  Youriev,  in 
the  public  and  private  schools,  municipalities,  etc. — in  a 
word,  of  using  the  language  as  a  means  of  oppression,  a 
form  of  oppression  which,  as  experience  has  amply  demon- 
strated, wherever  it  has  been  attempted,  has  always  been 
particularly  resented  by  those  upon  whom  such  linguistic 
tyranny  has  been  practised,  and  has  always  failed  to 
accomplish  the  political  ends  aimed  at. 

In  addition,  some  Machiavellian  policies  appear  to  have 
been  practised  in  fostering  racial  animosity  between  the 
majority  of  Letts  and  Esthonians  and  the  German  minority 
of  the  population,  by  seemingly  favouring  the  former, 
with  the  result  that  at  the  time  of  the  revolutionary  out- 
break of  1905  the  "Jacqueries  "  in  the  Baltic  Provinces 
assumed  a  particularly  violent  and  dangerous  character, 
such  as  to  necessitate  their  repression  with  a  ruthlessness 
which  rendered  Russian  rule  the  more  odious  in  the  eyes 
of  the  native  population  as  it  showed  itself  in  the  rdle  of 
protector  of  the  rights  of  property  of  the  landowning 
German  minority. 

To  sum  up,  our  ruling  bureaucracy  had  succeeded, 
under  the   inspiration   of    narrow-minded   militant    nation- 


140        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

alism,  in  turning  what  had  been  perhaps  the  most  prosperous 
and  unquestionably  the  most  cultured  part  of  the  Empire 
and  the  stanchest  support  of  the  throne,  into  a  seething 
cauldron  of  race  hatred  and  social  unrest,  at  the  same  time 
uniting  the  warring  elements  of  the  population  in  common 
resentment  of  its  own  arbitrary  rule. 

Since  this  had  been  the  outcome  of  the  Government's 
policy  in  our  most  important  and  most  exposed  border 
provinces  with  a  population  of  alien  races,  one  would  have 
thought  that  narrow-minded  nationalism,  taking  to  heart 
this  object-lesson,  would  have  refrained  from  giving  free 
rein  to  its  militant  ardour  in  another  part  of  the  Empire — 
Little  Russia  (Malorossiya),  comprising  the  "  governments  "  or 
provinces  of  Kharkoff,  Tehernigoff,  Poltava,  Ekaterinoslav, 
Kieff,  Podolia,  and  part  of  Kursk  to  which  it  has  now 
become  fashionable  to  apply  the  old  term  "  Ukraina," 
which  means  simply  "  borderland,"  The  population  is  of 
pure  Russian  stock,  being  one  of  the  three  branches  of 
the  Russian  family  (Great,  Little  and  White  Russians) 
and  uses  a  dialect  no  farther  removed  from  the  Russian 
language  than  the  Provencal  dialect  is  from  French. 

The  ruling  bureaucracy,  however,  in  its  zeal  for  Russi- 
fication  and  unification,  took  to  systematic  persecution  of 
the  Little  Russian  dialect,  thereby  simply  promoting  the 
growth  among  the  Little  Russian  "Intelligentzia"  of  an 
incipient  seditious  movement  which  it  was  intended  to 
prevent.  The  acme  of  senseless  arbitrariness  was  reached 
when  the  Government  prohibited  the  celebration  of  the 
anniversary  of  the  birth  of  Shevtchenko,  Little  Russia's 
greatest  poet — a  measure  the  provocative  and  aggravating 
absurdity  of  which  could  only  have  been  equalled  if,  for 
instance,  the  French  Government  had  chosen  to  forbid  a 
similar  celebration  in  honour  of  the  great  Provencal  poet. 
Mistral. 

Incidentally  I  would  observe  that  the  word  "  Ukraina  " 
(not  Ukrainia,  as  one  sometimes  sees  it  misspelt)  has  never 
served  to  designate  a  pohtical  entity  ;  it  has  always  been 
applied  colloquially  to  an  ill-defined  region  embracing  the 
"  governments "  or  provinces  enumerated  above.  It  has 
been  popularized  of  late,  first  by  German  and  then  by 
Entente    war    propaganda    since    the    dismemberment    of 


UKRAINA  141 

Russia  became  the  policy  first  of  our  former  enemies  and 
then  of  our  former  allies.  It  cannot  be  denied,  however, 
that  the  willingness  of  the  Little  Russian  "  IntelHgentzia  "  to 
co-operate  in  the  dismemberment  of  our  common  Father- 
land by  the  creation  of  an  "  independent  Ukraina "  is 
mainly  due  to  the  unwisdom  of  the  Russian  bureaucracy's 
nationalistic  policy. 

Nor  has  our  Government  displayed  less  unwisdom  in 
dealing  with  the  Jewish  question.  It  is  not  my  purpose  to 
enter  into  an  exhaustive  examination  of  this  momentous 
and  thorny  question,  to  the  only  rational  solution  of  which 
even  a  statesman  of  Witte's  calibre  could  not  see  his  way 
clear.  I  have  always  been  convinced  that  the  denial  to 
the  Jewish  population  of  equality  of  rights  was  as  unjusti- 
fiable in  principle  as  it  was  bound  to  be  an  unmitigated 
evil  in  practice,  and  was  utterly  indefensible  as  a  matter 
of  policy, 

I  have  previously  mentioned  the  impressions  I  carried 
away  from  some  months'  sojourn  in  Transcaucasia  half  a 
century  ago.  I  refer  to  it  now  only  to  mention  that  since 
then  the  intolerant  policy  pursued  by  the  Government  had 
succeeded  in  fomenting  bitter  racial  animosities  between 
the  three  nationalities,  Georgians,  Armenians  and  Tartars, 
composing  the  bulk  of  the  population,  and  in  uniting  them 
all  in  common  hatred  of  Russian  rule.  It  had  played 
havoc  with  the  beneficent  results  of  the  wise  rule  of  such 
Viceroys  as  Prince  Worontzoff,  Prince  Bariatinsky  and  the 
Grand  Duke  Michael  Nicolawitch,  brother  of  Alexander  II, 
and  would  have  done  worse  had  not  the  powerful  influence 
which  the  last  Viceroy,  Count  Worontzoff-Dashkoff,  a 
liberal  and  enlightened  statesman,  possessed  at  Court, 
rendered  him  sufficiently  independent  of  the  Central  Govern- 
ment to  enable  him  to  undo  some  of  the  mischief  which 
had  resulted  from  the  activities  of  his  predecessors  in 
office. 

In  surveying  the  political  situation  as  a  whole  I  could 
not  fail  to  realize  that  the  Government's  foreign  as  well 
as  domestic  policy  pursued  during  the  last  two  decades 
had  resulted  in  placing  the  country  in  the  imminent  danger 
of  being  involved  in  a  general  European  war  and  of  being 
found  at  the  critical  moment  totally  unprepared  to  meet 


142        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

such  an  emergency,  complicated  by  our  having  systemati- 
cally created  in  the  whole  chain  of  dominions  and  border 
provinces  surrounding  the  Empire  in  the  West  and  South 
an  atmosphere  of  discontent  and  hostility  to  Russian  rule 
which  eventually  could  only  benefit  the  interests  of  our 
potential  enemies. 

My  profound  conviction  of  the  alarming  character  of 
the  situation  prompted  me  to  avail  myself  of  my  position 
as  Member  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire  for  the  purpose  of 
once  more  sounding  a  note  of  warning,  this  time  from  a 
tribune  which  would  secure  to  it  the  widest  publicity.  The 
difficulty,  however,  consisted  not  only  in  the  rules  of  the 
House,  which  excluded  the  discussion  of  questions  con- 
nected with  foreign  policy,  but  also  in  the  rigour  with 
which  the  President  of  the  Council,  Mr.  Akimoff,  a  very 
able  man  but  extreme  reactionary,  was  wont  to  apply 
these  rules,  especially  to  Members  whose  political  views  he 
did  not  share. 

It  became  necessary,  therefore,  to  guard  against  the 
danger  of  being  called  to  order  before  having  had  a  chance 
to  utter  all  I  would  have  to  say.  With  this  end  in  view, 
having  prepared  with  the  greatest  care  the  text  of  my 
speech,  confining  myself  to  generalities  and  avoiding  as  far 
as  possible  reference  to  anything  that  could  lay  me  open 
to  interruptions  from  the  Chair,  I  called  upon  the  President 
of  the  Council  in  the  morning  of  the  day  when  I  had  made 
up  my  mind  to  address  the  House,  read  to  him  the  full 
text  of  my  speech,  and  requested  him  not  to  interrupt  me 
before  I  had  concluded  what  I  had  to  say. 

Mr.  Akimoff  listened  attentively  to  the  reading  of  my 
speech  and  said  that  personally  he  had  no  formal  objection 
to  offer,  the  more  so  as  on  that  day  he  was  not  going  to 
preside,  having  requested  the  Vice-President  to  take  his 
place  ;  but  he  asked  me  why  I  insisted  on  uttering  views 
the  expression  of  which  could  do  no  possible  good  and 
would  make  me  hosts  of  enemies.  To  this  I  could  only 
reply  that  I  was  not  inexperienced  enough  to  imagine  that 
my  saying  what  I  intended  to  say  would  do  much  good, 
or  indeed  any  good,  but  that  my  silence  would  do  still  less. 

I  delivered  my  speech  on  April  3/16,  1913,  in  the 
Council  of  the  Empire  in  connection  with  a  debate  that 


MY   SPEECH  143 

was  taking  place  on  the  subject  of  the  Bill  regarding  the 
use  of  the  Polish  language  by  the  municipalities  in  Poland 
which  had  come  up  from  the  Duma,  When  I  had  resumed 
my  seat  a  celebrated  jurist  and  popular  orator,  member  of 
the  extreme  Liberal  group  of  the  Council,  whose  acquaintance 
I  had  not  made  before,  came  up  to  me,  introduced  himself 
and  said  : 

"  I  congratulate  you  on  your  speech  and  I  share  your 
views.  But — they  are  the  views  of  an  Athenian  expressed 
before  an  audience  of  Scythians." 

We  both  felt  that  the  darkening  shadow  of  fate  was 
already  upon  us.  But  neither  of  us  could  foresee  that  we 
were  fated  to  witness  the  suicide  of  an  Empire  in  the 
summer  of  the  following  year,  and  three  years  later  the 
suicide  of  a  Nation. 


CHAPTER   XXXIII 

On  the  brink — Satanism  and  the  world  order — Tsardom — Goremykin  as 
Prime  Minister — Scene  in  the  Duma — Kerensky — A  Press  campaign — 
Russo-German  antagonism — "  Deutschtum  " — My  last  interview  with 
the  Emperor  Nicholas — Assassination  of  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand — 
Progress  of  events — A  glimmer  of  hope — The  die  is  cast. 

I  HAVE  now  reached  a  point  where  I  must  begin  to  relate 
the  tragic  history  of  the  last  days  of  an  Empire  which  was 
hated  and  feared  by  all,  pretended  friends  and  open  foes 
alike,  as  a  supposed  menace  to  all  Europe,  and  whose 
suicide,  committed  in  entering  the  World  War,  was  followed 
by  that  of  the  nation  and  left  the  world  in  the  presence 
of  a  menace  not  to  Europe  alone  but  to  the  very  founda- 
tions on  which  rests  the  civilization  of  contemporary 
mankind.  It  is  a  task  which  I  approach  with  profound 
emotion,  conscious  of  my  utter  inability  to  convey  in  feeble 
words  an  adequate  impression  of  the  sombre  grandeur  of 
the  tragedy. 

But  before  proceeding  with  my  narrative  I  must  attempt 
to  clear  up,  as  far  as  possible,  some  of  the  causes  of  the 
misapprehension  of  Russian  conditions  so  widely  prevailing 
in  countries  standing  on  a  higher  plane  of  political  and 
cultural  development,  which,  in  its  turn,  has  influenced  the 
attitude  of  public  opinion  in  those  countries  in  regard  to 
the  revolutionary  activities  of  Russia's  own  deluded  sons, 
and  has  therefore  been  a  considerable  factor  in  preparing 
the  ground  for  the  catastrophe  in  which  Russia  was  to 
perish. 

Perhaps,  in  endeavouring  to  explain  what  I  am  aiming 
at  in  this  respect,  I  could  do  no  better  than  begin  by 
quoting  a  great  English  writer,  who  in  a  recent  article 
published  in  the  Contemporary  Review,  dealing  primarily 
with  Great  Britain's  position  in  regard  to  her  subject  com- 
munities, gives  eloquent  expression  to  views  which,  I  think, 

144 


SATANISM  145 

are  fully  applicable  to  the  relations  of  the  Russian  Empire, 
not  only  to  its  dependent  alien  communities  but  also  to 
its  own  revolutionary  subjects  : 

The  relation  of  empires  to  subject  communities  is,  in  fact,  the 
great  seed-ground  for  those  states  of  mind  which  I  have  grouped  under 
the  name  of  Satanism.  An  appalling  literature  of  hatred  is  in  exist- 
ence, in  which  unwiUing  subjects  have  sung  and  exulted  over  the 
downfall  of  great  empires.  .  .  .  The  cry  of  oppressed  peoples  against 
the  Turk  and  the  Russian  is  written  in  many  languages  and  renewed 
in  many  centuries.  What  makes  this  literature  so  appalling  is,  first, 
that  it  is  inspired  by  hatred  ;  and  next  that  the  hatred  is  at  least 
in  part  just ;  and,  thirdly,  that  we  ourselves  are  now  sitting  on  the 
throne  once  occupied  by  the  objects  of  these  execrations.  Perhaps 
most  of  us  are  so  accustomed  to  think  of  Babylon  and  Nineveh  and 
Tyre,  and  even  Rome,  as  seats  of  mere  tyranny  and  corruption  that 
we  miss  the  real  meaning  and  warning  of  their  history.  These 
imperial  cities  mostly  rose  to  empire,  not  because  of  their  faults  but 
because  of  their  virtues.  .  .  .  And  we  think  of  them  as  mere  types 
of  corruption  !  The  hate  they  inspired  among  their  subjects  has  so 
utterly  swamped  in  the  memory  of  mankind  the  benefits  of  their  good 
government,  or  the  contented  and  peaceful  lives  which  they  made 
possible  to  their  own  peoples.  .  .  .  The  spirit  of  unmixed  hatred 
toward  the  existing  world  order,  the  spirit  which  rejoices  in  any  wide- 
spread disaster  to  the  world's  rulers,  is  perhaps  more  rife  to-day  than 
it  has  been  for  over  a  thousand  years.  It  is  felt  against  all  ordered 
Governments,  but  chiefly  against  all  Imperial  Governments  ;  and  I 
think  it  is  directed  more  widely  and  intensely  against  Great  Britain 
than  against  any  other  Power  ;  I  think  we  may  add  that,  while  every- 
where dangerous,  it  is  capable  of  more  profound  world-wreckage  by 
its  action  against  us  than  by  any  other  form  that  it  is  now  taking. 

Mr.  Gilbert  Murray  evidently  realizes  the  dangerous 
character  of  this  spirit,  even  if  directed  against  a  country 
whose  history  and  institutions  assure  to  it  a  leading  posi- 
tion among  the  foremost  nations  of  the  world.  How  much 
more  dangerous,  then,  must  a  similar  spirit  have  been 
when  directed  against  Russia,  a  late-comer  in  the  family 
of  European  nations,  whose  institutions  appeared  repellent 
to  those  who  would  not  consider  whether  they  were  not 
the  only  ones  really  suitable  to  the  state  of  the  nation's 
political  and  cultural  development.  This  spirit  which 
animated  our  revolutionaries  and  political  malcontents, 
was  finding  a  friendly  echo  and  encouragement  in  all 
countries  where  Tsardom  and  autocracy  were  considered  to 
be  a  regime  against  which  revolt  was  not  only  excusable 
VOL.  n  10 


146        FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

but  laudable  and  legitimate.  Such  sympathy  and  encourage- 
ment could  only  have  been  given  under  a  total  misappre- 
hension of  the  real  nature  of  Tsardom  on  the  one  hand 
and  on  the  other  of  the  eventual  consequences  of  its 
destruction  aimed  at  by  our  revolutionaries. 

In  order  to  reach  a  full  understanding  of  what  the 
catastrophe  of  the  Tsardom  meant  for  the  Russian  people, 
and  of  its  further  meaning  as  a  sinister  menace  to  all  our 
race  and  civilization,  it  will  not  come  amiss  to  revert  to 
the  teachings  of  history,  which  has  seen  the  decay  and 
disappearance  of  more  than  one  sometime  proud  and  seem- 
ingly indestructible  civilization.  The  ruin  of  that  of  the 
ancient  Roman  world  was  brought  about — as  its  celebrated 
historiographer,  Guglielmo  Ferrero,  avers — not  only  by  the 
slow  decay  due  to  internal  causes,  but  also  by  what  he 
calls  a  terrible  accident,  which,  by  destroying  the  key- 
stone of  all  legal  order,  threw  this  civilization  into  the 
convulsions  of  revolutionary  despotism.  That  political  acci- 
dent was  the  destruction  by  the  Emperor  Septimius  Severus 
of  the  authority  of  the  Senate ;  that  is  to  say,  of  the  only 
principle  of  legitimacy,  hallowed  by  the  traditions  of 
centuries,  on  whose  theretofore  solid  foundation  rested  the 
colossal  edifice  of  the  Roman  Empire. 

The  World  War  (continues  Guglielmo  Ferrero)  also  reminds  one 
as  to  its  consequences,  only  on  a  larger  scale,  of  the  revolution  of 
Septimius  Severus,  because  it  has  destroyed  or  weakened  all  the 
principles  of  authority  and  of  legitimacy  which  in  modern  civiliza- 
tion supported  the  legal  order.  These  principles  were  of  two  kinds  : 
the  divine  right  of  dynasties  in  the  powerful  monarchies  of  Central 
and  Northern  Europe  ;  the  will  of  the  people  in  the  democracies  of 
Western  Europe.  By  the  downfall  of  the  Russian  Empire,  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the  German  Empire  divine  right 
received  a  blow  from  which  it  will  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for 
it  to  recover.  But  it  is  very  doubtful  if  the  opposite  principle  will 
profit  by  its  ruin.  That  principle,  not  very  clear  in  itself  and  very 
difficult  of  application,  seems  to  have  emerged  from  this  great  crisis 
weakened  and  discredited  to  such  an  extent  that  its  unexpected 
triumph  in  the  Central  Empires  and  in  the  Russian  Empire  failed  to 
excite  any  hope  or  any  enthusiasm  in  the  rest  of  Europe.  Shall  we, 
as  an  outcome  of  these  uncertainties,  witness,  as  happened  seventeen 
hundred  years  ago,  a  prolonged  crisis  of  revolutions  and  wars  which 
may  disperse  the  treasures  accumulated  by  the  labour  of  centuries  ? 

Without   attempting   to   answer   this   question   put   by 


TSARDOM  147 

the  historian  of  The  Greatness  and  Decline  of  Rome,  I  might 
say  that  his  views,  as  outlined  in  a  recent  article  of  his, 
from  which  I  have  quoted  above  the  main  points,  go  far 
towards  confirming  my  contention  that  our  political  parties 
which  were  aiming  at  the  destruction  of  Tsardom  and 
autocracy  by  violent  means  instead  of  honestly  helping  to 
reform  them  by  peaceful  processes  of  evolution,  were  unwit- 
tingly committing  an  unpardonable  crime  against  not  only 
our  country,  but  against  the  welfare  of  mankind. 

Moreover,  by  seeking  and  relying  on  foreign  support  in 
their  reckless  warfare  against  the  mainstay  of  their  country's 
unity  and  greatness  they  were  disgracing  themselves  and 
the  cause  they  were  pretending  to  serve.  It  is  to  be  sup- 
posed that  their  foreign  sympathizers  could  not  possibly 
have  given  them  their  moral  support  if  they  had  been  able 
to  realize  the  veritable  nature  of  the  menace  which  the 
triumph  of  the  cause  on  which  they  were  wasting  their 
sympathies  would  mean  to  their  own  countries  and  to 
civilization  itself. 

Neither  could  public  opinion  in  the  Western  democracies 
understand  what  these  institutions,  Tsardom,  Autocracy 
and  Bureaucracy,  really  meant  to,  and  actually  achieved 
for,  the  Russian  people.  It  could  not,  or  would  not,  see 
that  it  was  autocratic  Tsardom  that  had,  from  the  modest 
nucleus  of  the  principality  of  Moscow,  built  up  in  the 
course  of  centuries  one  of  the  greatest  and  mightiest 
empires  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

Also,  swamped  as  it  was  by  the  flood  of  virulent  denun- 
ciation emanating  from  Russian  revolutionaries  and  poli- 
tical malcontents,  it  could  not  realize  that  it  was  this  same 
hated  Tsardom,  this  same  vilified  but,  in  spite  of  all  its 
sins  and  failings,  fairly  efficient  bureaucracy  that  had  built 
up  the  fabric  under  whose  shelter  some  hundred  and  seventy 
million  human  beings  were  able  to  lead  a  peaceful  existence 
such  as  now  may  only  be  dreamed  of  as  life  in  a  lost  para- 
dise. Nor  could  public  opinion  abroad  realize  what  even 
some  Russians  failed  to  understand,  that  Tsardom  was  the 
keystone  of  the  edifice  of  the  Empire  and  that  the  removal 
of  this  keystone  would  unfailingly  cause  the  whole  edifice 
to  collapse  with  a  crash  that  would  shake  a  continent. 

Since   Tsardom   and   autocracy   have    disappeared    and 


148        FORTY  YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

been  replaced  by  the  "  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  " — 
with  results  which  I  shall  not  here  discuss,  but  which  can 
hardly  be  gratifying  either  to  those  who  expect  to  secure 
the  lion's  share  in  the  exploitation  of  Russia's  undeveloped 
resources  or  to  those  who  count  on  the  restoration  of  the 
credit  and  solvency  of  Russia  for  a  chance  to  recover  part 
at  least  of  the  billions  of  money  loaned  to  her — a  juster 
view  of  Russian  conditions  seems  to  be  gradually  gaining 
ground  in  foreign  public  opinion,  to  judge  from  some 
articles  in  the  English  Press  which  have  lately  come  to 
my  notice.  Thus  I  find  in  a  London  weekly  paper,  the 
Russian  Outlook  of  December  27,  1919,  an  article  under  the 
heading  "  Development  under  the  Imperial  Government," 
the  author  of  which  writes  : 

The  more  one  looks  into  the  state  of  Russia  under  the  old  Imperial 
Government,  the  more  one  is  impressed  by  its  care — real  or  apparent 
— for  the  life  of  the  Russian  people  and  for  their  well-being  in  every 
way.  It  seems  that  this  care  was  real  enough  as  far  as  the  framing 
and  putting  into  working  the  various  ordinances,  and  only  became 
apparent  rather  than  real  through  the  corruptness  of  local  adminis- 
trators, who,  owing  to  the  general  rottenness  of  the  bureaucracy,  were 
able  to  convert  to  their  own  advantage  that  which  was  intended 
for  the  well-being  of  industries  and  of  the  population  generally.  Such 
an  evil  as  this,  had  the  Government  endured,  must  have  remedied 
itself  ;  for  the  spread  of  democratic  power  was  rapidly  forcing  Russia 
into  line  with  Western  European  countries  when  the  revolution  dis- 
organized the  country.  Had  democracy  modified  the  autocracy  of 
Tsarism  by  a  process  of  evolution,  instead  of  destroying  it  by  revo- 
lution, there  was  such  machinery  available  for  the  development  of 
the  country  as  can  hardly  be  rebuilt  in  the  present  century,  unless 
some  genius  of  government  should  come  along  and  enforce  the  old 
system. 

These  views  I  hold  to  be  entirely  sound.  In  fact,  they 
are  and  have  always  been  my  own  ;  but  I  am  glad  to  quote 
their  expression  by  an  English  writer  who  obviously  cannot 
be  open  to  the  suspicion  of  undue  bias,  as  a  former  servant 
of  the  Russian  Crown  might  be  in  the  opinion  of  prejudiced 
persons. 

Twice  within  a  quarter  of  a  century  had  attempts  been 
made  to  reform  the  autocracy  by  the  introduction  of  insti- 
tutions designed  to  prepare  the  nation  for  the  gradual 
assimilation  of  a  constitutional  regime  on  Western  lines. 
Twice  had  these  attempts  been  foiled  by  the  folly  of  the 


A  DANGEROUS   SITUATION  149 

revolutionary  parties  and  been  followed  by  periods  of 
reaction — the  natural  swinging  of  the  pendulum  in  the 
opposite  direction.  And  yet  Russia's  last  strong  man, 
Stolypin,  had  succeeded  in  keeping  alive  the  principle  of 
representative  government,  in  a  sense  limited  indeed,  but 
best  suited  to  the  state  of  the  poHtical  and  cultural 
development  of  the  Russian  people  and  to  the  real  needs 
of  the  nation.  But  the  educated  and  property-owning 
classes  had  recovered  from  the  alarm  caused  by  the 
Revolution  of  1905-6  and  the  quondam  frightened  sup- 
porters of  a  Government  in  whom  they  had  temporarily 
seen  the  saviour  of  society  had  resumed  their  attitude  of 
carping  criticism  and  ill-concealed  hostility.  The  revolu- 
tionary parties  had  succeeded  in  removing  by  cowardly 
assassination  the  one  man  whom  they  rightly  judged 
capable  of  leading  to  a  brilliant  future  of  prosperity  and 
contentment — a  policy  for  obvious  reasons  to  be  particu- 
larly dreaded  by  those  whose  aim  was  the  destruction  of 
the  social  and  political  fabric  of  the  State. 

On  the  other  hand,  with  the  disappearance  of  the  clear- 
sighted and  strong-willed  helmsman,  the  rudder  had  fallen 
into  the  less  virile  hands  of  an  estimable  functionary,  who 
did  not  possess  the  strength  needed  to  keep  the  ship  of 
State  steadily  on  a  course  laid  out  with  foresight  and  sound 
statesmanship.  Unrestrained  obscurantist  reaction  gained 
the  upper  hand,  with  the  result  that  profound  discontent 
was  becoming  more  and  more  general  and  was  beginning  to 
affect  even  such  social  circles  in  the  capital  and  in  the 
provinces  as  were  least  inclined  to  systematic  opposition  to 
the  Government. 

Profoundly  impressed  with  the  dangerous  character  of 
the  situation,  I  made  up  my  mind  to  sound  once  more  a 
note  of  warning.  At  the  sitting  of  the  Council  of  the 
Empire  on  January  29  (February  11),  1914,  when  a  Bill 
for  the  regulation  of  the  sale  of  spirituous  liquors  was 
under  consideration,  I  mounted  the  tribune  and  after  some 
desultory  remarks  relating  to  the  pending  Bill,  succeeded  in 
eluding  the  vigilance  of  the  presiding  officer,  who  may 
have  been  at  heart  in  sympathy  with  me,  and  addressed 
the  House  at  some  length  on  the  general  political  situation, 
a  subject  which  under  our  rules  we  were  not  permitted  to 


150        FORTY  YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

discuss.  While  I  was  speaking  I  felt  that  I  had  with  me 
the  sympathy  of  the  centre  and  the  left  of  the  House,  but  I 
noticed  signs  of  marked  displeasure  in  the  ranks  of  the 
right,  and  especially  the  extreme  right,  for  whom  my  dis- 
course was  meant  and  to  whom,  indeed,  I  directly  addressed 
it  ;  and  as  I  fully  expected,  it  did  not  in  any  way  what- 
ever affect  the  Government's  persistence  in  the  suicidal 
policy  it  was  pursuing.  Within  a  few  weeks  following  I 
was  the  recipient  of  letters  and  telegrams  of  sympathy 
and  adhesion  from  many  parts  of  the  country  and  had  the 
satisfaction  of  being  reviled  by  the  leading  nationalist 
paper,  the  Novoe  Vremia,  as  a  feudal  baron  shedding  croco- 
dile tears  over  the  fate  of  the  country,  and  by  the  leading 
reactionary  paper,  Prince  Meshtchersky's  Grashdanin,  as 
having  undergone  a  regrettable  process  of  "  American- 
ization." 

By  a  coincidence  it  happened  that  on  the  very  day  I 
had  been  speaking  in  the  Council  of  the  Empire  the  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  of  Finance,  Kokovtseff  (created 
Count  on  this  occasion),  was  made  to  resign  and  was 
replaced  as  Prime  Minister  by  Mr.  Goremykin,  the  same 
who  had  held  this  office  at  the  time  of  the  dissolution  of 
the  first  Duma.  His  appointment,  therefore,  seemed  to 
indicate  a  resolve  of  the  Sovereign  in  favour  of  a  recru- 
descence rather  than  a  relaxation  of  the  reactionary  policy 
pursued  by  the  Government.  I  am  unable  to  say  whether 
such  was  really  the  Emperor's  intention,  or  whether  it  was 
the  result  of  some  pressure  brought  to  bear  on  him  by 
domestic  influences  which  his  tender  and  loving  nature 
rendered  him  unable  to  resist,  or  lastly,  whether  it  was 
perhaps  simply  his  personal  preference  for  Goremykin,  who 
was  an  accomplished  courtier  and  possessed  a  certain 
charm  of  manner  which  may  have  rendered  necessary 
intercourse  with  him  as  head  of  the  Government  less  of  a 
drudgery  than  with  his  predecessor. 

My  personal  acquaintanceship  with  Goremykin  was  of 
the  slightest.  I  had,  of  course,  been  meeting  him  fre- 
quently enough  in  the  Assembly,  of  which  we  were  fellow- 
members,  and  I  found  him  very  good  company  indeed,  a 
cultivated,  open  mind,  not  by  any  means  a  reactionary, 
only  very  conservative  in  his  belief  in  the  saving  virtue  of 


GOREMYKIN  151 

the  Government's  traditional  policies  as  best   adapted  to 
the  real  needs  of  the  country.     Besides,  being  by  some  ten 
or   twelve   years   my   senior,    he   had   already   achieved    a 
certain  detachment  from  the  cares  of  this  world   and  an 
indifference    bordering    on    that    slightly    cynical    attitude 
which  the  French  designate  by  the  apt  but  untranslatable 
slang  expression   je  m'enfichisme — a   blissful   state  which  it 
has  not   yet   been  my  good  fortune   to   attain ;  in   short, 
a  personality,  in  spite  of  its  many  estimable  and  attractive 
parts,  about  the  least  qualified  to  face  at  the  head  of  its 
Government  the  greatest  crisis  in  a  great  empire's  destiny. 
I  was  interested  to  see  how  his  appointment  would  be 
received  by  the  Duma  and  went  to  the  Taurida  Palace  to 
attend  the  sitting  when  Goremykin  was  to  make  his  first 
appearance  before  the  representatives  of   the  nation  and  to 
acquaint  them  with  the  political  programme  of  the  Cabinet 
decided   upon   on   his   reappointment    as   its   head.     From 
the  coign  of  vantage  of  a  seat  in  the  box  reserved  for  the 
use  of  members  of  the  Upper  House,  I  watched  the  pro- 
ceedings   with    mixed   feelings.     My    expectation    that    the 
sitting  would  be  a  stormy  one  was  realized.     As  soon  as 
he   had   ascended   the   tribune    the   storm   broke.     It    was 
plain  that  the  Socialist-Revolutionaries  and  "  Labourites," 
sitting  on  the  extreme  left,  although  composing  but  a  very 
small  minority  of  the  House,   were  determined  not  to  let 
him   speak.     The   disorderly   noise   they   produced   was   of 
such  a  volume  that  neither  the  frantic  ringing  of  the  bell 
by  the  President  nor  the  counter-cheers  of   the  supporters 
of  the  Government  could  drown  it.     After  waiting  a  few 
minutes  for  the  storm  to  abate,  Goremykin  calmly  folded 
up  his  papers,   descended  from  the  rostrum  and  returned 
to  his  seat  in  the  ministerial  box.     President  Rodzianko  at 
last  succeeded  in  restoring  order,   and,  after  admonishing 
the   extreme  left   for   their   unruly   behaviour,   invited   the 
Prime  Minister  to  reascend  the  tribune.     But   Goremykin 
had  barely  spoken  a  few  words  when  the  disorder  broke 
loose  again  with  redoubled  intensity,  and  he  was  literally 
howled  down. 

After  having  again  resumed  his  seat,  the  President  pro- 
posed to  the  House  to  expel  for  the  day's  sitting  its  unruly 
members  who  had  flagrantly  defied  the  authority  of  the 


152        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Chair,  This  was  agreed  to  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  parties 
habitually  supporting  the  Government.  The  subsequent 
proceedings  occupied  considerable  time,  as  the  President 
had  to  submit  to  a  vote  of  the  House  each  individual  case 
by  naming  the  member  to  be  expelled.  When  he  invited 
the  first  member  whose  expulsion  had  been  voted,  to  with- 
draw, the  latter  refused  to  obey,  declaring  he  would  only 
yield  to  force.  The  President  had  to  send  for  the  Military 
Commandant  of  the  Palace  and  order  him  to  remove  the 
recalcitrant  member.  This  time  he  submitted  after  having 
demanded  of  the  Commandant  to  touch  his  shoulder  by 
way  of  symbolizing  the  employment  of  force.  This  pro- 
ceeding was  being  gone  through  for  the  expulsion  of  each 
one  of  the  refractory  deputies,  of  whom  there  were  some 
ten  or  twelve.  When  the  last  one  to  be  expelled  had 
reached  the  door  accompanied  by  the  Commandant  of  the 
Palace,  he  turned  around  and  shouted  at  the  top  of  his 
voice,  addressing  his  fellow-members  of  the  Duma,  "  We 
are  struggling  for  your  liberty,  but  you  prefer  to  be  the 
slaves  of  these  tyrants  !  "  at  the  same  time  pointing  the 
finger  of  scorn  at  the  ministerial  box  where  the  mild- 
mannered  Goremykin  with  the  other  very  commonplace- 
looking  "  tyrants "  sat,  calmly  stroking  his  long  grey 
whiskers  in  amused  contemplation  of  the  grotesque  scene. 

What  struck  me  most  was  the  artificial,  distinctly 
un-Russian  character  of  these  proceedings.  For  whatever 
qualities  or  defects  may  be  attributed  to  the  Russian 
national  character,  a  taste  for  declamatory  theatrical 
effects  has  never  been  accounted  one  of  them.  I  do  not 
now  recollect  the  names  of  the  revolutionary  Duma  mem- 
bers who  distinguished  themselves  by  their  noisy  conduct 
in  demonstrating  their  opposition  to  the  Government,  but 
I  believe  the  unfortunate  Kerensky  was  one  of  them — the 
same  Kerensky  who,  three  years  later,  was  to  pose  in  the 
preposterous  character  of  Russia's  dictator,  of  faithful  ally 
of  the  Entente  and  heroic  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Russian  Armies  ;  who,  by  his  incompetence,  weakness  and 
folly,  was  to  open  the  door  to  the  advent  of  the  Bolshevik 
regime,  and  at  the  critical  moment  to  seek  safety  in  inglorious 
flight,  abandoning  his  naive  but  honest  and  estimable 
bourgeois  colleagues  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  sinister 


THE   WINTER  SEASON,   1913-14         153 

bandits  of  Bolshevism  who  were  besieging  them  in  the 
Winter  Palace  defended  only  by  a  battalion  of  boy  cadets 
and  women  soldiers ;  the  same  Kerensky  who  is  said  to 
be  still  posing  as  the  saviour  of  Russia  and  to  be  cooling 
his  heels  in  the  ante-rooms  of  statesmen  and  politicians  in 
Paris  and  London,  receiving,  now  that  his  services  are  no 
longer  needed,  the  contemptuous  treatment  due  to  a  man 
who  unwittingly — let  it  go  at  that — has  betrayed  and 
ruined  his  country. 

What  became  of  the  other  participants  in  the  demon- 
stration I  do  not  know,  but  suppose  that,  if  not  tortured 
and  murdered  by  their  Bolshevik  "  comrades,"  they  are 
now  enjoying  the  sweetness  of  life  under  the  rule  of  real 
and  sanguinary  tyrants  of  their  own  breed. 

The  ministerial  declaration,  when  at  last  Goremykin  was 
enabled  to  read  it  in  his  unimpressive,  perfunctory  way, 
turned  out  to  be  quite  anodyne  and  unobjectionable.  It 
was  listened  to  with  decent  attention,  but  failed,  of  course, 
to  produce  any  noteworthy  effect  as  far  as  strengthening 
the  Government's  position  was  concerned.  Altogether,  the 
impression  I  carried  away  from  this  sitting  of  the  Duma 
was  not  of  a  kind  to  encourage  much  hope  for  salvation 
to  come  from  that  particular  quarter,  and  events  have  but 
too  tragically  confirmed  my  doubts  and  apprehensions  in 
that  respect. 

The  winter  season  of  1913-14  was  one  of  the  most  bril- 
liant— as  it  was  to  be  the  last — that  St.  Petersburg  had 
seen.  Society  was  gaily  dancing  on  an  unsuspected  volcano, 
quite  unconscious  of  the  approaching  catastrophe ;  nor 
could  anyone  even  dream  of  the  depth  of  misery  and 
unspeakable  horror  to  which  a  once  magnificent  capital, 
with  its  teeming  population  and  thousands  of  happy 
homes,  was  to  be  reduced  in  so  near  a  future. 

Among  the  most  poignant  memories  of  that  fateful 
season,  I  recall  an  afternoon  dance  in  the  carnival  week 
at  the  palace  of  the  Grand  Duchess  Vladimir,  to  which 
she  had  invited  the  Emperor  and  Empress  with  their  four 
daughters,  the  youngest  two  mere  children.  It  makes  my 
heart  bleed  when  I  see  now  before  my  mind's  eye  the  radi- 
antly happy  faces  of  these  innocent  young  ones  rapturously 
enjoying  their  first  ball — which,  alas !  was  to  be  their  last — 


154        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

blissfully  unconscious  of  the  unutterably  awful  fate  which 
was  in  store  for  all  of  them,  a  family  so  tenderly  united 
in  purest  love  in  life  as  in  death. 

Whether,  and  to  what  extent,  the  apparently  listless 
unconcern  of  the  smart  society  of  the  capital  was  shared 
in  by  our  ruling  powers  I  am  unable  to  say.  Not  being 
in  touch  with  our  Foreign  Department,  I  was  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  be  acquainted  with  the  view  taken  of  the  political 
situation  in  Europe  by  those  in  whose  hands  rested  the 
direction  of  our  foreign  policy. 

There  occurred,  however,  in  close  succession,  two  journal- 
istic events  which  might  well  have  claimed  the  serious 
attention  of  our  diplomacy.  Some  time  in  February  or 
the  beginning  of  March  an  alarmist  article  appeared  in 
the  Koelnische  Zeitung — the  semi-official  organ  of  the 
German  Foreign  Department — in  the  shape  of  a  letter 
from  the  correspondent  of  that  paper  at  St.  Petersburg 
calling  attention  to  the  symptoms  of  growing  hostility 
toward  Germany  in  Russian  influential  circles,  which  he 
pretended  to  have  been  able  to  observe,  and  which,  in  his 
opinion,  meant  a  serious  menace  to  his  country.  Such, 
as  far  as  I  can  now  recollect,  was  the  trend  of  the  author's 
reasoning.  This  article  created  a  considerable  sensation  at 
the  time  and  was  generally  supposed  to  have  been  inspired 
by  the  German  Embassy  in  the  Russian  capital,  although 
the  latter  steadfastly  denied  having  had  anything  to  do 
with  it.  Be  that  as  it  may,  it  was  plain  that  the  appear- 
ance of  such  an  article  in  a  Press  organ  reputed  to  reflect 
the  views  of  the  German  Government  meant  the  inaugura- 
tion of  a  campaign  to  arouse  public  opinion  in  Germany 
to  a  realization  of  the  necessity  of  a  "  preventive  "  war, 
evidently  already  decided  upon  in  the  preceding  year  in 
connection  with  the  levy  of  an  extraordinary  war  impost 
of  a  billion  marks,  to  which  I  had  alluded  in  my  speech 
in  the  Council  of  the  Empire  on  January  29th. 

With  this  end  in  view  it  was  obviously  necessary  to 
raise  and  exploit  the  spectre  of  the  Russian  menace,  so  as 
to  impress  the  popular  mind  with  the  fear  of  an  impending 
war  on  two  fronts  in  defence  of  the  Fatherland,  and  to 
rouse  thereby  the  spirit  of  the  masses  to  the  fighting-pitch. 
When,    therefore,    shortly    afterwards    a    bellicose    article 


SOUKHOMLINOFF'S   BOAST  155 

under  the  heading  "  We  are  Ready,"  announcing  to  the  world 
that  we  were  ready  not  only  for  a  defensive  but  also  for 
an  offensive  war,  appeared  in  one  of  the  leading  Russian 
newspapers,  and  when  it  became  known  that  this  article 
in  the  shape  of  an  interview  with  the  Minister  of  War, 
General  Soukhomlinoff,  had  been  dictated  by  the  Minister 
himself  to  a  representative  of  the  Bourse  Gazette  {Birjhevye 
Viedomosti),  it  simply  had  the  effect  of  bringing  grist  to 
the  mill  of  the  German  militarists  by  enabling  them  to 
point  out  that  the  Russian  menace  was  not  a  creature  of 
their  imagination,  but  a  most  serious  reality.  It  is  not 
easy  to  understand  what  could  have  prompted  General 
Soukhomlinoff  to  publish  at  such  a  moment  this  empty 
boast — as  it  proved  to  have  been  when  put  to  the  test — 
for  it  could  hardly  have  been  intended  as  a  bluff  to  inti- 
midate a  potential  enemy,  which  would  have  been  silly, 
and  still  less  as  a  deliberate  provocation,  which  would  have 
been  downright  criminal.  One  could  only  attribute  it  to 
that  same  irresponsible  recklessness  which,  in  conjunction 
with  the  wrong-headed  incompetence  of  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  was,  at  the  critical  moment,  to  push  the 
country  over  the  brink  of  the  precipice. 

In  preceding  chapters  I  have  referred  to  the  origin 
and  causes,  in  so  far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  of  the 
estrangement  between  the  two  neighbouring  Empires  which 
had  gradually  developed  in  the  course  of  the  last  decades. 
In  order,  now,  to  shed  some  light  upon  the  reason  why  it 
was  destined  to  become  the  final  determining  cause  of  the 
outbreak  of  the  World  War  it  will  be  necessary  to  examine 
also,  from  what  might  justifiably  be  considered  to  have 
been  the  German  point  of  view,  the  history  of  the  origin 
and  growth  of  this  estrangement.  Its  origin  dates  back  to 
a  very  insignificant — one  might  say  contemptibly  petty — 
cause  :  the  vainglory,  jealousy  and  offended  amour-propre 
of  two  leading  statesmen.  In  1875  the  Russian  Chancellor, 
Prince  Gortschakoff,  in  a  circular  telegram  to  all  Russian 
Ambassadors,  dated  from  Berlin,  where  he  was  in  attendance 
on  the  Emperor  Alexander  II,  announced  to  the  world 
that  "peace  was  now  assured,"  a  covert  but  sufficiently 
plain  suggestion  that  the  abandonment  by  Germany  of  the 
plan  of  a  contemplated  new  invasion  of  France,  with  which 


156        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

she  had  been  justly  or  gratuitously  credited,  was  due  to 
the  intervention  of  Russian  diplomacy.  Bismarck  could 
never  forgive  his  Russian  colleague's  attempt  at  playing 
the  first  fiddle  in  the  European  concert  and  at  pluming 
himself  with  the  undeserved  laurels  of  the  peacemaker. 

Then  followed  the  Russo-Turkish  War  into  which  the 
Russian  Government  suffered  itself  to  be  drawn  by  the 
Slavophile  movement,  supposedly  against  its  better  judg- 
ment. This  circumstance  seems  to  have  caused  too  exag- 
gerated an  importance  to  be  attached  to  Slavophilism  as 
a  driving  force  in  Russian  politics — although  such  influence 
as  it  actually  did  exert  has  certainly  been,  as  events  have 
proved,  very  much  to  the  detriment  of  Russia's  real  interests 
— and  to  have  helped  to  set  up  the  spectre  of  Pan-Slavism 
under  Russian  headship  as  a  standing  menace  to  the  Central 
Empires. 

Of  infinitely  wider  scope  and  immeasurably  greater 
importance  was  Pan-Slavism's  counterpart — Pan-Ger- 
manism— not  only  as  a  political  doctrine  professed  by  a 
limited  circle  of  militant  intellectuals  and  professional 
militarists,  but  as  a  deep-seated  race  consciousness  per- 
meating the  whole  nation.  Strangely  enough,  this  extrava- 
gantly exaggerated  race  feeling  was  vouchsafed  a  semblance 
of  justification  in  the  writings  of  two  foreigners,  one  French 
and  the  other  English,  who  both  proclaimed  the  superiority 
of  the  Germanic  race  over  all  others  :  the  Comte  de 
Gobineau,  in  his  Essai  sur  I'ine'galite  des  races  humaines 
(1853-55),  translated  into  English  under  the  title  Moral 
and  Intellectual  Diversity  of  Races  ;  and  Mr.  Houston  Stewart 
Chamberlain,  in  his  remarkable  book  The  Foundations  oj 
the  Nineteenth  Century.  The  latter  work  was  originally 
written  in  German  by  the  author,  who,  although  an 
Englishman  of  good  family,  had  settled  permanently  in 
Vienna.  Its  appearance  in  1901,  during  my  short  term  of 
office  as  Minister  to  Bavaria,  produced  in  Germany  a  great 
sensation,  and  was  naturally  hailed  with  enthusiasm  as 
an  admission  of  German  superiority  from  the  pen  of  a 
distinguished  Englishman  who  had  devoted  many  years  to 
the  study  of  German  culture  and  civilization.  It  may 
have  contributed  to  the  development  of  that  particular 
disease   of   the   "  swelled  head  "   with   which   the   German 


THE   *'DEUTSCHTUM"  157 

people  have  been  afflicted  ever  since  the  victories  achieved 
in  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  which  has  brought  down 
upon  it  the  dishke  and  ill-will  of  all  nations,  and  which 
has  tempted  its  leaders  to  risk  the  adventure  of  a  general 
European  war  destined  to  end  in  Germany's  downfall  and 
ruin. 

Mr.  Arthur  Bullard,  in  his  extremely  interesting  volume 
The  Diplomacy  of  the  Great  War,  in  a  chapter  headed  "  Das 
Deutschtum,"  sheds  some  hght  on  the  peculiar  mental 
attitude  of  the  German  people  which  manifests  itself  in 
the  cult  of  this  "  Deutschtum,"  a  cult  that  has,  from  its 
very  origin  at  the  time  of  the  nation's  deepest  abasement 
in  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  during  the 
Napoleonic  Wars,  been  carefully  nursed  by  the  ruhng 
powers,  first  as  a  means  of  rousing  the  people  to  a  sense 
of  national  dignity,  then  as  an  indispensable  element  of 
force  needed  to  secure  the  unification  of  the  nation  under 
the  Empire  and  to  consolidate  the  Empire's  international 
position,  until  it  had  become  a  kind  of  Messianic  obsession 
which  was  bound  to  become  obnoxious  to  all  other  nations. 

It  seems  to  me  that  Mr.  BuUard's  estimate  of  the  German 
people's  attitude  as  it  was  influenced  by  the  cult  of  the 
"  Deutschtum  "  is  not  mistaken  when  he  says  : 

There  have  always  been  Cassandra-like  prophets  in  Germany 
who  preached  the  virtue,  the  necessity,  the  inevitability  of  war.  Few 
countries  have  escaped  such  plagues.  But  the  great  mass  of  the 
German  people  and — for  more  than  a  generation — the  responsible 
rulers  of  the  Empire  have  given  a  deaf  ear  to  such  promptings. 
There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  their  faith  in  their  divine  mission 
weakened,  or  that  they  had  allowed  their  swords  to  rust.  But  they 
hoped  to  win  without  fighting.  War  was  the  supreme  weapon,  the 
last  resort.  They  were  resolved  not  to  unchain  it  lightly — not  till 
other  means  had  been  exhausted. 

It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that,  even  up  to  the  last 
moment,  such  as  indeed  been  the  attitude  of  the  civil  ele- 
ment in  Germany's  Government,  and  of  the  Sovereign 
himself.  But  it  was  by  no  means  that  of  the  military 
element,  as  exemplified  by  the  notorious  General  Bernhardi, 
the  propounder  of  the  insane  doctrine  of  "  world  power  or 
downfall."  It  was  plain  that,  as  far  as  Germany  was 
concerned,  the  world's  peace  depended  on  which  of  these 


158        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

two  elements  would  ultimately  gain  the  upper  hand  in  the 
councils  of  the  German  Government.  The  odds  were 
obviously  in  favour  of  the  military  element,  as  evidenced 
by  the  powerful  influence  acquired  by  its  most  gifted 
representative,  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  of  whom  Viscount 
Haldane,  in  his  very  illuminating  book  Before  the  War, 
says  that  he  possessed  a  "  General-Staff  mind  "  of  a  high 
order.  There  was  one  subject,  however,  in  regard  to 
which  both  the  civil  element  and  the  "  General-Staff  mind  " 
were  equally  in  the  dark,  owing  to  that  inability  to  under- 
stand other  people's  mentality  which  is  so  characteristic  of 
their  nation  and  which  has  its  source  in  a  certain  perhaps 
unconscious  and  naive  but  overweening  conceit.  That 
subject  was  the  far-reaching  importance  of  the  general 
feeling  of  distrust  and  hostility  which  the  German  Govern- 
ment's policy  and  the  vague  aspirations  of  an  insufferably 
pretentious  "  Deutschtum  "  had  created  everywhere  toward 
Germany  and  her  people,  a  feeling  which,  after  the  dogs 
of  war  had  been  recklessly  unchained,  was  to  turn  from 
national  antipathy  to  bitter  hatred,  a  hundredfold  intensi- 
fied by  the  ruthlessness  of  her  mode  of  warfare,  was  to 
array  against  her  almost  all  mankind  and  in  the  end  to  render 
impossible  any  such  settlement  of  the  war  as  the  true 
interests  of  the  whole  civilized  world  would  have  demanded. 
Both  sides,  it  seems  to  me,  had  been  agreed  on  one 
point,  namely,  on  the  necessity  of  finding  an  issue  from 
the  undeniably  perilous  situation  in  which  Germany  found 
herself  between  two  great  military  Powers  whose  com- 
bined armies  were  greater  than  hers.  But  from  this  point 
their  ways  had  parted.  The  civil  element  had  been  trying 
to  relieve  the  situation  by  attempts  at  reaching  friendly 
understandings  with  Russia  as  well  as  with  Great  Britain, 
on  the  basis  of  an  engagement  by  each  of  the  contracting 
parties  not  to  enter  or  take  part  in  any  combination  directed 
against  the  other.  Both  these  attempts  had  failed.  The 
failure  of  the  attempt  made  in  regard  to  Russia  may  have 
left  behind  a  particularly  smarting  sting,  inasmuch  as 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  having  an- 
nounced in  the  Reichstag  that  such  an  understanding  had 
been  reached  with  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
during  the  latter's  visit  to  Berlin,  Mr.  Sazonoff  had  subse- 


RUSSO-GERMAN  ANTAGONISM  159 

quently  had  it  denied  in  the  Russian  Press.  The  military 
party,  on  the  contrary,  had  always  maintained  that  force 
was  the  only  effective  remedy.  It  was  my  firm  belief  that 
in  the  summer  of  1913  an  agreement  in  this  sense  between 
the  two  elements  contending  for  supremacy  had  been 
reached  in  connection  with  the  levy  of  an  extraordinary 
war  impost  of  a  billion  marks,  and  that  the  outbreak  of 
war  was  impending  in  the  near  future,  as  I  had  warned 
the  Council  of  the  Empire  in  my  speech. 

A  resort  to  arms  having  been  decided  upon,  the  question 
necessarily  arose  how  to  bring  about  a  cause  for  rupture 
of  sufficient  gravity  to  rouse  the  nation  to  a  unanimous 
determination  to  fight,  without  which,  under  to-day's  con- 
ditions of  warfare,  a  successful  war  could  never  be  fought. 
Conditions,  at  the  moment,  were  not  favourable  for  arti- 
ficially creating  such  a  cause.  One  of  the  psychological 
conditions  out  of  which  an  armed  conflict  between  nations 
might  arise  was,  indeed,  present  in  the  undeniable  exist- 
ence of  what  Viscount  Haldane  describes  as  "a  set  of 
colossal  suspicions  of  each  other  by  all  the  nations  con- 
cerned." But  these  suspicions,  industriously  fostered  in 
all  countries  by  that  part  of  the  Press  which  thrives  on 
sensation  and  on  the  cultivation  of  passions  and  of  strife, 
were  confined  to  the  ruling  classes  without  profoundly 
affecting  the  popular  masses,  whose  passions  can  only  be 
aroused  by  the  stronger  emotions  of  hatred  or  of  fear. 

To  anyone  even  superficially  acquainted  with  the  poli- 
tical situation  in  Europe  it  was,  of  course,  plain  that  in 
every  one  of  the  leading  nations — I  say  advisedly  "  in 
every  one  "  without  fear  of  contradiction — there  existed  a 
small  group  of  ambitious  statesmen  and  General  Staff 
officers  of  all  grades  whose  main  preoccupation  was  the 
coming  war,  in  the  advent  of  which  they  were  deeply 
interested  politically  and  professionally,  and  whose  out- 
break, therefore,  would  be  extremely  welcome  to  them  all. 
But  it  was  no  less  evident  that  not  one  of  these  small 
groups,  however  influential — not  even  that  which  had  just 
succeeded  in  getting  the  upper  hand  in  Germany — could 
afford,  without  having  behind  it  the  unanimous  support  of 
the  nation,  to  risk  the  odium  of  having  taken  the  initiative 
in  bringing  about  a  war  which,  owing  to  the  existing  system 


160        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

of  the  two  chains  of  alliances,   was  bound  to  become  a 
general  European  war. 

The  support  of  the  German  nation's  unanimous  will  to 
fight  could,  however,  be  secured  by  arousing  its  fear  of 
being  attacked  and  of  being  compelled  to  defend  itself  on 
two  fronts,  an  apprehension  which  in  a  latent  state  had 
naturally  been  present  in  the  minds  of  the  people  since 
they  had  realized  that  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance  had  placed  them,  so  to  speak,  between  two  fires. 
It  became,  therefore,  necessary  to  play  on  this  latent  fear 
of  the  German  people  by  creating  the  illusion  of  an  imme- 
diately impending  attack  on  them  by  France  or  by  Russia, 
an  effect  that  could  be  produced  only  by  the  grossest  decep- 
tion practised  on  the  credulity  of  the  nation  and  its 
implicit  belief  in  the  wisdom  of  its  rulers. 

No  one  could  doubt  that  the  French  people,  however 
much  they  might  welcome  a  chance   to  obtain  a  revanche 
for  their  defeat  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War  and  to  recon- 
quer their  lost  provinces,  were  far  too  peacefully  inclined 
ever  to  suffer  their  rulers  to  take  the  initiative  in  bringing 
about  a  general  war.     The  apprehension  of  an  attack  from 
that  quarter  could,  obviously,  not  be  palmed  off  on  even 
a   credulous   nation   as   a   serious   and   immediate   danger. 
Nothing,  therefore,  remained  but  to  harp  on  the  Russian 
danger  in  every  possible  way,  which  evidently  accounts  for 
the  Press  campaign  against  Russia  started  by  the  Koelnische 
Zeitung,  as  mentioned  above  ;   and  that  is  also  why  General 
Soukhomlinoff's    idle    boast,    in    his    published    interview, 
about  our  readiness  not  only  for  a  defensive  but  also  for 
an  offensive  war,  must  have  been  extremely  welcome  to  the 
German    militarists.     Nevertheless   it    was   sufficiently    un- 
likely that  Russia  would  really  take  the  initiative  in  bring- 
ing about  a  settlement  by  force  of  arms  of  the  perennial 
feud  between  Teuton  and  Gaul,  which,  after  all,  was  no 
concern  of  hers,  an  initiative  which  the  French  themselves 
were  obviously  disinclined  to  assume. 

Another  ground  had  to  be  found  upon  which  to  bring 
into  play  the  Russian  danger,  and  that  ground  could  only 
be  the  latent  antagonism  between  Russia  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  which  was  apt  at  any  moment  to  reach  an 
extremely  acute  stage  on  the  basis  of  some  complications 


LAST   INTERVIEW   WITH  EMPEROR     161 

in  Balkan  politics.  That  is  where  the  danger  inherent  in 
our  Slavophile  policies,  to  which  I  had  so  often  called 
attention,  actually  did  come  into  play  with  results  fatal  to 
Russia  and  disastrous  to  Europe,  inasmuch  as  it  was  on 
this  ground  that  the  Austro-Russian  conflict  came  to  a 
head  and  furnished  a  pretext  for  the  mobilizations,  which, 
unless  arrested  in  time,  were  bound  to  lead  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  general  European  war.  Why  they  were  not  so 
arrested  is  a  subject  to  which  I  shall  revert  later. 

For  the  moment  there  seemed  to  be  a  lull  on  the  sur- 
face of  Balkan  affairs,  and  my  alarmist  forewarnings  of  an 
impending  crisis  appeared  to  have  been,  if  not  baseless,  at 
least  premature. 

Summer  was  approaching,  and  with  it  came  the  close 
of  the  session  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire.  As  had  been 
my  habit  in  the  preceding  years,  I  solicited  and  was 
graciously  granted  an  audience  with  the  Emperor.  His 
Majesty  received  me  at  the  Imperial  villa  at  Peterhof,  on 
the  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  in  his  study  overlooking 
the  sea.  I  had  been  commanded  to  present  myself  at  an 
unusual  hour  late  in  the  afternoon,  from  which  I  concluded 
that  a  more  than  usual  lengthy  interview  was  contemplated. 
In  this  expectation  I  was  not  disappointed,  but  my  hope 
of  being  given  a  chance  to  approach  the  subject  of  the 
burning  political  questions  of  the  day  was  not  realized. 

The  Emperor  was  manifestly  in  the  cheerful  mood  of  a 
man  who  had  made  up  his  mind  to  find  diversion  from 
work  or  cares  in  a  quiet  chat  on  subjects  remote  from  the 
preoccupations  of  the  hour  with  a  person  whom  he  knew 
not  to  be  a  seeker  of  office  or  influence.  His  Majesty 
engaged  me  at  once  in  a  conversation  on  events  of  days 
long  gone  by,  on  the  Japanese  War,  the  peace  negotiations 
at  Portsmouth,  on  the  part  President  Roosevelt,  of  whom 
he  spoke  in  the  highest  terms,  had  taken  in  these  negotia- 
tions with  such  skill  and  perfect  tact,  on  the  debt  of 
gratitude  he  owed  him  for  the  timely  offer  of  his  good 
offices  for  bringing  about  peace.  He  showed  himself  greatly 
interested  in  all  I  was  able  to  tell  him,  not  only  about  the 
course  of  the  negotiations  with  which  Witte  and  I  had 
been  entrusted,  but  also  about  all  our  doings  during  our 
sojourn  at  the  Went  worth  Hotel  and  in  New  York,  and  so 

VOL.    II  11 


1C2        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

on.  After  about  an  hour's  conversation  on  these  subjects 
which  seemed  to  have  afforded  him  a  welcome  diversion 
from  graver  thoughts,  the  Emperor  rose  to  dismiss  me, 
and  it  occurred  to  me  to  ask  him  whether  he  remembered 
a  memorandum  I  had  requested  Mr.  Kokovtseff,  the  then 
Prime  Minister,  to  submit  to  him.  He  answered  that  he 
remembered  perfectly  well  that  Kokovtseff  had  handed 
him  this  memorandum,  but  from  the  expression  of  his  eyes 
I  knew  at  once  that  he  had  not  read  it,  that  my  mention- 
ing it  had  embarrassed  him  and  that  he  wished  the  subject 
to  be  dropped.  Thereupon  I  ventured  to  say  that  a  bulky 
typewritten  document  was  very  inconvenient  for  perusal, 
and  asked  whether  I  might  be  permitted  to  present  to  him 
a  printed  copy  of  it.  To  this  he  assented  eagerly  and  most 
graciously,  and  told  me"  to  send  it  to  him  at  once  through 
the  Minister  of  the  Household  or  the  Grand  Marshal  of 
the  Court,  from  which  I  concluded  that  the  copy  I  had 
previously  sent  him  through  another  high  official  had  never 
reached  him. 

Before  leaving  the  Emperor's  presence  I  had  time  to 
express  to  him  my  profound  gratitude  for  the  generous 
way  he  had  set  me  right  in  the  eyes  of  the  public  when, 
returned  to  Russia  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with 
Japan,  I  was  generally  held  to  have  been  guilty  of  having 
failed  to  warn  the  Government  in  time  of  the  impending 
danger  of  war.  The  Emperor  shook  me  warmly  by  the 
hand,  and  by  a  spontaneous  impulse  I  kissed  his  and  he 
embraced  me  tenderly  and  kissed  me  on  the  cheek  in  the 
hearty  Russian  way.  It  was  the  last  time  I  ever  met  the 
unfortunate  Sovereign.  When  the  door  had  closed  behind 
me  the  aide-de-camp  on  duty  in  the  ante-room,  one  of  the 
younger  Grand  Dukes,  may  have  noticed  that  I  had  tears 
in  my  eyes. 

I  had  been  preparing  to  leave  for  Paris  to  join  my 
family  when  some  private  business  caused  me  to  delay 
my  departure  for  a  month,  so  that  the  fatal  news  of  the 
assassination  at  Sarajevo  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand 
and  his  morganatic  consort  found  me  still  at  St.  Petersburg. 
There  could  no  longer  be  any  doubt  that  the  crisis  was 
upon  us.  I  shall  not  attempt  to  give  a  synopsis  of  the 
negotiations  which  led  up  to  the  final  outbreak  of  the  war 


THE  SARAJEVO  ASSASSINATION       163 

and  of  which,  of  course,  I  have  no  more  knowledge  than 
what  everybody  has  been  able  to  gather  from  the  numerous 
official  publications  issued  by  the  Governments  concerned, 
and  shall  confine  myself  to  relating  my  personal  experi- 
ences during  the  few  remaining  days  before  the  catastrophe. 

It  so  happened  that  on  the  Sunday  preceding  the  fatal 
ist  of  August — that  is  to  say,  on  the  25th  of  July — I  was 
dining  at  the  villa  of  a  friend  situated  on  the  high  road  to 
Peterhof  and  Krassnoe  Selo,  where  the  troops  of  the  guard 
and  of  the  garrison  of  the  capital  always  spent  the  summer 
months  in  camp.  We  were  still  at  dinner,  when  the  ser- 
vants announced  that  a  regiment  of  the  guards  was  march- 
ing past.  We  all  rushed  out  to  the  garden  gate  and  stood 
there  looking  at  the  giant  forms  of  the  guardsmen  tramping 
silently  on  the  dusty  road  in  the  summer  twilight.  I  shall 
never  forget  the  sinister  impression  of  impending  doom 
this  sight  produced  on  me.  We  learned  that,  the  night 
before,  the  order  had  been  issued  to  raise  the  camp  imme- 
diately and  for  the  troops  to  return  to  the  capital.  The 
meaning  of  this  order  could  hardly  have  been  misunder- 
stood. Three  days  later  I  was  dining  at  the  villa  of  one 
of  the  most  popular  hostesses  on  one  of  the  beautiful 
islands  in  the  estuary  of  the  Neva.  Among  the  guests 
were  the  Minister  of  War  and  two  or  three  members  of 
the  Diplomatic  Corps,  representatives  of  allied  or  friendly 
Powers,  We  had  barely  sat  down  to  our  dinner  when 
General  Soukhomlinoff  was  called  to  the  telephone,  and 
when  he  resumed  his  seat  his  neighbour,  the  charming 
wife  of  a  prominent  General,  asked  him  what  the  news  was. 
He  said  that  Austria  had  declared  war  on  Serbia  and  that 
the  bombardment  of  Belgrade  had  begun,  adding  in  French 
the  words  I  distinctly  overheard,  sitting  opposite  his  neigh- 
bour at  table  :  "  Cette  fois  nous  marcherons  "  (This  time 
we  shall  march). 

There  could  evidently  be  no  doubt  whatever  about  the 
intentions  of  our  military  party.  The  next  morning,  the 
29th  of  July,  in  great  anxiety  lest  some  irrevocable  deci- 
sion might  be  taken  in  the  course  of  the  day,  I  went  to  see 
one  of  the  Ministers,  the  only  really  able  member  of  the 
Cabinet,  to  learn  the  latest  news  and  his  own  views  on  the 
situation.     I   found  him  in  full  agreement   with  me  that 


164         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

the  only  hope  left  of  our  escaping  a  general  war,  and  that 
a  very  slender  one,  was  to  limit  ourselves  to  a  partial 
mobilization  directed  only  against  Austria-Hungary.  He 
intended  to  make  a  determined  stand  for  this  point  of 
view  in  the  Council  of  Ministers  which  was  to  be  held  in 
the  afternoon.  I  returned  to  him  late  in  the  evening  and 
was  happy  to  learn  from  his  lips  that  after  many  vacilla- 
tions, the  military  element  having  been  very  insistent  on  a 
general  mobilization,  it  had  been  finally  decided  to  order 
the  mobilization  of  only  four  military  circumscriptions, 
those  of  Moscow,  Kieff,  Odessa,  and  Kazan  ;  that  is  to  say, 
a  partial  mobilization,  which  might  be  interpreted  as 
directed  solely  against  Austria-Hungary.  ^  An  Imperial 
ukase  to  that  effect,  as  required  by  law,  appeared  in  the 
morning  papers  the  following  day,  the  30th  of  July. 

Having  learned,  however,  that  the  General  Staff  was 
still  trying  to  obtain  an  order  for  a  general  mobilization,  I 
went  at  an  early  hour  to  interview  again  my  ministerial 
friend  of  the  day  before.  He  told  me  that  the  Prime 
Minister,  Mr.  Goremykin,  had  just  gone  to  Peterhof 
determined  to  insist  upon  no  general  mobihzation  being 
ordered  and  that  he  would  call  me  up  at  three  o'clock  by 
telephone  as  soon  as  he  had  learned  from  the  Prime 
Minister  the  result  of  his  demarche.  Punctually  at  three 
o'clock  the  telephone  bell  rang,  and  to  my  immense  relief 
I  heard  the  Minister's  voice  saying  that  Goremykin  had 
returned  from  Peterhof  with  the  Emperor's  assurance  that 
no  general  mobilization  would  take  place.  After  dinner, 
however,  new  doubts  began  to  assail  me,  and  I  rushed  off 
again  to  the  Minister's  summer  residence  on  one  of  the 
Neva  Islands.  I  found  him  at  home  and  in  a  hopeful 
mood,  reassuring  me  in  regard  to  my  apprehensions. 

While  we  were  talking  over  some  cups  of  tea  the  tele- 
phone bell  rang.  The  Minister  took  up  the  receiver,  and  I 
heard  him  say  from  time  to  time,  "  Yes,"  and  again  "  Yes  " 
in  a  gradually  lowering  voice,  until  he  hung  up  the  receiver 
with  a  sigh.  He  made  the  sign  of  the  cross  and  sadly 
said,   "It  is  all  over  !     The  general  mobilization  has  just 

I  But  see  pp  187-8.  This  passage  is  left  as  it  was  written  by  the 
late  Baron  Rosen  for  publication  in  the  New  York  Evening  Post. — 
Publisher's  Note. 


WAR   DECLARED  165 

been  ordered,  as  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  just  told 
me!" 

An  hour  later,  at  about  ten  o'clock,  I  returned  to  the 
club  where  I  had  my  bachelor  quarters  and  found  a 
number  of  the  members  assembled  on  the  terrace  waiting 
for  my  return  with  the  latest  news.  When  I  announced 
it,  one  of  the  members  present,  a  General,  asked  me 
whether  I  was  aware  of  the  fact  that  there  was  a  private 
wire  between  the  Emperor's  study  at  Peterhof  and  the 
official  residence  of  the  Minister  of  War.  I  said  that  I 
supposed  that  to  be  the  case,  but  I  wanted  to  know  what 
he  meant  by  his  remark.  "  Well,"  said  he,  "  I  wanted  to 
tell  you  that  half  an  hour  ago  the  order  for  a  general 
mobilization  was  revoked  by  a  telephone  message  from 
His  Majesty." 

I  went  to  bed  that  night  with  just  a  glimmer  of  hope, 
only  to  wake  up  the  next  morning,  the  fatal  31st  of  July, 
to  learn  that  the  order  for  a  general  mobilization  had  just 
been  issued  ! 

The  explanation  of  these  singular  proceedings  I  must 
reserve  for  the  next  chapter. 

That  same  night  the  German  ultimatum  was  received. 
It  was  naturally  left  without  a  reply,  and  the  next  day, 
August  1st,  at  7  p.m.,  we  learned  that  war  had  been 
declared  by  Germany. 

The  die  was  cast  ! 


CHAPTER   XXXIV 

Earl  Loreburn's  views — The  situation  on  July  30,  1914 — Russian  mobiliza- 
tion— Declaration  of  war — Feeling  in  Russia — Attack  on  German 
Embassy — Treatment  of  Poland  and  Finland — Invasion  of  East 
Prussia — Tannenberg — My  article  for  the  Associated  Press — A  letter 
from  Roosevelt. 

Before  proceeding  to  supplement  the  narrative  of  my 
personal  experiences  on  that  fateful  30th  of  July  with 
some  explanations  of  the  singular  occurrences  to  which 
that  narrative  referred,  I  must  quote  a  few  passages  from 
Earl  Loreburn's  book.  How  the  War  Came,  which  throw 
the  necessary  light  on  the  situation  as  it  presented  itself 
on  that  historic  date  : 

The  Civil  Governments  or  Managers  of  Foreign  Policy  in  Europe, 
under  whatever  title  they  be  designated,  -were  very  heavily  to  blame 
for  drifting  helplessly  in  a  situation  of  unexampled  danger.  They 
all  knew — in  Berlin,  Paris,  London,  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg — 
that  the  danger  lay  in  one  General  Staff  desiring  to  forestall  the  other 
or  fearing  to  be  itself  forestalled.  This  apprehension  is  clearly 
expressed  throughout  the  dispatches.  Therefore  time  became  all- 
important.  If  the  diplomatists  could  not  settle  soon,  the  chance  of 
settling  at  all  would  probably  vanish  in  a  few  days.  A  strong,  prompt 
decision  by  each  State  as  to  the  course  it  proposed  to  steer  and  an 
immediate  announcement  of  that  course,  where  an  antagonist  was 
about  in  ignorance  to  thwart  it,  or  a  friend  was  about  to  commit  some 
error  which  would  run  counter  to  it — these  surely  are  necessary  in 
the  management  of  controversial  business. 

Whether  such  an  announcement  as  here  outlined  was 
intended  to  be  made  at  St.  Petersburg  by  France  or  by 
Great  Britain,  or  by  both,  I  have  no  means  of  knowing. 
Earl  Loreburn  expresses  the  view  that  the  Russian  Alhance 
gave  France  the  right  to  require  that  Russia  should  not 
precipitate  war  by  mobilizing,  and  that  if  Russia  had  not 
mobilized  the  settlement  which  just  missed  fire  would  have 
been   completed.     (The   settlement   here   alluded   to   could 

166 


LORD  LOREBURN'S  VIEWS  1G7 

only  have  been  meant  to  be  the  settlement  of  the  Austro- 
Russian  conflict,  as  Austria  was  considered  to  have  been 
willing  to  enter  into  direct  negotiations  with  St.  Peters- 
burg.) He  further  mentions  that  Mr.  Jaures  had  been 
urging  his  Government  to  notify  Russia  that  if  she  mobil- 
ized without  the  consent  of  France,  France  would  not 
support  her  in  arms,  such  a  demand  being  perfectly  legi- 
timate, like  the  demand  ultimately  made  by  Germany  that 
Austria  must  not  precipitate  war  by  unreasonable  conduct. 
The  question,  however,  is  whether  the  French  Government 
of  the  day  might  not  have  been  precluded  from  bringing 
forward  such  a  demand  by  the  secret  convention  concluded 
between  the  French  and  Russian  General  Staffs  in  1892 
and  approved  by  their  predecessors  in  office.  The  text  of 
Article  II  of  the  Convention,  as  published  in  1918  in  the 
French  Yellow  Book,  entitled  L' alliance  Franco-Riisse,  on 
page  92,  reads  as  follov/s  : 

In  the  event  of  the  forces  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  or  of  one  of  the 
Powers  composing  it,  being  rnobilized  [subsequently  apparently 
amended  to  read  :  "In  case  of  the  Triple  Alliance  or  one  of  the  Powers 
composing  it  setting  the  general  mobilization  of  its  forces  into  opera- 
tion," p.  99,  ibidem],  France  and  Russia,  at  the  first  news  of  the  event 
and  without  any  preliminary  agreement  being  necessary,  shall  mobilize 
immediately  and  simultaneously  the  whole  of  their  forces  and  move 
them  as  nearly  as  possible  to  their  frontiers. 

The  meaning  of  this  article  would,  indeed,  imply  an 
affirmative  answer  to  the  above  question  as  far  as  the  formal 
presentation  of  such  a  demand  would  have  been  concerned. 
This,  nevertheless,  would  not  have  stood  in  the  way  of  a 
friendly  exchange  of  views  on  the  same  lines,  which  in 
circumstances  of  such  exceptional  gravity  would  have  been 
but  natural  between  allies  threatened  by  a  common  danger 
and  anxious  to  agree  upon  the  best  means  to  avoid  it. 

Another  question  then  presents  itself  :  whether  it 
would  have  been  possible  for  Great  Britain  to  say  to  the 
French  Government  at  the  outset,  as  Earl  Lorcburn 
suggests  : 

You  expect  us  to  help  you,  but  this  is  no  quarrel  of  yours  ;  you 
are  being  brought  into  it  because  of  your  treaty  with  Russia.  If 
you  like  to  give  Russia  a  free  hand,  well  and  good,  but  in  that  event 


168        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPL0:MACY 

we  will  not  give  Russia  a  free  hand  to  control  our  policy  as  well  ;  and 
unless  you  can  restrain  Russia  from  mobilizing  till  we  agree  that  the 
necessity  for  doing  so  is  come,  we  will  not  join  you  in  arms.  We  do 
not  intend  to  be  embroiled  by  your  Ally,  to  whom  we  arc  under  no 
sort  of  obligation. 

The  answer  to  this  question  would  seem  to  depend  on 
the  nature  of  the  understanding  arrived  at  between  British 
and  French  experts  as  a  result  of  the  "  military  and  naval 
conversations  "  which  had  been  authorized  to  be  held, 
apparently  in  1906  or  1907,  "  to  prepare  for  the  contingency 
of  a  joint  war  against  Germany,  as  appears  from  Sir  E. 
Grey's  speech  of  August  3,  1919,  and,  consequently,  on  the 
extent  to  which  the  British  Government  considered  itself 
as  morally  committed  by  the  result  of  these  conversations." 

Be  that  as  it  may,  two  things  stand  out  in  bold  relief 
as  a  lesson  to  be  deduced  from  the  condition  of  things 
which  led  up  to  and  determined  the  outbreak  of  the  World 
War  ;  they  are  :  the  extreme  danger  to  peace  and  to  the 
welfare  of  nations  lurking  in  secret  alliances,  conventions, 
understandings  between  rulers,  pledging  the  lives,  the 
fortunes  and  the  honour  of  their  peoples  without  their 
knowledge  and  consent,  and  the  no  less  formidable  danger 
of  the  ultimate  decision  of  the  question  of  peace  or  war 
being  left  to  the  military  element  ;  that  is  to  say,  to  the 
element  least  qualified  to  deal  with  problems  of  such  over- 
shadowing moment  in  a  spirit  of  true  statesmanship, 
because  its  professional  training  is  necessarily  directed, 
not  towards  the  study  of  the  means  of  ensuring  peace,  but 
toward  the  elaboration  of  plans  for  the  better  preparation 
and  conduct  of  prospective  wars. 

It  was,  however,  this  latter  contingency  that  resulted 
from  the  course  of  events.  Here  again  I  cannot  help 
quoting  from  Earl  Loreburn's  book  : 

Another  source  of  infinite  danger  now  began  to  emerge — the 
progress  of  military  preparations.  In  the  condition  of  universal 
distrust  which  had  corae  over  Europe,  what  men  most  feared  was 
being  caught  unprepared  and  destroyed  before  they  could  defend 
themselves.  .  .  .  Till  tension  is  removed  nothing  can  be  more  certain 
than  that  the  States  which  are  in  danger  of  attack  will  begin  to  get 
ready.  This  is  precisely  what  happened.  How,  when,  where,  to 
what  extent  is  obscure.  .  .  .  But  when  the  progress  has  once  been 
commenced,   it   goes   forward   progressively   faster  each   day.     Those 


JULY    30,  1914  169 

are  wise  men  who  hasten  their  action  and  make  Hght  of  forms,  so  as 
to  agree  on  terms  before  the  panic  comes  and  the  fate  of  nations  passes 
into  the  hands  of  mihtary  men. 

These  few  sentences  depict  exactly  the  situation  as  it 
presented  itself  during  the  last  week  preceding  the  out- 
break of  the  war.  To  complete  the  picture  drawn  by 
Earl  Loreburn  I  quote  the  following  weighty  words  : 

Not  a  single  one  of  the  men  who  had  real  power  was  wise  enough 
and  strong  enough  to  arrest  the  military  demon  that  was  about  to 
bring  upon  us  all  the  most  awful  catastrophe  in  human  history.  And 
after  this  war  had  commenced,  though  very  many  of  them  from 
motives  either  of  fear  or  of  humanity  desired  to  see  it  ended,  they 
had  so  committed  themselves  to  one  another  or  were  so  distrustful 
of  each  other's  private  intentions  that  they  could  not  close  the  conflict 
for  the  origin  of  which  they  had  been  themselves  responsible.  Mean- 
while the  guiltless  peoples  were  destroyed. 

That  was  the  world's  tragedy  ! 

When  day  broke  on  that  fateful  30th  of  July,  1914, 
the  situation  was  as  follows  :  The  original  two  conflicts, 
that  between  Austria  and  Serbia,  and  its  sequel,  the  con- 
flict between  Austria  and  Russia,  were  susceptible  of 
peaceful  settlement,  Austria  having  at  the  last  moment 
shown  a  willingness  to  enter  into  direct  negotiations  with 
St.  Petersburg.  The  adjustment  of  both  these  conflicts, 
once  Austria  was  ready  to  desist  from  her  arrogant 
attitude,  would  have  demanded  but  little  time  and  the 
catastrophe  would  have  been  averted,  because  there  would 
then  no  longer  have  existed  any  cause  whatever  for  a  con- 
flict between  Russia  and  Germany.  This  happy  result 
might  have  been  achieved  by  the  joint  efforts  of  the 
diplomacy  of  all  the  Powers,  not  excluding  even  that  of 
Germany,  at  the  last  moment  thoroughly  alarmed  by  the 
imminence  of  an  unparalleled  world  catastrophe,  had  not 
the  question  of  mobilizations  suddenly  assumed  an  acute 
character  and,  by  placing  Russia  and  Germany  face  to 
face  in  a  threatening  attitude,  removed  the  conflict  from 
the  domain  of  statesmanship  to  that  of  exclusively  military 
and  strategic  considerations  where  on  both  sides  the 
influence  of  the  General  Staffs  was  supreme. 

In  either  country,  however,  a  mobilization  could  only 
be  ordered  by   a  decree  signed  by  the   Sovereign  himself, 


170        FORTY  YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

and  the  ultimate  decision  of  the  question  of  peace  or  war 
was,  therefore,  left  in  the  hands  of  the  two  Emperors. 
That  they  were  both  fully  aware  that  mobilization  meant 
war  and  that  in  deciding  for  war  they  were  risking  their 
thrones,  their  dynasties  and  the  fate  of  their  Empires,  can 
hardly  be  doubted,  as  well  as  that,  had  they  been  free 
agents,  their  decision  would  have  been  in  favour  of  peace. 
But,  although  invested  with  supreme  power,  they  were  not 
free  agents  ;  they  were  both  subject  to  the  pressure  of 
the  sinister  influence  behind  them,  which  they  were  both 
too  weak  to  resist.  The  Emperor  Nicholas  almost  said  as 
much  in  a  telegram  to  the  Emperor  William,  dated 
July  29th  at  I  p.m.,  in  which  occurs  this  pathetic  admis- 
sion ("  The  Times  "  Documentary  History  of  the  War,  vol.  ii. 
page  159)  :  "I  fear  that  very  soon  I  shall  be  forced  to 
take  measures  which  will  lead  to  war."  That  same  night, 
at  II  p.m.,  he  signed  the  ukase  ordering  the  mobilization 
of  four  military  circumscriptions — that  is  to  say,  a  "  partial  " 
mobilization — which  was  announced  to  be  merely  a  counter- 
move  to  Austria's  mobilization. 

This  measure  might  not  necessarily  have  led  to  war 
with  Germany  if  not  followed  by  a  general  mobilization, 
for  which,  as  in  every  other  country  as  well,  some  secret 
preparations  had  presumably  been  under  way  for  some 
time  since  the  situation  had  obviously  become  critical  in 
the  extreme.  It  became,  therefore,  of  supreme  importance 
to  prevent  such  general  mobilization  to  be  decided  upon. 
With  this  object  in  view,  the  Prime  Minister,  Goremykin, 
had  gone  to  Peterhof  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  of  July 
and  returned  with  the  Emperor's  assurance  that  no  general 
mobilization  would  be  ordered.  On  the  same  day,  at 
1.20  p.m.,  the  Emperor  sent  to  the  Emperor  William,  in 
reply  to  the  latter's  telegram  announcing  his  readiness  to 
mediate  between  Russia  and  Austria,  the  following  message 
("  The  Times  "  Documentary  History  of  the  War,  vol.  ii.  page 
161): 

Peterhof,  July  2gth,  1.20  p.m. 

I  thank  you  from,  my  heart  for  your  quick  reply.     I  am  sending 

to-night  Tatistcheff   with   instructions.     The  miUtary  measures  now 

taking  form  were  decided  upon  five  days  ago  and  for  the  reason  of 

defence  against  the  preparations  of  Austria.     I  hope  with  all  my  heart 


THE  MOBILIZATION  ORDER  171 

that  these  measures  will  not  influence  in  any  manner  your  position 
as  mediator,  which  I  appraise  very  highly.  We  need  your  strong 
pressure  upon  Austria  so  that  an  understanding  can  be  arrived  at 
with  us. 

{Signed)  Nicholas. 

General  Tatistclieff,  Military  Representative  of  the 
Emperor  attached  to  the  person  of  Emperor  William,  who 
happened  to  be  on  leave  at  St.  Petersburg,  was  sent  for 
later  in  the  afternoon  and  was  awaiting  orders,  when  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  iVffairs,  Sazonoff,  and  the  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  General  Yanouchkevitch,  arrived  at  the 
Imperial  villa  at  Peterhof  and  were  received  by  His 
Majesty.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  arguments  brought 
forward  by  these  ill-omened  personages  in  order  to  influence 
the  Emperor's  decision,  the  result  of  their  interview  with 
His  Majesty  was  that  General  Tatistcheff's  departure  for 
Berlin  was  countermanded  and  general  mobilization  was 
ordered  to  be  proceeded  with.  Of  this  fatal  decision  I 
learned  at  about  9  p.m.  from  the  lips  of  the  member  of 
the  Cabinet  who  had  kindly  taken  the  trouble  to  keep  me 
informed  of  the  course  of  events.  Two  hours  later  I  was 
told  by  a  General  who  was  in  a  position  to  know  that  the 
mobilization  order  had  been  countermanded  by  a  telephone 
message  from  the  Emperor  to  the  Minister  of  War.  Had 
he  stood  firm  by  this  decision,  Russia  might  have  been  saved 
and  the  world  spared  the  catastrophe  which  has  over- 
whelmed it.  But  the  Minister  of  War,  General  Soukhomli- 
noff,  after  consultation  with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Sazonoff,  and  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General 
Yanouchkevitch,  succeeded  by  midnight  in  extorting  from 
the  Emperor  his  consent  to  let  the  mobilization  order 
stand,  having  represented  to  His  Majesty  that  the  general 
mobilization,  once  ordered,  could  not  be  stopped  for  "  tech- 
nical reasons." 

The  general  mobilization,  which  was  bound  to  lead  to 
war,  ordered  at  a  moment  when  the  whole  world  was 
overcome  by  a  vague  sense  of  impending  doom,  when  not 
only  Austria  but  even  the  German  Civil  Government  had 
shown  symptoms  of  having  come  to  their  senses  and  when, 
consequently,  a  few  days'  delay  might  have  sufficed  to 
allow  of  a  peaceful  settlement  being  reached — was  an  act 


172        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

of  unmitigated  folly  and  arrant  imbecility  if  intended  as  a 
bluff,  for  it  supplied  the  military  advisers  of  the  German 
Emperor,  who  were  obviously  and  unquestionably  bent  on 
seizing  the  moment  they  thought  to  be  favourable  for 
bringing  about  the  general  war  for  which  they  had  been 
preparing,  with  the  one  pretext  needed  for  a  rupture  with 
Russia,  with  a  compelling  argument  to  confound  the  hesi- 
tation of  their  Sovereign,  if  such  there  was,  and  last,  but 
not  least,  with  the  most  effective  means  of  deluding  the 
German  people  into  the  belief  that  they  were  being 
wantonly  attacked  and  that  they  were  called  upon  to 
defend  the  very  existence  of  their  Fatherland. 

But  if  it  was  meant  to  be  a  deliberate  provocation,  it 
was  an  appalling  crime,  the  responsibility  for  which  these 
three  men,  Sazonoff,  Soukhomlinoff  and  Yanouchkevitch, 
must  share  with  the  equally  guilty  advisers  of  the  German 
Emperor,  who  caused  the  Russian  mobilization  to  be 
answered  by  an  ultimatum  and  a  declaration  of  war.  I 
prefer  to  think  that  it  was  due  to  their  recklessness,  incom- 
petence and  groundless  belief  in  the  possibility  of  a  prompt 
and  glorious  victory,  rather  than  to  any  thought-out  inten- 
tion. But  it  was  an  act  that  scaled  the  doom  of  an 
Empire — their  own  Fatherland — and  the  crushing  con- 
sciousness of  having  advised  it  must  be  to  the  two  of  them 
who  are  still  alive  a  punishment  more  cruel  than  any 
which  human  justice  could  devise. 

In  the  morning  of  the  31st  of  July  the  general  mobili- 
zation had  begun,  and  on  the  same  day  the  Emperor  sent 
the  following  telegram  to  the  German  Emperor  ("  The  Times  " 
Documentary  History  of  the  War,  vol.  ii.  page  132)  : 

I  thank  you  cordially  for  your  mediation,  which  permits  the  hope 
that  everything  may  yet  end  peaceably.  It  is  technically  impossible 
to  discontinue  our  military  preparations,  which  have  been  made 
necessary  by  the  Austrian  mobilization.  It  is  far  from  us  to  want 
war.  As  long  as  the  negotiations  between  Austria  and  Serbia  con- 
tinue my  troops  will  undertake  no  provocative  action.  I  give  you 
my  solemn  word  thereon.  I  confide  with  all  my  faith  in  the  grace 
of  God,  and  I  hope  for  the  success  of  your  mediation  in  Vienna  for 
the  welfare  of  our  countries  and  the  peace  of  Europe. 

Your  cordially  devoted 

(Signed)  Nicholas. 

But  it  was  too  late.     Germany's  ultimatum  was  already 


FEELING   IN   RUSSIA  173 

on  its  way  to  St.  Petersburg.  Inexorable  Fate  was  on 
the  march  and  no  human  power  could  arrest  it. 

The  declaration  of  war  became  known  on  August  ist, 
between  seven  and  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening.  The  next 
day  there  was  considerable  excitement,  natural  under  the 
circumstances.  The  people  felt  that  they  were  being 
suddenly  and  wantonly  attacked  by  a  hitherto  friendly 
nation  with  whom  they  had  always  been  living  in  peace 
■  and  amity.  Of  the  complicated  causes  that  had  led  up  to 
this  unexpected  result  they — I  mean,  of  course,  the  popular 
masses — could  not  have  any  conception.  The  idea,  which 
was  spread  and  propagated  by  the  Press,  not  only  in  Russia, 
but  abroad  as  well,  and  had  become  a  kind  of  political 
axiom,  that  Russia,  as  a  Slav  Power  (I  would  observe  here 
in  parenthesis  that  Russia  is  no  more  and  no  less  a  Slav 
Power  than  Great  Britain  is  a  Teuton  Power  as  far  as  race 
affinity  is  concerned),  was  bound  to  intervene  in  the  con- 
flict between  Austria  and  Serbia  and  to  shield  the  latter 
from  the  consequences  of  her  policy  of  a  "  Greater  Serbia  " 
at  the  expense  of  Austria — was,  although  widely  entertained 
by  our  "Intelligentzia,"  quite  beyond  the  understanding  of 
the  popular  masses. 

If,  as  was  said  to  have  been  the  case,  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  had  really  represented  to  the  Emperor 
that,  unless  he  yielded  to  the  popular  demand  and 
unsheathed  the  sword  in  Serbia's  behalf,  he  would  run  the 
risk  of  a  revolution  and  perhaps  the  loss  of  his  throne,  it 
could  only  have  been  under  the  influence  of  the  same 
delusion  which  swayed  the  minds  of  the  majority  of  our 
intellectuals  and  had  its  origin  in  that  fatal  gulf  separating 
the  educated  classes  from  the  enormous  bulk  of  the  nation. 

This  same  remark  applies  with  no  less  force  to  the  rela- 
tion of  the  educated  classes  to  the  war,  which,  by  a 
majority  of  them,  was  indeed  hailed — and  for  various 
reasons — with  a  certain  amount  of  enthusiasm  sufficient  to 
deceive  even  perspicacious  foreign  observers — such,  for 
instance,  as  Mr.  E.  H.  Wilcox — into  the  belief  that  the  war 
with  Germany  was  popular  in  the  broadest  and  deepest 
sense,  and  to  make  him  say,  in  his  Russia's  Ruin  :  "  The 
very  air  was  electrified  with  patriotism  and  one  could  feel 
its  stimulating  infection  everywhere." 


174        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

In  some  respect  this  impression  correctly  reflected  the 
atmosphere  which  at  first  prevailed  in  the  capital  and 
other  large  centres  of  population  containing  considerable 
agglomerations  of  the  more  or  less  politically  "  conscious  " 
factory  labourers.  But  to  believe  that  the  immense  mass 
of  the  population  of  the  Empire — let  alone  the  peasantry 
which  had  to  furnish  the  bulk  of  the  reserve  forces,  mobil- 
ized and  torn  from  their  labours  in  the  middle  of  the 
harvest  season — would  be  to  any  appreciable  extent  affected 
by  such  warlike  enthusiasm,  could  only  betoken  a  pro- 
foundly erroneous  interpretation  of  the  real  feelings  of 
the  people,  quite  comprehensible  in  a  foreign  visitor 
naturally  inclined,  in  time  of  war,  to  see  everywhere  symp- 
toms of  the  disposition  which  he  hoped  to  find  in  the 
population  of  an  allied  country,  but  quite  inexcusable  in 
Russian  intellectuals,  who  ought  to  have  known  better, 
and  who  were  but  too  prone  to  foster  similar  illusions 
which  largely  prevailed  in  allied  countries. 

I  feel  bound  to  insist  on  this  point,  because  this  mis- 
interpretation of  the  real  feelings  of  the  Russian  people, 
not  only  by  our  Allies,  but  also  be  our  own  politicians, 
has  had  consequences  of  incalculable  importance — a  subject 
to  which  I  shall  revert  later — and  has  in  the  end  led  to  an 
inevitable  disillusionment  which  has  provoked  in  allied 
countries,  among  the  unthinking,  an  outburst  of  unbounded 
vituperation  and  the  vilest  accusations  against  a  great  and 
generous  nation,  when  it  was  found  that  the  Russian  people, 
after  having  borne  losses  surpassing  those  of  any  other  of 
the  allied  countries,  were  no  longer  willing  to  shed  their 
blood  for  a  cause  which  they  never  felt,  nor  ever  had  any 
reason  to  feel,  to  be  theirs. 

That  this  was  attributed  to  the  influence  of  German 
propaganda  and  German  gold  was  perhaps  natural  on  the 
part  of  Allied  war  propaganda,  interested  in  exciting  by 
every  means  indignation  against  the  proceedings  and  war- 
fare practices  of  the  enemy ;  but  that  Russians  abroad 
should  have  been  found  eager  to  join  in  such  an  outcry, 
which  indeed  means  nothing  less  than  the  grossest  ignominy 
heaped,  not  on  the  enemy,  but  on  the  Russian  nation,  is  a 
matter  of  profound  humiliation  to  those  Russians  who  do 
not  believe  in  the  desirability  of  seeking  to  ingratiate  them- 


POPULARITY  OF  THE  WAR  175 

selves  with  our  former  Allies  by  reviling  their  own 
people. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  war  was  welcomed,  just  as  any 
other  war  would  have  been,  by  the  military  element, 
especially  the  younger  generation,  dreaming  of  glory  and 
promotion  to  be  won  on  the  battlefield — a  perfectly  natural 
and,  as  long  as  war  is  considered  to  be  a  necessity  in  the 
life  of  nations,  a  not  only  laudable  but  most  desirable 
frame  of  mind.  Among  the  higher  ranks  of  the  Army,  in 
spite  of  official  optimism,  a  less  cheerful  disposition  seemed 
to  prevail.  They  could  not  but  be  avare  of  the  various 
defects  of  our  military  organization,  the  actual  insuffi- 
ciency of  our  preparations,  and  the  colossal  difficulties  of 
every  kind  which  would  be  entailed  in  the  conduct  of  a 
war  on  the  gigantic  scale  this  war  was  bound  to  assume. 

Among  the  Duma  leaders  and  politicians  the  war  was 
apparently  very  popular ;  at  least  there  was  no  lack  of 
most  enthusiastic  patriotic  demonstrations.  The  same  may 
be  said  of  the  "Intelligentzia"  as  a  whole.  Those  who 
understood  what  a  tragedy  the  war  really  meant  for  Russia 
and  were  bold  enough  to  say  so  were  necessarily  very  few, 
although  the  number  of  those  who  in  their  innermost 
hearts  thought  so  cannot  have  been  small.  The  revolu- 
tionary "Intelligentzia"  alone  had  any  reason  to  rejoice, 
for  their  opportunity  had  come  at  last. 

All  efforts  to  arouse  in  the  popular  masses  the  spirit  of 
hate  as  a  moving  force  in  the  war,  although  they  succeeded 
in  provoking  here  and  there  outbursts  of  disorder  and 
violence  to  which  many  thousands  of  perfectly  innocent 
people  fell  victims,  utterly  failed  in  their  object,  just  as 
they  had  been  unsuccessful  in  the  war  with  Japan,  and 
for  the  same  reason.  The  favourite  and  propagandist 
legend  of  the  inveterate  hatred  of  the  Russian  people 
toward  Germany  and  Germans  had  no  basis  in  fact.  In 
the  immense  expanse  of  Russia  proper  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  people  never  had,  nor  could  have  had,  any 
personal  contact  with  Germany  and  Germans,  nor  had, 
perhaps,  ever  set  their  eyes  on  a  live  representative  of 
that  supposedly  hated  race.  And  then,  the  spirit  of  hatred 
toward  foreigners  as  such  is  entirely  absent  in  the  mental 
and  moral  make-up  of  the  Russian  people.     This,  indeed,  is 


176        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

one  of  the  most  attractive  traits  of  the  Russian  national 
character,  to  which  all  foreigners  who  have  ever  lived  in 
Russia  have  always  been  willing  to  render  justice.  The 
conception  of  the  hatred  and  "  loathing  "  of  this  or  that 
nation,  even  of  a  nation  with  which  one  is  at  war,  as  a 
requisite  of  patriotism,  is  a  conception  quite  alien  to  the 
mentality  of  the  Russian  people,  and,  one  should  think,  to 
that  of  the  so-called  "  plain  people  "  in  all  countries  as 
well,  just  as  it  is  notoriously  absent  in  the  minds  of  the 
soldiers  who  face  each  other  in  the  trenches  and  in  deadly 
combat. 

This  conception  of  patriotism  seems  to  be  everywhere 
confined  mostly  to  the  educated  middle  classes,  and  its 
peculiarity  is  that  it  seems  to  inspire  the  minds  of  people 
with  greater  virulence  the  farther  they  are  from  the  fight- 
ing line.  But  what  is  truly  astonishing  is  that  the  ruling 
classes  when  making  ready  for  the  World  War  did  not 
reflect,  in  preparing  to  send  forth  millions  upon  millions  of 
the  "  plain  people  "  of  their  countries  to  a  war  that  was 
obviously  bound  to  demand  holocausts  of  unheard-of 
dimensions,  that  a  day  might  come  when  these  same  plain 
people  would  awaken  to  a  realization  of  the  fact  that  they, 
the  "plain  people,"  had  really  no  quarrel  with  the  "  plain 
people  "  in  the  enemy  camp  and  might  conclude  therefrom 
that  the  real  enemy  was  not  the  enemy  they  had  to  face 
in  the  trenches,  but  that  the  real  enemy  were  their  own 
rulers  who  had  sent  them  to  the  slaughter. 

That  is  exactly  what  has  happened  in  Russia,  and  that 
is  what  our  experience  in  the  Japanese  War  and  its  after- 
math should  have  taught  our  rulers  to  foresee  and  guard 
against  at  any  cost,  and  most  certainly  at  the  cost  of  such 
a  diplomatic  "  defeat  "  as  would  have  been  implied  in  an 
abstention  from  becoming  mixed  up  in  the  conflict  between 
Serbia  and  Austria.  For  their  failure  to  have  done  so 
tens  of  thousands  of  brave  oflicers  have  had  to  pay  with 
their  lives,  often  under  tortures  of  unspeakable  cruelty, 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  the  deluded  "  Intelligentzia  " — some 
with  their  lives  and  most  of  them  with  utter  ruin,  or  exile 
as  unwelcome  guests  in  foreign  lands,  often  in  conditions  of 
pitiable  destitution,  and  Russia  herself  with  abasement, 
dismemberment  and  total  destruction  of  her  political  and 


ATTACK   ON  GERMAN  EMBASSY       177 

social  fabric,  from  which  it  will  take  her,  possibly,  genera- 
tions to  recover. 

Ominous  symptoms  of  an  incipient  disorganization  of 
the  administrative  apparatus  were  noticeable  from  the 
very  beginning.  Two  or  three  days  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  a  crowd  of  rowdies  invaded  the  building  of  the 
German  Embassy,  murdered  the  Chancery  servant  who 
had  been  left  in  the  house  to  guard  the  furniture  and  effects, 
the  private  property  of  the  Ambassador,  and  occupied 
itself  during  an  hour  or  so  with  destroying  or  throwing 
out  of  the  windows  all  the  movable  objects  they  could  lay 
their  hands  on.  The  club  house  where  I  was  living  stood 
in  the  same  street,  and  being  informed  by  the  servants 
that  an  attack  on  the  German  Embassy  by  a  riotous  crowd 
was  in  progress,  I  went  with  a  couple  of  friends — among 
them  the  representative  of  a  neutral  Power — just  to  see 
what  was  going  on.  The  sight  that  met  our  eyes  was  not 
one  to  be  proud  of,  A  considerable  crowd  had  collected 
in  front  of  the  Embassy,  composed  of  the  most  heterogeneous 
elements,  among  them  some  decent  people,  mere  onlookers 
like  ourselves,  but  the  majority  a  howling  mob  of  such 
sinister  figures  as  usually  appear  on  the  surface  in  large 
towns  whenever  rioting  is  in  the  air.  An  officer  of  police 
and  a  couple  of  policemen  were  calmly  looking  on  while 
pieces  of  furniture,  crockery,  glassware,  etc.,  were  flying 
in  the  air  and  coming  down  on  the  pavement  with  a  crash, 
which  was  greeted  with  howls  of  delight  by  the  crowd. 
Nothing  evidently  had  been  done  to  prevent  the  possi- 
bility of  a  crowd  of  rowdies  breaking  into  a  building  of 
which  the  Embassy  of  the  United  States  had  officially 
taken  charge  and  which,  therefore,  was  placed  under  the 
protection  of  international  law.  Nothing  had  been  done  to 
put  an  end  to  the  disgraceful  outrage  which  was  being  com- 
mitted under  the  very  eyes  of  the  police  ;  no  arrests  were 
made  ;  no  one  was  ever  punished  or  even  prosecuted  for 
the  murder  of  the  German  Chancery  servant. 

Having  satisfied  its  lust  of  destruction,  the  crowd  moved 
on  in  the  direction  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Embassy, 
situated  at  some  considerable  distance  in  another  part  of 
the  town.  But  there,  Austria  not  yet  having  declared 
war  and  the  Ambassador  and  his  Staff  still  being  present, 

VOL.    II  12 


178        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

necessary  precautions  for  their  protection  had  been  taken, 
and  the  riotous  crowd  found  all  approaches  to  the  Embassy 
building  barred  by  troops. 

The  failure  to  have  taken  similar  steps  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  German  Embassy  building,  or,  at  all  events,  to 
have  immediately  put  a  stop  to  its  contents  being  looted 
and  destroyed,  disclosed  either  the  incapacity  or  the 
pusillanimity  of  the  responsible  authorities,  who  could 
only  have  been  either  unwilling  or  else  afraid  to  interfere 
with  the  mob,  engaged  in  what  may  have  been  considered 
to  have  been  a  manifestation  of  patriotic  rage.  It  seemed 
to  me  that  in  deliberately  allowing  the  dregs  of  the  popu- 
lace to  have  their  way  on  this  occasion  the  Government 
were  most  imprudently  entering  upon  a  course  fraught 
with  the  gravest  danger  and  that  they  were  already 
beginning  to  let  the  reins  of  power  slip  through  their  fingers. 
This  disgraceful  episode,  although  of  no  importance  at  the 
time,  proved,  indeed,  a  mild  foretaste  of  what  was  to  come 
two  years  and  a  half  later. 

There  was,  undoubtedly,  but  little  hope  that  the  admin- 
istrative apparatus  of  the  Empire  would  prove  capable 
of  satisfying  the  almost  unlimited  demands  which  the 
conduct  of  a  war  on  the  expected  scale  was  bound  to  make 
on  its  efficiency,  although  the  mobilization  of  the  armies 
had  been  effected  with  the  most  commendable  precision 
and  celerity — a  proof,  by  the  way,  of  the  fact  that  active 
preparations  had  been  secretly  under  way — as  presumably 
they  had  been  in  every  other  country — for  some  consider- 
able time  before  the  actual  outbreak  of  hostilities.  But  the 
most  disquieting  feature  of  the  state  of  affairs  was  the 
evident  non-comprehension  by  the  ruling  powers  of  the 
political  demands,  the  satisfaction  of  which  the  situation 
rendered  not  only  necessary  but  extremely  urgent  indeed. 
I  mean,  of  course,  the  absolute  necessity  of  an  immediate 
and  complete  reversal  of  the  policy  theretofore  pursued  in 
regard  to  our  outlying  dominions,  Poland  and  Finland. 

The  partition  of  Poland  had  unquestionably  been  a 
crime — as  the  Emperor  Paul  himself  is  said  to  have 
admitted,  although  it  had  been  committed  by  his  own 
mother.  But  in  committing  this  crime  Russia  had  had 
two    accomplices,    Prussia    and    Austria,    and    she    could 


PROCLAMATION  TO   THE  POLES        179 

remain  in  the  tranquil  enjoyment  of  the  fruits  of  the 
crime  only  so  long  as  she  avoided  falling  out  with  her 
accomplices.  Once,  however,  the  rupture  with  these  two 
Powers  had  taken  place,  there  was  only  one  rational  policy 
she  could  adopt,  and  that  was  to  make  reparation  as  fully 
as  lay  in  her  power  by  renouncing  her  share  in  the  spoli- 
ation of  a  gallant  and  generous  nation,  whose  goodwill  and 
support  in  the  coming  titanic  contest  was  of  inestimable 
value  to  her.  This  consideration  seemed  to  have  com- 
mended itself  to  the  attention  of  the  Government  and  to 
have  met  at  least  with  a  partial  approval.  It  was  decided 
that  something  had  to  be  done  to  conciliate  the  Polish 
people.  This  something,  however,  turned  out  to  be  an 
act  than  which  hardly  anything  more  illogical,  senseless 
and  unsatisfactory,  to  Poles  as  well  as  to  Russians,  could 
have  been  devised.  It  took  the  shape  of  a  declamatory 
and  dramatic  proclamation  addressed  to  the  Poles  by  the 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  Supreme  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Russian  Armies,  a  translation  of  the  text  of  which  I  take 
the  liberty  of  quoting  here  from  Mr.  F.  S.  Whitton's  A 
History  of  Poland  : 

Poles  !  The  hour  has  come  when  the  dream  of  your  fathers  and 
forefathers  will  at  length  be  realized.  A  century  and  a  half  ago  the 
living  body  of  Poland  was  torn  in  pieces,  but  her  soul  has  not  perished. 
She  lives  in  the  hope  that  the  time  will  come  for  the  resurrection  of 
the  Polish  nation  and  its  fraternal  union  with  all  Russia.  The  Russian 
armies  bring  you  the  glad  tidings  of  this  union.  May  the  frontiers 
which  have  divided  the  Polish  people  be  broken  down.  May  it  once 
more  be  united  under  the  sceptre  of  the  Russian  Emperor.  Under 
this  sceptre  Poland  will  come  together,  free  in  faith,  in  language  and 
in  self-government.  One  thing  Russia  expects  of  you  :  an  equal 
consideration  for  the  rights  of  nations  with  which  history  has  linked 
you.  With  open  heart,  with  hand  fraternally  outstretched,  great 
Russia  comes  to  you.  She  believes  that  the  sword  has  not  rusted 
which  overthrew  the  foe  at  Tannenberg.  From  the  shores  of  the 
Pacific  Ocean  to  the  Polar  Sea  the  Russian  war-hosts  are  in  motion. 
The  morning  star  of  a  new  life  is  rising  for  Poland.  May  there  shine 
resplendent  in  the  dawn  the  Sign  of  the  Cross,  the  symbol  of  the 
Passion  and  Resurrection  of  nations. 

I  can  best  describe  the  impression  the  proclamation 
produced  on  the  Poles  by  repeating  what  one  of  my  Polish 
friends  told  me  on  the  morning  it  had  appeared  in  the  papers 
of  the  capital  :    "I  read  it  with  tears  of  emotion,  bvit  I  do 


181        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

not  believe  a  single  word  of  it."  Another  Polish  gentle- 
man was  reported  to  have  said  that  he  had  taken  it  at 
first  for  an  apocryphal  production  concocted  by  some 
Russian  revolutionists  !  Moreover,  it  was  said — and  I  have 
every  reason  to  believe  the  story  to  be  true — that  simul- 
taneously with  the  issue  of  the  proclamations  from  Head- 
quarters of  the  Armies  the  Russian  governors  of  the  Polish 
provinces  had  been  confidentially  warned  by  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior  that  it  was  merely  an  act  oi  political 
strategy  ! 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was,  to  say  the  least,  inopportune, 
if  not  imprudent,  to  intimate  to  the  Russian  people  that 
their  old  feud  with  the  Poles  was  to  be  settled  at  last  by 
their  shedding  their  blood  for  the  creation  of  a  greater 
Poland,  not  to  mention  the  imprudence  of  the  implied 
promise  of  the  conquest  of  provinces  in  the  possession  of 
still  unconquered  enemies. 

Incidentally  I  would  observe  that,  according  to  rumour, 
Army  Headquarters  had  not  had  anything  to  do  with  thi 
production  of  this  amazing  document,  whose  inspiration  was 
said  to  have  been  due  to  the  political  insight  of  a  "  states- 
man," and  its  empty  but  grandiloquent  verbiage  to  the 
gifted  pen  of  some  one  of  his  subordinates. 

And  yet  how  clearly  indicated  was  the  obvious  course 
that  should  have  been  adopted  :  the  restoration,  under 
the  constitution  of  1815,  of  the  autonomous  Kingdom  of 
Poland,  united  to  Russia  solely  in  the  person  of  the 
Sovereign — a  solution  of  the  Polish  problem  which  was 
entirely  within  the  power  of  Russia,  could  have  been 
effected  immediately,  would  have  dealt  a  most  serious 
moral  blow  to  both  Prussia  and  Austria,  and  would  have 
given  to  the  Polish  nation  a  real  satisfaction  instead  of 
shadowy  promises  whose  realization  was  entirely  dependent 
on  the  fortune  of  arms.  I  have  no  doubt  that,  had  the 
Emperor  Nicholas,  as  soon  as  war  broke  out,  immediately 
gone  to  Warsaw  to  be  crowned  as  constitutional  King  of 
Poland,  dismissed  the  whole  Russian  administration  and 
appointed  a  Polish  Ministry,  he  would  have  evoked  an 
unbounded  enthusiasm  and  would  have  won  the  most 
loyal  devotion  of  the  Polish  people. 

Second  only  to  Poland  in  strategic  importance  was  the 


TREATMENT  OF  FINLAND  181 

Grand  Duchy  of  Finland,  where,  no  less  than  in  Poland,  a 
complete  reversal  of  the  policy  theretofore  pursued  by  the 
Imperial  Government  was  imperatively  demanded,  since 
this  outlying  dominion,  whose  border  was  no  farther 
removed  from  the  capital  of  the  Empire  than  some  twenty 
miles,  would  be  manifestly  exposed  to  the  imminent  danger 
of  an  invasion  by  the  enemy. 

Two  measures  should  have  been  taken  at  once  :  the 
immediate  repeal  of  the  laws  passed  by  the  Imperial  Legis- 
lature in  violation  of  the  Finnish  constitution  and  the 
removal  of  the  extremely  unpopular  Governor-General,  a 
certain  General  Seyn,  who  enjoyed  no  social  prestige  what- 
evef  and  seemed  to  be  entirely  unfit  for  the  part  of  repre- 
sentative of  the  Sovereign  in  a  constitutionally  governed 
country.  He  should  have  been  replaced  by  a  man  of 
unassailable  social  position  and  very  high  military  rank. 
The  latter  qualification  would  have  been  of  the  greatest 
importance,  because  the  requirements  of  the  defence  of  the 
Empire  necessitated  the  occupation  of  Finland  by  large 
forces,  military  as  well  as  naval,  and  therefore  the  establish- 
ment of  some  kind  of  arbitrary  miUtary  rule  which  it 
would  have  been  of  supreme  importance  to  confine  within 
the  bounds  of  reason — a  task  that  only  a  Governor-General 
of  very  high  military  rank  and  in  high  favour  at  Court 
could  hope  to  accomplish  successfully. 

Nothing  of  the  kind,  however,  was  done,  nor  seems  to 
have  been  even  thought  of.  On  the  contrary,  the  generally 
execrated  rule  of  Governor-General  Seyn  was  simply  rein- 
forced by  the  presence  of  military  commanders  inclined  to 
treat  Finland  almost  in  as  arbitrary  and  highhanded  a 
way  as  they  would  have  treated  a  conquered  country.  The 
effect  on  the  feelings  and  disposition  of  the  population  may 
be  imagined. 

Nor  was  Russia  herself  treated  by  her  ruling  powers 
with  any  more  statesmanlike  wisdom.  At  a  time  when 
the  most  extensive  and  cruel  sacrifices  were  being  demanded 
of  the  peasantry,  who  had  to  furnish  some  80  per  cent, 
or  more  of  the  required  cannon  fodder  in  a  cause  for  which 
they  had  not  the  faintest  understanding,  let  alone  sym- 
pathy— whatever  war  propaganda  may  have  succeeded  in 
inducing  the  gullible  public  to  believe — the  peasantry  who 


182         FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

ever  since  the  Japanese  War  had  been  belaboured  by  the 
ubiquitous  propaganda  of  the  Social-Revolutionaries,  the 
same  "  dastardly  "  terrorists  who  later,  masquerading  as 
"  loyal  "  Russian  war  patriots,  were  to  become  "  the  main 
hope  of  the  Allies — at  a  time  when  it  was  supremely  important 
to  prevent  the  "  bourgeois  "  parties  from  joining  hands 
with  those  who  were  working  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
Government,  as  they  ultimately  did,  nothing  whatever 
was  done  to  satisfy  their  moderate  and  reasonable  demands. 
On  the  contrary,  obscurantist  reaction  became  ever  more 
blatantly  arrogant.  Also  the  supremacy  of  the  military 
element,  more  or  less  unavoidable  in  time  of  war,  was 
being  exercised  with  ever-growing  arbitrariness  and  reck- 
lessness, helping  to  throw  the  Government  machinery  out 
of  gear  and  by  cultivating  a  sort  of  mild  anarchy  on  top 
was  paving  the  way  for  the  advent  of  anarchy  from 
below. 

The  outlook  did  not  seem  to  be  a  cheerful  one.  Far 
from  it  indeed.  But  events  seemed  at  first  to  belie  the 
worst  of  their  apprehensions.  Our  successful  invasion  of 
East  Prussia  was  considered  by  those  who  were  dreaming 
of  a  victorious  march  on  Berlin  to  be  heralding  a  speedy 
termination  of  the  war,  although  the  success  was  mainly 
due  to  the  fact  that  our  invading  army  had  encountered 
only  feeble  resistance  by  inferior  German  troops  and  insuffi- 
cient in  number — a  fact  which,  by  the  way,  contradicts 
flatly  one  of  the  arguments  said  to  have  been  used  by 
General  Soukhomlinoff  in  urging  the  Emperor  to  order  a 
general  mobilization,  namely,  that  the  Germans  had  in 
readiness  on  our  frontier  great  masses  of  troops  prepared 
to  forestall  our  mobilization  by  an  instant  invasion  of  our 
territory  the  moment  war  would  have  been  declared.  It 
ended,  however,  in  the  disastrous  defeat  of  our  troops  at 
Tannenberg,  the  same  place  where  in  1410  the  Poles  had 
gained  their  great  victory  over  the  Teutonic  Knights  to 
which  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas's  proclamation  had  referred 
in  such  pompous  terms. 

Nevertheless  our  at  first  victorious  invasion  of  East 
Prussia  had  served  its  purpose  in  having  compelled  the 
Germans  to  withdraw  sufficient  troops  from  their  western 
front  to  enable  the  French  to  gain  their  victory  on  the 


FALL   OF   PRZEMYSL  183 

Marne,  which  practically  decided  the  issue  of  the  war  by 
demonstrating  the  impossibility  of  France  being  overwhelmed 
by  a  lightning  blow,  as  originally  planned  by  the  German 
General  Staff. 

Furthermore,  our  defeat  at  Tannenberg  was  com- 
pensated by  the  brilliant  victory  which  crowned  our  arms 
in  Galicia.  In  September  the  occupation  of  Lemberg,  the 
Galician  capital,  took  place  and  was  followed  by  the  fall 
of  the  fortress  of  Przemysl.  Finally,  in  October  the  Germans 
were  completely  repulsed  from  Warsaw. 

In  spite  of  the  more  or  less  favourable  aspect  of  the 
military  situation  on  both  fronts,  I  never  wavered  in  my 
profound  conviction  that  the  war,  unless  arrested  before  it 
was  too  late,  was  bound  to  end  in  the  ruin  of  Russia,  and 
I  therefore  began  to  revolve  in  my  mind  various  plans  how 
the  lull  in  military  operations  coincident  with  the  winter 
season,  as  well  as  the  comparatively  satisfactory  military 
situation,  could  be  taken  advantage  of  for  the  initiation  of 
negotiations  looking  to  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace. 
Having  given  the  subject  much  thought  and  having  inci- 
dentally ascertained  the  views  of  the  very  able  and  experi- 
enced representative  of  one  of  the  most  important  neutral 
Powers,  whose  views  I  found  to  be  concurrent  with  mine, 
I  was  anxious  to  lay  them  before  the  American  public, 
because  I  was  convinced  from  the  beginning  that  this  war 
could  only  be  brought  to  an  end  by  the  intervention  and 
under  the  auspices  of  the  United  States.  The  occasion  to 
do  so  presented  itself  at  the  end  of  the  year  when  I  received 
a  letter  from  an  old  and  influential  friend  in  New  York, 
who  suggested  that  I  should  write  an  article  on  the  situ- 
ation for  one  of  the  leading  magazines.  I  replied  that  I 
felt  some  diffidence  about  following  up  his  suggestion, 
having  never  tried  my  hand  at  writing  for  the  Press,  but 
that  I  would  be  glad  to  give  an  interview  to  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  Associated  Press.  This  interview  took 
place  on  January  i,  1915,  and  the  following  is  the  text 
which  I  dictated  to  him  and  which  he  sent  by  telegraph 
to  the  London  office  of  the  Associated  Press.  Whether  it 
was  ever  printed  in  any  American  newspaper  I  have  not 
been  able  to  ascertain,  and  I^therefore  feel  no  compunction 
about  reproducing  it  here  : 


184        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

As  current  events  develop  one  realizes,  if  one  goes  to  the  bottom 
of  things,  that  the  true  significance  of  the  present  general  war  between 
the  European  Powers  lies  not  only  in  the  determined  resistance  to 
the  German  aim  of  establishing  an  overlordship  of  the  world  through 
force  of  arms,  but  also  in  the  revolt  of  mankind  against  the  idea  that 
might  goes  before  right.  This  is  why  the  sympathy  of  the  world 
seems  to  be  on  the  side  of  the  Allies. 

No  one  dreams  of  begrudging  the  German  people  the  "  place  in 
the  sun  "  that  is  theirs  by  birthright  among  the  great  nations  on 
a  footing  of  equality  ;  but  the  world  will  never  submit  to  the  hegemony 
of  the  "  mailed  fist."  German  militarism  has  shown  its  true  colours 
in  a  way  and  by  deeds  which  have  aroused,  the  world  over,  feelings 
against  the  German  people  that  it  will  take  them  long  years  to  live 
down. 

That  the  cause  of  right,  of  the  sacredness  of  treaties  and  of  the 
integrity  and  independence  of  the  smaller  Powers,  for  which  we  are 
fighting,  must  and  will  prevail  in  the  end,  I  consider  to  be  a  moral 
certainty. 

At  the  present  moment  the  rulers  of  Germany  must  already  fully 
realize  from  the  march  of  events  that  their  original  plan  of  first 
crushing  France  and  then  dealing  a  death-blow  to  Russia  has  totally 
and  irretrievably  failed,  and  that  their  dream  of  establishing  by  this 
means  a  German  overlordship  of  the  world  has  come  to  naught. 

I  believe  that  the  day  will  come  when  the  German  people  will 
realize  that,  instead  of  fighting,  as  they  have  been  deluded  into 
believing,  for  the  safety  and  very  existence  of  their  country,  which 
nobody  thought  of  attacking,  they  are  shedding  the  blood  of  their 
sons,  ruining  their  prosperity  and  wasting  their  substance  for  nothing 
but  a  wild  dream  of  unbridled  ambition  and  megalomania  that  could 
never  become  a  reality.  That  day  the  German  people  will  make 
a  day  of  reckoning  with  the  militarism  which  has  inflicted  on  them 
the  misery  of  this  terrible  war.  But  that  day  may  still  be  far  in 
the  future. 

No  one  doubts  the  patriotism  of  the  Germans  or  their  determina- 
tion to  fight  as  long  as  their  resources  will  last.  Still,  the  amount 
of  suffering  which  this  war  entails  not  only  on  the  belligerents  but 
also  on  the  rest  of  the  civilized  world,  is  bound  to  grow  from  month 
to  month  as  the  war  continues.  Therefore  it  would  seem  to  be  to 
the  interest  of  all  concerned,  and  most  of  all  perhaps  of  the  German 
people  themselves,  to  bring  the  war  to  a  conclusion  as  soon  as  possible. 
The  surest  way  of  reaching  such  a  result  would  be  to  bring  about 
a  general  coalition  such  as  crushed  the  power  of  the  first  Napoleon, 
still  leaving  France  intact  and  an  honoured  member  of  the  family 
of  nations.  Failing  this,  however,  a  league  of  neutrals,  especially 
if  headed  by  the  United  States,  might  bring  to  bear  upon  Germany 
moral  pressure  sufficient  to  make  her  realize  the  futility  of  continuing 
a  struggle  that  could  certainly  never  lead  to  a  realization  of  her 
ambitions. 

The    attitude    of    Germany    toward    treaties    such    as   the    treaty 


MY   PRESS   ARTICLE  185 

guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  which  her  foremost  statesman 
in  his  last  interview  with  the  British  Ambassador  characterized  as 
merely  "  a  scrap  of  paper,"  her  systematically  inhuman  and  ruthless 
manner  of  conducting  the  war,  constitute  a  standing  menace  to  small 
Powers,  like  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland  and  Denmark,  to  whom 
the  cruel  fate  of  heroic  Belgium  affords  a  warning  of  what  they  may 
expect  should  Germany  at  any  time  consider  it  to  her  interest  to 
invade  any  of  them.  They  would,  therefore,  probably  be  among  the 
first  to  join  such  a  league  in  an  attempt,  if  not  to  bring  about  the 
termination  of  the  war,  at  least  to  mitigate  its  accompanying  horrors. 

A  formal  ground  for  the  intervention  of  neutrals  could  be  easily 
found  in  the  well-established  fact  of  the  breach  by  Germany  of  most 
of  the  stipulations  of  The  Hague  Convention  in  regard  to  the  conduct 
of  war,  to  which  she  was  herself  a  party.  The  right  of  all  or  any  of 
the  signatory  Powers  to  protest  against  such  breach  of  the  said 
stipulations  could  certainly  not  be  questioned. 

The  portentous  and  calamitous  events  we  are  witnessing  should, 
it  seems,  impress  civilized  mankind  with  the  necessity  of  organizing 
the  life  of  the  community  of  nations  upon  a  different  basis,  designed 
so  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  any  one  Power  automatically 
involving  almost  all  the  others  in  a  catastrophe  such  as  Germany's 
overweening  ambition  has  brought  upon  the  civilized  world.  It  can 
hardly  be  denied  that  the  much-vaunted  equilibrium  based  on  the 
grouping  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  into  two  irreconcilably  hostile 
camps  has  lamentably  failed  to  do  so.  Instead  of  being,  as  was 
claimed  for  it,  the  surest  safeguard  of  the  peace  of  Europe,  it  has 
proved  the  cause  of  constant  emulation  between  the  two  opposing 
groups  of  Powers  in  ever-growing  formidable  armaments,  and  has 
finally  led  to  one  of  the  Powers  concerned  resorting  to  the  criminal 
folly  of  a  preventive  war. 

To  devise  a  plan  of  safeguarding  the  civilized  world  against  the 
recurrence  of  a  catastrophe  such  as  the  present  one  will,  after  the 
conclusion  of  peace,  become  the  task  and  should  not  prove  to  be 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  competence  of  true  statesmanship. 

Remembering  the  leading  part  Colonel  Roosevelt  as 
President  of  the  United  States  had  taken  by  his  timely 
and  generous  offer  of  mediation  in  bringing  about  peace 
between  Russia  and  Japan,  and  thinking  that  this  inter- 
view might  perhaps  interest  him,  I  took  the  liberty  of 
enclosing  a  copy  of  it  in  a  letter  to  him,  to  which  he 
replied  by  a  letter,  from  which  I  have  been  very  kindly 
permitted  to  extract  the  following  for  publication  in  this 
chapter  of  my  reminiscences  : 

Your  letter  has  just  come  and  your  interview.  I  am  in  hearty 
accord  with  all  that  you  say.  I  wish  to  Heaven  I  were  President  at 
this  moment.     That  won't  strike  you,   I  know,  as  an  expression  of 


186        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

personal  ambition.  I  would  be  quite  willing  to  accept  the  Presidency 
now  with  a  guarantee  of  being  removed  from  it  the  very  instant  I 
had  succeeded  in  doing  what  I  started  to  accomplish  ;  and  the  first 
thing  I  would  like  to  do,  aside  from  the  subordinate  incident  of  aiding 
civilization  and  decency  in  Mexico,  would  be  to  interfere  in  the  World 
War  on  the  side  of  justice  and  honesty  by  exactly  such  a  league  as 
you  mention. 

I  do  not  believe  in  neutrality  between  right  and  wrong.  I  believe 
in  justice.  .  .  .  Meanwhile,  whatever  I  can  do  by  tongue  and  pen 
will  be  done  along  exactly  the  lines  indicated  in  your  letter  and  your 
interview. 

With  all  good  wishes,  faithfully  yours, 

[Signed]     Theodore  Roosevelt. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

The  question  of  mobilization — War  passions — War  propaganda — Declaration 
of  London — Opportunity  for  a  League  of  Neutrals — Disorganization  in 
Russia — The  Tsar  and  a  separate  peace — Rasputin — The  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas — The  "  Progressive  Bloc." 

In  a  preceding  chapter  I  related  my  personal  experiences 
on  that  fateful  Thursday,  July  30,  1914,  when  the  question 
of  peace  or  war  was  hanging  in  the  balance,  to  be  ultimately 
decided  at  midnight  by  the  Emperor's  reluctant  consent 
to  the  general  mobilization,  which  meant  war.  In  so  doing 
I  had  no  diary  or  notes  of  any  kind  to  rely  on  and  nothing  to 
aid  me  except  these  two  dates,  which  were  indelibly  engraved 
on  my  memory  as  the  epitaph  on  the  gravestone  of  my  country 
— July  29  and  July  30,  1914.  For  this  reason  my  account 
of  what  I  had  learned  on  the  evening  of  July  29th  in  regard 
to  the  decision  of  the  mobilization  question  was  not  quite 
exact,  inasmuch  as  I  learned  of  the  decision  in  favour  of  the 
partial  mobilization  only  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  from 
the  Imperial  ukase  to  that  effect  printed  in  the  papers. ^ 
It  so  happens  that  I  am  enabled  to  refer  for  the  elucidation 
of  this  circumstance  to  documentary  evidence  which  has 
just  come  into  my  possession.  An  elucidation  of  this  circum- 
stance is  of  some  importance,  as  it  will  show  how  great  were 
the  vacillations  which  preceded  the  ultimate  fatal  decision 
and  how  great  was  the  unfortunate  Emperor's  reluctance 
to  give  his  consent  to  a  measure  the  incalculable  consequences 
of  which,  apprehended  by  some  of  his  faithful  subjects, 
may  have  been  instinctively  grasped  by  a  Sovereign  over- 
whelmed with  the  sense  of  his  appalling  responsibility  before 
his  country  and  his  people.  This  documentary  evidence, 
in  the  shape  of  a  letter  written  by  myself  at  2  p.m.  on  July 

"  Publisher's  Note  :  See  p.  164. 
187 


188        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

30,  1914,  and  addressed  to  my  wife  in  Paris,  was  received 
there  on  August  19th,  as  marked  by  the  stamp  of  the  Paris 
post  office,  was  deUvered  to  the  caretaker  of  our  apartment 
after  the  departure  of  my  family  for  Russia,  and  reaches 
me  now  together  with  some  indifferent  mail  matter  which 
had  accumulated  there  in  our  absence.  The  following  is 
a  translation  from  the  Russian  original  of  this  letter — one 
of  a  series  of  numbered  daily  short  communications  I  was 
in  the  habit  of  addressing  to  my  wife  when  separated  from 
my  family  : 

No.  163.  St.  Petersburg, 

Thursday,   17/30/A  of  July,  1914,  2  p.m. 
Dearest, 

I  received  yesterday  your  letter  of  Sunday,  and  to-day  that 
of  Monday.  I  see  that  you  are  calm  and  not  frightened,  thank 
God.  But  affairs  have  taken  a  more  than  critical  turn.  Yesterday 
there  were  vacillations  :  a  partial  mobilization  or  a  general  one. 
I  was  the  whole  day  in  telephonic  communication  with  X.  (a  member 
of  the  Cabinet)  and  have  been  to  see  him  three  times  at  his  summer 
residence.  I  returned  from  my  last  visit  to  him  at  midnight,  having 
learned  that  the  general  mobilization  had  been  decided  upon.  This 
morning  I  see  from  the  papers  that  a  partial  mobilization  only  has 
been  ordered.  This,  of  course,  is  a  little  better,  but  I  am  afraid  that 
it  will  nevertheless  be  considered  a  direct  challenge  and  that  Germany 
will  to-morrow  order  a  general  mobilization,  an  example  which  will 
immediately  be  followed  by  France.  Whether  hereafter  negotiations 
will  still  be  possible  is  very  doubtful.  But  that  is  our  only  hope. 
I  am  working  indefatigably  here  in  that  direction,  and  Y.  at  Peterhof . 
I  have  already  had  an  interview  to-day  with  X.,  and  Y.  has  gone  to 
Peterhof.  What  a  calamity  that  we  should  have  such  Ministers 
as  Soukhomlinoff  and  Sazonoff  1  Des  gens  an  cceur  leger  I  (Light- 
hearted  men).  It  seems  incredible  that  during  all  the  crisis,  which 
began  with  the  assassination  of  Francis  Ferdinand,  our,  albeit  sorry 
and  incapable,  Ambassador  should  have  been  absent  from  Berlin. 
He  returned  there  but  yesterday.  At  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
they  apparently  had  no  suspicion  of  the  plans  of  Austria  and  had  no 
information  in  regard  to  the  intentions  and  the  frame  of  mind  of 
Berlin  !  All  this  is  monstrous  light-headedness  and  incompetence. 
Our  poor,  unfortunate  country  !  At  such  a  truly  tragic  historical 
moment,  this  is  the  kind  of  servants  upon  whom  has  to  rely  the  best 
of  Sovereigns,  with  all  his  soul  devoted  to  his  country  and  his  people  I 
I  cannot  help  worrying  about  you.  But  your  fortitude  and  brave 
spirit,  which  never  leave  you  in  critical  moments,  are  a  great  conso- 
lation to  me.  God  bless  you.  I  cannot  decide  anything  to-day. 
There  is  still  a  faint  glimmer  of  hope  that  Russia  and  Europe  may 
be  spared  this  catastrophe.  Ever  yours, 

R. 


WAR  PASSIONS  189 

For  obvious  reasons  I  have  indicated  only  by  the  letters 
X.  and  Y.  the  persons  referred  to  in  the  body  of  the  letter, 
but  I  would  mention  incidentally  that  one  of  them  was  a 
Minister  of  State  and  the  other  a  distinguished  General, 
and  that  their  names  were  purely  Russian,  as  was  the  true 
Russian  patriotism  which  animated  them  in  their,  alas ! 
fruitless  endeavours  to  avert  the  coming  catastrophe. 

During  August  and  September  there  was  a  constant  stream 
of  Russian  travellers  returning,  mostly  by  way  of  Denmark, 
Sweden  and  Finland,  from  Germany,  where  they  had  been 
surprised  at  the  various  resorts  and  watering-places  by  the 
declaration  of  war.  Most  of  them  had  to  complain  of  all 
sorts  of  insults,  maltreatment  and  manifestations  of  hatred 
heaped  upon  them  by  the  populace — all  of  which  went  to 
show  how  well  the  Government  had  succeeded  in  poisoning 
the  popular  mind  with  the  idea  that  Russia  was  wantonly 
attacking  Germany  and,  in  conjunction  with  France,  was 
bent  on  her  destruction.  The  Emperor  William  himself, 
it  was  said,  had  not  scrupled,  in  haranguing  a  crowd  from  the 
balcony  of  his  palace,  to  accuse  the  Emperor  Nicholas  of 
treachery,  waving  in  the  faces  of  the  maddened  multitude 
the  "  scrap  of  paper  "  representing  the  Treaty  of  Bjorkoe, 
bearing  the  Emperor's  signature  and  afterwards  denounced 
by  him.  The  violence  of  the  hatred  against  Russia  seemed 
to  have  somewhat  abated  when,  after  the  British  declara- 
tion of  war,  "  hymns  of  hate  "  and  "  Gott  strafe  England  " 
became  the  order  of  the  day.  The  ever-smouldering  hatred 
against  the  hereditary  enemy — France — needed,  of  course, 
no  special  effort  to  be  made  to  burst  into  flame. 

Thus  it  was  that  the  strongest  passions  that  can  move 
the  soul  of  a  people — the  passions  of  hatred  and  of  fear — 
were  brought  into  play  and  caused  the  youth  of  the  country 
to  rush  into  battle  with  frantic  enthusiasm  for  what  they 
believed  to  be  the  salvation  of  the  Fatherland  from  threatened 
destruction.  On  the  other  hand,  among  the  stay-at-home 
plain  people,  according  to  the  accounts  of  many  fugitive 
Russians  who  had  fled  from  Germany  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  war,  a  widespread  panicky  feeling  seemed  to  prevail, 
manifesting  itself  in  the  most  absurd  "  spy  "  mania,  and 
in  such  fantastic  rumours  as,  for  instance,  the  legend  of 
the  phantom  automobile  carrying  twenty  million   francs   in 


190        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

gold  fioni  Paris  to  St.  Petersburg  through  the  heart  of 
Germany. 

Both  these  elements  of  hatred  and  of  fear  were  absent 
in  Russia.  The  regular  Army  marched  to  the  front,  obeying 
the  orders  of  the  Tsar,  gaily  and  full  of  fighting  spirit,  as  was 
to  be  expected  from  a  body  of  young  men  to  whom  war  against 
any  enemy  whatever  meant  relief  from  the  drudgery  of  barrack 
life  and  held  out  the  promise  of  all  the  excitement  and  the 
glory  of  a  victorious  campaign.  But  the  inarticulate  bulk 
of  the  nation,  traditionally  submissive  to  the  will  of  the 
Tsar,  accepted  the  war  as  an  infliction  sent  down  by  Providence 
which  had  to  be  borne  in  patience  and  resignation. 

The  war  was  hailed  with  satisfaction  only  by  part  of  the 
"  Intelligentzia  " — perhaps  the  largest  part — and  her  leaders, 
the  same  ' '  Intelligentzia  "  who  had  rightly  been  opposed  to  the 
war  in  the  Far  East,  and  who  now  expected  as  a  result  of 
the  war  in  Europe,  whatever  its  ultimate  issue,  the  end 
of  autocracy  and  their  own  advent  to  power  with  the  favour 
and  support  of  Allied  opinion  and  diplomacy.  The  Duma 
leaders  and  their  following,  including  our  official  diplomacy, 
were  flattered  by  being  admitted  on  toleration  to  the  society 
of  their  "  betters  "  and  by  being  condescendingly  treated 
as  real  "  statesmen,"  never  suspecting  the  true  reason  why 
they  were  being  made  so  much  of  and  that  an  alliance  and 
entente  with  backward  Russia — at  heart  partly  feared, 
partly  hated  and  looked  down  upon  as  semi-barbarous — 
could  only  have  been  sought  by  Powers  standing  on  a  higher 
plane  of  culture  and  civilization  for  the  purpose  and  in  the 
hope  of  securing,  in  case  of  need,  an  inexhaustible  supply 
of  cannon  fodder  in  the  shape  of  the  poor,  inarticulate 
"  Moujik  "  ;  and  never  suspecting  either  that  a  day  might 
come  when  the  same  "  Moujik  "  would  rebel  against  the 
part  assigned  to  him  by  his  "  betters,"  the  bourgeoisie  and 
"  Intelligentzia,"  and  would  wreak  on  them  his  wrath  and 
vengeance  with  relentless  fury  and  unspeakable  cruelty. 

The  only  ones  who  had  a  real  reason  to  rejoice  over  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  were  the  revolutionaries  of  every  brand, 
Social-Revolutionaries,  Social-Democrats,  Mensheviks  and 
Bolsheviks,  for  their  opportunity  to  wreck  the  Empire  had 
come. 

The  work  of  the  war  propaganda,  before  Allied  assistance 


WAR   PROPAGANDA  191 

made  its  appearance,  was  at  first  carried  on  by  the  Russian 

Press  on  indigenous  lines,  necessarily  with  patriotic  attacks 

on  Germany  and  Germans,  but — to  its  credit  be  it  said — as 

a  rule  without  the  application  of  opprobrious  terms  to  the 

enemy  and   with  harping  on  such  slogans  as  "  war  to  end 

war  " — a  brilliant  idea  quite  on  a  par  with  other  slogans 

which  later  on  became  popular,  such  as  "  peace  offensive," 

"  premature  peace,"  or  "  defeatism  "  as  applied  to  the  views 

of  those  who  were  anxious  to  prevent  the  defeat  of  their 

country  before  it  became  too  late.     Practical  war  propaganda 

manifested  itself  mainly  in  occasional  mob  attacks  on  shops 

owned  by  Germans  or  people  with   German  names  and  in 

persecutions   by   the    military    authorities   of  estate-owners 

in  the  Baltic  Provinces  of  Russian  nationality  dating  back 

a  couple   of  centuries,   but   of   German   origin,   whose   sons 

almost  without  exception  were  shedding  their  blood  at  the 

front  for  their  common  country.     Some  of  these  unfortunate 

landowners,  guilty  of    possessing  in    the  grounds  of    their 

mansions  cemented  tennis  courts,   which  were  declared  to 

have   been   traitorously   prepared   as   platforms    for   heavy 

enemy  artillery  (an  alarming  symptom  of  war-madness  said 

to  have  been  observed  in  isolated  cases  even  in  more  favoured 

countries   such   as   Great    Britain   and  America),   had   been 

without  further  ado  shipped  off  with  their  families  to  Siberia. 

Of  the  treatment  meted  out  by  the  military  authorities  under 

the  influence  of  spy  mania  to  the  Jewish  population  in  Poland 

and  Lithuania,  especially  after  the  retreat  of  our  armies  had 

begun,  I  prefer  not  to  speak.     It  is  a  page  in  our  history 

of  which  every  patriot  who  has  at  heart  the  honour  of  his 

country  must  be  deeply  ashamed. 

As  to  our  Government — that  is  to  say,  our  Civil  Govern- 
ment— I  was  decidedly  under  the  impression  that  from  the 
very  moment  of  the  unexpected  outbreak  of  the  war,  which 
they  had  shown  themselves  incompetent  to  prevent,  they  had 
begun  to  lose  their  bearings,  and  between  the  ever-growing 
arrogance  and  interference  in  State  affairs  of  the  military 
element,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  ever-threatening  revolu- 
tion, were  incapable  of  dealing  effectually  with  the  increasingly 
chaotic  state  of  affairs  brought  about  by  the  war. 

The  conduct  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  country  was 
in  the  hands  of  a  very  honourable  man,  whose  incredible 


192        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

self-sufficiency,  however,  joined  to  glaring  incompetence, 
rendered  his  occupancy  of  the  office  of  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  a  disastrous  calamity  for  Russia  and  was  one  of  the 
main  contributory  causes  of  her  downfall.  Nothing,  for 
instance,  but  the  incompetence  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  could  have  explained  the  participation  of  Russia 
in  this  Declaration,  signed  in  London  on  September  5,  1914, 
by  Sir  E.  Grey  and  the  Ambassadors  of  France  and  Russia, 
to  wit  : 

"  The  undersigned,  duly  authorized  thereto  by  their 
respective  Governments,  hereby  declare  as  follows  : 

"  The  British,  French  and  Russian  Governments  mutually 
engage  not  to  conclude  peace  separately  during  the  present  war. 

"  The  three  Governments  agree  that  when  terms  of 
peace  come  to  be  discussed  no  one  of  the  Allies  will  demand 
conditions  of  peace  without  the  previous  agreement  of  each 
of  the  other  Allies." 

Comments  on  the  second  article  of  this  Declaration  I 
must  reserve  for  a  later  chapter  when  I  shall  have  reached 
in  my  narrative  the  point  where  the  question  of  the  timeliness 
of  entering  upon  the  discussion  of  possible  terms  of  a  general 
peace  should  have  been  raised  by  Russia.  For  the  present 
I  must  confine  myself  to  the  elucidation  of  the  obligation 
undertaken  by  Russia,  inasmuch  as  it  is  covered  by  the  first 
article  of  the  Declaration.  In  this  connection  I  have  to  point 
out  that  practically  identical  stipulations  were  contained : 

(i)  In  Article  V  of  the  Secret  Convention  concluded 
by  the  Chiefs  of  the  French  and  Russian  General  Staffs 
in  August  1892,  and  subsequently  endorsed  by  an  exchange 
of  ministerial  notes  between  the  two  Governments,  which, 
as  far  as  can  be  ascertained  from  the  secret  documents 
hitherto  published,  was  considered  as  taking  the  place  of 
a  formal  Treaty  of  Alliance  ;  this  article  reading,  "  France 
and  Russia  will  not  conclude  peace  separately." 

(2j  In  Article  II  of  the  Treaty  of  Bjorkoe,  concluded 
in  1895  between  the  Emperors  William  and  Nicholas,  subse- 
quently denounced  by  the  latter,  by  which  the  two  Sovereigns 
bound  themselves,  "  not  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  with 
any  enemy  whatever." 

I  have  already  commented  on  the  latter  transaction  in 
Chapter  XXVI  of  these  reminiscences. 


DECLARATION   OF   LONDON  193 

Did  it  ever  occur  to  our  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to 
ask  himself  what  could  have  been  the  object  of  both  France 
and  Germany,  two  Powers  irreconcilably  hostile  to  one 
another,  in  seeking  to  bind  Russia  to  a  similar  engagement  ? 
Did  it  never  occur  to  him  that  each  one  of  these  Powers  had 
obviously  sought  to  make  Russia  subservient  to  its  own 
policy  and  interest  in  the  prospective  war  they  were  both 
looking  forward  to,  in  which  the  participation  of  Russia 
on  either  side  was  essential  to  that  side's  success,  whilst 
Russia's  sole  and  paramount  interest  was  to  avoid  being 
drawn  into  the  war,  which  sooner  or  later  was  bound  to  be 
the  outcome  of  the  perennial  feud  between  them  ?  Did 
it  never  occur  to  him  that  by  entering  into  the  agreement 
covered  by  the  Declaration  of  London,  with  two  Powers  at 
once  mightier  and  standing  on  a  much  higher  plane  of  civihza- 
tion,  Russia  was  placing  herself  in  a  position  of  inferiority 
in  regard  to  them  similar  to  that  of  Austria-Hungary  and 
even  Turkey  in  regard  to  the  German  Empire  ?  Or  was  he 
sharing  the  naive  illusion  of  that  distinguished  member  of 
the  Duma  who  expressed  to  me  his  great  admiration  of 
Mr.  Sazonoff's  skilful  statesmanship  in  having  created  a 
"  conjuncture  "  which  brought  the  two  foremost  civiUzed 
Powers  of  Europe  to  the  side  of  Russia  in  the  Great  War  ? 
And  was  he  quite  unconscious  of  the  part  Russia  was  really 
being  made  to  play  in  that  "  conjuncture  "  by  those  who  now, 
since  she  has  long  ago  ceased  to  be  available  as  a  useful 
auxiliary,  appear  to  see  their  interest  in  her  dismember- 
ment ? 

However  that  may  have  been,  the  inexorable  logic  of 
events  must  have  dispelled  any  illusions  he  may  have  enter- 
tained in  this  regard,  which  were  indeed  not,  of  course, 
justified,  but  to  some  extent  explicable,  on  the  ground  of 
the  readiness  of  his  wiher  partners  in  the  game  of  "  high 
poUtics  "  to  give  their  assent  to  the  preposterous  claim  he 
appears  to  have  put  forward  in  March  1915  on  behalf  of 
Russia  to  the  future  acquisition  of  Constantinople  with 
part  of  Thrace  and  both  shores  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the 
Dardanelles  with  a  couple  of  islands  thrown  in — a  part  of 
those  recently  disclosed  secret  agreements  for  the  realization 
of  which  rivers  of  blood  were  being  shed  by  millions  of  human 
beings  in  the  behef  that  they  were  laying  down  their  lives 

VOL.    II  13 


194        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

for  the  liberty  of  the  world  and  the  triumph  of  right  over 
might  in  "a  war  to  end  war." 

In  the  meantime  the  fates,  as  if  to  give  European  mankind 
a  last  chance  to  return  to  sanity,  had  allowed  the  French  to 
gain  in  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  a  victory  which  decided 
irrevocably  the  final  issue  of  the  war,  by  demonstrating  the 
impossibility  of  France  being  overpowered  by  a  sudden 
onslaught  on  the  success  of  which  the  whole  plan  of  campaign 
had  been  calculated  by  the  German  General  Staff.  Hence- 
forth the  war  was  bound  to  become  a  long,  protracted, 
sanguinary  struggle,  which  could  only  end  in  the  material 
and  moral  collapse  of  the  Central  Powers  as  the  obviously 
weaker  side.  So  far  no  irreparable  damage  had  been  done  ; 
no  calamitous  devastation  of  vast  areas  had  yet  taken  place  ; 
the  incipient  war  psychosis  had  not  yet  reached  the  acute 
and  hopeless  stage  in  which  it  seems  to  have  become  fixed 
since,  and  the  passions  of  hatred  and  revenge  created  by  the 
war  had  not  yet  come  to  dominate  the  minds  of  men  to  the 
exclusion  of  calm  deliberation  and  statesmanship.  The  time 
seemed  to  have  come  for  an  attempt  to  bring  about  the 
pacification  of  the  world.  Such  an  attempt  could  only  be 
made  by  those  Powers  who  had  had  the  wisdom  to  stay 
aside  from  the  titanic  conflict  between  the  two  alliances. 
It  was  plain  that  neutral  countries  were  bound  to  reap  certain 
material  advantages  by  exploiting  the  boundless  needs  of 
both  belhgerent  sides,  but  it  was  no  less  self-evident  that, 
while  certain  groups  of  men  in  these  countries,  manufacturers 
of  war  material  of  every  conceivable  kind,  financial  magnates, 
negotiators  of  loans,  purveyors  of  foodstuffs,  and  so  on, 
were  going  to  be  enriched  beyond  the  dreams  of  avarice,  and 
no  less  than  war  profiteers  in  belligerent  countries — never- 
theless the  masses  of  the  people  even  in  neutral  countries 
were  bound  to  become  sufferers — and  the  greater  sufferers 
the  longer  the  war  should  last — from  the  fundamental 
disorganization  of  the  economic  life  of  the  whole  world  and 
its  attending  evils,  inseparable  from  a  war  on  such  a  gigantic 
scale. 

It  seemed,  therefore,  that  self-interest  alone  would  have 
inspired  the  neutral  Powers  with  the  desire  to  bring  about  a 
termination  of  the  war,  whose  indefinite  prolongation,  with 
its  fatal  consequences  to  all  Europe,  their  statesmen  could 


THE  NEUTRAL  POWERS  195 

not  have  failed  to  foresee.  The  simplest  way  to  reach  such 
a  result  obviously  would  have  been  for  all  the  neutral  Powers 
to  form  a  coalition  with  the  United  States  at  their  head  and 
to  join  in  arms  our  side  as  the  stronger  one,  rendering  it  so 
overpoweringly  strong  as  to  enable  it  to  enforce  a  peace 
upon  such  conditions  as,  not  hatred  and  vengeance,  but 
reason  and  statesmanship,  would  dictate.  Such  a  coaHtion 
and  such  an  armed  intervention  were,  however,  not  to  be 
thought  of,  simply  because  it  would  have  been  impossible — 
or,  let  us  say,  hardly  possible — to  estabHsh  between  all  of 
them  a  full  agreement  as  to  which  of  the  two  sides  they  would 
decide  to  join.  For  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  in  neutral 
countries  not  only  unreasoning  sympathies  or  hatreds  but 
also  reasoned  opinions  were  at  first  very  much  divided,  and 
that  there  was  a  large  body  of  opinion  which  held  that  the 
question  of  so-called  war  guilt  as  between  the  two  sides — 
which  has  been  so  much  made  of  by  propaganda  on  both 
sides — had  best  be  decided  on  the  basis  of  the  old  saw  about 
the  pot  calHng  the  kettle  black.  In  this  regard  it  would 
not  be  inappropriate  to  observe  that  the  importance  attached 
by  propaganda  to  this  question  of  guilt  and  condign  punish- 
ment for  such  guilt,  together  with  the  demand  of  a  "  repentant 
spirit  "  on  the  part  of  the  defeated  nations,  constitutes  a 
rather  novel  development  in  the  history  of  warfare  since  the 
time  when  the  defeated  Roman  legions  at  the  Caudine 
Forks  were  made  to  crawl  under  the  yoke  erected  by  their 
Samnite  victors.  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  while  pro- 
paganda on  one  side  represented  the  Central  Powers  as 
wild  beasts  wantonly  attacking  the  peace-loving  champions 
of  liberty  and  right,  its  counterpart  propaganda  on  the  other 
side  accused  the  wild  beasts  of  Pan-Slavism  and  of  Anglo- 
French  envy,  hatred  and  revenge  of  being  bent  on  the 
destruction  of  the  innocent  lambs  of  "  Deutschtum  "  and 
"  Kultur." 

There  was,  however,  another  way  open  to  the  neutral 
Powers  in  which  they  could,  if  so  minded,  have  rescued  the 
world  from  the  calamity  which  has  since  overtaken  it  and 
whose  full  and  sinister  extent  does  not  seem  to  be  generally 
realized  even  yet.  If  they  had  united  with  the  United 
States  at  its  head  in  a  real  league  to  enforce  peace,  such  a 
league  might  have  offered  its  mediation  to  the  belligerents, 


196        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

an  offer  which,  under  The  Hague  Convention,  it  would  have 
been  its  unquestionable  right,  if  not  indeed  its  duty,  to  put 
forward,  and  which,  as  expressly  stipulated  in  that  Conven- 
tion, could  not  have  been  considered  by  either  belligerent 
side  as  an  unfriendly  act — it  would  have  been  unthinkable 
that  such  an  offer,  backed  by  the  colossal  potential  power  and 
the  commanding  moral  authority  of  the  United  States,  could 
have  been  declined  by  either  of  the  belHgerent  sides. 

It  stands  to  reason  that  the  resultant  Peace  Conference 
would  have  led  to  the  conclusion  of  a  "  peace  by  negotiation," 
that  particular  bugbear  of  propaganda,  but  the  only  peace 
that  could  have  become  a  lasting  one  and  could  have  rendered 
possible  the  birth  of  a  "  new  international  psychology," 
which  President  Wilson  held  to  be  the  paramount  need  of 
our  time.  A  vague,  instinctive  perception  of  the  pressing 
character  of  such  a  need  seems,  indeed,  to  prevail  everywhere, 
and  it  explains  the  fervour  with  which  the  idea  of  the  League 
of  Nations  was  greeted  at  first  and  even  now  is  still  clung 
to  by  most  lovers  of  peace,  presumably  in  the  belief  that  it 
will  be  instrumental  in  creating  the  much-needed  new  inter- 
national psychology,  although  its  Covenant  is  intertwined 
with  the  stipulations  of  a  treaty  which  renders  illusory  any 
hope  placed  on  a  possible  improvement  in  the  psychology 
of  mankind,  at  least  in  an  appreciably  near  future. 

But  the  most  favourable  moment  for  the  intervention 
of  a  league  of  neutrals  was  allowed  to  pass  by.  Not  one 
of  the  neutral  Powers  realized  the  opportunity  or  had  the 
foresight  and  enterprise  to  take  the  initiative  in  organizing 
such  a  league. 

In  the  spring  of  1915  the  fortune  of  war,  which  in  the 
beginning  had  favoured  our  arms,  at  least  in  Gahcia,  had 
decidedly  turned  its  back  on  us  and  the  collapse  of  the 
bureaucratic  apparatus  under  the  strain  of  the  war  had 
begun.  The  first  to  break  down,  as  was  to  have  been  expected, 
was  the  railway  administration.  At  the  time  of  the  mobihza- 
tion  it  had  functioned  surprisingly  well,  and  had  completed 
this  huge  operation  with  exemplary  speed  and  efficiency. 
But  when  the  disastrous  retreat  of  our  armies  from  Poland 
and  Galicia  had  begun,  compHcated  by  the  flight  of  miUions 
of  the  unfortunate  inhabitants  of  the  devastated  regions 
abandoned   to   the  invading   enemy,   and   when   it   became 


i 


DISORGANIZATION   IN   RUSSIA         197 

necessary  to  provide  transportation  for  these  millions  to 
be  distributed  all  over  Russia  and  for  the  evacuation  of  the 
war  industries  from  the  threatened  districts  in  the  west, 
the  railway  administration  was  no  longer  capable  of  coping 
with  the  immense  task  thrust  upon  it.  The  result  was  chaos 
and  untold  suffering  for  millions  of  refugees,  tens  of  thousands 
of  whom  were  left  dying  by  the  roadside  for  want  of 
transportation  facilities  and  of  care  and  assistance  of  any 
kind.  The  saddest  part  of  this  awful  tragedy  was  that 
the  devastation  of  vast  territories  and  the  forced  flight  of 
their  inhabitants  were  organized  by  our  own  mihtary 
authorities  in  conformity  with  the  teachings,  it  seems, 
of  the  science  of  warfare,  which  demand  that  evacuated 
regions  must  be  abandoned  to  an  invading  enemy  in  a 
condition  approaching  as  near  as  possible  that  of  a  desert. 

Next  to  break  down  was  the  system  of  providing  for  the 
armies  the  needed  ammunition  and  war  material  of  every 
kind.  The  fatal  shortage  of  ammunition  had  made  itself 
sorely  felt  during  the  retreat  of  our  armies,  and  was,  indeed, 
said  to  have  been  the  main  cause  of  their  defeat.  Public 
indignation  on  this  account  was  directed  principally  against 
the  Minister  of  War,  General  Soukhomhnoff,  and  in  the 
sequel,  under  the  Provisional  Government,  caused  his  trial 
on  charges  the  most  serious  of  which  were  not  satisfactorily 
proved,  only  the  minor  ones — negUgence  and  corruption 
in  the  administration  of  the  Ministry  of  War — being  sub- 
stantiated. He  was,  nevertheless,  sentenced  to  hard  labour 
for  Hfe,  But,  characteristically  enough,  his  real  and  most 
serious  guilt,  that  of  having  advised  the  general  mobiHzation, 
when  he  must  have  known  that  it  meant  war  and  that 
Russia  was  U^  de  prepared  for  such  an  adventure,  was  but 
lightly  touc^  .^d  upon  during  the  trial.  It  should,  however, 
be  observe  x  that  the  colossal  expenditure  of  ammunition 
in  this  war  surpassed  the  expectations  of  the  war  departments 
of  all  the  belligerent  Powers,  not  excluding  that  of  Germany, 
which  was  undoubtedly  the  best  prepared  of  all. 

The  disorganization  of  the  economic  hfe  of  the  country 
and  the  advent  of  reckless  finance  had,  of  course,  to  be 
foreseen  and  could,  indeed,  not  have  been  avoided  under 
the  circumstances.  Not  one  of  the  belHgerent  countries 
escaped   these   baneful   consequences   of   a   war   on   such   a 


198        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

vast  scale.  The  difference  was  only  one  of  degree.  Russia 
being  the  weakest  economically  and  financially  of  the  Allied 
Powers,  necessarily  suffered  the  most  in  this  respect.  During 
the  first  part  of  the  war,  owing  mainly  to  the  prohibition 
of  the  sale  of  Hquor  and  to  the  increased  demand  for 
agricultural  produce  for  the  Army,  the  peasantry  had  been 
accumulating  large  sums  of  money  and  the  deposits  in  the 
Government  savings  banks  had  shown  a  very  marked  increase. 
But  this  prosperity  was  more  apparent  than  real,  nor  was  it 
lasting.  Some  17,000,000  men  had  been  mobilized  for  the 
war,  of  whom  about  80  per  cent,  were  drawn  from  the 
peasantry.  The  withdrawal  of  such  vast  numbers  of  men  in 
the  prime  of  life  from  labour  on  the  land,  together  with  the 
requisition  for  the  Army  of  enormous  numbers  of  horses 
and  cattle,  could  not  but  have  the  most  injurious  effect 
on  agricultural  conditions  all  over  the  country ;  that  is  to 
say,  on  the  main  source  of  the  country's  prosperity. 

But  the  most  alarming  feature  of  the  situation  was  the 
composition  of  the  personnel  of  the  Government  and  the 
conditions  in  which  the  Ministers  had  to  attend  to  the  business 
of  governing  an  immense  Empire.  This  is  how  it  impressed 
an  observant  foreigner  : 

From  the  outbreak  of  the  War  (writes  Mr.  E.  H.  Wilcox  in  Russia's 
Ruin)  down  to  that  of  the  Revolution,  it  was  always  difficult  to  say 
who  actually  ruled  Russia  and  what  were  his  motives  for  ruling  it  in 
that  particular  way.  There  was  never  either  homogeneity  in  the 
Cabinet  or  consistency  in  its  policy.  It  was  never  composed  of  men 
whose  political  convictions  and  administrative  aims  were  all  even 
approximately  identical.  Its  deliberations  never  issued  in  a  logical 
sequence  of  actions.  .  .  .  The  members  of  these  ill-assorted  Cabinets 
hated,  despised  and  distrusted  one  another.  Cordial  co-operation 
between  them  was  out  of  the  question,  and  when,  as  not  infrequently 
happened,  the  departments  of  two  or  more  of  them  were  called  upon 
to  work  together  at  some  common  task  on  which  the  fate  of  armies 
depended,  they  wasted  their  time  and  energies,  and  imperilled  the 
national  safety,  by  childish  disputes  as  to  jurisdiction,  or  by  spiteful 
mutual  obstruction.  The  nation  and  its  representative  institutions 
were  first  flattered  and  cajoled,  then  insulted  and  humiliated,  then 
again  flattered  and  cajoled.  The  Duma  was  convoked  and  assured 
that  its  co-operation  was  indispensable  ;  but  hardly  had  it  got  to 
work  before  it  was  prorogued,  and  the  Government  Bills  were  hurriedly 
adopted  under  Clause  87  of  the  Fundamental  Laws,  which  allowed 
the  Cabinet  "  in  exceptional  circumstances  "  to  pass  legislation  pro- 
visionally   without    parliamentary    sanction.     From    a    Government 


ESSENTIALS   OF  SUCCESS   LACKING      199 

which  acted  in  this  way,  the  kind  of  pohcy  necessary  to  win  the  war 
was  not  to  be  expected. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  picture  is  overdrawn.  It  is 
only  to  some  extent  marred  by  an  incidentally  introduced 
remark  of  the  author  to  the  effect  that  "  at  times,  it  seemed 
that  the  Government  earnestly  desired  to  win  the  war  ; 
at  other  times,  that  it  as  earnestly  desired  to  lose  it."  The 
proposition  that  any  Government  under  the  sun  engaged 
in  a  war,  whether  of  its  own  seeking  or  not,  could,  under 
any  conceivable  circumstances,  desire  to  lose  it,  is  of  course 
preposterous.  Its  enunciation,  even  quahfied  by  the 
attenuating  clause  "  at  times,  it  seemed,"  can  only  be 
explained  by  its  author  having  unconsciously  succumbed  to 
the  insidious  influence  of  the  prevalent  war  psychosis  with 
its  haunting  spectres  of  "  premature  peace  "  and  "  defeatism  " 
— an  influence  which,  in  war-time,  even  some  of  the  clearest 
thinking  minds  appear  unable  to  resist.  There  may  have  been 
among  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  one  or  two  men  of  superior 
insight  who  realized  that  Russia,  as  far  as  participation  in 
this  war  was  concerned,  was  already  defeated,  and  that 
henceforth  it  could  only  be  a  question  of  saving  what  still 
could  be  saved  from  the  wreck  of  her  former  greatness  and 
prosperity.  Russia  was  defeated,  or  rather  was  certain  to 
be  defeated,  even  before  the  war  began,  because  the  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  people  never  felt,  nor  could  possibly 
have  felt,  this  war  to  be  their  war — a  war  for  pohtical  objects 
they  could  neither  understand  nor  have  any  sympathy  with. 

Two  conditions  were  essential  for  Russia  to  participate 
with  any  hope  of  success  in  such  a  war  as  this  war  was  bound 
to  prove  :  organization  and  will  to  fight  of  the  people. 
Both  these  conditions  were  absent.  Nor  would  organization 
alone,  however  perfect,  have  availed  to  secure  victory,  nor 
even  to  avert  defeat,  if  the  spirit  was  not  there,  in  the  masses 
of  the  people  behind  the  Army.  Nothing  could  prove  the 
soundness  of  this  proposition  more  conclusively  than  the 
total  collapse  that  overtook  Germany  once  the  spirit  of  her 
people  had  failed.  Also,  Russia  was  not  defeated  in  the 
sense  of  her  armies  having  been  beaten  in  decisive  battles, 
nor  because  they  had  been  compelled  to  abandon  to  the 
enemy    vast    regions    in    disastrous    retreats — during    the 


200         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

Napoleonic  Wars  our  Army,  in  those  days  a  professional 
army  of  a  few  hundred  thousand  men,  retreated  bej^ond 
Moscow,  and  might  have  retreated  to  the  very  Ural  Mountains 
without  that  having  implied  Russia's  ultimate  defeat — but 
she  was  defeated  because  the  people,  who  had  furnished  the 
seventeen  or  more  million  soldiers,  in  other  words  the  nation 
in  arms,  was  sick  of  the  war  and  decidedly  would  have  no 
more  of  it.  That  was  the  people's  unmistakable  will,  as  also 
it  was  its  right — a  right  which  could  not  be  questioned,  least 
of  all,  one  should  think,  by  the  democracies  of  free  nations. 

It  was  also  the  truth,  which  no  amount  of  lying  propaganda 
could  conceal,  and  which  only  voluntary  blindness  could  fail 
to  see  or  moral  cowardice  could  shrink  from  looking  in  the 
face.     To  bow  to  it  would  not  only  not  have  been  a  disgrace, 
but  was  the  bounden  duty  of  the  Sovereign  and  his  Govern- 
ment, a  sacred  duty  they  owed  to  the  country  and  to  the 
nation,  for  that  was  their  only  salvation.     For  having  failed 
to  see  his  true  duty  and  to  have  acted  upon  it,  the  unfortunate 
Sovereign  has  paid  with  his  life  and  the  lives  of  those  dearest 
to  him,  and  Russia  with  her  ruin  and  eclipse  as  a  once  great 
and  powerful  Empire.    Nor  could  there  have  been  any  betrayal 
of  her  Allies  implied  if  Russia  had  told  them  the  truth  and 
signified  to  them  her  demand  to  begin  common  negotiations 
aiming  at  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace.     To  raise  this 
question  at  the  moment  her  vital  interest  demanded  it  was 
a  right  Russia  had  not,  and  could  not  have,  renounced  by 
putting  her  signature  to  the  Declaration  of  London  ;    for  if 
she  had,  those  who  acted  on  her  behalf  would  have  been 
guilty  of  treason  to  their  country  and  their  people.     The 
real  betrayal,  however,  of  our  Allies  was  the  concealment 
from  them  of  the  truth.     It  was  also  a  betrayal  of  the  nation, 
because  in  order  to  conceal  it  efforts  had  to  be  made  to  force 
upon  an  unwilling  people  a  continuation  of  the  war  until 
at  last  they  revolted  against  it,  which  was  the  real  underlying 
meaning  of  the  revolution. 

But  there  was,  alas  I  no  one  in  the  Cabinet  possessed 
of  suihcient  insight  and  authority  to  insist  upon  the  only 
policy  being  adopted  which  would  have  been  compatible  with 
Russia's  honour  and  vital  interest  and  which  if  followed 
would  have  saved  not  only  Russia  but  Europe  from  the 
chaos  they  are  weltering  in  at  present. 


THE   TSAR   AND   A   SEPARATE   PEACE    201 

I  would  observe  at  this  point  that  the  question  of  a 
separate  peace  has  never  been  raised  at  any  time  or  by  any- 
one. Nor  had  any  secret  negotiations  with  the  Central 
Powers  been  carried  on  by  anyone  behind  the  back  of  Russia's 
Allies.  In  this  connection  I  may  quote  the  opinion  of 
Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon,  who,  in  his  Eclipse  of  Russia,  writes  : 

The  most  painful  impression  of  all,  Entente  publicists  tell  us, 
was  made  by  the  perfidious  conduct  of  Nicholas  II  in  arranging  for 
a  separate  peace  in  the  year  1916-17  when  his  devoted  Allies  were 
shedding  their  blood  and  giving  their  substance  ungrudgingly  in  his 
cause.  I  cannot  agree  with  them.  I  have  made  inquiries  into  this 
allegation  and,  although  it  is  uncommonly  difficult  to  prove  a  negative 
assertion,  the  upshot  of  my  investigation  comes  as  near  to  it  as  one 
can  reasonably  demand.  So  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  ascertain, 
there  is  not  a  tittle  of  evidence  to  show  that  Nicholas  II  had  the 
intention  to  make  a  separate  peace.  That  conditions  being  what 
they  were  his  armies  could  not,  with  the  best  will  in  the  world,  have 
continued  to  fight  much  longer  on  the  same  scale  as  theretofore  may 
be  taken  for  granted.  But  it  nowise  follows  that  he  would  have  con- 
cluded a  separate  peace.  And  from  what  I  know  of  his  mentality, 
of  the  motives  to  which  he  was  most  impressible  and  of  the  available 
evidence,  I  look  upon  that  assumption  as  most  improbable.  Certain 
ignoble  charges  launched  against  the  Tsarists  whose  meddling  in 
politics  was  disastrous  to  the  Tsardom  are  equally  groundless  and 
even  more  characteristic  of  those  who  first  launched  them. 

These  groundless  accusations  brought  against  Russia's 
Sovereigns — as  Dr.  Dillon,  who  certainly  cannot  be  suspected 
of  any  bias  in  favour  of  them,  or  of  Tsardom,  says — by 
Entente  publicists,  or  by  war  propaganda,  were  destined  to 
play  a  most  fatal  part  in  subsequent  events,  as  will  be  shown 
later.  Dr.  Dillon's  opinion  as  to  the  groundlessness  of  these 
accusations  is  corroborated  by  documentary  evidence  which 
has  recently  come  to  light.  After  the  massacre  by  the 
Bolsheviks  of  the  Imperial  couple  and  their  unfortunate 
children  a  quantity  of  papers,  letters,  diaries,  etc.,  was  found 
among  their  effects  in  the  house  in  which  they  had  been 
confined  at  Ekaterinburg.  .A.mong  them  was  a  series  of 
letters  addressed  by  the  Empress  to  the  Emperor  during  the 
years  1915  and  1916.  The  representative  at  Moscow  of  a 
New  York  newspaper  was  permitted  by  the  Bolshevist 
authorities  to  take  copies  of  these  letters,  and  they  have 
recently    been    pubhshed    in    that    paper.     Their    absolute 


202        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

authenticity  is  vouched  for  by  the  internal  evidence  of  their 
contents,  whose  intimate  character  quite  exckides  the 
possibihty  of  these  letters  having  been  the  M'ork  of  an 
imaginative  forger.  They  show  conclusively  that  the  Emperor 
was  very  much  under  the  domination  of  his  wife,  that  she 
was  a  self-willed,  ambitious,  extremely  religious,  superstitious 
and  hysterical  woman,  adoring  her  husband,  worshipping 
her  son,  and  heart  and  soul  devoted  to  the  country  of  her 
adoption,  and  that  she  was  in  her  turn  dominated  by  Rasputin, 
a  common,  totally  uncultured  peasant,  gifted  with  a  strange 
hypnotic  fascination,  whom  she  believed  to  be  a  "  Man  of 
God  "  and  to  have  some  esoteric  influence  over  her  poor  son's 
health.  They  also  show  that  her  influence  was  exercised  exclu- 
sively in  matters  of  domestic  poHcy  and  in  a  most  unfortunate 
ultra-reactionary  direction,  and  that  Rasputin's  influence 
over  the  Empress  was  used  mainly  to  secure  appointments 
to  various,  sometimes  the  highest,  offices  in  the  State  to 
personages  base  enough  to  seek  his  favour  and  protection. 
But  in  the  whole  series  of  letters  there  is  not  one  word  showing 
that  either  the  Empress  or  Rasputin  ever  had  anything 
to  say  in  regard  to  a  "  separate  "  or  any  other  peace. 

The  disquieting  effect  produced  by  the  retreat  of  our 
armies  from  Poland  and  Galicia  caused  the  Government  to 
take  some  steps  which  seemed  to  indicate  a  disposition  to 
meet  the  wishes  of  the  "  Intelligentzia."  General  Soukhomlinoff 
and  some  other  Ministers  were  replaced  by  less  unpopular 
ones  ;  members  of  the  Duma  and  of  the  Upper  House  were 
admitted  to  Government  Commissions  dealing  with  questions 
connected  with  the  war,  the  Unions  of  Zemstvos  and  munici- 
palities were  given  more  liberty  of  action  in  their  work  of 
army  supply. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  removal  from  the  supreme  command 
of  the  armies  of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  Nicholaevitch 
and  his  appointment  to  the  Viceroyalty  of  the  Caucasus, 
brought  about  by  the  influence  of  the  Empress  under  the 
suspected  guidance  of  Rasputin,  and  for  motives  of  her 
jealousy  of  the  Grand  Duke's  popularity,  was  received  by 
the  public  with  mixed  feelings,  not  so  much  on  account 
of  this  removal  in  itself  as  because  it  led  to  the  Emperor 
taking  supreme  command  himself.  Not  that  in  a  military 
sense  it  could  have  made  much  difference.     As  figure-head — 


THE   GRAND   DUKE  NICHOLAS         203 

and  no  man  in  his  position  could  have  been  anything  more — 
the  Grand  Duke  had  been  very  useful.  War  propaganda 
proclaimed  him  to  be  one  of  the  greatest  mihtary  leaders, 
and  he  was  unquestionably  very  popular  with  the  people  at 
large,  perhaps  even  more  so  than  with  the  Army.  His  was 
a  picturesque  personality.  Very  tall  of  stature,  of  dis- 
tinguished and  imposing  mien,  he  produced  the  impression 
of  a  masterful  man,  the  type  of  man  in  whom  the  people 
love  to  recognize  a  ruler.  But  the  Empress's  womanly 
jealousy,  the  typical  jealousy  an  adoring  wife  is  apt  to  feel 
in  regard  to  her  husband's  supposed  rival,  was  certainly 
most  unreasonable  and  unjustified.  The  Grand  Duke  was 
the  soul  of  honour  and  chivalrous  loyalty,  and  the  Emperor 
could  not  have  had  a  subject  more  passionately,  more  heart 
and  soul  devoted,  to  his  Sovereign  and  to  his  country. 

But  the  wisdom  of  the  Emperor's  decision  to  take  supreme 
command  of  the  armies  himself  appeared  to  be  subject  to 
the  gravest  doubts,  not  so  much,  of  course,  from  a  military 
point  of  view — the  presence  of  the  Sovereign  among  his 
troops  was  bound  to  have  some  favourable  effect  on  their 
morale — but  because  his  prolonged  absence  from  the  centre 
of  Government  would  leave  the  field  entirely  free  for  all 
the  sinister  influences  which  were  surrounding  the  Empress. 
On  the  other  hand — in  the  words  of  the  above-mentioned 
author  of  the  review  of  her  letters — "  it  is  clear  that  the 
Tsaritsa  lost  a  great  deal  of  her  influence  on  the  Tsar  as  soon 
as  he  was  out  of  her  presence  and  far  enough  away  to  be 
relieved  of  that  dread  of  hysteria  in  a  companion  which  may 
make  even  a  strong  personality  (which  he  was  not)  subservient 
to  a  weak.  Hysteria  in  letters  is  less  terrifying  than  hysteria 
in  the  next  room." 

The  alarming  condition  of  public  affairs  led,  in  the  course 
of  the  year,  to  the  formation  in  the  Duma  of  a  coalition  among 
the  Centre,  Octobrist,  Progressive  and  "  Cadet  "  parties  with 
part  of  the  NationaHsts,  which  became  known  as  the  "  Pro- 
gressive Bloc,"  leaving  outside  of  it  the  Extreme  Right, 
the  remainder  of  the  Nationalists  and  the  SociaHsts.  The 
programme  of  the  Bloc,  the  result  of  patriotic  compromises 
between  the  divergent  views  of  the  parties  composing  it, 
was  a  liberal,  moderate  and  entirely  reasonable  one,  which 
any  Government  possessed  of  a  modicum  of  constitutional 


204        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

experience  and  political  understanding  would  have  accepted 
unhesitatingly.  The  demand  of  the  Bloc  "  for  the  creation 
of  a  homogeneous  Government,  composed  of  men  enjoying 
the  confidence  of  the  country  and  wilHng  to  carry  out,  in 
harmony  with  the  Legislative  Chambers,  as  soon  as  possible 
a  definite  programme  aiming  at  the  maintenance  of  domestic 
peace  and  the  removal  of  differences  between  nationalities 
and  classes  ^  was  no  less  reasonable  and  should  have  been 
granted  immediatel}^  For,  once  the  ruling  powers  were 
determined — as  they  undoubtedly  were — to  continue  to  carry 
on  the  war,  in  disregard  of  the  manifest  unwilHngness  of  the 
bulk  of  the  people  and  of  the  crying  need  of  the  country, 
it  was  the  height  of  folly  not  to  conciliate  at  least  the  political 
parties  who  had  been  supporting  and  were  anxious  to  continue 
to  support  the  Government's  war  policy.  The  Government's 
insane  domestic  policy,  which  could  only  in  the  end — as 
actually  happened — drive  these  parties  into  the  arms  of 
the  revolution,  was  the  more  reckless  as  the  fact  of  the 
close  connection  of  some  of  the  Duma  leaders  with  certain 
important  elements  in  the  high  Army  Command  could  not 
possibly  have  been  unknown  to  the  ruling  powers. 

•  Russia's  Ruin,  by  E.  H.  Wilcox. 


CHAPTER  XXXVl 

Goremykin  is  succeeded  by  Stuermer — A  "  peace  without  victory  " — My 
political  faith — A  memorandum  for  the  Emperor — Attempt  to  detach 
Turkey — Visit  to  England — Talk  with  Mr,  Asquith — Importance  of 
peace  to  Russia — Protopopoff — Situation  in  Russia. 

In  the  beginning  of  1916,  although  the  Duma  was  not  in 
session,  it  appears  that  its  President,  Mr.  Rodzianko,  succeeded 
in  persuading  the  aged  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Goremykin, 
to  resign  the  functions  of  head  of  the  Government,  for  the 
efficient  exercise  of  which,  in  the  troubled  times  through 
which  the  country  was  passing,  he  manifestly  no  longer 
possessed  the  necessary  strength 

He  was  succeeded  by  Mr,  Boris  Stuermer,  of  whom  the 
best  that  could  be  said  is  that  he  was  merely  a  very  ordinary 
functionary  of  even  less  than  average  capacity,  who  owed 
his  sudden  elevation,  as  appears  to  be  well  estabUshed,  to 
the  favour  of  Rasputin  and  to  the  influence  of  the  Empress, 
to  whom  Rasputin  had  recommended  him  as  the  most  worthy 
candidate  for  the  position  of  head  of  the  Government.  Of 
his  appointment  Mr.  E.  H.  Wilcox  writes  in  his  Russia's 
Ruin  : 

It  became  the  custom  in  Russia  and  among  the  AUies  to  speak 
of  Stuermer  as  a  convinced  partisan  of  Germany  and  a  dehberate 
traitor  to  his  country.  That  view  is  probably  a  flattering  one.  It 
is  more  likely  that  he  was  merely  an  obsequious  and  servile  functionary 
whose  deepest  conviction  was  that  it  was  pleasant  and  profitable  to 
be  in  favour  in  high  places  and  whose  main  political  aim  was  to  get 
as  near  to  those  places  as  possible. 

This  characterization  of  Mr.  Stuermer  fits  the  case  exactly. 
If  the  author's  allusion  to  Stuermer's  suspected  German 
partisanship  and  deliberate  betrayal  of  his  own  country  is 
intended  to  mean  that  he  was  suspected  of  having  disclosed 

205 


206        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

to  the  enemy  "  most  precious  secrets  " — as  Miliukoff  is 
said  to  have  asserted  in  a  speech  in  the  Duma,  according  to 
Mr.  Wilcox — or  of  having  carried  on  secret  negotiations  for 
the  conclusion  of  a  separate  peace  with  Germany,  I  can 
only  say  that  the  suspicions,  apparently  entertained  by 
Mr.  Miliukoff  and  his  pohtical  friends,  from  whom  Entente 
diplomats  were  wont  to  gather  their  information  on  Russian 
affairs,  are  not  supported  by  any  evidence  as  far  as  I  know. 

But  that  Mr.  Stuermer  failed  in  his  bounden  duty,  which 
was  to  have  raised  with  our  Allies  the  question  of  the  earhest 
possible  conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  is  a  fact  to  which  I 
could,  if  necessary,  bear  witness  myself,  since  I  requested 
and  obtained  an  interview  with  him  when  he  had  become 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  for  the  special  purpose  of 
representing  to  him  the  urgency  of  such  a  step  being 
taken  without  the  least  delay,  because  that  was  the  only 
possible  way,  compatible  with  Russia's  honour  and  dignity, 
of  extricating  the  country  from  her  critical  position  ;  and 
my  urgent  representations  not  only  had  been  unsuccessful, 
but  their  reason  and  purport  apparently  failed  to  have  been 
even  understood  by  the  new  head  of  the  Foreign  Department, 
whom  I  found  sUghtly  less  pompous,  but  on  the  other  hand 
even  more  incompetent,  than  his  predecessor  in  office. 

In  connection  with  this  so  frequently  ventilated  subject 
of  "  separate  "  or  "  general  "  peace,  of  "  premature  "  peace, 
or  "  peace  without  victory,"  and  of  "  peace  by  negotiation  " 
as  opposed  to  "  peace  by  dictation,"  I  feel  compelled,  before 
proceeding  with  my  narrative,  to  'submit  to  my  indulgent 
readers  a  few  considerations  of  a  general  nature  which  I 
hope  may  help  to  dispel  some  of  the  prevalent  misconceptions 
born  of  war  psychosis  and  fostered  by  war  propaganda. 

Leaving  aside  the  point  of  view  of  those  who  rightly 
hold  that  war  of  whatsoever  kind,  whether  between  nations 
or  between  parties  or  classes  within  nations,  is  an  unmitigated 
curse,  of  which  mankind  should  and  could  rid  itself  as,  in 
Anglo-Saxon  countries  at  least,  it  has  succeeded  in  ehminating 
that  private  war  between  individuals,  the  duel,  which  is 
still  tolerated  in  most  other  countries  of  Europe,  there  are 
two  kinds  of  mental  attitude  in  regard  to  war,  conflicting  with 
each  other  and  alternately  gaining  the  upper  hand.  First, 
there  is  the  attitude  of  what  I  would  call  the  military  or 


SOME   CONSIDERATIONS   ON  WAR     207 

militaristically  thinking  mind,  which  looks  upon  war  not 
so  much  as  a  means  to  an  end,  but  rather  as  an  end  in  itself, 
so  to  speak,  as  a  game  that  can  only  be  won — hke  a  game  of 
chess — by  a  checkmate,  be  it  even  with  the  sacrifice  on  both 
sides  of  almost  all  their  chessmen — a  stalemate,  that  is  to 
say  a  "  peace  without  victory,"  being  considered  equivalent 
to  a  defeat,  and  any  suggestion  of  the  desirabihty  of  such  a 
peace  looked  upon  as  an  act  of  treason — or  else  as  a  prize 
fight  that  can  only  be  ended  by  a  "  knock-out  blow  "  dealt  to 
the  adversary.  This  is  the  mental  attitude  that  has  fathered 
such  ideas,  expressed  in  apparently  senseless  because  illogical 
terms,  as  for  instance  the  idea  of  "  a  peace  offensive,"  meaning 
an  adversary's  proposal  to  enter  upon  negotiations  for  the 
conclusion  of  peace  ;  or  the  idea  of  a  "  premature  peace  " 
as  a  peace  concluded  before  a  "  knock-out  blow  "  had  been 
dealt  or  received  ;  or  the  reproach  of  "  defeatism,"  appHed 
to  the  endeavours  of  those  who  aim  at  preventing  the  final 
defeat  and  ruin  of  their  country.  Such  a  mentahty  is  a 
survival  of  the  past  when  war  was  "  the  sport  of  kings  " 
and  could  be  waged  for  any  cause,  and  could  be  carried  on 
for  any  length  of  time  as  long  as  the  necessary  cash  could  be 
secured  and  wilhng  cannon  fodder  could  be  hired  or  pressed 
into  service  ;  when  kings  considered  their  countries  as  their 
private  domains  and  their  subjects  as  human  material  to  be 
utihzed  for  any  service  they  pleased  ;  when  kings  and  rulers 
could  conclude  such  agreements  between  themselves  as,  for 
instance,  the  Declaration  of  London  of  September  5,  1914, 
in  the  honest  behef  that  they  had  the  right  to  pledge  the  Uves 
and  honour  of  their  subjects  or  their  fellow-citizens  and  that 
these  subjects  or  citizens  were  in  duty  bound  to  keep,  at  the 
sacrifice  of  their  hves  and  fortunes,  their  rulers'  engagements 
concluded  without  their  knowledge  and  consent. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  attitude  of  what  might 
be  called  the  civihan  mind,  or  the  mind  thinking  on  hnes 
of  statesmanship  preoccupied,  not  with  the  idea  of  "  wmning 
the  game  "  of  war  or  of  the  glory  of  dealing  a  "  knock-out 
blow  "  to  the  adversary,  but  with  the  solemn  duty  of  securing 
the  permanent  interests  and  welfare  of  the  people  confided 
to  its  care.  This  kind  of  mentahty  looks  upon  war  as  an 
unavoidable  evil,  necessary  at  a  given  stage  of  the  mental 
and   moral   development   of   mankind,   for   the   purpose   of 


208        FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

attaining  certain  well-defined  and  practical^  attainable 
ends,  and  is  ready  and  willing  to  begin  negotiations  for 
the  conclusion  of  peace  as  soon  as  these  ends  are  attained 
or  it  has  become  evident  that  they  cannot  be  attained  except 
at  the  cost  of  sacrifices  not  commensurate  with  the  advantages 
aimed  at. 

Both  these  mental  attitudes,  although  conflicting  one 
with  the  other,  were,  so  to  speak,  balancing  each  other 
in  former  times,  when  wars  were  waged  with  armies  of  Umited 
size  and  the  ultimate  decision  of  questions  of  pohcy  was  still 
left  in  the  hands  of  statesmanship  not  yet  overpowered  by 
the  domination  of  irresponsible  military  organizations  and 
b}^  the  unreasoning  passions  of  systematically  fostered 
mass  psychosis. 

These  times,  however,  were  no  more.  But  latter-day 
statesmen  of  all  the  leading  nations  of  Europe  seemed  to 
be  quite  unconscious  of  the  profoundly  altered  conditions 
which  had  been  brought  about  by  the  adoption  of  conscription 
by  the  leading  Powers  of  Continental  Europe.  They  were 
playing  unconcernedly,  as  of  old,  the  traditional  nefarious 
game  of  high  politics  whose  aim  is  political  and  military 
supremacy,  and  which  is  played  with  stakes  represented  by 
the  lives  and  fortunes  of  the  teeming  millions  of  the  peace- 
loving  peoples  of  Europe.  When  it  had  led  to  the  outbreak 
of  a  war  of  unparalleled  dimensions,  and  when,  in  order 
to  hold  out  to  these  peaceable  millions  a  powerful  motive 
for  which  they  would  be  wilHng  to  risk  their  lives  and  fortunes, 
the  formidable  ghost  of  international  hatred  and  fear  had 
been  raised — a  ghost  which  to  this  hour  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  lay — it  became  evident  that  the  longer  the  war 
lasted  the  slenderer  would  grow  the  chances  of  statesmanship 
remaining  in  control,  a  control  which  was  bound  to  pass  in 
the  end  into  the  hands  of  the  all-powerful  military  element, 
supported  and  itself  dominated  by  the  all-pervading  influence 
of  war  psychosis,  at  once  the  parent  and  the  child  of  Propa- 
ganda, with  the  disastrous  results  we  are  witnessing  to-day. 
That  was  the  real  danger  threatening  not  only  the  future 
welfare  of  the  belligerent  nations,  but  the  future  peaceful 
development  of  mankind. 

To  any  independently  reflecting  mind  it  could  not  but 
be  evident  that  the  loudly  proclaimed  aim  of  the  war  as  a 


"PEACE   WITHOUT   VICTORY"         209 

"  war  to  end  war  "  and  a  war  to  destroy  "  militarism  " 
could  never  be  attained  by  a  crushing  victory  achieved 
by  either  of  the  beUigerent  sides,  which  would  only  mean 
the  substitution  of  a  victorious  militarism  for  a  defeated 
one,  thereby  simply  preparing  the  ground  for  a  renewal  of 
the  struggle  for  supremacy  in  a  more  or  less  remote  future, 
since  the  total  annihilation  of  the  defeated  side,  however 
ardentl}''  desired,  would  obviously  not  be  within  the  bounds 
of  possibility,  nor  could  its  ultimate  recuperation  be  for 
ever  prevented  by  any  devices  of  statecraft  or  military 
precautions. 

It  would  seem  probable  that  President  Wilson,  when  he 
spoke  of  "  peace  without  victory,"  may  have  had  in  view 
these  same  considerations,  which  would  naturally  occur  to 
a  mind  earnestly  preoccupied  with  the  search  for  a  new 
basis  upon  which  the  community  of  civilized  nations  might 
be  so  organized  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  the  recurrence 
of  such  horrors  as  the  world  was  passing  through,  and  they 
may  have  inspired  his  attempt  at  inducing  the  belHgerents 
to  put  an  end  to  the  slaughter  by  negotiation  before  the  war 
psychosis  prevaihng  in  both  camps  had  reached  a  stage 
when  leading  statesmen  would  no  longer  be  able  to  lay  the 
ghost  they  had  raised  themselves. 

I  have  dwelt  at  such  length  on  these  considerations,  of 
whose  weighty  nature  I  was  entirely  convinced  at  the  time, 
because  they  serve  to  explain  my  personal  attitude  in  regard 
to  the  question  of  the  earhest  possible  conclusion  of  a  general 
peace,  which  I  regarded  not  only  as  a  question  of  life  or  death 
for  Russia,  but  also  as  a  question  of  supreme  interest  to 
all  mankind,  an  attitude  from  which  no  fear  of  obloquy 
or  disingenuous  insinuations  could  ever  make  me  swerve. 
Perhaps  it  will  not  be  superfluous  at  this  point  to  recapitulate 
briefly  my  pohtical  profession  of  faith,  to  which  I  have 
incidentally  referred  in  other  chapters  of  these  reminiscences. 
It  can  be  expressed  in  these  few  points  : 

Russia,  hke  the  United  States,  may  be  regarded  as  a 
continent  by  itself,  self-contained,  self-suflicient,  satiated, 
placed  above  the  necessity  of  seeking  expansion  in  any 
direction  whatever. 

Russia,  therefore,  has  no  call  to  take  any  part  whatever 
in  the  struggle  for  pohtical  or  miHtary  supremacy  in  Europe, 
VOL.   II  14 


210        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

either  as  a  principal,  or  as  an  auxiliary  or  adversary  of  any 
one  Power  or  group  of  Powers. 

Russia's  sole  interest  in  European  politics  centres  in 
the  maintenance  of  peace. 

And,  lastly,  the  guiding  principle  of  Russia's  foreign 
poUcy  should  be  :  avoidance  of  any  entangUng  alHances 
with  any  Power  or  Powers  whatsoever. 

To  this  brief  expose  of  the  principles  which  have  always 
governed  my  actions  in  pubhc  life  I  would  add  that  once  the 
struggle  for  supremacy  seems   to  be  an  incurable   disease 
affecting  the  three  leading  Powers  of  Europe — Great  Britain, 
France  and  Germany — and  as  I  hold  it  to  be  a  matter  of 
indifference  to   Russia,  inasmuch  as  her  true  interests  are 
concerned,  into  whose  hands  of  the  three  this  supremacy 
might  pass,  my  personal  preference  would  be  in  favour  of 
Great  Britain,  simply  because  from  choice  I  have  found  my 
intellectual  home  in  the  English-speaking  world.     But  this 
purely  personal  preference  does  not  by  any  means  imply 
that  I  would  be  ready  to  admit  that  Russia's  pohcy  should 
be  made  in  any  way  subservient  to  Great  Britain's  aims  in 
that  direction,  just  as  little  as  to  those  of  either  France  or 
Germany  if  either  the  one  or  the  other  had  been  the  object 
of   my   personal   preference.     And   I   would   wish  it   to   be 
distinctly  understood  that  whatever  I  have  said  or  written 
so  far,  and  whatever  I  shall  still  have  to  say  or  write,  has 
been  and  will  be  said  and  written  by  a  Russian,  owing  and 
acknowledging  allegiance   and   loyalty  to  no  one  but  to  his 
own  country  and  to   his  own  people,  who,  in  their  distress 
and  agony,  have  become  objects  of  obloquy  and  contumely 
heaped  on  them  by  those  who  deem  themselves  entitled  to 
show  their  contempt  for  a  great  and  generous  nation,  whose 
alliance  they  had  been  eagerly  courting,  because  that  nation 
disappointed  the  expectations  raised  through  the  misinter- 
pretation of  the  Russian  people's  real  feelings  by  their  own 
as  well  as  by  Russian  war  propaganda. 

But  to  resume  the  thread  of  my  narrative.  It  was,  if 
I  remember  rightly,  some  day  in  the  beginning  of  March 
1916  when  I  found  myself  in  the  reading-room  of  my  club, 
after  luncheon,  alone  with  the  Minister  of  the  Court,  Count 
Fredericksz,  who  had  come  with  the  Emperor  for  a  couple  of 
days  to  the  capital  and  who  was  the  same  afternoon  to  return 


A  MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  EMPEROR  211 

with  His  Majesty  to  the  Headquarters  of  the  Army  at  Mohileff. 
He  may  have  noticed  that  I  seemed  to  be  preoccupied  and 
paying  but  httle  attention  to  his  chat  on  indifferent  subjects  ; 
and  he  asked  me  abruptly  what  I  thought  of  the  pohtical 
situation.  I  told  him  that  I  regarded  the  situation  in  every 
respect  as  extremely  serious,  not  to  say  critical ;  that  as 
far  as  I  could  see  we  were  drifting  rapidly  towards  a  revolution, 
which  would  mean  the  downfall  of  the  Empire  and  the  ruin 
of  Russia  ;  that  the  only  salvation  for  Russia  that  I  could 
think  of  would  be  the  earUest  possible  conclusion  of  a  general 
peace  (I  would  observe  here  parenthetically  that  I  have  never 
at  any  time  advocated  the  conclusion  of  a  "  separate  "  peace 
with  Germany,  for  the  simple  reason  that  I  have  never 
considered  the  conclusion  of  such  a  peace  to  be  to  the  interest 
of  Russia  or  to  be  called  for  by  compelHng  circumstances)  ; 
that  I  could  not  see  how  the  war  could  ever  come  to  an  end 
otherwise  than  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  States  and 
through  their  intervention  in  one  shape  or  another  ;  that  it 
was  of  the  utmost  importance  for  us  that  when  such  an 
American  intervention  should  come  about  it  should  be  in 
a  sense  not  unfavourable  to  our  interests  ;  and  lastly,  that  if 
it  were  considered  desirable  I  would  be  ready  at  any  time  to 
go  to  America  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying  myself  as  to  the 
trend  of  popular  feeUng  in  the  United  States  in  regard  to 
the  war,  simply  as  a  private  individual  on  the  look  out  for 
a  possibiHty  of  securing  the  participation  of  American  capital 
in  some  business  undertaking  in  which  I  was  interested. 
Count  Fredericksz  Ustened  to  me  very  attentively,  and  when 
I  had  finished  talking  asked  me  whether  I  could  put  on  paper 
what  I  had  told  him,  as  he  wished  to  submit  it  to  the  Emperor, 
whom  he  was  to  join  in  the  Imperial  train  at  four  o'clock. 
I  consented  to  do  so,  although  I  had  barely  half  an  hour 
before  me  in  which  to  draft  what  should  have  been  a  well- 
thought-out  and  carefully  worded  State  paper.  Under  the 
circumstances  all  I  could  do  was  to  jot  down  then  and  there 
on  a  sheet  of  the  club's  letter-paper  the  substance  of  the 
ideas  I  had  developed  in  the  course  of  my  conversation  with 
the  Count.  I  sent  it  to  the  train  in  an  envelope  addressed 
to  Count  Fredericksz,  who  received  it  just  in  time  ;  and  then 
I  wrote  down  from  m^emory  a  second  copy  which  I  intended 
to  forward  to  Mr.  Sazonoff,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


212         FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Unfortunately,  I  did  not  make  and  keep  for  myself  a  third 
copy,  so  that  I  am  unable  to  reproduce  here  the  text  of  this 
hastily  drawn  document,  whose  sense  I  think  I  have  rendered 
correctly  as  above. 

In  the  middle  of  the  following  night  I  was  awakened  by 
the  arrival  of  a  rush  telegram  despatched  by  the  Minister  of 
the  Court  from  one  of  the  stations  on  the  wa}^  to  Mohileff, 
in  which  he  informed  me  that  the  Emperor  had  expressed 
his  approval  of  the  ideas  set  forth  in  my  paper  and  desired 
me  to  confer  on  the  subject  with  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  In  obedience  to  the  order  received,  I  wrote  the  next 
morning  to  Mr.  Sazonoff  requesting  an  interview  and  enclosing 
the  copy  of  my  paper  which  I  had  prepared  for  that  purpose. 
The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  received  me  in  a  manner 
which  precluded  any  attempt  on  my  part  to  enter  into  a 
discussion  on  the  subject,  and  told  me  that  he  disapproved 
the  idea  I  had  expressed  in  my  paper  submitted  to  His 
Majesty  by  Count  Fredericksz,  because  in  his  opinion  the 
object  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  was  to  prevent  us 
from  crushing  Germany,  an  event  which  was  to  be  looked  for 
in  a  few  months.  I  thereupon  withdrew,  having  asked  him 
whether  he  had  any  objection  to  my  acquainting  the  Minister 
of  the  Court  with  the  negative  result  of  my  interview  with 
him,  and  having  obtained  his  consent  to  my  doing  so. 

I  mention  this  insignificant  episode  merely  because  in 
the  sequel  I  shall  have  to  refer  to  it  later  on  in  connection 
with  another  matter  in  which  this  paper  of  mine  seems  to 
have  played  a  rather  unsuspected  part. 

Our  campaign  in  Asia  Minor,  conducted  with  brilliant 
success  by  General  Yudenitch,  had  culminated  in  the  taking 
of  Erzerum,  and  to  all  appearances  the  military  and  political 
situation  in  Turkey  had  taken  a  turn  which  furnished  sufficient 
ground  for  the  supposition  that  an  attempt  at  detaching 
Turkey  from  her  alhance  with  the  Central  Powers  by  the  offer 
of  a  separate  peace  might  meet  with  success.  The  idea  of 
the  timehness  of  such  an  attempt  being  made  occurred  to  a 
friend  of  mine  who  was  in  charge  of  the  Diplomatic  Chancellery 
of  the  Supreme  Commander-in-Chief.  Of  course  such  an 
attempt  would  have  implied  the  definitive  abandonment 
by  us  of  any  plans  for  the  conquest  of  Constantinople,  plans 
for  the  realization  of  which  there  was  absolutely  no  hope  that 


ATTEMPT  TO   DETACH  TURKEY       213 

could  be  said  to  be  warranted  by  the  general  military  situation 
of  Russia  and  her  Allies.  Having  consulted  on  the  subject 
the  Chief  of  the  General  Staf^,  General  Alexeeff,  who  concurred 
entirely  in  his  views,  my  friend  submitted  his  plan  to  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  only,  as  was  to  be  expected,  to  be 
reproved  for  his  pains.  Of  the  soundness  and  practic- 
ability of  my  friend's  idea  I  had  no  doubt,  provided  only 
it  were  possible  to  overcome  the  maniacal  obsession  under 
which  our  politicians  and  the  majority  of  our  "  Intelligentzia  " 
were  labouring  in  regard  to  the  assumed  necessity  for  Russia 
to  secure  possession  of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits. 

It  appears,  indeed,  if  rumour  is  to  be  believed,  that  the 
Turks  had  actually  some  time  in  the  spring  of  1916  thrown 
out  a  feeler  to  the  Government  of  one  of  the  Allied  Powers 
as  to  the  possibility  of  the  conclusion  of  a  separate  peace 
with  the  Entente,  and  upon  being  advised  to  broach  the  subject 
first  of  all  to  Russia  as  the  Power  principally  interested, 
had  repHed  that  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  approach 
with  such  a  proposal  the  Power  whose  hardly  concealed  aim 
was  the  conquest  of  the  capital  of  their  Empire. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  the  obvious  reasons 
why  the  successful  realization  of  this  idea  would  have  exercised 
a  most  important  and  probably  decisive  influence  on  the 
course  of  events.  But  it  was  Russia's  fate  that  her  policies 
should  have  been  conducted  with  the  same  incompetence 
during  the  war  as  they  had  been  before  its  outbreak. 

Early  in  May  of  that  year  communications  were  received 
from  the  Governments  of  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy, 
inviting  our  Legislature  to  delegate  ten  members  of  each 
House  for  a  visit  to  the  Alhed  countries.  Ten  members  of 
the  Duma  accepted  at  once  the  invitation,  but  among  the 
members  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire  only  seven,  of  whom 
I  was  the  only  one  not  elected,  but  appointed  by  the  Crown, 
were  found  willing  to  undertake  the  journey.  Our  President 
had  suggested  that  before  leaving  we  had  perhaps  better  see 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  concert  with  him  the 
attitude  we  were  to  observe  in  foreign  parts  in  regard  to 
statesmen  or  representatives  of  the  Press  with  whom  we 
might  come  into  contact.  He  had  also  taken  steps  to  arrange 
for  us  an  interview  with  Mr.  Sazonoff.  We  were  received 
by  him,  we  seven  members  of  the  Upper  House,  in  corpore, 


214        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

and  after  some  desultory  conversation,  he  proceeded  to  give 
us  an  account  of  the  negotiations  he  had  been  carrying  on 
in  the  preceding  year  with  the  British  and  French  Govern- 
ments which  had  resulted  in  the  conclusion  of  a  secret  agree- 
ment by  which  these  Governments  consented  to  our  taking 
and  retaining  possession  of  Constantinople,  of  part  of  Thrace 
as  far  as  the  line  Enos-Media,  of  the  Asiatic  shores  of  the 
Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles,  and  of  two  of  the  ^Egean 
Islands  commanding  the  entrance  to  the  Straits.  He  showed 
us,  with  considerable  naive  satisfaction,  on  a  large  map  the 
future  possessions  which  Russia  was  to  receive  as  the  price 
of  her  participation  in  the  war  for  the  "  triumph  of  right 
over  might." 

This  was  the  first  disclosure  made,  very  confidentially, 
of  a  secret  agreement  between  the  AUied  Powers,  which  was 
to  be  followed  by  several  others  of  a  no  less  remarkable  and 
equally  secret  character.  When  we  had  left  the  Minister's 
presence  and  found  ourselves  in  the  street,  one  of  my  colleagues 
took  a  long  breath  and  said  to  me  in  French  :  "  Et  dire  que 
9a  c'est  un  ministre  des  affaires  etrangeres ;  mais  c'est 
effrayant." 

Our  journey  to  England  was  in  all  respects  a  very  enjoy- 
able one.  We  were  apparently  all  happy  to  escape  for  a 
while  from  the  atmosphere  of  nervous  tension  in  which  we 
had  been  living  for  nearly  two  years,  and  the  utmost  good 
feeling  prevailed  among  the  members  of  our  small  party. 
The  leader  of  the  delegation  from  the  Lower  House  was 
Mr.  Alexander  Protopopoff,  at  the  time  Vice-President 
and  a  rather  popular  member  of  the  Duma,  who  a  few  months 
later  became  notorious  as  the  last  Minister  of  the  Interior 
under  the  old  regime,  whose  downfall  he  not  only  failed  to 
prevent,  but  by  his  insane  policy  helped  to  achieve.  I  had 
not  known  him  personally  before,  but  as  a  travelUng 
companion  I  found  him  all  that  could  be  desired. 

My  impression  of  him  was  that  he  was  an  amiable 
nonentity,  a  shifty  politician  in  a  small  way,  with  no  settled 
convictions  and  quite  incapable  of  conceiving  and  carrying 
through  any  independent  line  of  pohcy.  His  sudden  elevation 
to  the  post  of  Minister  of  the  Interior  seems  to  have  turned 
his  head  completely,  so  much  so  that  at  last  serious  doubts 
began  to  be  entertained  as  to  his  sanity. 


VISIT   TO   ENGLAND  215 

Among  our  travelling  companions  of  the  Duma,  the  most 
prominent  were  the  leader  of  the  "  Cadet  "  Party,  Mr.  P. 
Miliukoff,  and  Mr.  Shingareff,  who  in  the  year  following 
became  Minister  of  Agriculture  and  then  of  Finance  in  the 
Provisional  Government,  and  ended  by  being  shot  in  his  bed 
in  a  prison  hospital  by  the  murderous  bandits  of  Bolshevism. 
Of  my  own  colleagues  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire,  one, 
a  very  wealthy  landowner  in  South  Russia,  seems  to  have 
met  last  winter  with  a  tragic  and  mysterious  fate,  according 
to  newspaper  accounts.  His  body  and  those  of  several 
members  of  his  family  and  of  some  other  relatives,  together 
with  the  bodies  of  all  the  members  of  the  crew,  were  found 
on  a  disabled  little  steamer  on  which  they  appear  to  have 
escaped  from  Odessa  in  the  hope  of  being  able  to  reach  some 
port  on  the  Black  Sea  coast.  They  had  probably  encountered 
very  heavy  weather,  the  steamer  had  become  disabled  on 
the  high  sea  and  they  had  run  short  of  provisions  and  water 
until  starvation  stared  them  in  the  face,  and  nothing  remained 
but  to  cut  short  their  agony  by  shooting  one  another,  the 
last  one  committing  suicide.  Thus  ran  the  harrowing  story 
as  told  by  the  papers. 

What  became  of  my  other  colleagues  I  have  no  means 
of  ascertaining.  Some  of  us,  Hke  myself,  felt  at  the  time 
that  the  days  of  the  old  Russia  we  loved  were  counted,  and 
that  a  catastrophe  was  due  to  overtake  us,  but  no  one  could 
foresee  its  extent  and  atrocious  character. 

After  a  long  railway  journey  through  Finland,  Sweden 
and  Norway,  we  were  to  embark  at  Bergen  for  Newcastle, 
and  we  had  passages  engaged  for  us  on  a  Norwegian  steamer 
still  plying  between  those  ports,  unabashed  by  the  risk  of 
encountering  German  submarines.  On  arrival  at  the  station 
at  Bergen,  while  we  were  clamouring  for  the  steamship 
company's  agent  who  was  to  have  taken  charge  of  our 
baggage,  we  were  met  by  the  Russian  and  British  consuls, 
who  in  mysterious  whispers  imparted  to  us  the  information 
that  we  were  not  to  embark  on  the  mail  steamer,  as  other 
means  had  been  provided  for  taking  us  to  England.  We 
were  hurried  away  in  automobiles  before  the  watchful  eyes, 
as  we  were  told,  of  some  official  of  the  German  consulate, 
and  were  carried  to  a  special  landing  stage  where  boats 
were  waiting  for  us  in  charge  of  Norwegian  naval  officers 


216        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

to  take  us  to  the  King  of  Norway's  yacht,  where  we  were 
most  hospitably  welconied  and  treated  to  a  hixurious 
hmcheon. 

As  soon  as  we  had  all  come  on  board,  the  yacht  weighed 
anchor  and  went  out  to  sea,  up  a  beautiful  fjord,  at  the  top  of 
which,  after  about  an  hour's  steaming,  we  descried  in  the 
shadow  of  a  high  mountain  the  imposing  form  of  a  large 
British  cruiser  on  which  we  were  to  embark.  The  Donegal 
had  arrived  the  day  before — a  venial  infraction  of 
international  law — and  had  spent  the  night  at  anchor, 
guarded  against  possible  submarine  attacks  by  several 
Norwegian  torpedo-boats.  We  were  made  extremely  com- 
fortable on  board ;  room  was  found  for  everybody,  thanks 
to  the  kindness  and  courtesy  of  the  captain  and  officers, 
some  of  whom  gave  up  their  cabins  for  the  night.  We 
were  to  have  landed  the  following  morning  at  some  point  up 
the  Moray  Firth — I  believe  it  was  Inverness — where  a  special 
train  was  waiting  to  take  us  to  London.  In  the  middle  of 
the  night,  however,  a  wireless  message  was  received  from  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Admiral  Jellicoe,  ordering  the  Donegal 
to  proceed  to  Scapa  Flow  instead  of  Inverness.  When  we 
were  told  of  it  in  the  morning  we  were  delighted  to  find  that 
we  would  have  a  chance  to  see  the  majestic  spectacle  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  at  anchor  at  its  base.  However,  on  arrival  at 
Scapa  Flow  we  found  that  during  the  night  the  whole  fleet 
had  gone  to  sea,  presumably  in  consequence  of  some  alarm, 
and  we  saw  only  a  small  part  of  it  returning  to  its  anchorage. 
We  were  transferred  to  a  small  steamer  and  taken  to  the 
port  of  Thurso,  where  the  special  train  ordered,  up  from 
Inverness  was  waiting  for  us.  On  arrival  at  Thurso  we  learned 
that  the  reason  why  our  destination  had  suddenly  been  altered 
was  that  it  had  been  discovered  that  during  the  night  German 
submarines  had  succeeded  in  barring  the  mouth  of  the 
Moray  Firth  with  a  chain  of  submerged  mines. 

From  the  moment  we  set  foot  on  British  soil  until  the 
time  fixed  for  the  departure  of  the  delegation  for  Paris  and 
Rome  we  were  the  guests  of  the  Government,  and  nothing 
could  have  exceeded  the  courteous  cordiality  and  the  generous 
hospitality  extended  to  us.  A  few  days  after  our  arrival 
we  had  the  honour  of  being  presented  to  their  Majesties 
the   King   and   Queen    at   Buckingham   Palace.     Upon   our 


TALK  WITH  MR.   ASQUITH  217 

entering  the  drawing-room,  where  we  were  assembled, 
the  King  addressed  to  us  a  brief  speech  of  cordial  welcome, 
after  which  the  individual  presentations  took  place  and 
their  Majesties  engaged  each  of  us  in  turn  in  some  minutes 
of  animated  conversation. 

In  the  evening  of  the  same  day  we  were  entertained  at 
Lancaster  House  at  a  banquet  presided  over  by  the  Prime 
Minister,  Mr.  Asquith,  to  which  most  of  the  prominent 
personages  of  the  political  world  had  been  bidden.  Being 
seated  at  table  next  to  the  Prime  Minister,  I  took  occasion 
to  tell  him  that  on  arrival  in  London  I  had  received  an 
invitation  from  the  American  Luncheon  Club — an  association 
of  American  residents  and  business  men  established  in  London 
and  presided  over  by  the  American  Ambassador — to  be  their 
gaest  at  a  luncheon,  when  I  would  be  expected  to  deliver 
a  speech.  That  luncheon  was  to  take  place  the  following 
day,  and  as  I  was  anxious  not  to  say  anything  that  might 
not  be  in  entire  harmony  with  the  Prime  Minister's  views, 
I  gave  him  a  complete  expose  of  the  address  I  had  prepared 
and  intended  to  deliver  before  my  American  hosts,  Mr. 
Asquith  listened  to  me  attentively  and  was  kind  enough  to 
say  that  he  approved  everything  I  intended  to  say,  and 
reiterated  the  expression  of  his  approval  in  a  personal  note 
to  me  when  I  had  enclosed  to  him  a  clipping  from  the  Daily 
Telegraph  containing  a  verbatim  report  of  my  speech  which 
appeared  in  that  paper  on  June  6,  1916,  under  the  caption 
"  Neutrals  and  the  War.     A  Grave  Responsibility." 

I  believe  that  the  Allied  Governments  had  a  vague 
inkling  of  an  impending  weakening  of  Russia's  participation 
in  the  war  ;  only,  unable  to  understand  its  real  causes, 
they  attributed  it  to  intrigues  aiming  at  the  conclusion  of 
a  separate  peace  with  Germany  and  being  engineered  by 
supposedly  German  influences  surrounding  the  unfortunate 
Empress,  a  delusion  in  which  they  were  presumably 
encouraged  by  rumours  reaching  them  from  equally  mis- 
informed Russian  sources. 

I  also  believe  that  the  object  of  the  invitations  extended 
to  delegations  from  our  Legislative  Chambers  was  to  impress 
them  with  the  colossal  extent  of  the  preparations  being 
made  in  Allied  countries  for  the  effective  continuation  of 
the  war,  in  the  hope  that  by  their  reports  and  influence  they 


218        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

would  counteract  the  suspected  pacifist  tendencies  of  the 
Government  and  encourage  it  to  increased  efforts  and  activity 
in  the  conduct  of  the  war. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  all  that  I  had  been  able  to  observe 
confirmed  me  in  the  conviction  that  the  material  resources 
of  the  Allies  were  so  greatly  and  so  palpably  superior  to 
those  of  the  Central  Powers  as  to  render  the  ultimate  outcome 
of  the  contest  an  absolutely  foregone  conclusion.  It  was, 
moreover,  plain  that  the  cause  of  the  Entente,  in  as  far  as 
it  pursued,  not  the  realization  of  such  plans  as  stand  revealed 
now  in  the  secret  agreements  between  its  members,  but  the 
legitimate  end  of  defeating  the  ambitious  aims  of  the  German 
ruhng  caste,  was  already  won,  and  that  the  cause  of  the 
Central  Powers,  in  as  far  as  it  aimed  at  the  establishment 
of  Germany's  military  supremacy  in  Europe,  was  irretrievably 
lost,  and  had  been  practically  lost  ever  since  the  French  victory 
on  the  Marne.  The  spectre  of  a  threatened  German  over- 
lordship  of  the  world  had  no  longer  any  basis  in  fact,  and 
could,  therefore,  at  best  serve  only  as  a  device  of  "  f rightful- 
ness," to  be  used  by  propaganda  for  the  purpose  of  keeping 
alive  the  war  psychosis,  recovery  from  which  it  was  the  obvious 
duty  of  statesmanship  on  both  sides  to  promote  by  every 
possible  means,  not  only  in  the  interest  of  the  belligerent 
nations,  but  in  that  of  the  future  peaceful  development 
of  mankind. 

Two  ways  were  open  for  bringing  about  negotiations 
with  a  view  to  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace  ;  they  were  : 
the  announcement  by  one  of  the  belligerent  sides  of  its 
readiness  to  enter  into  such  negotiations,  or  else  an  offer 
of  mediation  by  a  League  of  Neutral  Powers  sufficiently 
powerful  to  make  it  sure  that  its  offer  would  not  be  rejected 
by  either  side. 

As  regards  the  first  mode  of  procedure  it  is  plain  that 
such  an  announcement  could  be  safely  made  by  the  winning 
side  without  running  any  risk  whatever  of  its  initiative 
being  treated  as  a  "  trap,"  or  a  so-called  "  peace  offensive," 
as  happened  to  the  losing  side  when,  under  pressure  of  popular 
thirst — or  perhaps  one  had  better  say  literally  "  hunger  " — 
for  peace,  it  ventured  upon  such  a  step.  It  was  my  profound 
conviction  that  the  time  had  come  for  Russia  to  raise  with 
her  Allies — as  was  her  incontestable  right — the  question  of 


SITUATION  IN  RUSSIA  219 

the  timeliness — nay,  urgency — of  initiating  serious  steps  with 
a  view  to  a  general  peace.  This  conviction  was  based  on 
the  following  considerations  :  The  coming  of  a  revolution 
in  Russia  was  a  matter  of  certainty  ;  its  coming  was  not 
dependent  on  the  issue  of  the  war,  whether  victorious  or 
otherwise — indeed,  it  would  not  wait  for  such  an  issue  to 
be  decided  one  way  or  the  other,  since  it  would  be  primarily 
a  revolt  against  the  war  itself  ;  this  revolt  would  be  the 
resultant  of  elemental  forces  working  among  the  inarticulate 
masses  of  the  people  sick  of  a  war,  with  all  its  attendant 
suffering  and  misery,  inflicted  on  them  by  their  rulers,  and 
not  of  German  intrigues  in  Court  or  Government  circles,  as 
Allied  and  Russian  war  propaganda  would  have  it,  presumably 
in  the  naive  belief  that  the  fighting  spirit  of  the  people 
could  be  roused  by  such  insinuations  ;  the  Army  was  no 
longer  composed  of  first-class  troops  such  as  by  the  hundred 
thousand  had  laid  down  their  lives  on  the  battlefields  of 
East  Prussia,  Poland  and  Galicia  :  they  were  mainly  reserve 
troops,  commanded  by  a  sadly  depleted  corps  of  officers 
also  largely  composed  of  officers  of  the  reserve  or  promoted 
from  the  ranks — in  a  word,  largely  hordes  of  armed  peasants, 
whose  hearts  were  not  at  the  front,  but  in  their  abandoned 
homes,  and  who  in  case  of  a  revolution  would  be  sure  to  side 
with  whomsoever  would  bring  them  peace.  The  outbreak 
of  the  revolution  was  merely  a  question  of  time,  of  a  few 
months  at  the  utmost,  and  there  was  only  one  way  in  which 
it  could  be  prevented  and  the  country  could  be  saved  from 
catastrophe,  and  that  was  the  conclusion  of  peace  (when 
I  say  peace  I  always  mean  a  general  peace  and  not  a  separate 
peace  with  Germany)  ;  the  moment  was  favourable  for  the 
initiation  of  peace  negotiations  ;  the  brilliant  campaign  of 
General  Yudenitch  in  Asia  Minor  and  General  Broussiloff's 
victorious  advance  in  Galicia,  which  had  helped  to  avert 
disaster  from  Italy,  had  redeemed  the  glory  of  the  Russian 
arms,  and  Russia  presented  still — at  least  in  appearance — 
a  very  formidable  and  threatening  front  to  the  enemy ; 
it  was  no  less  to  the  interest  of  our  Allies  to  seize  the 
opportunity  for  the  initiation  of  such  negotiations  whilst 
Russia  was  still  standing  erect,  because  a  coalition  being 
a  chain  the  strength  of  which  is  dependent  on  its  weakest 
link,  prudent  foresight  would  have  suggested  to  them  the 


220        FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

advantage  of  not  waiting  until  that  weakness  had  become  a 
breakdown  inevitable  in  case  of  a  revolution. 

All  these  considerations,  whose  soundness  subsequent 
events  have  confirmed,  it  was  not  my  province  to  expose 
to  the  Allies,  That,  and  not  futile  attempts  at  concealing 
from  them  the  truth,  was  the  plain  duty  of  whosoever  was 
responsible  for  the  conduct  of  our  foreign  policy.  It  was  a 
duty  of  honour  and  loyalty  to  our  Allies  no  less  than  a  sacred 
duty  to  our  Sovereign,  our  country,  and  our  nation,  whose 
salvation  depended  on  the  earliest  possible  conclusion  of 
peace.  To  listen  and  to  accede  to  her  representations 
would  have  been  a  duty  of  loyalty  to  Russia  resting  with  her 
Allies.  Their  failure  to  do  so,  and  that  alone,  would  have 
not  only  justified  but  necessitated  the  conclusion  by  Russia 
of  a  separate  peace  with  Germany — an  eventuality  much  to 
be  deprecated,  but  to  which  Russian  statesmen  would  have 
been  bound  to  resign  themselves  in  such  a  case,  or  else  to 
have  become  traitors  to  their  own  country. 

As  for  me,  all  I  could  do  was  to  try  to  press  these  considera- 
tions upon  the  attention  of  those  who  were  in  charge  of  our 
policies.  I  attempted  to  do  so  with  Stuermer,  with  his 
successor,  Pokroffsky,  and  after  the  Revolution  with  the 
Provisional  Government,  first  of  Prince  LwofE  and  then 
of  Kerensky,  and  never  ceased  my  efforts  until  the  very  eve 
of  the  Bolshevist  Revolution,  of  whose  impending  advent 
I  warned  them  as  an  inevitable  consequence  of  their 
obstinate  persistence  in  a  policy  which  could  only  end  in 
throwing  the  country  into  the  abyss  of  anarchy  and 
civil   war. 

My  expectation  that  our  Allies,  if  approached  in  the 
proper  way,  would  be  willing  to  enter  into  our  view  of  the 
situation  and  to  act  accordingly  was  naturally  based  on 
the  supposition  that  their  statesmen  would  not  consider  the 
downfall  and  dismemberment  of  Russia  to  be  desirable  in 
the  interest  of  their  countries,  as  for  various  reasons  some 
politicians  in  both  countries  seemed  to  think.  Also,  it  was 
not  in  that  quarter — if,  as  I  said,  approached  in  the  proper 
way  and  with  unreserved  frankness — that  I  apprehended  that 
the  chief  difficulty  would  be  encountered,  but  rather  in  the 
fatuous  blindness  and  incompetence  of  those  in  whose  hands 
a  cruel  fate  had  placed  the  conduct  of  Russia's  foreign  policy. 


RETURN   TO   RUSSIA  221 

an  apprehension  which  subsequent  events  have  proved  to 
have  been  well  founded. 

There  was,  however,  another  way  in  which  the  initiation 
of  peace  negotiations  could  have  been  brought  about,  and  that 
was  through  the  intervention  of  a  league  of  nations  headed 
by  the  United  States.  Nothing  short  of  such  a  league  would 
have  had  sufficiently  authoritative  influence  on  the  public 
mind  in  both  belligerent  camps  to  induce  them  to  accept 
mediation  with  a  view  to  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  by  negotia- 
tion. No  close  observer  of  the  political  situation  could  have 
failed  to  realize  that  the  direction  of  affairs  on  both  sides  had 
slipped,  or  was  about  to  slip,  from  the  hands  of  statesman- 
ship, and  would  henceforth  be  swayed  by  that  mentality 
which  can  see  no  other  possible  termination  of  a  war  bat 
by  a  "  knock-out  blow,"  "  crushing  "  of  the  adversary, 
and  peace  by  "  dictation." 

In  connection  with  the  banquet  at  Lancaster  House 
an  incident  occurred  which,  quite  insignificant  in  itself, 
represented  nevertheless  a  little  rift  in  the  lute  of  our  com- 
panionship in  the  Parliamentary  Delegation  and  which 
caused  me,  so  as  to  avoid  its  possible  widening,  to  remain 
behind  when  my  colleagues  left  for  Paris  and  Rome. 

It  happened  in  this  way  :  On  the  day  before  the  banquet 
our  Ambassador  sent  me  word  that  it  had  been  decided, 
according  to  customary  etiquette,  that  I,  as  ranking  member 
of  the  delegation  from  our  Upper  House,  should  reply  to  the 
Prime  Minister's  speech  on  behalf  of  the  Council  of  the 
Em.pire.  To  this  arrangement,  however,  three  of  my 
colleagues  demurred  on  the  ground  that  I  was  an  appointed 
and  therefore,  properly  speaking,  not  a  representative 
member  of  the  Council,  and  that,  moreover,  my  name  was 
a  German  one.  The  unanswerable  character  of  the  first 
reason  given  I  could  only  acknowledge,  and  to  the  second  one 
I  could  not  take  exception,  since  in  view  of  the  war  it  had 
been  considered  advisable  to  rechristen  St.  Petersburg  into 
Petrograd,  and  I  could  not  repudiate  my  name,  of  which  I 
had  no  reason  to  be  ashamed. 

Upon  my  return  to  Russia  I  found  the  situation  by  no 
means  improved.  The  ship  of  State  seemed  to  be  drifting, 
rudderless  and  helpless,  steersmen  being  changed  to  all 
appearances    quite    aimlessly — Sazonoff    was    replaced    by 


222        FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Stuermer,  a  man,  however  incompetent  as  a  statesman, 
at  least  experienced  in  the  handling  of  the  business  of  his 
office,  by  a  man  absolutely  incapable  and  entirely  ignorant 
of  foreign  affairs.  Protopopoff  was  appointed  Minister  of 
the  Interior — it  was  said  because  he  had  been  recommended 
for  the  post  by  the  Empress  at  the  instigation  of  Rasputin. 
But  the  most  important,  and  in  its  consequences  most 
fatal,  measure  was  decided  upon  at  a  Council  of  Ministers 
presided  over  by  the  Emperor  at  the  Headquarters  of  the 
Army  at  Mohileff.  General  Alexeeff,  the  Emperor's  Chief 
of  Staff  and  practically  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army, 
had  demanded  the  immediate  mobilization  of  12,000,000 
men  to  provide  for  the  replenishing  of  possible  losses  during 
the  year,  without  which  he  declared  he  could  not  undertake 
to  continue  the  campaign.  All  the  Ministers  had  energeti- 
cally protested  against  this  measure,  to  be  taken  at  harvest 
time,  when  all  available  hands  were  needed  for  securing  the 
crops,  not  to  mention  that  the  infallible  effect  of  this  mobiliza- 
tion would  obviously  be  the  creation  of  a  gigantic  army, 
which  could  not  be  utilized  at  the  front  and  would  have  to 
be  spread  all  over  the  country  in  readiness  for  the  coming 
revolution.  General  Alexeeff,  however,  remained  obdurate, 
and  the  Emperor  finally  sided  with  him. 

It  seems  as  if  nothing  was  to  be  left  undone  that  could 
ensure  the  downfall  of  the  Empire  and  the  ruin  of  the 
nation. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

Foreign  influences  in  Russia — Trepoff  as  Prime  Minister — Interviews  with 
Pokroffsky — An  Imperial  order — Visit  of  Lord  Milner  and  others — 
Causes  of  the  Revolution — The  Soviet — Interview  with  Kerensky — 
Fruitless  efforts — American  mission  at  Petrograd. 

Any  attempt  to  convey  an  accurate  idea  of  the  situation  of 
affairs  and  of  the  moral  atmosphere  prevaiHng  in  Russia's 
capital  during  the  last  months  of  the  existence  of  the  Empire, 
must  necessarily  fail  on  the  score  of  incompleteness  when 
undertaken  by  one  who,  like  myself,  although  an  eye-witness 
of  passing  events,  was  not  in  touch  with  the  inner  circle  of 
the  actors  of  the  tragedy,  and  can,  therefore,  only  relate 
his  personal  impressions  as  an  outside  observer. 

An  English  visitor,  who  had  come  to  study  the  situation, 
summarized  the  result  of  his  observations  in  this  brief 
sentence  :   "  It  looks  to  me  like  a  mild  Bedlam." 

It  was  a  mild  Bedlam  indeed,  presenting  the  pitiful 
spectacle  of  the  governing  body  of  a  great  Empire  helplessly 
floundering  in  a  sea  of  self-evoked  catastrophal  troubles, 
which  they  had  thought  themselves  capable  of  facing  success- 
fully and  which  now  threatened  to  sweep  them  off  their 
feet,  lacking  the  means  to  stem  the  rising  tide  of  disaster, 
as  well  as  the  moral  courage  to  take  the  only  decision  that 
could  have  saved  the  country,  and  gradually  sinking  deeper 
and  deeper  in  the  mire  which  was  to  engulf  them,  and  with 
them  all  that  remained  of  Russia's  former  greatness  and 
prosperity. 

Only  the  wilfully  blind  could  fail  to  see  that  the  country 
was  drawing  ever  nearer  to  the  brink  of  the  precipice  and  that 
its  salvation  could  be  found  in  the  earliest  possible  conclusion 
of  a  general  peace.  It  is  hardly  possible  that  really  able  and 
perspicacious  statesmen  at  the  head  of  affairs  in  Allied 
countries  could  have  entertained  any  illusions  in  this  regard. 
But  it  is  quite  comprehensible  that,  being  bent — whether 

223 


224        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

rightly  or  wrongly  from  the  pomt  of  view  of  their  own  interests 
— on  continuing  the  war  at  any  cost,  our  Allies  should  have 
made  every  effort  to  keep  Russia,  as  a  still  valuable,  though 
already  somewhat  doubtful,  asset,  as  long  as  possible  in  the 
field,  whatever  might  become  of  her  in  the  end.  It  might 
have  been  to  their  own  interest  to  save  Russia  from  her 
impending  downfall  and  ruin,  but  it  was  certainly  neither 
their  duty  nor  their  business  to  suggest  to  the  Russian 
Government  the  only  way  in  which  it  could  be  done.  More- 
over, the  members  of  our  Government,  as  well  as  our  party 
leaders,  seemed  to  be  much  less  concerned  about  saving  their 
country  from  the  impending  disaster  than  they  were  anxious 
to  save  their  own  "  faces  " — as  a  Chinese  would  put  it — in 
the  eyes  of  our  Allies  by  fervent  protestations  of  loyalty 
to  their  cause. 

The  curious  trait  of  our  "  Intelligentzia  " — I  mean  a  certain 
tendency  to  subordinate  the  obvious  interests  of  their  own 
country  to  those  of  foreign  Powers  and  a  snobbish  eagerness 
to  curry  favour  in  the  eyes  of  foreigners,  presumably  due  to 
atavistic  influences  dating  back  to  the  centuries  of  Mongolian 
domination  over  mediaeval  Russia — seems  to  be  the  only 
plausible  explanation,  for  example,  of  General  Alexeeff's  in- 
sistence on  the  additional  mobilization  referred  to  in  the  last 
chapter.  It  is  incredible  that  he,  who  was  virtually  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  our  armies,  could  have  been  so  utterly 
ignorant  of  the  real  feelings  of  the  soldiery  as  not  to  have 
been  aware  of  the  sinister  portent  of  the  addition  to  their 
numbers  of  many  new  millions  of  men  drawn  fr6m  a  war- 
weary  peasantry,  seething  with  discontent  and  hatred  of 
the  classes  whom  they  held  responsible  for  the  war  and  its 
indefinite  prolongation.  This  fateful  measure  could  only 
have  been  devised  as  a  grandiose  gesture,  intended  to  impress 
the  Allies  with  the  fervour  of  the  Government's  devotion  to 
their  cause  and  the  magnitude  of  the  resources  of  human 
material  at  its  disposal,  without,  apparently,  reflecting  that 
the  day  might  be  near  when  this  human  material  would 
object  to  the  part  of  "  cannon  fodder  "  assigned  to  it. 

Likewise  nothing  but  similar  atavistic  influences  could 
have  accounted  for  the  mentality  which  made  it  possible 
for  some  of  our  politicians  to  seek  the  countenance  of  foreign, 
albeit   Allied,   diplomacy   in   plotting  the   dethronement   of 


TREPOFF   AS   PRIME   MINISTER        225 

their  Sovereign,  whom  they  suspected,  or  pretended  to 
suspect — a  question  which  could  not  be  answered  in  one  sense 
or  the  other  without  impugning  either  their  intelligence  or 
their  good  faith — of  carrying  on,  or  suffering  to  be  carried 
on,  secret  intrigues  aiming  at  the  conclusion  of  a  separate 
peace  with  Germany.  The  fact  of  such  relations  having 
existed — explicable,  of  course,  on  the  diplomatic  side  by 
the  influence  of  the  all-pervading  war  psychosis — is  apparently 
alluded  to  by  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon  when  he  writes  in  his  Eclipse 
of  Russia  : 

For,  say  what  we  may,  the  blast  that  destroyed  the  monarchy 
and  shattered  the  nation  came  directly  from  the  Duma  leaders,  semi- 
consciously  aided  and  abetted  by  the  simple-minded  representatives 
of  the  Entente,  whom  history  may  come  to  regard  as  drowsy,  if  not 
sleeping,  partners  of  the  active  plotters. 

It  seems,  however,  that  the  Government,  in  spite  of  all 
their  boastful  assurances  of  readiness  to  carry  on  the  war 
with  redoubled  energy,  had  conceived  some  doubts  as  to 
the  disposition  of  the  people  in  this  regard,  and  had  come  to 
the  conclusion  that,  in  order  to  reanimate  their  obviously 
waning,  or  even  totally  vanished,  fighting  spirit,  it  was 
necessary  to  hold  out  to  them  some  inducement  supposedly 
powerful  enough  to  reconcile  them  to  the  necessity  of 
continuing  to  shed  their  blood,  and  that  this  could  best 
be  done  by  disclosing  the  real  aims  Russia  was  pursuing 
in  the  war. 

In  consequence  of  a  decision  in  this  sense  arrived  at, 
evidently  after  consultation  with  the  Allies,  the  new  Prime 
Minister,  Mr.  Trepoff,  who  in  the  meanwhile  had  replaced 
Stuermer,  on  the  reassembling  of  the  Duma  on  December  3rd, 
read  a  declaration,  from  the  text  of  which,  as  cabled  over 
by  the  Russia  semi-ofiicial  news  agency  and  published  in 
the  New  York  papers  of  December  4,  1916,  I  quote  the 
following  two  main  points : 

"  We  have  concluded  an  agreement  with  our  Allies, 
which  establishes  in  the  most  definite  manner  the  right 
of  Russia  to  the  Straits  and  Constantinople.  Russians 
should  know  for  what  they  are  shedding  their  blood,  and 
in  accord  with  our  Allies,  announcement  of  this  agreement 
is  made  to-day  from  this  Tribune." 

VOL.    II  15 


226        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

And  further  in  regard  to  the  Polish  question  :  "One 
part  of  the  task  before  us  is  to  reconquer  the  Kingdom  of 
Poland,  temporal il}''  detached  by  force  of  arms.  But  that 
is  not  enough.  We  must  also  wrest  from  our  enemies 
territories  formerly  Polish,  beyond  the  old  frontier.  We  will 
then  reconstitute  Poland,  free  within  its  ethnographical 
boundaries,  but  inseparably  united  with  Russia." 

Well  might  the  Allies  have  hesitated  to  consent  to  this 
official  disclosure  of  Russia's  war  aims,  which  included  the 
dismemberment,  not  only  of  Turkey  but  also  of  Prussia 
and  Austria,  from  whom  the  former  Polish  territories — that 
is  to  say,  Posen  and  Galicia — were  to  be  wrested.  Their 
consent  to  the  satisfaction  of  these  territorial  ambitions  of 
Russia  necessarily  implied  the  existence  of  similar  concessions 
secretly  made  to  them  at  the  expense  of  enemy  countries, 
and  therefore  invalidated  the  claim  that  the  war  was  being 
waged  to  secure  the  "  triumph  of  right  over  might,"  or  to 
"  end  war,"  or  to  "  destroy  militarism." 

This  official  disclosure  was  a  most  dangerous  admission 
to  be  made  in  the  hearing  of  the  millions  of  naturally  peace- 
able human  beings  who,  amidst  the  horrors  of  modern  war- 
fare, were  expected  to  continue  fighting  indefinitely  in  the 
belief  that  they  were  fighting  to  save  the  liberty  of  the  world 
or  to  end  war  for  ever.  It,  moreover,  supplied  the  enemy 
Governments  with  a  most  welcome  argument  to  rouse  the 
fighting  spirit  of  their  peoples,  by  representing  to  them  that, 
in  the  presence  of  the  openly  declared  aims  of  one  at  least 
of  their  adversaries,  nothing  remained  for  them  but  to  continue 
to  fight  to  the  bitter  end  if  they  wanted  to  save  their  countries 
from  dismemberment  and  ruin. 

The  effect  which  this  solemn  disclosure  of  the  Government's 
war  aims  produced  on  the  minds  of  the  Russian  people — 
I  mean,  of  course,  the  real  people — was  the  very  opposite 
to  what  had  evidently  been  hoped  for,  if  not  expected.  That 
the  Government  could  have  for  a  moment  imagined  that  the 
people  would  be  roused  to  any  degree  of  enthusiasm  by  the 
prospect  of  having  to  fight  for  the  potential  conquest  of 
Constantinople  and  the  Straits,  or  the  acquisition  of  Posen 
and  Galicia,  for  the  benefit  of  Poland,  merely  shows  how 
unbridgeable  is  the  gulf  which  in  Russia  separates  the  thin 
upper  crust  from  the  bulk  of  the  nation. 


PRESIDENT   WILSON'S   NOTE  227 

What  the  Poles,  who  hoped  for  the  realization  of  their 
national  ideal — a  reunited,  independent  Poland,  as  a  result 
of  the  World  War — may  have  thought  of  the  announcement 
of  the  Russian  Government's  intentions  in  regard  to  their 
country,  and  of  the  acquiescence  therein  of  the  Allies,  the 
mainstay  of  their  hopes,  had  best  be  left  to  the  imagination. 

While  the  situation  of  affairs  in  Russia  was,  from  week 
to  week,  almost  from  day  to  day,  growing  more  and  more 
alarming,  those  who,  like  myself,  were  anxiously  scanning 
the  horizon  for  any  premonitory  signs  of  coming  peace 
were  gladdened  by  two  rays  of  hope,  which  in  quick  succession 
broke  through  the  lowering  war-clouds.  They  were  the 
German  Chancellor's  note  of  December  12,  1916,  announcing 
Germany's  readiness  to  enter  into  peace  negotiations,  and 
the  note  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Lansing,  conveying 
to  the  belligerent  Powers  President  Wilson's  proposal  "  that 
soundings  be  taken  in  order  that  all  may  learn,  the  neutrals 
with  the  belligerents,  how  near  the  haven  of  peace  may  be 
for  which  all  mankind  longs  with  an  intense  and  increasing 
longing." 

The  relation  of  the  propaganda  Press  to  these  timid 
attempts  at  initiating  peace  negotiations  foreshadowed  the 
attitude  of  the  Governments  concerned,  and  was  characteristic 
of  the  prevailing  war  psychosis.  The  German  announcement 
of  readiness  to  enter  into  peace  negotiations  was  declared 
to  be  "  insincere,"  a  "  peace  offensive,"  a  "  sham,"  a  "  war 
manoeuvre,"  devised  to  entrap  the  Allies  into  negotiations, 
with  the  object  of  compelling  them  to  conclude  a  "  German 
peace,"  and  similar  expressions  of  disapproval,  some  of 
which  subsequently  found  a  complaisant  echo  in  the  collec- 
tive reply  to  the  German  note,  which  made  it  abundantly 
clear  that  no  beginning  of  peace  negotiations  was  to  be 
thought  of. 

It  so  happened  that  these  notes  were  received  when 
Mr.  Pokroffsky,  Comptroller  of  the  Empire  and  also  Member 
of  the  Upper  House  of  our  Legislature  and,  therefore,  a 
colleague  and  personal  acquaintance  of  mine,  had  just  been 
appointed  to  the  post  of  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  which 
since  the  dismissal  of  Stuermer  had  remained  vacant  for  some 
time.  Being  convinced  that  in  his  case  I  should  not  meet 
with  the  supercilious  rebuff  towhich  I  had  been  accustomed 


228        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

at  the  hands  of  his  predecessors  in  office,  I  asked  him  to  give 
me  an  opportunity  to  discuss  with  him  the  poHtical  situation, 
a  request  which  was  most  readily  granted  in  the  same  spirit 
in  which  it  had  been  made.  Mr.  Pokroffsky  was  an  open- 
minded,  level-headed  and  well-meaning  man,  but,  being 
entirely  new  to  the  office  to  which  he  had  been  unexpectedly 
appointed,  he  was  naturally  somewhat  handicapped  by  his 
inexperience  in  the  handling  of  intricate  diplomatic  affairs 
and  by  the  consequent  necessity  of  relying  more  than  would 
otherwise  have  been  unavoidable  on  the  advice  of  his  new 
subordinates. 

In  the  course  of  two  prolonged  interviews  which  he 
very  courteously  granted  me,  I  was  enabled  exhaustively  to 
explain  my  views,  and  I  brought  away  the  impression  that 
at  heart  he  was  inclined  to  share  them  but  that  he  considered 
as  hopeless  any  attempt  at  carrying  out  the  policy  I  advocated, 
presumably  on  account  not  only  of  the  insurmountable 
difficulties  which  he  seemed  to  think  we  should  encounter 
on  the  part  of  our  Allies,  but  also  of  the  opposition  of  our 
party  leaders  and  evidently  also  of  his  own  official  advisers, 
all  of  whom  were  wedded  to  the  policy  which  had  brought 
Russia  to  the  brink  of  the  precipice  and  was  preparing  to 
push  her  into  the  abyss. 

Mr.  Pokroffsky's  apprehension  in  regard  to  the  probable 
attitude  of  our  Allies  was  certainly  not  unfounded.  It  was 
evident  that  in  all  belligerent  countries  on  both  sides  of  the 
fence  the  "  knock-out  blow  "  point  of  view  was  gaining  the 
upper  hand  over  the  inspirations  of  statesmanship.  Moreover, 
there  were  then,  in  Great  Britain  as  well  as  in  France,  those 
who  believed  that  a  weakened  and  dismembered  Russia 
would  best  serve  their  countries'  interests,  partly  as  an  elimi- 
nation of  potential  rivalry  in  Asia,  partly  as  an  immunization 
from  the  danger  of  a  possible  Russo-German  understanding 
in  the  future.  There  were,  however,  other  and,  one  might 
have  thought  more  powerful  motives  of  a  political  and 
financial  nature,  which  should  have  rendered  desirable  to 
our  Allies  the  unimpaired  power  and  greatness  of  the  Russian 
Empire,  and  consequently  should  have  moved  them  to  help 
us  in  every  way  to  prevent  its  impending  collapse. 

It  is  true,  of  course,  that  the  adoption  of  the  line  of  policy 
I  advocated  would  have  implied,  in  the  first  place,  an  entirely 


POKROFFSKY'S   SPEECH  IN  THE  DUMA   229 

open  and  unreserved  avowal  of  the  hopeless  condition  to 
which  Russia  had  already  been  reduced  by  the  war  and  which 
was  going  to  be  aggravated  by  its  further  prolongation  ; 
and  in  the  second  place  an  unshakable  firmness  in  insisting 
on  the  occasion  furnished  by  the  German  and  American 
notes  being  seized  without  delay  for  the  initiation  of  negotia- 
tions for  a  general  peace. 

It  is  unquestionable  also  that  the  adoption  of  such  a 
policy  would  have  demanded  of  those  who  would  have  had 
to  carry  it  out  a  moral  courage  and  a  fortitude  in  which  they 
might  have  been  deficient,  not  to  mention  that  clean-cut 
solutions  of  momentous  questions  are  usually  repugnant  to 
the  mentality  of  politicians — not  only  in  Russia.  In  any 
case,  no  agreement  with  our  Allies  on  the  lines  I  suggested 
could  have  been  reached  without  delicate  negotiations, 
which  the  new  and  quite  inexperienced  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  may  have  hesitated  to  conduct  himself  and  been 
unwilling  to  entrust  to  any  one  of  our  Ambassadors  in  Allied 
countries.  Be  that  as  it  may,  nothing  whatever  was 
attempted  to  save  the  Empire  from  the  catastrophe  whose 
imminence  only  wilful  blindness  could  fail  to  foresee. 

Russia  assented  to  the  collective  replies  of  the  Allies 
to  the  German  and  American  notes,  which  effectually  closed 
the  door  to  any  hope  of  approaching  peace.  Mr.  Pokroffsky 
read  in  the  Duma  a  speech  composed  in  the  most  approved 
war-propaganda  style,  winding  up  with  the  declaration  that 
no  premature  peace  could  be  concluded  with  an  enemy 
"  seeking  a  breathing-space  by  making  deceitful  offers  of 
a  permanent  peace,"  and  lastly  that  "  in  this  conviction 
Russia  is  in  complete  agreement  with  all  her  valiant  Allies. 
We  are  all  equally  convinced  of  the  vital  necessity  of  carrying 
on  the  war  to  a  victorious  end,  and  no  subterfuge  by  our 
enemies  will  prevent  us  from  following  this  path  to  the 
end." 

In  the  text  of  this  speech,  as  reported  by  cable  and 
published  in  the  New  York  papers,  from  which  I  have  quoted 
the  above,  occurs,  however,  a  passage  which  contains  the 
whole  truth  in  a  nutshell.  Mr.  Pokroffsky  is  made  to  say  : 
"  In  the  event  of  failure  [of  their  proposal]  they  will  exploit 
at  home  the  refusal  of  the  Allies  to  accept  peace  in  order  to 
rehabilitate  the  tottering  morale  of  their  people." 


230        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

In  other  words,  the  perhaps  expected  and  even  hoped- 
for  refusal  was  to  bring  grist  to  the  mill  of  the  German 
militarists.  If  that  was  the  real  object  of  the  refusal,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  it  was  successfully  attained. 

After  listening  to  Mr.  Pokroffsky's  speech,  the  Duma 
passed  a  resolution  "  unanimously  favouring  a  categorical 
refusal  by  the  Allied  Governments  to  enter  under  present 
conditions  into  any  peace  negotiations  whatever."  The 
resolution  then  goes  on  to  say  that  the  Duma  "  considers 
that  the  German  proposals  are  nothing  more  than  a  fresh 
proof  of  the  weakness  of  the  enemy  and  a  hypocritical  act 
from  which  the  enemy  expects  no  real  success,  but  by  which 
he  seeks  to  throw  upon  others  the  responsibility  for  the  war 
and  for  what  happened  during  it  and  to  exculpate  himself 
before  public  opinion  in  Germany." 

Nothing  could,  probably,  have  been  more  welcome  to 
the  German  militarists  than  to  have  the  enemy  deliberately 
walking  into  the  trap  which,  according  to  this  explanation 
by  the  Duma,  had  been  set  for  them  by  the  hypocritical  and 
wily  German. 

These  proceedings  in  the  Duma  were  followed  on 
December  25th  by  the  issue  of  an  Imperial  order  to  the 
Army  and  Navy,  from  the  text  of  which,  as  transmitted 
by  the  British  Admiralty  per  Wireless  Press,  and  published 
in  the  New  York  papers  of  December  28th,  I  quote  the 
following  : 

The  time  for  peace  negotiations  has  not  yet  arrived.  The 
enemy  has  not  been  driven  out  of  the  provinces  he  has  occupied. 
Russia's  attainment  of  the  task  created  by  the  war — regarding 
Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles,  as  well  as  the  creation  of  a 
free  Poland  from  all  the  three  of  her  now  incomplete  tribal  districts — 
has  not  yet  been  guaranteed.  To  conclude  peace  at  this  moment 
would  mean  failure  to  utilize  the  fruits  of  the  untold  trials  of  the 
heroic  Russian  troops  and  fleet.  These  trials  and  the  still  more 
sacred  memory  of  those  noble  sons  of  Russia  who  have  fallen  on  the 
battlefield  do  not  permit  of  thoughts  of  peace  until  final  victory  over 
our  enemies.  Who  dares  to  think  that  he  who  brought  about  war 
shall  have  it  in  his  power  to  conclude  peace  at  any  time  he  likes  ? 

Whether  all  these  declarations  were  intended  to  placate 
our  Allies,  anxious  to  make  sure  of  our  participation  in  the 
prolongation  of  the  war,  or  to  conceal  from  them  our  actually 
critical  position,  or  to  "  bluff  "  the  enemy,  or  whether  they 


PROTOPOPOFF  231 

were  inspired  by  a  really  sincere,  albeit  erroneous,  conviction 
that  by  such  means  the  fighting  spirit  of  the  nation  could 
be  aroused,  I  cannot  undertake  to  determine. 

The  effect  produced  by  them  on  a  profoundly  war-weary 
Army  and  people,  may  be  imagined.  Besides,  it  was  to 
manifest  itself  very  soon  in  a  way  apparently  little  expected 
by  the  authors  of  these  bellicose  declarations. 

The  new  year,  1917,  brought  us  the  sanguinary  denoue- 
ment of  the  disgraceful  Rasputin  episode,  the  resignation  of 
Trepoff,  the  appointment  to  replace  him  as  Prime  Minister 
of  Prince  Golitzyn,  an  honourable  and  worthy  man  but 
politically  a  nonentity,  and  lastly  the  arrival  of  a  Franco- 
Anglo-Italian  delegation  headed  by  Mr.  Doumergue,  Viscount 
Milner,  and  Signor  Scialoya,  the  object  of  whose  coming 
was  not  disclosed  to  the  public.  Since  the  publication  by 
the  Bolsheviks  of  the  secret  documents  found  by  them  in 
the  archives  of  our  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  it  has  been 
said  that  during  the  sojourn  at  Petrograd  of  the  aforesaid 
Allied  delegation  some  agreement  had  been  reached  between 
the  Russian  and  French  Governments  guaranteeing  to 
France  the  return  to  her  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  an  exceptional 
position  for  her  in  the  Saar  Valley  and  the  political  separation 
from  Germany  and  organization  on  a  special  basis  of  her 
possessions  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  so  as  to  make  that 
river  a  solid  strategic  frontier  against  German  aggression; 
and  to  Russia  the  right  to  a  free  hand  in  the  settlement 
of  her  western  frontiers.  Not  having  seen  any  of  these 
secret  documents  published  by  the  Bolsheviks,  I  am  not  in 
a  position  to  verify  whether  there  has  ever  been  any  serious 
foundation  for  such  rumours. 

Since  the  resignation  of  Trepoff  the  whole  power  of  the 
Government  had  practically  fallen  into  the  hands  of  Proto- 
popoff,  and  the  singular  way  in  which  he  sometimes  used  it 
gave  rise  to  doubts  as  to  his  entire  sanity. 

Protopopoff' s  share  in  the  responsibility  for  the  catastrophe 
which  overtook  the  Government  is  undeniable,  but  there  was 
no  need  of  provoking,  as  he  has  been  accused  of  doing,  a 
revolution.  The  revolution  was  there  already  ;  it  was  in 
the  hearts  of  the  people,  deadly  sick  of  the  war  and  sighing 
for  peace — a  fact  which  Allied  as  well  as  Russian  war  propa- 
ganda was  endeavouring  to  conceal  or  to  deny.     It  was  not 


232        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

an  organized,  but  an  instinctive,  elemental  force,  this  revolt 
of  the  people  against  the  war.  Its  outbreak  was  not  pre- 
meditated. It  was  spontaneous — one  might  say  almost 
accidental.  Its  outbreak  in  the  form  in  which  it  occurred 
was  rendered  possible  by  the  presence  in  the  fantastically 
overcrowded  barracks  of  the  capital  of  a  horde  of  armed 
peasants  (one  of  the  products  of  the  insane  mobilization 
measure  of  the  preceding  year),  some  two  to  three  hundred 
thousand  reservists  of  the  regiments  of  the  Imperial  Guards 
combating  at  the  front.  They  were  very  sparsely  officered 
and  were  merely  by  force  of  tradition  and  inertia  submitting 
to  some  kind  of  loose  and  precariously  maintained  discipline. 

The  success  of  the  outbreak  was  due  to  the  only  cause 
that  renders  successful  revolutions  possible,  for  no  Govern- 
ment worthy  of  the  name  has  ever  been  overthrown  by  a 
revolution  save  through  its  own  incompetence,  weakness  and 
folly.  Its  success  was  hailed  with  general  enthusiasm  by 
the  people — I  mean,  of  course,  the  real  people — who  saw 
in  it  the  end  of  the  war,  and  by  the  "  Intelligentzia"  and  the 
politicians,  who  expected  to  possess  themselves  for  good  of 
the  power  of  the  State  and  to  be  enabled  to  carry  on  the  war 
to  a  victorious  conclusion  which  would  have  justified  the 
policy  to  which  they  were  wedded. 

Both  the  people  and  the  "  Intelligentzia  "  were  disappointed 
in  their  hopes  and  expectations,  and  for  the  same  reason : 
the  unbridgeable  gulf  of  mutual  non-comprehension  which 
separates  the  bulk  of  the  nation  from  the  educated  classes — 
that  same  abnormal  condition  which  has  always  been  the  curse 
of  our  country.  For  it  was  the  failure  to  comprehend  and 
to  satisfy  the  imperious  craving  of  the  people  for  peace  that 
caused  the  overthrow  of  the  Imperial,  as  well  as  later  on  the 
Provisional,  and  lastly  Kerensky's  Coalition  Government, 
and  that  literally  threw  the  country  into  the  arms  of  the 
Bolsheviks  who  promised  the  people  what  they  were  yearning 
for — Peace. 

The  Revolution,  properly  speaking,  which  actually  and 
with  the  greatest  ease  overthrew  the  Government,  from  whose 
palsied  hands  power  was  let  slip  without  any  effort  whatever 
to  retain  it,  was  not,  as  mentioned  above,  organized,  nor 
was  its  outbreak  apparently  preconcerted  with  the  leaders 
of  the  revolutionary  parties.     It  was — such  at  least  was  my 


CAUSES   OF   THE   REVOLUTION         233 

impression — a  spontaneous,  anarchic  uprising  of  the  mutinous 
soldiery  and  of  a  revolutionary  rabble  of  workmen  from  the 
numerous  factories  in  the  capital  and  suburbs.  Its  success 
was  achieved  in  the  simplest  way  by  the  disorderly  soldiery 
of  some  regiments  of  the  guard  marching  to  the  Palace  of  the 
Duma,  which  had  just  been  dissolved  by  Imperial  decree — 
one  of  Protopopoff's  insane  measures — not,  by  any  means, 
with  hostile  intent,  as  some  Duma  members  were  said  to  have 
apprehended,  but  apparently  with  no  other  object  than  to 
acclaim  the  Duma  and  its  President. 

Owing  to  the  complete  self-effacement  of  the  legitimate 
Government,  all  the  power  of  the  State  seemed  to  have  been 
literally  thrust  into  the  hands  of  the  Duma  and  its  President, 
Mr.  Rodzianko,  who  for  a  few  days  became  the  most  popular 
and,  as  far  as  appearances  went,  the  most  powerful  personage 
of  the  country.  These  appearances,  however,  were  deceptive. 
The  Social-Democratic  and  Social-Revolutionary  Parties, 
although  apparently  taken  by  surprise  by  the  spontaneous 
outbreak  of  the  Revolution,  had  nevertheless  succeeded  in 
the  course  of  the  very  first  day,  March  12,  1917,  in  organizing 
a  "  Soviet  "  or  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies, 
which  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day  held  its  first  sitting, 
in  which  some  two  hundred  and  fifty  to  three  hundred  of 
these  deputies  took  part,  in  the  Duma  Hall  of  Session  coolly 
appropriated  by  them. 

"  From  the  outset  the  Petrograd  Soviet  became  the 
only  body  the  authority  of  which  was  fully  acknowledged 
by  those  who  had  supplied  the  element  of  physical 
force  in  bringing  about  the  Revolution  ;  that  is  to  say,  the 
garrison  and  factory  hands  of  the  capital  " — I  quote  this 
sentence  from  Mr.  Wilcox's  book,  because  it  states  an  un- 
controvertible and  illuminating  fact  in  the  most  lucid  and 
precise  terms.  The  fact  is  illuminating  inasmuch  as  it  explains 
the  reason  why  neither  the  Provisional  Government  of 
Prince  Lwoff-Miliukoff  nor  the  Coalition  Government  of 
Kerensky,  although  accepted  by  the  nation  and  recognized 
by  the  Allied  and  Neutral  Powers,  ever  possessed  that 
fullness  of  power  without  which  a  Government  is  at  best 
but  a  Government  in  name. 

Nevertheless  I  venture  to  think  that  the  unorganized, 
planless  and  leaderless  outbreak  might  have  been  at  once 


234        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

summarily  and  successfully  dealt  with  by  some  of  the  Duma 
leaders  possessed  of  sufficient  courage  and  energy,  had 
they  not  been  engaged  themselves  in  a  revolutionary  con- 
spiracy, to  which  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon  refers  in  the  above  quoted 
passage  of  his  Eclipse  of  Russia  when  he  attributes  the  "  blast 
that  destroyed  the  Monarchy  and  shattered  the  nation  " 
directly  to  the  Duma  leaders,  omitting  to  mention  among 
those  who,  in  his  opinion,  "  aided  and  abetted "  them 
some  of  the  leading  Generals  of  the  active  Army,  without 
whose  connivance  it  would  not  have  been  possible  to  arrest 
the  Imperial  train  on  its  way  to  Tsarskoje  Selo  at  Pskow,  the 
headquarters  of  a  General  commanding  a  whole  group  of 
armies,  and  to  allow  two  Duma  members  to  demand  of  their 
Sovereign  that  he  abdicate  his  throne.  These  unfortunates, 
whose  patriotism  it  would  be  unjust  to  question,  were  unable 
to  realize  that  by  their  action  they  were  sealing  the  doom  of 
their  country  and  to  foresee  that  their  names  would  go  down 
to  history  branded  with  the  maledictions  of  a  nation.  It 
must,  however,  be  stated  in  justice  to  them  that  their  aim 
was  not  by  any  means  the  destruction  of  the  Monarchy,  but 
merely  the  removal  of  the  Sovereign,  whom  they  presumably 
thought  unwilling  to  continue  the  war,  or  incapable  of 
continuing  it  successfully,  and  the  placing  on  the  throne  of 
his  young  son  under  a  suitable  regency.  That  their  plan, 
even  if  it  had  not  been  definitely  foiled  by  the  Grand  Duke 
Michael's  refusal  to  accept  the  throne — the  Emperor  had 
abdicated  in  his  favour  and  not  in  that  of  his  son — could 
have  been  successfully  carried  out,  appears  more  than  doubt- 
ful, because  the  Petrograd  Soviet,  although  represented  in 
the  Provisional  Government  by  only  one  of  its  members, 
Kerensky,  had  already  acquired  an  overshadowing  influence 
which  reduced  that  Government  to  practical  impotence. 

From  the  very  beginning  there  was  a  fundamental  disagree- 
ment between  the  Soviet  and  the  Government  in  regard  to 
the  momentous  question  of  peace  or  war.  The  Soviet, 
relying  on  the  support  of  the  Army  and  Navy  and  the  un- 
mistakable will  of  the  people,  had  pronounced  itself  in  favour 
of  the  earliest  possible  conclusion  of  a  general  peace  (not 
of  a  separate  peace  with  Germany,  but  emphatically  of  a 
general  peace)  on  the  basis  of  the  famous  three  principles  : 
No  annexations,   no  indemnities   and  self-determination  of 


INTERVIEW  WITH  KERENSKY        235 

nationalities.  The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  leading 
member  of  the  Government,  Miliukoff,  on  the  contrary, 
assured  the  Allied  Governments  of  Russia's  unshakable 
determination  to  continue  the  war  with  the  greatest  energy 
until  a  final  victory.  This  disagreement  was  to  lead  in  the 
end  to  Miliukoff's  resignation,  without,  however,  materially 
improving  the  situation,  as  I  shall  explain  presently. 

In  the  meantime,  although  I  had  hardly  any  hope  of 
bringing  Miliukoff  round  to  my  view  of  the  urgent  necessity 
of  beginning  negotiations  for  a  general  peace,  I  sought  an 
interview  with  him  as  soon  as  I  learned  that  our  Ambassador 
to  the  United  States  had  tendered  his  resignation,  and  offered 
to  undertake  without  a  day's  delay  a  mission  to  Washington, 
if  he  thought  it  desirable,  considering  the  extreme  importance 
of  the  attitude  which  the  United  States  Government  might 
assume  in  the  question  of  bringing  about  the  end  of  the  war. 
He  told  me  frankly  that  he  mistrusted  my  politics,  in  which 
he  was  unquestionably  quite  right — for  my  views  were  indeed 
the  very  opposite  of  his,  and  I  would  under  no  conceivable 
circumstances  have  consented  to  conceal  from  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  what  I  held  to  be  the  truth.  But 
I  suggested  to  him  that  since  after  all  we  could  both  of  us 
have  but  one  aim,  the  good  of  our  country,  we  might  perhaps 
by  an  exchange  of  views  and  a  thorough  discussion  of  the 
momentous  question  at  issue,  reach  an  agreement.  He  seemed 
at  first  to  be  inclined  to  assent  to  this  proposal,  but  nothing 
came  of  it  and  I  did  not  meet  him  again. 

The  next  step  I  undertook  when,  in  the  beginning  of  May, 
it  became  evident  that  Kerensky  was  the  master-mind  in 
the  Government.  Through  a  friend  who  had  been  a  client 
of  Kerensky's  in  a  lawsuit  and  who  had  kept  up  friendly 
relations  with  him,  an  interview  between  us  was  arranged. 
It  took  place  at  my  friend's  house,  and,  as  it  happened,  on 
the  very  night  when,  at  a  Cabinet  meeting,  as  Kerensky  told 
me,  two  momentous  decisions  had  just  been  taken  after  pro- 
longed and  presumably  stormy  discussions  :  to  form  a  Coali- 
tion Government  of  socialistic  and  bourgeois  elements  and 
to  definitely  break  with  the  policy  of  Miliukoff,  Sazonoff 
and  Iswolsky.  This  latter  decision  I  could  only  welcome, 
as  it  was  this  policy  that  had  brought  Russia  to  the  verge 
of  ruin,  and  after  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  question  at 


236        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

issue  I  left  under  the  impression  that  the  necessary  negotia- 
tions with  our  Allies  would  be  initiated  without  delay  in  order 
to  come  to  an  agreement  as  to  the  conditions  upon  which  a 
general  peace  could  be  concluded. 

A  few  days  later  Mr.  Terestchenko,  a  young  multi- 
millionaire, who  seemed  to  have  taken  up  revolutionary 
politics  more  or  less  as  an  expensive  sport,  was  appointed 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  I  was  not  personally  acquainted 
with  him  at  all,  but  realizing  that  as  he  was  quite  inexperienced 
in  matters  of  diplomacy  he  might  find  himself  handicapped 
by  his  unavoidable  dependence  on  the  collaboration  of  his 
future  subordinates,  who  were  all,  as  was  natural,  devoted 
adherents  of  the  very  policy  from  which  the  Government  had 
decided  to  dissociate  itself,  I  wrote  to  him  offering  to  place 
at  his  disposal  all  the  knowledge  and  experience  I  possessed 
which  might  be  of  use  to  him,  and  enclosing  a  paper  I  had 
drawn  up  in  which  I  succinctly  outlined  the  diplomatic  steps 
I  considered  it  necessary  to  be  taken  without  delay,  and 
requesting  him  to  submit  it  to  the  Government  or  to  enable 
me  to  report  it  myself  to  a  Cabinet  meeting  with  such  supple- 
mentary explanations  as  might  be  required. 

No  answer  was  returned  to  this  letter.  Having  waited 
about  a  fortnight  for  further  developments,  I  made  up  my 
mind  to  call  public  attention  to  this  matter,  which  I  considered 
to  be  of  supreme  importance  for  the  salvation  of  the  country, 
and  embodied  the  substance  of  the  above-mentioned  paper, 
with  some  amplifications,  in  an  article  which  the  Den,  a 
mildly  socialistic  paper,  had  the  courage  to  print. 

Having  set  my  views  before  the  public  by  means  of  my 
article  in  the  Den,  I  found  that  the  three  following  ones, 
meant  as  a  complement  to  the  first,  although  in  each  case 
set  in  type  and  sent  to  me  for  approval,  could  not  be  printed, 
the  requisite  courage  having  apparently  failed  the  editors. 
Thereupon,  being  determined  not  to  leave  a  stone  unturned 
in  the  pursuit  of  my  self-imposed  quixotic  task,  I  began  a 
round  of  calls  on  all  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  in  succession. 
I  found  all  of  them  quite  innocent  of  any  knowledge  of 
diplomatic  matters,  and  I  never  learned  whether  my 
endeavours  to  enlighten  them  had  produced  the  desired 
effect.  One  of  them,  and  it  seemed  to  me  the  most  intelligent 
one  of  them  all,  after  listening  to  me  attentively,  astonished 


THE   AMERICAN   MISSION  237 

me  not  a  little  by  maintaining  that  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  was  proceeding  on  the  very  lines  I  suggested  in 
proposing  to  the  Allied  Governments  to  proceed  jointly  to 
a  "  revision  of  the  war  aims."  To  this  I  demurred,  trying 
to  make  him  see  that  it  was  not  a  question  of  revising  so- 
called  "  war  aims,"  but  of  seeking  to  come  to  an  agreement 
with  our  Allies  on  the  subject  of  basic  conditions  upon  which 
we  might  conclude  jointly  a  general  peace  with  the  enemy 
Powers,  and  that  such  an  agreement  could  only  be  reached 
by  delicate  negotiations  which  could  not  possibly  be  carried 
on  by  exchanges  of  published  notes  or  parliamentary 
declarations  primarily  meant  for  home  consumption.  I 
could  not  help,  however,  admiring  the  skill  with  which  Mr. 
Terestchenko,  who  had  evidently  fallen  under  the  influence 
of  the  ideas  of  his  predecessors,  had  succeeded  in  making  his 
colleagues  believe  that  he  was  actually  carrying  out  the  policy 
which  the  Cabinet  had  at  first  decided  to  adopt. 

Then  came  the  news  of  the  departure  from  America  of 
Mr.  Root's  mission,  sent  apparently  for  the  purpose  of 
encouraging  Russia  to  continue  the  war  with  greater  energy^ — 
a  mission  whose  failure  I  knew  was  certain  and  could  only 
lead  to  mutual  irritation.  I  learned  of  it  with  painful 
consternation,  because  I  realized  how  hopelessly  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  had  been  influenced  by  the  current 
misconception  of  the  real  condition  of  affairs  in  Russia 
and  of  the  real  feelings  of  the  Russian  people,  fostered  by 
war  propaganda,  by  the  deceptive  assurances  of  our  diplomacy, 
and  the  vapourings  of  our  subsidized  Press  and  of  our  party 
leaders,  whom  Allied  diplomacy  in  Petrograd  was  wont  to 
consider  the  only  reliable  source  of  information  on  Russian 
affairs. 

During  the  sojourn  of  the  American  mission  in  Petrograd 
I  most  earnestly  requested  to  be  given  an  opportunity  of 
laying  before  its  members  my  views  on  the  war,  on  the  true 
meaning  of  the  Revolution,  and  on  the  actual  condition  of 
the  country.  Such  an  opportunity,  however,  was  not  vouch- 
safed to  me.     This  I  regret  more  than  words  can  express. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII 

First  news  of  the  Revolution — Some  personal  experiences — Am  offered 
Governorship  of  Finland — Situation  in  Finland — Blindness  of  the  Allies — 
My  efforts  towards  peace. 

It  was  my  intention  to  relate  in  this  chapter  some  of  my 
personal  experiences  in  the  first  days  of  the  Revolution, 
and  not  being  in  possession  of  any  diaries  or  notes,  as  we 
had  left  behind  everything  except  wearing  apparel  in  our 
flight  from  that  combination  of  prison  and  madhouse  yclept 
"  Soviet  Russia,"  I  resorted  to  the  files  of  the  New  York 
Times  in  order  to  refresh  my  memory  as  to  the  dates  on  which 
some  events  had  taken  place. 

The  first  mention  of  the  Revolution  I  found  in  the  issue 
of  that  paper  of  March  15,  1917,  in  the  shape  of  a  series  of 
cablegrams,  most  of  them  dated  from  London,  some  of  the 
same  date  and  some  of  the  day  before,  the  Revolution  having 
taken  place  on  the  12th. 

The  very  headlines  printed  on  the  first  page  of  the  New 
York  Times,  on  top  of  the  first  column  of  a  long  series  of 
cablegrams,  show  the  fatal  misconception  of  the  real  mean- 
ing of  the  Russian  Revolution  which  prevailed  among  the 
representatives  at  Petrograd  of  the  Press  as  well  as  of  the 
diplomacy  of  Allied  countries.     They  ran  as  follows  : 

London  Hails  Revolution. 

Expected  Tsar's  Overthrow  and  sees  Brighter  Prospect  for 

THE  Allies. 

Think  the  Coup  Decisive. 

Well-informed  Observers   believe  the  Patriotic  War   Party 
HAS  made  its  Control  Secure. 

Fear  no  Separate  Peace. 

With  weak   Ruler  Deposed  and   pro-German   Advisers  Ousted 

THEY   predict   NEW  VICTORIES. 

238 


THE   REVOLUTION  239 

On  the  second  page  I  found  another  cablegram  from 
London,  dated  March  15th,  under  the  caption  : 

Commons    told    of    Abdication.     Revolution    due    to    Russian 

PURPOSE    TO    fight    WaR    OUT,    SAYS    BONAR  LaW. 

In  the  text  of  the  cablegram  giving  an  extract  from 
Mr.  Bonar  Law's  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  he  is 
made  to  say  : 

There  is  some  comfort  for  us  in  the  comparative  tranquilHty  with 
which  the  change  was  conducted.  Here  is  also  real  comfort  that 
all  the  Government's  information  shows  that  the  movement  was  not 
in  any  sense  directed  toward  an  effort  to  secure  peace  by  Russia.  On 
the  contrary,  the  discontent  was  not  against  the  Government  for 
carrying  on  the  war,  but  for  not  carrying  it  on  with  that  efficiency 
and  energy  which  the  people  had  expected. 

That  such  a  fundamentally  erroneous  idea  of  the  causes 
and  effect  of  the  Revolution  that  had  taken  place  in  Petrograd 
should  have  been  conceived  at  first  in  Allied  countries  is 
perhaps  not  surprising.  The  wish  is  sometimes  father  to 
the  thought.  And  the  Allied  diplomacy  as  well  as  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Allied  Powers  at  Petrograd  were  handicapped 
in  their  task  of  forming  a  correct  judgment  on  Russian  affairs, 
on  the  one  hand  by  their  ignorance  of  the  Russian  language 
and  their  non-comprehension  of  the  mentality  and  of  the 
true  sentiments  and  aspirations  of  the  Russian  people,  and 
on  the  other  hand  by  their  habit  of  relying  for  their  enlighten- 
ment mainly,  if  not  exclusively,  on  such  information  as  would 
reach  them  through  their  particular  friends  and  adherents 
among  the  Duma  leaders  and  their  following  ;  in  other  words, 
on  one-sided  information  derived  from  political  circles  which, 
although  either  prejudiced  or  deluded  themselves,  were  being 
mistaken  for  the  only  authoritative  exponents  of  the  nation's 
feelings  and  wishes. 

But  there  was  one  feature  in  the  outbreak  of  the  Russian 
Revolution  which,  one  would  think,  should  have  opened 
the  eyes  of  even  the  most  superficial  observer  of  the  event 
to  the  fact  that  the  Revolution  meant,  not  the  advent  of 
an  improved  or  even  simply  a  new  form  of  government,  but 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  advent  of  anarchy,  at  first  in  a 
comparatively  mild  form,  but  which  from  week  to  week — nay. 


240        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

from  day  to  day — was  bound  to  become  more  accentuated  ; 
and  that,  therefore,  all  expectations  based  on  the  overthrow 
of  the  Imperial  Government  were  necessarily  doomed  to 
disappointment . 

That  feature  was  the  leading  part  assumed  from  the 
very  first  days  of  the  Revolution  by  a  so-called  "  Soviet  " 
of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates,  organized  in  haste 
by  professional  revolutionists,  which  had  established  its 
headquarters  in  the  Taurida  Palace,  and  was  holding  its 
meeting  in  the  hall  of  sittings  of  the  Duma.  Both  the 
Provisional  Executive  Committee  of  the  Duma  and  the 
Provisional  Government  which  it  had  been  suffered  to  appoint 
with  the  consent  of  the  Soviet  were  never  for  a  moment 
anything  else  but  a  Government  in  name,  the  real  power 
resting  with  the  Soviet,  the  only  body  whose  authority  was 
being  fully  acknowledged  by  the  forces  that  had  achieved 
the  Revolution,  the  mutinous  soldiery  and  the  revolutionary 
workmen. 

In  this  connection  I  cannot  help  quoting  from  an  article 
I  have  just  come  across  in  one  of  the  New  York  dailies,  the 
truly  prophetic  words  uttered  by  the  late  Count  Witte  in 
a  conversation  with  the  distinguished  author  of  that  article 
at  a  dinner  given  in  honour  of  the  Russian  Plenipotentiaries 
by  Mr.  Melville  E.  Stone,  of  the  Associated  Press,  a  few 
days   after   the   conclusion   of   the    Treaty   of    Portsmouth. 

The  world  should  be  surprised  (Count  Witte  is  reported  to  have 
said)  that  we  have  any  Government  in  Russia,  not  that  we  have 
an  imperfect  Government.  With  many  nationalities,  many  languages 
and  a  nation  largely  illiterate,  the  marvel  is  that  the  country  can  be 
held  together  even  by  autocracy.  Remember  one  thing:  if  the 
Tsar's  Government  falls,  you  will  see  absolute  chaos  in  Russia,  and 
it  will  be  many  a  long  year  before  you  see  another  Government  able 
to  control  the  mixture  that  makes  up  the  Russian  nation. 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  give  here  a  description  of  the 
sensational  events  of  the  first  days  of  the  Revolution.  That 
has  been  done,  with  far  greater  fullness  and  accuracy  than 
I  could  command,  by  the  very  able  and  distinguished  corre- 
spondent of  the  London  Times  at  Petrograd,  Mr.  Robert 
Wilton,  in  his  interesting  book,  Russia's  Agony.  No  one 
who  has  not  lived  through  a  revolution  in  his  own  country 
can  possibly  realize  the  tragic  meaning  of  the  sinking  of  the 


PERSONAL   EXPERIENCES  241 

heart  one  experiences  in  feeling  that,  so  to  speak,  the  bottom 
has  suddenly  dropped  out  of  everything.  Nor  can  I  attempt 
to  convey  in  feeble  words  an  impression  of  such  an  experience 
which  I  should  not  wish  my  worst  enemy  to  have  to  go  through. 
But  I  may  relate  some  episodes  from  my  personal  adventures 
in  those  days  which  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  chaotic  condi- 
tions brought  about  at  once  by  the  overthrow  of  the  Imperial 
Government. 

It  was  the  third  day  of  the  Revolution,  March  14,  1917. 
I  was  at  luncheon  with  my  fellow-lodgers  in  one  of  the  erst- 
while Imperial  Yacht  Club's  bedrooms  reserved  for  the  use 
of  members,  where  I  had  my  bachelor  quarters  when  separated 
from  my  family.     These   bedrooms,   five  in  number,   were 
situated  in  a  wing  of  the  club-house  on  the  second  floor, 
opening  on  a  corridor,  and  the  windows  overlooking  the  court- 
yard.    The  ciub-rooms  on  the  first  floor  were  closed  because 
of  the  disorder  and  frequent  firing  in  the  street,  so  that  we 
were  having  our  meals  in  one  of  our  bedrooms.     My  four 
companions  were  all   military  men — three   Generals   and   a 
Captain  of  a  guard  regiment — all  men  of  social  prominence  : 
a  former  Governor-General  of  one  of  our  outlying  dominions ; 
a  Division  Commander  ;  a  near  relative  of  one  of  our  Allied 
Sovereigns  ;   and  a  member  of  one  of  the  leading  families  of 
the  PoUsh  nobility — but  all  of  them  innocent  of  any  connection 
whatever  with  politics  of  any  kind.     We  had  just  finished 
our  meal  and  I  had  returned  to  my  room,  when  our  apartment 
was  invaded  by  a  noisy  crowd  of  some  twenty  soldiers  and 
sailors,  armed  with  bayonets  and  pistols,  who  declared  with 
shouts    and    threats    that    they    had    come    to    arrest    the 
"  Generals  "  and  to  take  them  to  the  Duma.     I  had  left  the 
door  of  my  room  open  on  purpose  to  avoid  the  appearance 
of  trying  to  hide.     One  of  the  soldiers  looked  into  my  room, 
but  seeing  that  I  was  a  civilian,  withdrew.     After  some  noisy 
altercation  my  fellow-lodgers  put  on  their  overcoats  and  were 
marched  downstairs  into  the  street,  v/here  a  lorry  was  waiting 
to  take  them  to  the  Duma.     But  an  ugly  mob  had  collected 
in  front  of  the  house,  and,  hurling  invectives  at  the  "  blood- 
suckers," insisted  on  their  being  marched  off  on  foot.     They 
reached  the  Taurida  Palace  after  a  march  of  some  two  or  three 
miles  through  the  snow  and  slush  characteristic  of  Petrograd 
streets  in  early  spring,  all  the  while  exposed  to  the  insults 

VOL.   II  16 


242        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

and  imprecations  of  the  populace.  As  good  luck  would  have 
it,  they  met  on  the  steps  of  the  palace  Mr.  Gutchkoff,  the 
Minister  of  War  in  the  Provisional  Government,  who  happened 
to  be  personally  acquainted  with  one  of  them,  and  who  not 
only  had  them  liberated  at  once,  but  brought  them  back  to 
the  club  in  his  automobile.  I  would  mention  here  incidentally 
that  having  deposited  my  friends  at  the  door  of  the  club- 
house, he  continued  on  his  way  farther  down  the  same  street, 
where  some  desultory  firing  was  going  on,  with  the  result 
that  his  aide-de-camp,  young  Prince  W.,  an  officer  of  one  of 
the  guard  regiments,  was  killed  by  his  side  by  a  stray  bullet. 

After  my  fellow-lodgers  had  been  carried  off  by  the  soldiers 
who  had  come  to  arrest  them,  I  was  left  alone,  our  servants 
having  disappeared,  and  fancied  that  the  trouble  had  blown 
over  as  far  as  I  was  concerned.  This  illusion,  however, 
was  soon  to  be  dispelled.  Some  eight  or  ten  of  the  original 
band  of  soldiers,  among  whom  seemed  to  be  also  a  couple 
of  sailors,  after  having  seen  their  comrades  carr}'  off  their 
prisoners,  returned  to  the  scene  of  their  exploit  for  the  pur- 
pose, evidently,  of  finding  out  whether  some  loot  could  not 
be  secured  from  the  rooms  of  the  presumably  wealthy 
bourgeois.  They  had  no  difficulty  in  invading  our  apartment, 
the  servant  having  neglected  to  lock  the  entrance  door 
before  running  away  by  the  back  stairs  ;  and  presently  I 
found  myself  confronted  by  one  of  the  band,  who  entered 
my  room  with  a  drawn  sword,  but  looked  so  silly  and  sheepish 
that  I  laughingly  asked  him  whether  he  had  really  come  to 
cut  my  throat  ;  whereupon  he  respectfully  said  that  he  had 
come  to  look  for  concealed  arms,  and  when  I  had  shown  him 
that  there  were  none  hidden  under  my  bed,  he  discreetly 
withdrew. 

In  the  meantime  the  others  had  begun  to  search  the  rooms 
vacated  by  their  occupants,  opening  their  wardrobes,  drawers 
and  boxes,  and  appropriating  such  small  articles  as  struck 
their  fancy.  These  proceedings  occupied  considerable  time 
amidst  much  boisterous  noise,  shouting  and  apparent 
quarrelling.  Curiosity  made  me  go  to  see  what  was  going 
on.  I  went  out  into  the  corridor  and  looked  into  the  room 
of  my  left-hand  neighbour,  a  brilliant  young  cavalry  officer, 
and  there  I  found  two  soldiers,  one  of  whom  was  in  the  act 
of  putting  on  my  young  friend's  magnificent  regulation  boots, 


AN  INCAUTIOUS   INTERFERENCE      243 

having  thrown  into  a  corner  his  own  dirty  footwear.     My 
appearance  in  the  corridor  attracted  the  other  invaders,  and 
one  of  them,  who  seemed  to  be  their  leader,  told  me  in  a  gruff 
and  threatening  tone  that  their  orders  were  to  arrest  me  as 
well,  and  that  I  had  better  make  ready  to  accompany  them 
to  the  Duma.     Seeing  that  in  the  presence  of  superior  force 
protesting   would   have   been   useless,    I   began   with   some 
deliberation  to  get  into  my  fur  coat,  when  one  of  the  soldiers 
approached  me  from  behind  and  whispered  in  my  ear  :  "  That's 
all  right ;  don't  be  in  a  hurry,"     There  evidently  were  divided 
counsels,  and  somewhat  reassured  as  to  my  immediate  fate, 
I  returned  to  my  room,  took  off  my  fur  coat  and  sat  down  in 
my  favourite  corner  in  expectation  of  further  developments. 
It  so  happened  that   my  right-hand   neighbour  had  a  few 
days  before  removed  from  his  room  a  bulky  trunk  and  had  it 
placed  in  the  corridor  between  the  doors  to  our  rooms.     The 
marauders  had  procured  an  axe  and  had  begun  hammering 
away  at  the  top  of  the  trunk,  when  instinctive  indignation 
moved  me  to  interfere.     I  went  out  into  the  corridor  and  told 
the  men,  in  as  calmly  authoritative  a  manner  as  I  thought  I 
might   assume,   that  the  trunk  they  were  trying  to   open 
belonged  to  a  foreign  prince,  a  near  relative  of  one  of  our 
Allied  Sovereigns,  and  that  they  had  better  respect  at  least 
his    property.     They    responded    by    threatening    shouts : 
"  Get  out  of  here;  this  is  none  of  your  business."     I  had  to 
retire  with  as  good  grace  as  I  could  muster,  but  I  had  barely 
reached  my  favourite  corner  again  when  I  heard  one  of  the 
soldiers  shouting  at  the  others  in  a  voice  betokening,  evidently, 
sincere  indignation  :   "  For  shame  !     This  is  a  political  action, 
and  you  behave  like  a  lot  of  scoundrelly  bandits  !  "     However, 
my   uncautious  interference    had    excited    the    ire    of    the 
marauders,  and  after  some  noisy  and  rather  violent  discussion 
the  echo  of  which  reached  me  in  my  retreat,  the  whole  crowd 
rushed  into  my  room,  led  by  a  particularly  villainous-looking 
individual,  and  I  realized  that  things  had  begun  to  look 
decidedly  blue  for  me,  when  suddenly  a  young  distinguished- 
looking  man  in  a  reserve  officer's  uniform  appeared  in  the 
doorway,  and,  the  soldiers  having  instinctively  subsided  into 
silence  in  the  presence  of  a  superior,  asked  me  who  I  was. 
Upon  being  told,  he  at  once  declared  that  he  knew  and 
respected  my  name,  that  I  need  not  be  arrested,  and  that  he 


244        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

would  be  personally  responsible  for  me.  A  violent  altercation 
ensued,  the  leader  of  the  crowd  behaving  with  the  utmost 
insolence  and  insisting  on  carrying  me  off  to  the  Duma. 
But  the  majority  of  the  soldiers  sided  with  the  officer,  and  he 
succeeded  at  last  in  causing  them  to  depart,  having  shown  them 
a  certificate  which  he  then  and  there  had  made  out  on  a  sheet 
of  my  letter  paper  and  signed  in  their  presence.  This  curious 
document,  which  I  have  preserved  as  a  memento  of  those 
troubled  days,  runs  as  follows  : 

March  i    {that  is  to  say  14,  new  style),   1917. 
By  order  of  the  Provisional  Government,  the  Yacht  Club,  as  well 
as  the  room  occupied  by  Baron,  Rosen  in  the  building,  having  been 
searched  and  no  arms  having  been  found.   Baron  Rosen  is  allowed 
to  renaain  in  his  room. 

Patrol  of  the  Reserve  Division  of  Armoured  Cars, 

{Signed)   Lieutenant  Dekhtiareff. 

My  young  benefactor,  who  was  a  student  of  the  University 
of  Petrograd,  then  explained  that  the  Mihtary  Commission 
of  the  Duma  had  sent  him  in  an  armoured  car  with  a  couple 
of  men  to  verify  whether  in  our  part  of  the  town  the  search 
for  arms  by  the  soldiers  was  being  effected  in  an  orderly  way  ; 
that  in  passing  he  had  noticed  that  a  crowd  had  collected  in 
front  of  the  club-house,  and  that,  suspecting  something  to 
be  happening  in  the  house,  he  had  stopped  his  car,  run  upstairs 
and  arrived  just  in  the  nick  of  time  to  save  me  from  being 
arrested  and  carried  off  by  my  tormentors.  I  wonder  if 
this  young  man  has  escaped  the  cruel  fate  that  has  overtaken 
so  many  thousands  of  deserving  people  of  his  class.  If  he 
has  been  spared  to  live  a  life  of  honour  and  usefulness  to  the 
country  and  the  nation,  and  if  these  lines  should  ever  meet 
his  eyes,  I  beg  he  will  believe  that  his  timely  intervention 
at  a  critical  moment  will  always  be  remembered  with  profound 
gratitude  by  their  author. 

Late  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  the  third  day  of 
the  Revolution,  we  inhabitants  of  the  club  chambers  were 
destined  to  meet  with  another,  and  this  time  less  alarming, 
experience.  We  were  quietly,  over  tea  and  cigars,  exchanging 
our  impressions  on  the  events  of  the  day,  when  there  was  a 
furious  knocking  at  the  door  and  our  servant,  in  great  alarm, 
evidently  under  the  impression  of  the  afternoon's  invasion, 


UNEXPECTED   GUESTS  245 

rushed  in  to  inquire  what  he  was  to  do.  He  was,  of  course, 
ordered  to  open  the  door  immediately,  and  we  all  went  out 
into  the  corridor  to  see  what  was  going  to  happen.  When  the 
door  opened  we  beheld  a  rather  surprising  sight  :  two  burly 
soldiers  with  rifles  and  bayonets  led  by  what  at  first  sight 
appeared  to  be  a  young  woman  disguised  in  male  attire 
awkwardly  handling  a  large  Army  revolver.  The  young 
woman,  however,  turned  out  to  be  a  very  nice  and  well- 
bred  boy  of  fifteen  or  sixteen,  who  in  the  most  polite  language 
explained  that  he  had  been  sent  by  the  Duma  Commission 
on  Military  Affairs,  in  charge  of  a  dozen  men,  in  a  motor 
lorry,  to  search  for  and  to  collect  arms  of  every  kind  that  might 
be  found  in  private  houses  and  apartments  in  our  part  of  the 
town  ;  that  they  had  not  yet  finished  their  task,  which  was 
to  be  taken  up  again  the  following  morning  ;  and  he  asked 
whether  we  would  consent  to  put  him  and  his  soldiers  up  for 
the  night  on  the  premises  of  the  club.  Under  the  circum- 
stances the  best  we  could  do  was  to  comply  with  this  request, 
and  we  sent  for  the  steward  of  the  club,  who  declared  his 
willingness  to  let  our  unexpected  guests  occupy  for  the  night 
the  bowling  alley,  and  even  to  have  some  supper  prepared 
for  them. 

The  following  morning  I  went  downstairs  to  see  how 
things  were  going  on,  and  found  that  the  soldiers  had  been 
behaving  themselves  with  propriety,  and  although  quite 
innocent  of  any  show  of  military  discipline,  seemed  to  acquiesce 
in  the  unpretentious  leadership  of  the  boy  who  had  been 
placed  at  their  head  and  whom  they  addressed  as  "  Comrade  " 
{Tovaristch  in  Russian).  Taking  aside  the  youngster,  I 
asked  him  how  it  had  come  about  that  he,  a  mere  boy, 
had  been  placed  in  charge  of  these  men,  every  one  of  them  old 
enough  to  have  been  his  father.  This  is  what  he  told  me  : 
When  it  had  been  decided  (evidently  under  strong  pressure, 
or  rather  by  command  of  the  "  Soviet  ")  to  disarm  the 
population,  the  Duma  Commission  on  Military  Affairs  had 
taken  steps  to  send  out  all  over  the  town  groups  of  soldiers 
in  motor  lorries  for  the  purpose  of  searching  for  and 
confiscating  arms  found  in  private  dwellings.  Being  afraid, 
however,  of  entrusting  this  task  to  an  uncontrolled  soldiery, 
and  as  there  were  no  officers  available,  many  of  whom  had 
been  murdered  by  their  soldiers  on  the  very  first  day  of  the 


246        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Revolution,  and  the  rest  having  been  disarmed  by  its  order 
or  being  in  hiding,  the  Commission  had  apphed  to  the 
University  and  to  the  higher  schools,  calling  upon  volunteers 
among  their  pupils  who  would  be  willing  to  take  charge  of 
the  groups  of  soldiers  to  be  sent  out  ;  our  young  friend, 
being  a  pupil  of  the  Petrograd  Commercial  College,  had 
volunteered  for  this  service  and  had  not,  so  far,  experienced 
any  difficulty  with  the  men  of  his  command. 

I  have  dwelt  at  such  length  on  the  apparently  immaterial 
details  of  these  occurrences  because  they  shed  light  not  only 
on  the  general  mentality  of  the  Russian  peasant-soldiers, 
which  so  strangely  combined  truly  sadic  lust  of  murder  and 
torture  applied  to  their  regular  officers  with  good-natured 
acquiescence  in  the  occasional  leadership  of  mere  University 
students,  and  even  schoolboys,  but  also  on  their  state  of  mind 
in  the  initial  stages  of  the  Revolution,  when  they  were  still 
dazed  and  bewildered  by  the  unexpected  results  they  had  them- 
selves achieved,  and  were  not  yet  awake  to  the  consciousness 
of  having  entirely  at  their  mercy  the  capital  of  the  Empire — 
nay,  the  Empire  itself — and  more  particularly  the  hated 
educated  classes,  whom  they  held  responsible  for  the  war 
and  the  misery  of  its  indefinite  prolongation.  This  conscious- 
ness was  to  come  to  them  later  and  was  to  be  skilfully  and 
ruthlessly  exploited  by  the  sanguinary  bandits  and  demented 
fanatics  of  Bolshevism  for  the  purpose  of  seizing  power  over 
a  helplessly  unresisting  nation  which  they  proceeded  to  enslave 
by  a  regime  of  terrorism  such  as  the  world  has  never  before 
seen,  reducing  the  Russian  people  to  a  state  of  deepest  abase- 
ment and  irretrievable  ruin. 

A  few  days  later  I  had  occasion  to  visit  the  so-called 
"  Palais  Marie,"  the  home  of  what  had  been  the  Council  of 
the  Empire,  and  found  the  beautiful  vestibule  of  the  palace 
occupied  by  a  most  disreputable-looking  lot  of  some  twenty 
to  thirty  soldiers,  who  were  lounging  on  benches  and  chairs 
they  had  brought  in,  and  who  presented  a  lamentable  spec- 
tacle of  revolutionary  sans  gene  and  contempt  for  discipline. 
An  official  of  the  Chancellerie  of  the  Council,  where  I  had 
some  business  to  transact,  told  me  that  the  palace  had  been 
occupied  by  the  soldiery  in  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution 
presumably  for  the  same  reason  that  prompted  them  to  invade 
the  Duma  ;  that  so  far  they  had  not  done  any  serious  damage 


THE   PROVISIONAL   GOVERNMENT     247 

to  the  State  apartments  and  the  hall  of  sittings  on  the  main 
floor  of  the  building  ;  that  it  had  not  been  possible  as  yet  to 
get  rid  of  their  unwelcome  presence,  but  that  nevertheless 
the  members  of  the  Provisional  Government  were  using  the 
State  apartments  for  their  meetings  ;  and,  lastly,  that  at 
that  very  moment  they  were  assembled  there  for  the  purpose 
of  receiving  the  representative  of  a  foreign  Power  who  was 
to  announce  to  them  their  recognition  by  his  Government. 

I  could  not  help  reflecting  with  profound  humiliation 
on  the  thoughts  which  would  be  bound  to  cross  the  mind 
of  that  distinguished  foreigner,  however  friendly  disposed, 
at  the  sight  of  such  a  disorderly  band  of  armed  men,  which 
by  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  could  be  taken  for  a  guard 
to  present  military  honours  to  an  ambassador. 

It  would  seem  difficult  to  explain  how  it  was  possible  that, 
in  the  presence  of  similar  evidences — and  there  were  many 
and  more  serious  ones — of  the  Provisional  Government's 
helpless  inability  to  maintain  even  an  outward  show  of  really 
controlling  the  situation.  Allied  diplomacy  could  have 
acclaimed  that  shadowy  Government  with  favour  and  could 
have  based  optimistic  expectations  on  its  advent.  The 
observant,  sharp-witted  and  level-headed  wife  of  a  naval 
attache  to  the  American  Embassy  has,  in  her  recently 
published  Intimate  Letters  from  Petrograd,  written  in  1917 
and  1918,  expressed  her  perplexity  in  this  regard  in  the 
following  somewhat  cruel  terms  : 

I  have  determined  upon  a  new  definition  of  optimism  in  Russia. 
An  optimist  is  an  alleged  diplomat  who  is  wilfully  blind. 

The  reproach  of  wilful  blindness,  fully  merited  by  Allied 
diplomacy  in  the  sequel  of  events,  when  it  played  such  a 
sinister  part  in  shaping  the  destiny  of  our  unfortunate  country, 
could  hardly  be  applied  to  the  illusions  entertained  at  first, 
inasmuch  as  these  illusions  were  in  the  fullest  measure 
shared  not  only  by  those  political  circles  from  which  that 
diplomacy  was  wont  to  derive  its  information  on  Russian 
affairs,  but  also,  indeed,  by  the  majority  of  the  educated 
classes  in  the  country.  After  the  lamentable  collapse  of 
the  last  Government  of  incapables  under  the  Imperial 
regime,  the  advent  to  what  was  supposed  would    be    real 


248        FORTY  YEARS  OF  DIPLOMACY 

power   of   a   Provisional   Government,    composed   with   one 
exception  of  leaders  of  the  moderate  Conservative  and  Liberal 
parties,  all  men  of  proved  ability  in  various  walks  of  life, 
of   high    character   and  unquestioned  integrity,   was  hailed 
by   public    opinion   with    unfeigned   satisfaction    and    even 
enthusiasm.     Their   fatal  lack   of  backbone,   manifested  in 
their  acceptance  as  a  fellow-member  in  their    Government 
of  Kerensky,  the  leader  of  one  of  the  revolutionary  parties 
whose  aim  was,  and  always  had  been,  the  destruction  of  the 
Empire   for   the   purpose   of   clearing  the  ground  for  their 
socialistic  millennium,  was  not  at  once  realized  in  its    in- 
evitable bearing  on  the  future  development  of  events.     Nor 
was  their  failure  to  understand  the  underlying  meaning  of 
the  revolutionary  outbreak,   and  to  gauge  aright  the  real 
feelings  of  the  immense  bulk  of  the  nation,  comprehended 
as  what  it  really  was — a  total  lack  of  that  true  statesmanship 
which  places  the  satisfaction  of  the  crying  needs  of  the  people 
above  the  gratification  of  personal  ambitions  and  of  the  aims 
of  party  policies.     Moreover,  they  were  handicapped  not  only 
by  their  inexperience  in  statecraft,  for  which  no  blame  could 
be  attached  to  them,  since  they  had  never  been  given  an 
opportunity  to  participate  in  the  handling  of  affairs  of  State, 
but  also  by  their  inexperience  in  dealing  with  the  complicated 
mechanism  of  the  huge  bureaucratic  machine.     This  machine 
continued,  indeed,  to  function  by  that  force  of  inertia  which 
keeps  all  institutions  running  for  some  time  after  the  guiding 
power  is  gone.     But  it  was  bound  to  and  did  break  down 
in  the  end,  leaving  the  country  in  a  state  of  complete  anarchy. 
Among  my  personal  adventures  of  the  first  days  of  the 
Revolution  was  one  which  I  have  not  yet  mentioned.     It 
was  on  the  day  following  after  my  attempted  arrest  by  some 
soldiers  that  I  was  sent  for  by  the  Provisional  Government 
and  requested  to  accept  the  post  of  Governor-General  of 
Finland,  where  my  name  enjoyed  some  popularity  on  account 
of  the  position  I  had  taken  up  in  the  Council  of  the  Empire 
in  defence  of  the  constitutional  rights  of  the  Finnish  people. 
I  told  the  member  of  the  Duma  who  approached  me  on  the 
subject  in   the  name    of  the   Provisional  Government  that 
I  held  it  to  be  the  duty  of  every  good  citizen  to  place  his 
services  unreservedly  at   the  disposal  of  that   Government 
which   evidently  stood  between   the   country   and   anarchy 


AN   OFFER   BY  THE   GOVERNMENT     249 

as  the  only  hope  of  the  re-estabUshment  of  law  and  order, 
and  that,  therefore,  I  unhesitatingly  agreed  to  undertake 
the  task  it  was  proposed  to  entrust  to  me.  At  the  same  time 
I  pointed  out  to  him  the  very  serious  misgivings  I  felt  as  to 
the  possibility  of  a  successful  accomplishment  of  such  a 
mission,  not,  of  course,  on  account  of  any  difficulties  to  be 
encountered  on  the  part  of  the  Finnish  population,  which, 
after  the  complete  restoration  of  the  Finnish  constitution 
immediately  conceded  by  the  Provisional  Government, 
would,  I  felt  sure,  prove  entirely  loyal,  but  on  account  of 
the  unruly  disposition  prevailing  among  our  soldiery  stationed 
in  Finland,  and  especially  among  the  crews  of  the  numerous 
vessels  of  the  fleet  wintering  in  the  harbour  of  Helsingfors, 
of  the  existence  of  which  I  had  convinced  myself  by  personal 
observation  in  my  frequent  visits  to  the  Finnish  capital, 
where  my  family  had  found  a  temporary  home  since  the 
autumn  of  1915. 

I  must  say  here  that  if  this  offer  had  come  to  me  before 
the  war  I  should  have  accepted  with  real  enthusiasm  the 
task  of  being  the  instrument  of  reconciliation  between  the 
Empire  and  the  Grand  Duchy  on  the  basis  of  the  unreserved 
recognition  and  the  fullest  restitution  of  the  constitutional 
rights  of  Finland,  because  of  my  profound  conviction  that 
such  a  reconciliation  was  imperatively  demanded  by  every 
consideration  of  sound  statesmanship,  and  was  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  Russia  no  less  than  to  Finland. 

I  will  say  also  that  I  was  perfectly  sincere  in  my  immediate 
acceptance  of  the  offer  made  to  me,  evidently  on  the  spur  of 
the  moment,  on  behalf  of  the  revolutionary  Provisional 
Government  and  emanating  presumably  from  some  of  its 
more  liberal-minded  members.  But  knowing  the  mentality 
prevailing  not  only  in  our  bureaucratic  circles,  but  generally 
speaking  in  the  world  of  our  political  "Intelligentzia,"  priding 
itself  upon  its  freedom  from  bureaucratic  prejudices  and 
pettinesses,  I  had  not  a  moment's  doubt  that  nothing  would 
come  of  it  after  all. 

Indeed,  that  same  evening  I  was  called  up  on  the  telephone 
by  a  friend  of  mine,  who  told  me  that  one  of  the  leaders  of 
the  Cadet  Party  (Constitutional  Democratic  Party)  who  was 
with  him  at  the  time  and  who,  although  not  personally 
acquainted  with  me,  was  greatly  in  favour  of  my  appoint- 


250        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

ment  to  the  post  of  Governor-General  of  Finland,  and  had 
come  to  ask  him  to  ascertain  from  me  whether  it  was  true 
that  I  had  written  a  letter  to  the  former  Emperor  advising 
the  conclusion  of  a  "  separate  peace  "  with  Germany,  the 
point  having  been  raised  in  the  party  council  by  some  one 
opposed  to  my  appointment.  I  replied  that  I  had  never 
written  any  letter  to  the  Emperor,  and  that  if  I  had  done  so 
I  should  certainly  not  have  advocated  the  conclusion  of  a 
separate  peace  with  Germany, 

This  story  of  a  letter  supposed  to  have  been  written  by 
me  to  the  Emperor  could  only  have  related  to  the  paper 
mentioned  in  a  preceding  chapter,  of  which  I  had  handed  a 
copy  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Sazonoff,  and  which 
did  not  contain  even  an  allusion  to  the  conclusion  of  such  a 
peace,  let  alone  the  tender  of  advice  to  that  effect. 

A  couple  of  days  later,  as  I  had  expected  from  the  first, 
I  was  informed  that  my  proposed  appointment  had  been 
cancelled,  the  member  of  the  Duma  who  had  approached  me 
on  behalf  of  the  Provisional  Government  explaining  in  his 
letter  to  me  that  on  second  thought  the  question  had  once 
more  been  discussed  in  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  that  the 
majority  of  the  members  of  the  Government  had  concluded 
that  at  such  a  time  the  appointment  to  the  post  of  Governor- 
General  of  Finland  of  a  person  bearing  a  "  not  entirely  Russian 
name  "  would  be  undesirable. 

I  must  own  that  this  decision  of  the  Government,  far 
from  causing  me  any  disappointment,  gave  me  a  feeling  of 
profound  relief,  because  I  was  entirely  convinced  that  the 
position  which,  as  a  matter  of  patriotic  duty,  I  had  consented 
to  fill,  would  in  the  nearest  future  become  absolutely  untenable 
since  the  Revolution  in  Russia  was  bound  to  have  its  counter- 
part in  Finland. 

At  first  the  Russian  Revolution  was  hailed  by  the  ruling 
classes  in  Finland  with  some  apparent  satisfaction,  not  perhaps 
unmixed  with  serious  apprehensions  as  to  future  develop- 
ments, because  it  meant  the  end  of  the  oppressive  regime 
unconstitutionally  maintained  by  the  Russian  bureaucracy 
and  the  complete  restoration  of  the  country's  autonomy 
and  constitution,  at  once  unreservedly  conceded  by  the 
Provisional  Government.  At  any  rate,  when  I  had  occasion 
to  visit  Helsingfors  in  the  second  week  of  the  Revolution  I 


THE  FINNISH  SOCIALISTS  251 

was  struck  by  the  sight  of  quite  a  large  number  of  Russian 
national  flags,  which  since  the  days  of  the  extremely  popular 
Emperor  and  Grand  Duke  Alexander  II  had  not  been  seen 
flying  in  Finland's  capital,  except  from  the  Governor-General's 
palace — a  sight  as  gratifying  as  it  was  humiliating  to  a  Russian 
fresh  from  witnessing  the  shameful  spectacle  of  his  own 
country's  capital,  where  the  national  colours  were  no  longer 
tolerated  and  where  from  thousands  of  houses  was  seen  flying 
the  sinister  red  flag  of  Socialism — emblem  of  bloodshed  and 
revolution. 

In  order  to  understand  the  attitude  of  the  Finnish,  or 
rather  Finlandish,  bourgeoisie  (since  it  was  composed  of  both 
nationalities,  Swedish  as  well  as  Finnish,  with  a  preponderance 
of  the  former)  one  must  keep  in  mind  that  Finland's  connection 
with  the  Russian  State — geographically  natural — had  been 
economically  of  the  greatest  advantage  to  the  country  to 
whose  trade  and  industry  it  had  opened  unrestrictedly  a 
market  of  illimited  capacity  in  the  immense  extent  of  its 
Russian  "  hinterland,"  and  had  never  been  felt  as  a  hardship 
under  the  wise  and  liberal  rule  of  the  first  Emperors — Grand 
Dukes  Alexander  I,  Nicholas  I  and  Alexander  II.  Finnish 
separatism,  whose  birth  and  growth  the  Russian  bureaucracy's 
oppressive  policy  was  supposed  to  prevent  or  to  counteract, 
had  really  been  the  direct  outcome  of  that  very  policy  with 
whose  passing  the  main  compelling  motive  for  aiming  at 
separation  from  Russia  had  ceased  to  exist. 

It  was,  of  course,  not  surprising  that  the  Finnish  Socialists 
should  have  welcomed  the  Russian  Revolution  as  a  powerful 
aid  in  realizing  their  aim  at  bringing  about  a  revolution  in 
their  own  country.  It  was,  indeed,  not  long  before  our 
mutinous  soldiers  and  sailors,  who  had  at  once  organized 
"  Soviets  "  on  the  most  approved  pattern,  and  had  been 
freely  murdering,  and  often  cruelly  torturing,  their  offtcers, 
had  concluded  an  alliance  with  the  Finnish  Socialist  Red 
Guards — an  alliance  which,  after  the  withdrawal  from 
Finland  of  most  of  the  Russian  troops,  led  to,  or  rather 
was  followed  by,  the  outbreak  of  civil  war  between  the 
Finnish  Red  Guards,  assisted  by  Russian  revolutionary 
elements,  and  Finnish  White  Guards  composed  of  volunteers 
drawn  from  the  bourgeoisie,  at  first  with  the  aid — soon 
withdrawn — of  some  German  troops,  who  had  been  landed  in 


252        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Finland,   and  later    with   the   co-operation  of  a  brigade  of 
Swedish  volunteers. 

Finland's  bourgeoisie — to  its  great  credit  and  honour  be 
it  said — had  found  in  its  own  midst  the  courage,  the  resources 
and  the  energy  not  only  to  resist  the  onslaught  of  revolutionary 
Socialism,  but,  with  very  little  external  aid,  to  defeat  it  and 
to  save  the  country  from  the  fate  that  has  overtaken 
unfortunate  Russia. 

Foreseeing  the  impending  outbreak  of  revolution  and 
civil  war  in  Finland,  I  had  in  time  caused  my  family  to  move 
from  Helsingfors  to  Petrograd,  where  they  found  in  one  of 
the  few  still  open  hotels  a  precarious  shelter,  open  to  sudden 
nocturnal  invasions  and  searches  for  "  arms  "  by  the  revolu- 
tionary soldiery,  and  where  they  remained  until  in  May  19 18 
it  became  possible  for  us  to  escape  from  the  Socialist  paradise 
and  the  doomed  capital  of  what  had  been  the  Russian 
Empire. 

To  those  who  wish  to  form  a  vivid  idea  of  what  life  in 
a  town  cursed  with  a  state  of  revolution  really  is  like  I 
recommend  the  perusal  of  Mrs.  Pauline  S.  Crosley's  fascina- 
tingly interesting  volume.  Intimate  Letters  from  Petrograd. 

The  blindness  displayed  by  our  Allies  in  their  policy  in 
regard  to  Russia,  before  as  well  as  after  the  Revolution,  is,  of 
course,  undeniable,  since  the  outcome  of  this  policy  is  there 
to  prove  it — an  outcome  as  fatal  to  Russia  as  it  must  in  the 
end  prove  disadvantageous  to  our  former  Allies  themselves, 
and  which,  therefore,  could  not  possibly  have  been  deliber- 
ately aimed  at  by  them.  To  attribute  the  blindness  of  their 
policy  to  mere  "  wilfulness  "  would  be  neither  satisfactory 
as  an  explanation  nor  would  it  be  fair  to  the  statesmen  who 
devised  and  conducted  it  in  what  they  believed  to  be  the  best 
interests  of  their  countries.  Whether  this  belief  has  been 
justified  by  events  they  will  determine  for  themselves.  But 
it  stands  to  reason  that  their  "  wilfulness  "  in  deliberately 
shutting  their  eyes  to  conditions  which  were  bound  to  defeat 
in  the  end  the  very  aims  of  their  policy  and  which  to  them 
no  less  than  to  independent  observers  must  have  appeared 
quite  evident,  could  not  but  have  had  some  determining  and 
perhaps  even  compelling  causes. 

Among  these   determining  causes   the   first   place   must 
be  assigned  to  the  attitude  of  the  various  Governments — 


BLINDNESS   OF  THE  ALLIES  253 

Imperial    as  well    as    "  Provincial  "    under   Prince    Lwoff's 
presidency,  and  lastly  "  Coalition  "  under  Kerensky — with 
whom  they  had  to  deal,  and  who,  all  of  them,  in  disregard 
of  the  country's  crying  need  of  peace,  of  the  manifest  un- 
willingness of  the  people  to  stay  any  longer  in  the  fight,  and 
of   the   resultant   gradual    voluntary    "  demobilization  "    of 
the  Army,  which  in  reahty  had  set  in,  although  carefully 
concealed,  already  towards  the  end  of  1916,  were  constantly 
assuring  and  continued  to  the  last  moment  to  assure  our 
Allies   of   their   unshakable   determination   to   continue   the 
war  with  the  greatest  energy  and  vigour  until  a  final  victory 
was  achieved.     Of  their  earnest  desire  to  do  so  there  could 
be  no  question,  although  the  sincerity  of  their  own  belief 
in  their  ability  to  carry  through  such  a  policy  might  well 
have    been   doubted.      Therefore   the   solemn   character   of 
their  repeated  official    assurances,  however  sceptically  they 
may  have  been  received,  furnished  the  Allies,  who  were  bent 
on  the  continuation  of  the  war  at  any  cost,  with  a  sufficient 
and  welcome  ground  for  insisting  on  the  realization  of  these 
assurances   to   the   fullest   extent.     But   in   exercising   such 
pressure  by  persuasion,  flattery,  and  lastly  by  comminatory 
joint  representations,  they  seemed  not  to  realize  sufficiently 
that  what  ailed  all  these  Governments  they  were  dealing  with 
— the  Imperial  Government  in  the  last  months  of  its  existence 
no  less  than  its  revolutionary  successors — was  that  they  were 
Governments  only  in  name,  bereft  of  real  power  since  the 
complete  disorganization  of  the  huge  bureaucratic  machinery 
and   the   disintegration   of   the    Army   which    accompanied 
the  prolonged  death-throes  of  the  Imperial  regime  had  been 
succeeded  by  a  condition  of  revolutionary  anarchy,  gradually 
growing   in   intensity  and   presaging  the   final   catastrophe. 
They  were  being  swept  along  helplessly  and  semi-consciously 
on  a  current  of  elemental  forces  whose  irresistible  nature  they 
failed  to  realize — a  current  which  they  neither  commanded 
the  power  to  stem  nor  had  the  wisdom  and  ability  to  deflect 
into  the  only  possible  channel  of  safety. 

I  cannot  undertake  to  say  whether  or  not  any  one 
of  these  successive  Governments,  composed  all  of  them 
of  elements  swayed  by  various  degrees  of  Conservative, 
Liberal  or  Socialistic  doctrinairianism,  and  belonging  to 
the    same     "  Intelligentzia "     whose    separation     from     tlie 


254        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

masses  of  the  people  has  been  the  bane  of  modern 
Russia  since  Peter  the  Great — whether  any  one  of  them 
at  any  time  had  poUtical  insight  enough  to  comprehend 
that  under  existing  circumstances  the  only  Government 
that  could  ever  hope  to  become  a  Government  in  fact, 
wielding  the  plenitude  of  power,  and  not  in  name  merely, 
would  be  a  Government  willing  to  bring  to  the  people 
what  they  were  clamouring  for  ;  that  is  to  say,  peace  in  any 
shape  or  form.  If  they  possessed  such  insight,  they  lacked 
the  courage  to  act  upon  it,  thereby  working  not  only  their 
own  downfall  but  the  ruin  of  the  country,  deliberately 
abandoned  to  the  tender  mercies  of  those  who  had  both  the 
insight  and  the  determination  to  translate  it  into  action  and 
who  were  thus  enabled  to  seize  real  power  which  they  to  this 
hour  exercise  with  a  sanguinary  ruthlessness  unexampled 
in  the  history  of  the  world. 

It  was  not  unnatural  that  the  Allies  should  have  at  first 
welcomed  and  treated  as  Russia's  coming  and  at  last  real 
statesmen  the  members  of  the  Provisional  Government  whose 
advent  to  power  they  had — if  not   "  aided  and  abetted," 
as  Dr.  E.  J,  Dillon  has  it — evidently  hoped  for  and  favoured. 
Did  not  Russian  public  opinion  itself,  on  the  whole,  share 
this  illusion  before  these  men  had  shown  their  utter  inability 
to  deal  with  the  critical  situation  in  which  the  country  found 
itself  placed  through  the  war  and  the  Revolution,  an  inability 
due  not  only  to  their  own  incompetence  but  also  to  the  fact 
that  they  never  at  any  time  had  been  really  free  agents. 
But  it  is  hardly  credible  that  Allied  statesmen  could  have  taken 
seriously  the  sinister  farce  of  the  dictatorship  of  that  glorified 
Russian  Poo  Bah,  Kerensky,  at  once  Dictator,  Prime  Minister 
and  Supreme  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and  of  the 
Navy,  who  by  the  inspired  Press  in  Allied  countries  was  hailed 
as  the  greatest  statesman  of  Russia,  the  coming  Man  and 
Saviour  of  his  country.     Nor  could  they  have  failed  to  realize 
that  Russia  was  drawing  ever  nearer  to  a  state  of  anarchy 
and  dissolution  from  which  nothing  could  save  her  but  the 
conclusion   of   a   general   peace — an   eventuality   they   were 
anxious  to  avoid  for  reasons  that  had  nothing  to  do  with  any 
altruistic  consideration  for  the  welfare  of  Russia  and  her 
people,   which,  indeed,  they  were  not  bound  to  entertain. 
But  Kerensky  and  his  honest,  simple-minded,  and,  like  him- 


EFFORTS   TOWARDS   PEACE  255 

self,  quite  inexperienced  associates  were  just  the  elements  that 
could  be  made  pliant  instruments  of  the  policy  of  the  Allies, 
aiming  at  the  reconstitution  and  maintenance  in  efficiency 
of  the  Russian  front,  which  was  palpably  melting  away,  in 
the  mistaken  belief  in  the  possibility  of  such  an  achievement. 
Not  being  minded  to  await  in  mute  resignation  the  doom 
of  my  country,  I  devoted  myself  entirely  to  the  thankless 
task  of  fighting  with  word  and  pen  the  fatal  blindness  and 
irresolution  which  prevented  the  adoption  of  the  only  course 
compatible  with  her  honour  and  dignity  which  could  lead 
to  the  country's  salvation.  I  never  ceased  until  the  very 
eve  of  the  November  Revolution,  and  regardless  of  the  rebuffs 
I  was  meeting  with,  my  efforts  in  seeking  to  be  given  a  hearing 
by  the  men  in  whose  inexperienced  hands  was  placed  the  fate 
of  our  unfortunate  country.  I  met  with  similar  treatment 
at  the  hands  of  the  Press  which,  following  the  example  of 
the  Press  in  all  belligerent  countries,  and  evidently  from  the 
same  motives  of  misunderstood  patriotism,  was  suppressing 
all  independent  opinion  which  would  not  minister  to  the 
prevailing  and  artificial  war  psychology.  Out  of  a  number 
of  articles  which  I  wrote  as  events  were  progressing,  only 
the  first  could  be  printed  in  one  of  the  important  newspapers, 
to  the  readers  of  which  I  wished  to  address  myself.  The 
remaining  ones  I  was  finally  compelled  to  print  and  to  issue 
in  pamphlet  form  under  the  title  Peace  or  War  at  Any  Cost, 
in  the  hope  that  in  this  shape  they  might  reach  at  least  a 
limited  circle  of  readers.  The  following  quotation  from  one 
of  these  articles  speaks  for  itself : 

What  the  country  requires  above  all  in  this  hour  of  her  trial 
is  the  close  and  firm  union  of  all  her  loyal  sons.  But  no  such  union 
is  possible  as  long  as  the  "  masses  "  are  under  the  spell  of  Utopian 
doctrines  of  Socialism  and  the  "  classes  "  are  obstinately  wedded  to 
the  idea  of  "  war  at  any  cost,"  utterly  abhorrent  to  the  bulk  of  the 
nation  and  most  of  all  to  the  soldiery.  Stiil,  there  is  a  common 
ground  upon  which  such  a  union  could  be  achieved,  and  that  is  the 
crying  need  of  peace,  a  need  that  cannot  but  be  felt  by  anyone  who 
has  truly  at  heart,  not  the  "  saving  "  of  his  own  or  this  or  that  party's 
political  "  face,"  but  the  saving  of  what  still  can  be  saved  from  the 
wreck  of  the  country's  former  greatness  and  prosperity.  If  such  a 
union  could  have  been  brought  about,  it  would  have  presented  to 
the  world  the  imposing  sight  of  a  great  nation  rising  in  ardent  and 
unanimous  fervour  for  the  sacred  cause  of  Liberty  and  of  Peace  ; 


256        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

it  would  have  increased  tenfold  the  weight  of  Russia's  voice  in  the 
Council  of  Nations  ;  and  it  would  have  silenced  those  scornful  voices, 
full  of  contempt  for  the  Russian  people,  which — be  it  confessed  to 
our  shame — have  sometimes  found  a  not  unwilling  echo  in  our  Press 
and  in  our  society,  so  disastrously  torn  by  partisan  dissensions  and 
passionate  hatreds. 

But  it    was    not    to    be.     The    unique    opportunity  for   opening 
negotiations  with  our  Allies  was  neglected  at  a  time  when  the  impos- 
ing edifice  of  the  State,  although  beginning  already  to  be  undermined 
by  the  rising  tide  of  anarchy,  was  still  standing  erect  and  our  strategic 
front  was  still  unimpaired,  and  at  a  time  when  exhausted  and  defeated 
Germany   was    plainly   anxious    for   peace.     I    have    used    the    term 
"  defeated  Germany  "  purposely  and  advisedly.     If  one  stops  to  con- 
sider that  of  the  contending  sides,  the  German  side  is  the  only  one 
wliich  holds  in  its  armed  possession  immense  extents  of  enemy  terri- 
tory  on   the    European   Continent   which    might   become   objects   of 
annexation,  as  well  as  grounds  for  claiming  pecuniary  contributions 
in  exchange  for  their  surrender,  one  must  suppose  that  nothing  short 
of  a  realizing  sense  of  Germany's  defeat,  irrespective  of  the  actual 
military  situation,  could  have  induced  the  German  Reichstag  in  its 
resolution  of  July  19th  to  declare  itself  in  favour  of  a  peace  "  without 
annexations  and  contributions  " — if  not  in  these  very  terms  of  the 
Russian  democracy's  formula,   but  unquestionably  within  its  mean- 
ing— nor  could  have  caused  the  German  Government  in  its  reply  to 
the  note  of  the  Vatican  to  announce  its  willingness  to  conform  not 
only  to  the  wishes  of  His  Holiness  but  likewise  to  the  peace  resolu- 
tion of  the  Reichstag  of  July  19th. 

It  is  evident  that  the  German  Government  is  not  in  a  position 
to  decline  to  accept  any  fair  and  reasonable  terms  that  might  be 
offered  them,  and  it  is  obviously  our  duty  to  begin  without  the  least 
delay  negotiations  with  our  Allies  with  a  view  to  reaching  an  agree- 
ment as  to  such  an  expression  of  the  determination  of  mankind, 
undoubtedly  shared  in  by  all  the  peoples,  to  put  an  end  to  the  World 
War,  as  would  lead  to  the  initiation  of  negotiations  for  the  conclusion 
of  a  general  peace. 

That  my  estimate  of  the  situation  in  Germany  was  correct 
I  find  confirmed  in  what  the  Austrian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Count  Czernin,  has  to  say  on  the  subject  in  his 
secret  memorandum,  presented  to  his  Sovereign  in  the 
beginning  of  April  1917,  as  published  now  in  the  Count's 
book,  In  the  World  War.  These  are  his  words  :  "I  am  firmly 
convinced  that  Germany,  too,  like  ourselves,  has  reached  the 
limit  of  her  strength,  and  the  responsible  political  leaders 
in  Berlin  do  not  seek  to  deny  it." 

On  the  other  hand,  G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  in  his  introduction 
to  the  recently  published  volume  Documents  and  Statements 


THE   REICHSTAG'S   PEACE   RESOLUTION    257 

relating  to  Peace  Proposals  and  War  Aims,  says  on  the  subject 
of  the  Reichstag's  peace  resolution  : 

This  resolution,  it  will  be  observed,  is  on  the  lines  of  the  Russian 
proposals — a  peace  without  annexations  and  without  indemnities. 
But  we  have  Count  Czernin's  authority  for  the  statement  that  the 
military  rulers  in  Germany  were  opposed  to  any  such  peace.  There 
was  thus  a  cleavage  in  Germany  between  the  civilian  Government 
and  the  majority  of  the  representatives  of  the  people  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  Army  chiefs,  who  had  the  effective  power,  on  the  other. 
Had  the  Allied  Governments  been  willing  to  consider  such  a  peace 
as  the  Russian  Democracy  and  the  Reichstag  were  demanding,  their 
policy  was  clear.  They  would  have  expressed  their  willingness  to 
discuss  terms  on  that  basis.  Had  they  done  so,  it  is  at  least  possible 
that  the  movement  for  peace  in  the  enemy  countries  would  have 
become  irresistible  and  have  swept  the  militarists  from  power.  But 
as  we  have  seen,  the  Allied  Governments  were  just  as  much  opposed 
to  such  a  peace  as  the  German  militarists.  The  Reichstag  resolution, 
therefore,  was  treated  with  contempt  by  the  Governments,  the  Parlia- 
ments, and  the  Press  of  the  Allied  nations. 

The  Russian  "  bourgeois  "  Press  was  dealing  with  the 
question  on  the  same  lines,  reflecting  evidently  the  views  of 
the  Kerensky  Government,  which  by  that  time  had  entirely 
fallen  under  the  influence  of  the  policy  of  continuing  the  war 
at  any  cost.  Intending  to  have  my  say  on  the  subject, 
and  having  found  all  the  organs  of  the  "  bourgeois  "  Press 
inaccessible  to  me,  nothing  remained  for  me  but  to  try  my 
luck  with  the  Socialist  paper  Novaya  Zhisn,  to  whose  editor, 
Maxim  Gorki,  I  addressed  the  following  letter  : 

Being  a  most  convinced  opponent  of  the  Utopian  doctrines  of 
Socialism,  and  the  more  so  of  any  attempts  at  their  application  to 
our  country,  I,  nevertheless,  venture  to  appeal  to  your  patriotism  and 
impartiality  in  requesting  you  to  open  the  columns  of  your  esteemed 
paper  to  this  letter.  I  venture  to  do  so  because  I  know  that  you, 
as  well  as  I,  have  set  yourself  the  task  of  working  for  the  re-establish- 
ment of  general  peace.  To  serve  this  cause  I  consider  to  be  the  sacred 
duty  of  every  Russian  citizen  who  has  at  heart  the  fate  of  his  country 
and  the  saving  of  what  can  still  be  saved  from  the  wreck  of  her  former 
greatness  and  prosperity. 

In  order  to  prevent  any  intentional  or  unintentional  misunder- 
standing of  my  position,  I  deem  it  necessary  to  state  here  expressly 
that  in  using  the  term  "  general  peace  "  I  do  mean  a  peace  reached 
in  complete  agreement  with  our  Allies,  with  whom  we  should  have 
begun  negotiations  more  than  six  months  ago,  as  directed  by  the 
VOL.    II  17 


258        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Democracy  who  had  just  overthrown  the  regime  of  autocracy,  but 
whose  directions  have  not  been  obeyed  to  this  hour. 

I  beg  you  will  find  room  for  the  following  text  of  an  identical 
letter  I  have  addressed  to  the  editors  of  the  most  widely  read  papers 
none  of  whom,  however,  has  seen  his  way  to  print  it  : 

"  In  the  treatment  of  the  question  of  peace  by  our  Press,  which 
evidently  reflects  the  views  current  among  the  public,  the  following 
points  call  for  attention  : 

"  First,  the  adverse  comment  on  the  Russian  Democracy's  pro- 
claimed formula,  Peace  without  annexations  and  without  contribu- 
tions, of  which  such  a  respected  organ  of  the  neutral  Press  as  the 
Journal  de  Geneve,  in  a  leading  article  on  June  26th,  says  :  '  It  imposes 
itself  not  only  on  the  delegates  at  Stockholm,  but  on  the  opinion  of 
all  countries.'  At  its  sitting  on  July  19th  the  German  Reichstag 
adhered  to  the  sense  of  this  formula.  And  in  its  reply  to  the  note 
of  the  Vatican  the  German  Government  says  how  much  it  has  at 
heart  this  task  in  conformity  with  the  desires  of  His  Holiness  and 
with  the  resolution  in  regard  to  peace  adopted  by  the  German  Reich- 
stag on  July  19th.  This  resolution,  among  other  things,  covers  also 
the  Reichstag's  adherence  to  the  sense  of  the  formula  of  Russia's 
Democracy.  The  renunciation  of  annexations,  implied  in  the  adher- 
ence to  this  formula,  can  evidently  refer  only  to  that  side  which  has 
realized  the  occupation  by  force  of  arms  of  territories  which  could 
become  the  objects  of  annexation.  The  Russian  Democracy's  formula 
covers  indisputably  all  territories  occupied  by  the  enemy,  conse- 
quently also  Courland  with  Riga,  Lithuania  and  Poland,  and  does 
not,  therefore,  sacrifice  any  one  of  our  real  interests.  The  dreams 
of  annexations  by  us  of  parts  of  Thrace,  with  Constantinople  and  the 
Asiatic  shores  of  the  Straits — if  realizable  at  all — could  evidently  be 
realized  only  in  a  very  remote  and  very  dim  future,  and  could  not, 
therefore,  be  included  in  the  category  of  real  and  actual  interests  of 
Russia.  On  the  other  hand,  the  acceptance  by  all  the  civilized  Powers 
of  the  world  of  the  Russian  Democracy's  formula — wliicli  should  be 
the  aim  of  the  future  Peace  Conference — would  do  away,  once  for 
all,  with  the  right  of  conquest  hitherto  recognized  by  international 
law  and  would  thereby  remove  for  ever  one  of  the  most  potent  motives 
for  armed  contests  between  States. 

"  Secondly,  the  constantly  expressed  expectation  that  the  German 
Government  would  at  last  come  out  with  a  statement  of  the  concrete 
conditions  of  peace  which  would  be  acceptable  to  them  if  they  really, 
and  not  hypocritically,  wished  for  peace,  and  also  apprehensions 
lest  their  silence  on  this  subject  covered  a  trap  with  a  view  to  induce 
our  coalition  to  consent  to  the  conclusion  of  a  so-called  German 
peace. 

"  Similar  statements  fill  the  columns  of  those  organs  of  the  Press 
in  Allied  countries  which  minister  to  the  public  sentiment  artificially 
created  by  the  Governments  and  ruling  classes,  and  sustained  by 
a  regime  of  censure  and  administrative  tyranny  hitherto  unheard  of 
in  free  countries.     To  anyone  who  has  ever  taken  part  in  the  conduct 


LETTER   TO   MAXIM   GORKI  259 

of  negotiations,  not  even  on  questions  of  great  international  impor- 
tance, but  simply  on  important  questions  of  private  interests,  it  must 
be  perfectly  plain  that  such  attitude  of  the  German  Government  is 
dictated  to  it  precisely  by  their  consciousness  of  the  impossibility 
of  realizing  what  is  termed  a  German  peace.  In  all  business  tran- 
sactions the  obvious  tactics  for  the  side  which  expects  to  have  to  make 
large  concessions  will  consist,  not  in  beginning  by  offering  such  con- 
cessions itself,  but  in  waiting  till  they  are  demanded  by  the  other  side. 

"  But  our  coalition  with  the  accession  of  the  United  States  has 
acquired  material  strength  and  moral  authority  quite  sufficient,  in 
spite  of  the  failure  of  our  front,  in  order  to  cause — if  and  whenever 
it  really  so  wills — the  submission  of  the  German  Government  and 
the  ruling  caste  on  whose  support  it  relies,  to  the  will  of  now  almost 
all  civilized  mankind,  if  expressed  in  the  terms  of  a  final  proposal 
based  on  the  principles  of  justice  and  equity  to  all.  The  reluctance 
to  enter  upon  negotiations  to  that  effect  can  only  be  explained  by 
the  desire  to  continue  the  war  at  any  cost  in  the  hope  that  military 
events  in  an  indefinite  future  will  realize  the  total  crushing  of  the 
adversary  promised  to  their  peoples  by  the  belligerent  Governments." 

The  above  are  views  an  open  expression  of  which  seems  to  be 
considered  inconvenient  and  even  dangerous  by  an  influential  part 
of  our  Press,  although  these  views  are  undoubtedly  shared  in  every- 
where by  millions  of  people  who,  even  under  the  tyranny  of  the 
bellicose  psychosis  fostered  by  the  Governments  and  the  ruling  classes, 
still  possess  the  faculty  of  independent  reasoning. 

Our  failure  to  enter  upon  negotiations  with  our  Allies  in  the 
direction  pointed  out  by  the  Democracy  and  the  dubious  attitude 
of  our  diplomacy  in  regard  to  its  formula  has  already  caused  and 
continues  to  cause,  an  incalculable  and  irreparable  injury  to  the  true 
interests  of  Russia.  The  weight  of  her  voice  goes  on  diminishing 
with  every  month  the  war  lasts,  as  the  impending  bankruptcy  of 
the  Treasury,  the  entire  ruin  of  the  economic  life  of  the  country,  and 
the  destruction  of  the  social  and  political  fabric  of  the  State  through 
the  ever  higher  rising  tide  of  anarchy,  approaches  nearer  and  nearer. 
At  the  same  time  this  double-faced  attitude  toward  the  question  of 
peace  or  war  discloses  before  the  world  the  division  of  the  nation 
into  an  overwhelming  majority  thirsting  for  peace  and  an  influential 
minority  obstinately  wedded  to  the  doctrine  of  "  war  at  any  cost," 
which,  if  under  existing  conditions  it  could  possibly  be  put  in  opera- 
tion, could  only  lead  to  the  completion  of  the  ruin  and  perdition  of 
Russia — a  division  which  has  already  foreshadowed  to  us  the  for- 
midable phantom  of  coming  civil  war. 

We  should  remember  that  on  contemporary  Russia  and  her 
leading  men  of  all  parties  a  merciless  verdict  will  be  rendered  by 
future  generations  of  the  Russian  people. 

The  publication  of  this  letter  in  Maxim  Gorki's  widely 
read  newspaper  brought  down  on  my  devoted  head  the  fully 
expected    silly    insinuations    of    pro-Bolshevism    and    pro- 


260        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Germanism,  which  I  could  only  treat  with  the  contempt 
they  deserved. 

Of  the  comparative  soundness  of  the  divergent  views 
taken  of  the  situation  in  Russia  by  the  Kerensky  Government 
on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the  author  of  these  reminiscences 
on  the  other,  the  reader  will  be  able  to  judge  from  the 
following  quotations. 

The  first  is  from  a  telegraphic  circular  addressed  by  Mr. 
Terestchenko,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Russian 
Ambassadors  at  Paris,  London,  Tokio  and  Washington, 
and  to  the  envoy  at  Stockholm,  under  date  August  31, 
1917  (old  style),  relating  to  the  military  rising  attempted 
by  General  Korniloff,  with  the  connivance  of  the  Duma 
leaders  and  other  adherents  of  the  "  war  at  any  cost  "  policy, 
which  seems  to  have  been  favourably  looked  upon  by  Allied 
Diplomacy  as  promising  an  effective  restoration  of  the  Russian 
front.     The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  begins  by  saying  : 

The  rising  of  General  Korniloff  has  been  definitively  liquidated  ; 
all   has   been   settled   without   bloodshed,    as   the   troops    moved   by 
him  on  Petrograd  refused  to  march  against  the  Provisional  Govern 
ment  and  declared  their  submission. 

In  concluding  his  circular  he  says  : 

In  general  it  may  be  considered  that  the  regrettable  events  of 
the  last  days,  thanks  to  their  quick  liquidation,  have  not  weakened 
us  for  the  struggle  with  the  external  enemy,  but  have  demonstrated 
the  unity  of  sentiment  and  the  general  tendency  toward  concentra- 
tion on  that  struggle  regardless  of  domestic  dissensions.  Vv^hatever 
attempts  may  be  made  in  the  future,  from  left  or  right,  to  disturb 
the  course  of  policy  adopted  by  the  Government,  it  may  be  hoped 
that  they  will  meet  with  a  unanimous  rebuff  in  the  country.  The 
Government  will  firmly  follow  the  path  of  continuation  of  the  war 
at  any  cost  and  will  with  renewed  energy  conduct  the  work  of  the 
renovation  and  restoration  of  the  moral  health  of  the  Army. 

The  second  is  the  text  of  a  letter  I  had  occasion  to  address 
four  days  later,  in  reply  to  an  inquiry,  to  a  distinguished 
English  statesman  with  whom  I  was  in  friendly 
correspondence  : 

Petrograd,  September  3/16,   1917. 

My  Dear  , 

I  do  not  know  whether  my  reply  to  your  last  letter  which 
I  had  to  forward  by  mail  ever  reached  you.  Under  present  con- 
ditions it  is  rather  difficult  to  carry  on  a  regular  correspondence. 


DIVERGENT   VIEWS  261 

The  present  missive,  however,  will  reach  you  through  another  channel. 
It  would  take  me  a  couple  of  hours  to  tell  you  all  I  would  have  to 
say,  or  a  ream  of  notepaper  to  take  it  down  in  writing.  The  best 
I  can  do,  therefore,  is  to  enclose  herewith  some  of  the  material  I  have 
had  printed  for  circulation  among  my  friends,  from  which  you  will 
be  able  to  form  an  opinion  in  regard  to  my  views  on  the  situation  of 
affairs.  The  sober,  unvarnished  truth  being  nowadays  everywhere 
in  belligerent  countries  treated  as  contraband  of  war  and  a  most 
dangerous  explosive,  I  have  great  difficulty  in  bringing  my  views 
before  the  public  even  here,  where  there  is  now  no  more  political 
censure.  So  it  happened  that  even  the  mildly  socialistic  Den,  which 
had  picked  up  sufficient  civic  courage  to  print  my  first  article  on  the 
way  out  of  the  present  impasse,  felt  itself  compelled  to  refuse  to  publish 
a  second  one,  part  of  the  substance  of  which  you  will  find  reproduced 
in  "  A  Letter  from  a  Russian  Patriot  to  an  American  Friend,"  of  which 
I  enclose  a  printed  copy. 

The  greatest  perturbing  element  in  the  situation  has  been  the 
totally  erroneous  conception  of  the  true  meaning  of  the  Russian 
Revolution  formed  at  first  in  Allied  countries  on  the  basis  apparently 
of  the  dubious  attitude  of  our  diplomacy,  due  either  to  failure  to 
understand  the  real  trend  of  events  or  else  to  culpable  insincerity. 
Even  now  people  who  ought  to  know  better  are  loath  to  admit  that 
the  mainspring  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  was  the  revolt  of 
the  people  against  the  war — a  revolt  that  will  probably  soon  be 
shared  in  by  the  "  masses  "  in  other  belligerent  countries,  unless 
the  "  classes  "  come  to  their  senses  before  it  will  be  too  late. 

The  attempted  revolt  of  General  Kornilofi  has  disclosed  a  crisis 
of  the  utmost  gravity.  Its  immediate  inglorious  collapse,  it  is  to 
be  hoped,  should  at  least  have  served  to  open  the  eyes  of  even  the 
mo.st  obstinately  purblind  believers  in  the  "  war  to  the  end  "  doctrine, 
and  to  convince  them  of  the  utter  hopelessness  of  their  endeavour 
to  force  their  policy  upon  an  unwilling  people.  The  country  is 
confronted  now  by  this  alternative : 

Either  the  speedy  conclusion  of  a  general  peace  (not,  of  course, 
a  separate  peace  with  Germany,  that  groundless  bugbear  of  Allied 
Diplomacy  and  of  our  own  Chauvinists),  but  a  general  peace  on  the 
basis  of  the  Russian  Democracy's  programme,  and  of  the  principles 
proclaimed  by  President  Wilson  ! 

Or  else,  the  prospect  of  civil  war,  anarchy,  and  the  disruption  of 
Russia  as  a  State,  which  could  not  possibly  be  to  the  advantage  of 
any  one  of  our  Allies. 

Yours  very  sincerely, 

R.  R. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX 

Korniloff's  rising  and  its  failure — Russian  political  parties — The  Soviet  and 
the  Provisional  Government — The  Duma — Kerensky  and  his  party — 
Communications  from  Allied  Ambassadors — The  two  Socialist  parties — 
Allies'  attitude  to  Russia — Further  efforts  towards  peace. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  the  military  rising  attempted  by 
General  Korniloif  in  August  1917  has  been  briefly  alluded  to 
in  two  absolutely  contradictory  interpretations  of  the  meaning 
of  the  collapse  of  this  attempt,  as  expressed  on  the  one  hand 
in  a  circular  telegram  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Mr.  Terestchenko,  to  Russian  representatives  abroad, 
dated  August  31st  (old  style),  and  on  the  other  hand  in  a 
letter  addressed  four  days  later  by  the  author  of  these 
reminiscences  to  an  English  statesman  with  whom  he  was 
in  friendly  correspondence. 

Mr.  E.  H.  Wilcox,  in  Russia's  Ruin,  rightly  considers  this 
affair  to  have  been  the  turning-point  of  the  Russian  Revolu- 
tion. When  he  says,  "  After  that  episode  the  triumph  of 
Bolshevism  and  the  dissolution  of  Russia  into  primeval  chaos 
were  inevitable,"  he  hits  the  nail  on  the  head  indeed,  although 
in  the  very  circumstantial  account  he  gives  of  the  "  Korniloif 
affair,"  and  of  the  network  of  political  intrigues,  counter- 
intrigues,  misunderstandings  and  treachery  in  which  that 
gallant,  honest  and  single-minded  soldier,  quite  inexperienced 
• — to  his  honour  be  it  said — in  such  intrigues,  found  himself 
helplessly  enmeshed,  Mr.  Wilcox  does  not  make  quite 
clear  the  real  reason  why  General  Korniloff's  undertaking  was 
inevitably  doomed  to  failure. 

The  discovery  of  that  reason  could  not,  of  course,  but 
be  most  unwelcome  to  our  Allies  and  may,  therefore,  have 
been  purposely  delayed  until  it  would  no  longer  be  possible 
to  ignore  it.  It  is,  however,  hardly  credible  that  Kerensky 
and  his  associates  could  have  failed  to  understand  the  true 
cause,  or  rather  the  true  meaning,  of  the  collapse  of  General 

262 


KORNILOFF'S   RISING  263 

Korniloff' s  undertaking,  and  that  they  could  have  been  acting 
in  good  faith  when  asserting,  as  Mr.  Terestchenko  did  in 
his  circular,  evidently  intended  to  be  communicated  to  the 
Allied  Powers,  that  "  the  events  of  the  last  days  had 
not  weakened  them  for  the  struggle  with  the  external  enemy, 
but  had  demonstrated  the  unity  of  sentiment  and  the  general 
tendency  towards  concentration  on  that  struggle  regardless 
of  domestic  dissensions,"  and  furthermore  that  they  would 
"  firmly  follow  the  path  of  continuation  of  the  war  at  any 
cost,"  and  would  "  with  renewed  energy  conduct  the  work 
of  the  renovation  and  restoration  of  the  moral  health  of  the 
Army." 

One  assertion  in  Mr.  Terestchenko's  circular,  quoted  in 
the  preceding  chapter,  namely,  that  "  the  troops  moved  by 
Korniloff  on  Petrograd  refused  to  march,"  was  unquestionably 
true.  But  it  was  not  true  that  they  "  refused  to  march  " — 
as  that  circular  asserts — "  against  the  Government."  Mr. 
Wilcox  rightly  says  :  "  Korniloff 's  action  was  not  a  coup 
d'etat  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term,  either  in  form  or 
substance.  He  wanted  to  strengthen  the  Government,  not 
to  weaken  it.  He  did  not  want  to  encroach  upon  its  authority, 
but  to  prevent  others  from  doing  so.  He  wanted  to 
emancipate  it  from  the  illicit  and  paralysing  influence  of  the 
Soviets."  That  was  the  very  reason  why  his  troops  refused 
to  march,  and  they  refused  to  march,  not  against  the  Govern- 
ment, but  against  the  "  Soviets,"  whose  influence  in  favour 
of  peace  Korniloff  and  his  aiders  and  abettors,  the  Duma 
leaders,  with  the  undoubted  moral  support  of  Entente 
Diplomacy,  wanted  to  paralyse  for  the  purpose  of  continuing 
the  war  with  renewed  energy — a  purpose  utterly  abhorrent 
to  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  people  and  against  which 
the  mutinous  soldiery  were  in  almost  open  revolt. 

In  passing  judgment  on  the  policies  pursued  both  by 
the  first  Provisional  Government  under  Prince  Lwoff  and 
Miliukoff,  and  then  by  the  Coalition  Government  under 
Kerensky — policies  which  in  the  end  delivered  unfortunate 
Russia  into  the  hands  of  the  only  party  clear-sighted  enough 
to  have  gauged  aright  the  real  feelings  and  ardent  craving 
for  peace  of  the  immense  bulk  of  the  nation,  and  to  have 
secured,  by  ministering  to  them,  the  unflinching  support  of  the 
soldiery,   the  sailors  and  the  revolutionary  workmen — it  is 


264         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

but  just  to  take  into  account  the  circumstances  and  conditions 
which  may  be  said  to  mitigate  their  unquestionable  guilt 
in  this  respect.  Their  responsibility,  however,  cannot  be 
shifted  to  other  shoulders  ;  for  no  amount  of  enemy  gold  at 
their  disposal  could  have  enabled  the  fanatic  visionaries  of 
Bolshevism,  with  their  following  of  murderous  bandits,  to 
accomplish  what  the  failure  of  the  Government  to  satisfy 
the  legitimate  craving  of  the  people  and  the  tragically  crying 
need  of  the  country  rendered  so  easy  for  them  to  achieve. 

Incidentally  I  would  remark  that  the  constant  and  still 
continued  harping  on  the  traitorous  venality  of  the  leaders 
of  Bolshevism  and  their  treasonable  propaganda  work  as 
the  cause  of  Russia's  downfall  and  ruin,  apart  from  the 
absence  of  all  sense  of  national  dignity  which  it  discloses, 
cannot  exonerate  from  reproach  those  whose  policies  had 
brought  Russia  to  the  brink  of  the  precipice,  nor  those  who, 
by  their  incompetence,  irresolution  and  lack  of  moral  courage, 
have  rendered  possible  the  seizure  of  power  by  a  band  of 
dangerous  dreamers,  determined  to  promote  by  the  ruthless 
destruction  of  the  social  fabric  of  their  own  country  the  advent 
of  the  socialistic  world  revolution  by  which  they  expect  to 
secure  the  future  felicity  of  mankind. 

It  might  be  said — perhaps  not  without  reason — that  it 
would  be  best  to  cover  with  the  mantle  of  charity  the  failings 
and  shortcomings,  as  well  as  the  sins  of  commission  and 
omission,  of  the  chief  actors  in  Russia's  tragedy  ;  since, 
after  all,  they  might  be  held  to  have  been  merely  unconscious 
pawns  in  the  hands  of  Fate.  But,  considering  the  momentous 
and  sinister  meaning  for  the  rest  of  the  world  of  the  awful 
tragedy  which  is  being  enacted  in  a  country  covering  a  seventh 
part  of  the  inhabited  globe,  among  a  people  justly  entitled 
to  the  claim  of  being  one  of  the  most  important  members  of 
the  family  of  nations  of  the  white  race,  the  author  of  these 
reminiscences  has  set  himself  the  task  of  shedding  as  much 
light  as  he  may  be  able  to  on  the  conditions,  the  motives 
and  the  influences  which  determined — it  may  be  unavoidably 
— the  attitude  and  policies  of  the  party  leaders  and  their 
following,  in  whose  actions  (or  else  in  whose  inaction  at 
critical  moments)  this  tragedy  had  its  origin. 

In  attempting  to  accomplish  this  task  to  the  best  of  my 
ability   I   must  begin   by   earnestly  requesting   my  readers 


RUSSIAN   rOLITICAL   PARTIES  265 

to  divest  themselves  of  all  traditional  preconceived  notions 
in  regard  to  political  parties  and  party  politics,  in  a  Western 
sense,  which  can  have  no  application  to  Russian  conditions. 
I  will  even  say  that  the  inveterate  habit  of  viewing  Russian 
affairs  exclusively  from  the  standpoint  of  Western  political 
conditions  has  led  public  opinion  in  foreign  countries  into 
grievous  misconceptions,  causing  valuable  sympathy  and  well- 
meant  moral  support  to  be  wasted  on  causes  which,  however, 
worthy  they  may  have  appeared  to  Western  eyes,  were  in 
reality  either  consciously  or  unconsciously  working  for  the 
downfall  and  ruin  of  Russia,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  causing 
the  undeserved  odium  of  reactionary  so-called  "  Tsarism  " 
to  be  thrown  on  those  who  in  the  maintenance  of  the  Empire 
saw  the  only  salvation  of  their  country  and  the  guarantee  of 
its  greatness  and  prosperity. 

First  of  all  it  should  be  kept  in  view  that  in  Russia  political 
parties  do  not  penetrate  the  density  and  do  not  reach  the  depth 
of  the  popular  masses.  They  are  practically  confined  to  the 
thin  layer  of  the  "  Intelligentzia,"  spread  over  the  immense 
surface  of  the  inarticulate  and  largely  illiterate  bulk  of  the 
nation,  from  which  they  are,  as  I  have  already  many  times 
had  occasion  to  point  out,  separated  by  an  almost  unbridge- 
able gulf  of  mutual  non-comprehension.  They  played  the 
game  of  party  politics  among  themselves.  The  bulk  of 
the  nation,  the  mainstay  of  its  power  and  prosperity,  the 
peasantry,  were  only  being  drawn  into  the  game  for  the  j5urpose 
of  securing  their  support  by  holding  out  to  their  baser  instincts 
the  bait  of  a  prospective  spoliation  in  their  favour  of  their 
neighbours,  the  landowning  gentry.  All  the  parties,  from  the 
Cadets,  the  Constitutional  Democrats  down,  were  dealing 
in  such  promises,  endeavouring  to  outbid  one  another  in 
the  generosity  of  their  potential  disposal  of  other  people's 
rights  of  property.  But  none  of  these  parties  could  in  justice 
lay  claim  to  be  truly  representative  of  the  people.  They  were, 
one  and  all,  flesh  from  the  flesh  and  bone  from  the  bone  of 
the  "Intelligentzia."  "  Mere  doctrinaires,"  as  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon 
has  it  in  his  Eclipse  of  Russia,  "  and  moving  far  apart  from  the 
popular  currents,  they  operated  with  borrowed  theories.  .  .  . 
They  were  Westernized  politicians,  foreign  political  ideal- 
mongers,  who  had  no  vested  interests  in  the  country  and 
dealt  mainly  in  abstractions,  imported  conceptions  and  exotic 


266         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

theories.  This  master  fact  of  the  situation  appears  to  have 
been  wholly  missed  by  Entente  diplomacy.  For  Great 
Britain  and  France  took  the  Liberals,  who  subsequently 
became  the  Cadets,  as  their  advisers,  and  made  support  of  the 
Cadets  the  cornerstone  of  their  Russian  policy.  Miliukoff, 
Gutchkoff,  Rodzianko,  and  their  friends  were  the  oracles 
whose  utterances  were  eagerly  sought  after  and  whose  counsels 
were  generally  followed — with  the  deplorable  results  recorded 
in  recent  history.  They  were  upright,  honourable,  enlightened 
men,  who  lacked  political  experience  and  acquaintanceship 
with  the  temper  of  their  own  people." 

One  fact  alone  throws  a  lurid  light  on  the  condition  of 
pitiable  helplessness  in  which  the  Revolution  surprised  them. 
That  fact  was  the  invasion,  on  the  very  first  day  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, of  the  Duma's  own  palace  by  a  band  of  Socialists, 
who  proclaimed  themselves  a  "  Soviet  of  Workmen's  and 
Soldiers'  Delegates,"  who  could  not  lay  claim  to  represent 
anything  or  anybody  save  revolutionary  factory  hands  and 
mutinous  soldiers  of  the  Petrograd  garrison,  before  whom, 
nevertheless,  the  legally  elected  representatives  of  the  nation 
gave  way  at  once,  and  with  whom  the  Duma  leaders  felt 
themselves  compelled  to  negotiate  for  the  very  formation  of 
the  Provisional  Government,  which  was  never  more  than 
a  Government  in  name  and  on  sufferance,  having,  moreover, 
had  to  accept  as  a  fellow-member,  Kerensky,  the  vice-president 
of  the  "  Soviet."  All  this  would  seem  incredible  if  it  had  not 
been  true.  There  is,  however,  a  rational  explanation  of  what, 
at  first,  must  have  appeared  inexplicable  to  any  observer 
only  superficially  acquainted  with  Russian  mentality  and 
Russian  conditions.  But  this  explanation,  being  an  unwel- 
come one,  was  for  a  long  time  being  discarded,  until  events 
confirming  it  rendered  it  impossible  to  deny  its  truth  any 
longer.     It  was  this  : 

That  the  Provisional  Government  was  powerless  from  the 
very  first  day  of  its  installation,  and  must,  in  its  inner  con- 
sciousness, have  been  aware  of  the  true  reason  of  its  power- 
lessness,  because  it  represented  a  fiction — whether  deliberately 
created  with  intent  to  deceive  or  produced  by  naive  illusions 
and  pious,  supposedly  patriotic,  self-deception  I  shall  not 
undertake  to  determine — the  fiction  of  the  supposed  revolt 
of  the   people  against   the  inefficiency  of  the   overthrown 


THE   SOVIET  267 

Imperial  Government's  conduct  of  the  war,  or  the  fiction  of 
the  people's  ardent  desire  for  its  continuation  with  redoubled 
energy,  whereas  the  Socialist  Soviet  represented  a  reality  : 
the  desperate  craving  for  peace  of  the  immense  bulk  of  the 
nation.  The  fiction  was  for  some  time  persistently  maintained 
by  Russian  and  Allied  war  propaganda  and  the  reality  was 
as  persistently  denied  or  attributed  to  the  influence  of  German 
gold — an  insinuation  which  every  Russian  gifted  with  a 
modicum  of  self-respect  should  resent  as  an  offensive  reflection 
upon  the  Russian  people.  But  the  proportion  of  real  power 
possessed  by  each  of  the  sides  was  necessarily  commensurate 
with  the  importance  of  the  popular  backing  it  could  rely 
on.  On  the  Duma  side  it  was  limited  to  the  adherents  of 
the  "  war  at  any  cost  "  policy  among  the  "  Bourgeoisie," 
or  "Intelligentzia,"  and,  therefore,  amounted  practically  to 
nothing,  since  the  "Intelligentzia"  had  no  material  force  at 
its  command.  Hence  the  helplessness  of  the  Provisional 
Government  in  its  contest  with  the  "  Soviet."  It  was  reduced 
to  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  systematic,  diplomatic 
"  sabotage  "  of  the  Soviet's  peace  policy,  rendered  easy  and 
effective  owing  to  the  Soviet  leaders'  glaring  ignorance, 
evident  inexperience  and  consequently  incompetence  in 
the  conduct  of  international  affairs.  But  the  Provisional 
Government  and  its  only  support,  the  Bourgeois  Intelli- 
gentzia, placed  themselves  thereby  in  antagonism  to  the 
unmistakable  will  to  peace  of  the  overwhelming  majority 
of  the  people.  By  the  fatal  unwisdom  of  the  position  taken 
by  what  might  be  termed  the  "  classes  "  as  differentiated 
from  the  "  masses  "  in  the  vital,  all-overshadowing  question 
of  peace  or  war — in  calling  it  unwisdom  I  am  using  the  mildest 
term  I  can  think  of,  for,  presuming  to  speak  as  a  Russian, 
to  whom  Russia  comes  first  and  who  is  unable  to  view  with 
equanimity  the  deliberate  sacrifice  of  his  country  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  hatreds,  ambitions  and  rivalries  of  other 
nations,  I  would  have  been  justified  in  applying  a  harsher 
term — the  "  classes  "  have  incurred  the  fierce  hatred  of  the 
"  masses,"  in  whose  eyes  they  were  primarily  guilty  of 
having  brought  down  upon  the  people  the  unspeakable 
and  unending  misery  of  the  war  and  its  indefinite 
prolongation. 

They  have  paid  for  their  unwisdom,  partly  with  bodily 


268        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

extermination,  partly  with  all  the  bitterness  of  exile  and  utter 
destitution  in  foreign  lands,  and  partly — cruellest  of  all — with 
degrading  slavery  to  Bolshevist  masters  ! 

But  the  greatest  and  almost  irretrievable  misfortune  that 
could  have  befallen  unhappy  Russia  has  been  the  elimination 
of  the  educated  classes,  who  should  have  been  the  natural 
leaders  of  the  nation,  without  whose  leadership  and  active 
co-operation  the  rescue  of  Russia  from  her  present  condition 
of  primitive  communistic  barbarism  and  her  reconstitution 
as  a  civilized  State  will  be  a  gigantic  task,  which,  perhaps, 
the  gradual  evolution  of  coming  generations  alone  will  be 
able  to  accomplish. 

Among  the  educated  classes  the  most  influential  and 
best  organized  political  party  was  the  Constitutional-Demo- 
cratic or,  by  abbreviation,  Cadet  Party,  having  of  late  adopted 
the  style  and  title  of  "  Party  of  the  People's  Freedom." 
This  party,  which  formerly  had  been  opposed  to  the  war  with 
Japan  and  to  Russia's  imperialistic  activity  in  the  Far  East, 
had  become  a  strong  supporter  of  Iswolsky's  and  Sazonoff's 
policy  that  had  involved  Russia  in  the  World  War,  and  enjoy- 
ing the  favour  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  Entente,  was  wedded 
to  the  doctrine  of  "  war  at  any  cost,"  or  "  war  to  the  bitter 
end  "  and  "  no  peace  without  victory."  I  felt  that  the 
moment  was  approaching  when  the  persistent  pursuit  of 
such  a  policy,  which,  under  pressure  by  the  Allies,  had 
already  led  to  the  disastrous  spectacular  advance  of  our  troops 
in  Galicia  ending  in  the  horror  and  disgrace  of  Tarnopol, 
whose  successful  pursuit,  as  far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  was, 
under  existing  conditions,  manifestly  impossible  and  which 
was,  moreover,  utterly  abhorrent,  not  only  to  a  demoralized 
soldiery,  but  to  a  profoundly  war-weary  people,  would 
unavoidably,  unless  arrested  in  time,  lead  to  the  seizure  of 
power  by  the  Bolsheviks  who  were  prepared  to  promise  the 
people  immediate  peace. 

/Having  failed  in  my  persistent  endeavours  to  approach 
the  leading  members  of  the  Government,  it  occurred  to  me 
that  I  might  meet  with  better  luck  at  the  hands  of  the  leaders 
of  the  Cadet  Party  whose  influence  in  the  Coalition  Govern- 
ment seemed  to  be  still  active  in  diplomatic  matters.  My 
earnest  request  to  be  given  a  hearing  at  a  forthcoming  meeting 
of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Party  elicited  from  one  of 


A   PERSONAL   INCIDENT  269 

its  members  a  letter  of  regret,  dated  October  12  (old  style), 
1917,  in  which  he  wrote  : 

"  However  valuable  might  have  been  to  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  Party  of  the  People's  Freedom  an 
opportunity  to  hear  you,  circumstances  have  arisen  owing 
to  which  the  appearance  before  a  meeting  of  the  Committee 
of  a  person  of  such  weight  and  authority  as  yourself,  and  in 
support  of  the  views  which  you  have  recently  expressed  on 
the  pages  of  the  Novaya  Zhisn,  would  produce  abroad  [mean- 
ing apparently  in  diplomatic  circles  of  the  Entente]  a  quite 
definite  impression  and  would  be  interpreted  in  a  sense 
undesirable  to  the  Party."  The  views  here  referred  to  had 
been  expressed  by  me  in  the  open  letter  which  I  wrote  to 
Maxim  Gorki,  editor  of  the  Novaya  Zhisn.  These  views, 
although  favourably  commented  on  by  one  or  two  English 
newspapers  of  acknowledged  standing,  may  have  been  un- 
palatable to  the  diplomacy  of  the  Entente.  The  proposition, 
however,  that  a  Russian  statesman  who  has  grown  grey  in 
the  service  of  his  country  and  who  can,  after  all,  lay  claim 
to  some  experience  in  affairs  of  State,  could  not  appear  and 
be  heard  before  the  Central  Committee  of  a  Russian  Parlia- 
mentary Party  without  creating  "  abroad  "  an  impression 
undesirable  to  that  party — is  a  proposition  characteristic 
of  a  mentality  whose  apparent  prevalence  among  our  politi- 
cians goes  far  towards  explaining  the  kind  of  estimation  in 
which  Russian  statesmanship  and  Russian  political  parties 
seem  to  be  held  in  more  advanced  countries. 

I  have  mentioned  this  unimportant  personal  incident 
merely  because  I  think  that  it  throws  an  illuminating  side- 
light on  the  whole  abnormal  situation,  inasmuch  as  it 
illustrates  the  extent  to  which  the  foremost  and  most  influen- 
tial of  our  Bourgeois  parties  was  feeling  itself  dependent  on 
the  goodwill  of  Foreign,  albeit  Allied  diplomacy. 

The  situation  was  really  this  :  the  March  Revolution, 
in  the  eyes  of  unprejudiced  observers,  whom  war  psychosis 
had  not  deprived  of  the  faculty  of  seeing  things  as  they  are, 
and  not  merely  as  they  would  have  wished  them  to  be,  had 
plainly  disclosed,  not  by  any  means  the  "  union  of  the  whole 
nation  in  the  ardent  desire  to  continue  the  war  with  redoubled 
energy,"  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  division  of  the  nation  in 
two   very  unequal   parts  :    on    one  side   the  immense   but 


270        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

inarticulate  bulk  of  the  people  ardently  craving  for  peace, 
and  on  the  other  side  a  small  but  influential  minority  wedded 
to  the  policy  of  continuation  of  the  war  at  any  cost. 

Such  was  undoubtedly  the  relative  importance  of  the 
forces  arrayed  on  either  side  in  the  country.  In  the  Duma, 
however,  the  relative  position  of  the  sides  was  reversed, 
or  rather  the  peace  sentiment  of  the  overwhelming  majority 
of  the  people  was  not  represented  at  all,  if  one  leaves  out  of 
account  the  few  Socialist-Revolutionary  members,  disguised 
as  "  labourites,"  including  Kerensky  himself,  whose  voices, 
if  they  could  have  been  raised,  would  have  been  drowned  in 
the  general  chorus  of  war  enthusiasm,  such  as  used  to  greet 
on  every  solemn  occasion  the  appearance  in  the  diplomatic 
box  of  the  Ambassadors  of  the  Entente  Powers.  Whether 
any  of  these  diplomats  entertained  doubts  as  to  the  genuine- 
ness of  this  enthusiasm  manifested  by  men  who  could  not  but 
be  aware  of  the  desperately  critical  position  of  their  country, 
which,  as  the  far-seeing  among  them  must  have  realized,  was 
heading  for  a  downright  catastrophe  in  case  of  an  indefinite 
prolongation  of  the  war,  I  cannot  say.  But  it  would  seem 
rather  natural  that  they  should  have  been  deceived  by 
appearances  and  should  have  overestimated  the  influence 
and  power  of  the  Bourgeois  parties,  underrating  the 
compelling  force  of  the  peace  sentiment  of  the  bulk  of  the 
nation.  The  immediate  self-effacement  of  the  Duma  before 
the  hurriedly  constituted,  entirely  self-appointed  "  Soviet," 
explicable  only  by  the  Duma  members'  unavowed  conscious- 
ness of  not  representing  the  real  feelings  of  the  people,  might 
have  opened  their  eyes  to  the  reality  of  the  situation.  If 
it  did  not  have  that  effect  on  them  at  once,  it  can  only  have 
been  because  they  had  suffered  themselves  to  be  deceived 
by  the  disingenuous  assurances  of  their  proteges,  who  had 
been  allowed  by  the  Soviet  to  form  a  simulacrum  of  a  Pro- 
visional Government, 

These  assurances,  however,  were  in  direct  opposition  to 
the  aim  proclaimed  at  first  by  the  Socialists,  namely,  the 
earliest  possible  conclusion  of  a  general  peace  (emphatically 
not  a  separate  peace  with  Germany)  on  the  basis  of  the 
following  principles  :  No  annexations,  no  contributions,  and 
self-determination  of  nationalities — principles  which  were 
persistently    antagonized    and    even    openly    ridiculed    and 


KERENSKY  AND  HIS  PARTY    271 

sneered  at  in  the  "bourgeois"  Press  and  were  at  the  same 
time  quietly  ignored  in  the  official  utterances  of  the  Foreign 
Department  of  the  Provisional  Government.  Thus  was  laid 
bare  from  the  very  beginning  the  existence  of  a  fundamental 
conflict  of  aims  and  policies  between  the  officially  constituted, 
universally  recognized,  but  shadowy  Provisional  Government 
and  the  real  power  behind  the  Throne,  The  issue  of  this 
conffict  could  not  be  doubtful.  It  could  only  end  in  the 
elimination  of  the  weaker  side,  which  in  this  case  was  the 
Lwoff-Miliukoff  Government,  just  as  a  few  months  later  its 
successor,  the  Kerensky  Government,  under  similar  circum- 
stances and  for  the  same  reason,  was  defeated  and  supplanted 
by  the  Bolshevist  Government  of  the  Soviets. 

It  becomes  necessary  now  to  examine  the  part  played 
in  these  events  by  Kerensky  and  the  party  of  which  he  was 
the  leader,  I  have  no  doubt  that  at  the  time  when  he 
became  head  of  the  Government  he  was  sincerely  determined 
to  do  his  best  to  bring  about  a  general  peace.  At  any  rate, 
in  the  course  of  the  only  interview  I  ever  had  with  him,  on 
the  very  evening,  in  the  beginning  of  May,  when  he  had  just 
succeeded  in  forming  his  first  Coalition  Government,  he  told 
me  that  he  had  decided  to  break  definitely  with  Sazonoff's 
and  Miliukoff's  policy,  which  could  evidently  mean  only 
one  thing,  namely,  that  he  was  prepared  to  enter  into  negotia- 
tions with  our  Allies  with  a  view  to  the  eventual  conclusion 
of  a  general  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  principles  proclaimed 
by  the  Socialists,  as  the  question  of  the  conclusion  of  a  separate 
peace  with  Germany  had  never  even  been  considered  in  any 
shape  or  form.  That  he  very  soon  departed  from  his  original 
standpoint — unless  I  had  misunderstood  his  meaning — became 
evident  to  me  when,  a  few  days  later,  he  transferred  Mr, 
Terestchenko  from  the  post  of  Minister  of  Finance,  which 
he  had  for  some  weeks  held,  to  that  of  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  for  the  occupancy  of  which  he  was  as  little  qualified 
by  experience  as  could  have  been  desired  by  those  who  would 
have  to  treat  with  him  questions  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  the  country.  This  young,  clever,  well-bred  and  fashionable 
cavalier,  who  had  apparently  taken  up  revolutionary  poHtics 
as  a  kind  of  multi-millionaire's  sport,  seems  to  have  fallen 
at  once  under  the  influence  of  his  predecessors  in  office  and 
the  experienced  staff  of  his  department,  who  naturally  were 


272         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOIMACY 

zealous  adepts  of  the  policy  which  unfortunate  Russia  was 
expiating  so  cruelly.  He  may,  besides,  not  have  been  in- 
sensible to  the  attractions  of  social  intercourse  with  high  and 
mighty  Ambassadors,  nor  refractory  to  their  blandishments, 
like  his  chief,  the  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  de  la  Guerre 
et  de  la  Marine,  dwelling  in  the  splendid  halls  of  the  Winter 
Palace,  and  travelling  in  regal  state  in  Imperial  trains  and 
automobiles.  Theirs  were  the  ludicrously,  or  rather  tragically, 
incompetent  hands  into  which  a  mocking  fate  had  placed  the 
destinies  of  a  once  proud  Empire  and  of  a  great  and  generous 
nation. 

It  was  becoming  evident  that  in  these  conditions  an 
initiation  by  the  Provisional  Government  of  negotiations 
with  our  Allies  aiming  at  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace 
could  hardly  be  thought  of. 

A  golden  opportunity  was  going  to  be  missed  for  ever, 
a  chance  for  bringing  about  the  only  condition  that  could 
have  rendered  possible  the  realization  of  the  aim  for  the 
attainment  of  which  so  many  noble  minds  are  vainly  striving 
now — a  real  League  of  Nations  which  could  only  have  been 
based  on  the  termination  of  the  World  War  by  a  peace  of 
conciliation.  I  do  not  know  who  was  the  author  of  the 
famous  formula :  No  annexations,  no  contributions,  and 
self-determination  of  nationalities.  It  seems  to  have  been 
a  spontaneous  expression  of  an  idea  responding  to  the  intimate 
sentiment  of  mankind,  and  to  its  craving  for  a  real  peace  and 
recovery  from  the  psychosis  of  strife  and  hatred  and  revenge 
which  threatens  to  overwhelm  the  civilization  of  the  modern 
world.  It  was  launched  forth  to  the  world  by  an  entirely 
self-constituted  body,  but  it  was  the  voice  of  the  soul  of  the 
Russian  people.  It  was  felt  to  be  such,  and  that  was  the  reason 
why  the  Russian  Revolution  was  at  first  hailed  so  universally 
as  the  dawn  of  a  brighter  day,  just  as  was  the  proclamation 
by  President  Wilson  of  the  principles  responding  to  the  noble 
ideals  of  the  American  people  which  later  caused  his  arrival 
in  Europe  to  be  hailed  with  enthusiastic,  almost  religious, 
fervour  by  the  masses — not  the  "  classes  " — of  all  European 
peoples  as  the  advent  of  a  Messiah  of  Peace. 

Instead  of  avaihng  itself  of  the  universal  and  enthusiastic 
sympathy  which  the  Russian  Revolution  evoked  at  first  in 
the  masses  of  the  people  all  over  the  world,  who  undoubtedly 


TERESTCHENKO  273 

would  have  hailed  with  unbounded  delight  new-born  Russia's 
coming  forward  frankly  as  an  apostle  of  pacification  and 
initiator  of  negotiations  for  a  general  peace,  the  first  revolu- 
tionary Provisional  Government,  under  the  leadership  of 
Mihukoff  and  the  Cadet  Party  dehberately  chose  to  cast  in 
its  lot  with  the  "  classes,"  which  in  all  belligerent  countries,  on 
both  sides,  were  bent  on  the  continuation  of  the  war  of  mutual 
extermination  to  the  sole  advantage  of  their  common  enemy. 
Revolutionary  Socialism,  whether  in  the  guise  of  Bolshevism, 
or  Communism,  or  Syndicalism,  the  most  dangerous,  relent- 
less enemy  of  civilization. 

The  moderate  Social  Revolutionaries  under  Kerensky's 
leadership  might  have  saved  the  country  had  they  remained 
faithful  to  their  own  ideal  of  general  peace  on  the  basis  of 
the  three  points  and  had  they  at  once  initiated  negotiations 
with  the  Allies  with  that  end  in  view.  That  may,  indeed, 
at  first  have  been— and  probably  was,  if  I  am  not  mistaken — 
their  intention.  But  they  were  necessarily  handicapped  by 
their  ignorance  and  total  lack  of  experience  in  the  handling 
of  international  affairs.  Moreover,  Kerensky's  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  Terestchenko,  seems  to  have  been  taking 
advantage  of  his  chief's  ignorance  of  international  relations 
in  order  to  manage  them  more  or  less  on  the  same  lines  as 
his  predecessors  in  office,  with  whose  policies  Kerensky  was 
supposed  to  have  made  up  his  mind  to  break  for  good. 
And  then  they  had  both  evidently  been  taken  in  hand  by  the 
diplomacy  of  the  Entente,  and  been  made  pliable  tools  of 
the  latter's  policy,  as  witness  the  advance  of  our  troops  in 
Galicia  in  June  1917,  recklessly  undertaken  evidently  under 
pressure  of  the  Allies,  which  led  to  such  fatal  consequences 
in  disclosing  to  the  enemy  the  utter  demoralization  and 
collapse  of  our  Army. 

The  zealous  subserviency  displayed  by  the  Provisional 
Government  in  obvious  disregard  of  Russia's  most  vital 
interests  did  not,  however,  protect  it  from  the  treatment 
at  the  hands  of  Allied  diplomacy  which  its  humble  submissive- 
ness  evidently  invited.  We  may  judge  of  it  now  from  the 
secret  documents  from  the  archives  of  the  Russian  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  which  have  been  published  by  the  Soviet 
Government.  The  following  secret  telegrams  refer  to  a 
painful    incident    illustrating    the    nature    of    the    relations 

VOL.    II  18 


274        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

established  between  the  Provisional  Government  and  the 
Allied  Ambassadors  accredited  to  it  : 


[Secret  telegram  to  the  Ambassador  of  Russia  at  Washington.'] 

Petrograd,  September  26  {October  9),  191 7. 
No.  4559. 

The  English,  French  and  Italian  Ambassadors  were  received  to-day 
by  the  Minister  President,  and  in  the  name  of  tlie  Governments  made 
a  communication  to  him  on  the  necessity  of  re-establishing  the  fighting 
capacity  of  our  Army.  This  demarche  could  not  but  produce  a  pain- 
ful impression  on  the  Provisional  Government,  the  more  so  as  all 
our  Allies  are  cognizant  of  the  efforts  which  the  Government  is  making 
for  the  continuation  of  the  unremitting  fight  against  the  common 
enemy.  I  beg  you  will  transmit  in  strict  confidence  to  Mr.  Lansing 
how  highly  the  Provisional  Government  appreciate  the  abstention 
of  the  American  Ambassador  from  participation  in  the  above-men- 
tioned collective  d-marche. 

{Signed)    Terestchenko. 

In  another  secret  telegram  addressed  on  the  same  day 
to  the  Russian  representatives  in  London,  Paris  and  Rome, 
Mr.  Terestchenko  informs  them  that  the  three  Ambassadors 
in  their  collective  communication  pointed  out  "  that  recent 
events  inspire  doubts  as  to  the  force  of  resistance  of  Russia, 
and  as  to  the  possibility  for  her  to  continue  the  war,  in 
consequence  whereof  public  opinion  in  Allied  countries  may 
demand  of  their  Governments  an  account  of  the  material 
assistance  extended  to  Russia.  In  order  to  render  it  possible 
for  the  Allied  Governments  to  quiet  public  opinion  and  to 
inspire  it  again  with  confidence,  the  Russian  Government 
must  prove  in  reality  its  determination  to  employ  all  possible 
means  to  re-establish  discipline  and  military  spirit  in  the 
Army,  and  likewise  to  assure  the  regular  functioning  of  the 
Government  apparatus  at  the  front  as  well  as  in  the  rear. 
In  concluding,  the  Allied  Governments  express  the  hope  that 
the  Russian  Government  will  fulfil  their  task  and  thereby 
secure  the  assistance  of  the  Allies." 

Such  was  the  tone  adopted  by  the  Allies  in  their  dealings 
with  the  Provisional  Government.  And  now  follows  a  third 
telegram  illustrating  the  spirit  in  which  the  Provisional 
Government  responded  to  the  comminatory  communication 
of  the  Allied  Governments  : 


SECRET  TELEGRAMS  275 

[Secret  telegram  to  the  Russian  Representatives  in  London,  Paris 

and  Rome.] 

Petrograd,  September  28  [October  11),  1917. 

The  collective  communication  of  the  three  Ambassadors  has  pro- 
duced on  us  a  painful  impression  by  its  essence  as  well  as  by  the  form 
in  which  it  was  presented.  Our  Allies  are  well  acquainted  with  the 
exceptional  efforts  put  forth  by  the  Provisional  Government  with 
a  view  to  re-establish  the  fighting  capacity  of  the  Army.  Neither 
military  defeats,  nor  interior  troubles,  nor  enormous  material  diffi- 
culties within  the  last  six  months,  have  been  able  to  break  the  firm 
resolve  of  the  Russian  Government  to  continue  to  the  end  the  fight 
with  the  common  enemy.  In  these  conditions  we  are  decidedly  at 
a  loss  to  understand  what  motives  could  have  caused  the  above- 
mentioned  demarche  of  our  Allies  and  what  actual  results  they  expect 
of  it.  Be  pleased  to  communicate  this  telegram  to  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  Transmit  to  him  also  my  insistent  request  not  to 
publish  the  demarche  of  the  Allies  without  previous  agreement  with 
us,  so  as  to  avoid  a  dangerous  excitement  of  our  public  opinion. 

[Signed)     Terestchenko. 

No  Russian  patriot  could  peruse  without  the  deepest 
blush  of  shame  these  documents,  which  throw  such  a  lurid 
light  on  the  depth  of  abasement  to  which  a  great  country 
had  been  reduced  by  the  Revolution  and  the  usurpation  of 
power  by  the  grotesque  personages  who  presumed  to  speak 
in  its  name. 

That  the  Allies  should  have  treated  the  Kerensky  Govern- 
ment with  scant  consideration  is  not  surprising.  The 
bourgeois  parties  having  failed  them,  through  their  lamentable 
incapacity  to  maintain  themselves  in  power,  they  were 
compelled  to  take  up  the  game  with  the  Socialists,  who  had 
succeeded  in  ousting  their  bourgeois  predecessors.  But  it 
was  natural  that  they  should  have  done  so  reluctantly. 
Neither  of  the  two  branches  of  the  Socialist  Party  could, 
indeed,  lay  claim  to  be  considered  as  a  party  fit  to  govern 
the  country.  The  Social  Revolutionaries  had  been  carrying 
on  for  years  an  active  revolutionary  propaganda  among  the 
peasantry,  with  promises  of  the  spoliation  of  the  landowning 
gentry,  and  had  been  warring  with  the  Imperial  Government 
by  means  of  innumerable  terroristic  crimes ;  the  Social 
Democrats  were  bent  on  transplanting  Marxian  Socialism 
and  class  warfare  on  Russian  soil,  but  had  been  opposed  to 
terrorism  on  principle  as  an  ineffective  weapon  of  political 
struggle ;  that  is  to  say,  the  terrorism  which  expressed  itself 


276        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

in  individual  assassinations  and  not  in  the  wholesale  butchery 
which  has  been  the  most  infamous  feature  of  the  Lenin- 
Trotzky  regime. 

To  non-Socialists  (writes  E.  H.  Wilcox  in  his  Fussia's  Ruin)  there 
was,  in  the  old  days,  very  little  to  choose  between  Social  Revolutionaries 
and  Social  Democrats.  If  any  preference  was  felt,  it  was  probably 
given  to  the  Social  Democrats,  whose  record  was  not  yet  stained  with 
terrorism,  and  who,  consequently,  might  be  regarded  as  harmless 
doctrinaires  so  long  as  the  realization  of  their  theories  lay  outside 
the  sphere  of  practical  politics.  However,  the  war,  which  upset  so 
many  old-established  conceptions,  wrought  a  great  change  here.  By 
all  their  traditions  the  Social  Revolutionaries  were  inclined  to  be 
national  and  patriotic.  By  their  fundamental  principles  the  Social 
Democrats  were  essentially  international ;  that  is  to  say,  unpatriotic. 
The  "  harmless  doctrinaires  "  thus  became  the  most  dangerous  of 
men,  the  "  dastardly  "  terrorists  the  main  hope  of  the  Allies.  These 
cross-currents  were  not,  however,  uniform  in  their  action,  and  two  of 
the  stoutest  champions  of  the  Allied  cause  were  Plehanoff,  the  founder 
of  the  Russian  Social  Democratic  Party,  and  Savinkoff,  the  author 
of  a  score  of  terrorist  outrages. 

This  seems  to  be  a  fair  statement  of  the  view  taken  by 
the  Allies  of  the  respective  positions  of  the  two  branches  of 
the  Russian  Socialist  Party,  with  one  of  which,  after  the 
collapse  and  passing  of  the  bourgeois  parties,  they  found  them- 
selves compelled  in  pursuing  their  policy  to  deal  as  with 
the  power  standing  behind  the  shadowy  Kerensky  Govern- 
ment and  supposedly  willing  to  champion  their  cause. 
Whether  this  cause — I  mean  the  cause  of  the  continuation 
of  the  war  at  any  cost — could,  in  existing  conditions,  be  held 
to  be  the  cause  of  Russia,  and  in  how  far  any  of  these  political 
parties  could  be  held  to  represent  the  real  will  of  the  Russian 
people,  was  obviously  a  consideration  of  secondary  importance 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Allies  so  long  as  they  could,  by  the  exercise 
of  pressure  on  the  Provisional  Government,  be  able  to  secure 
the  maintenance  of  the  Russian  front  in  some,  at  least, 
state  of  relative  efhciency,  this  being  of  paramount  importance 
to  them  from  purely  strategic  considerations  which,  to  the 
exclusion  of  statesmanship,  entirely  dominated  their  policies. 
The  necessities  of  war,  revolution  and  politics  are  apt  to  lead 
to  strange  bed-fellowships,  and  it  is  natural  that  the  Powers 
of  the  Entente  should  have  resigned  themselves — 'not,  I 
take  it,  without  some  reluctance — to  deal,  as  with  statesmen. 


THE   RUSSIAN   FRONT  277 

with  the  leaders  of  a  party  whose  erstwhile  only  claim  to 
distinction  had  been  that  it  had  for  years  been  carrying  on, 
by  seditious  propaganda,  conspiracies  and  terroristic  crimes, 
a  relentless  warfare  against  the  Imperial  Government,  the 
Government  of  their  own  country,  and  the  former  ally  of 
these  Powers. 

It  is  abundantly  clear  from  the  contents  of  the  joint 
communication  made  to  the  Provisional  Government  by  the 
Allies  that  they  were  perfectly  well  aware  of  the  hopeless 
condition  of  the  Russian  front.  Their  statesmen  were  far 
too  experienced  not  to  have  realized  that  this  condition 
could  never  be  remedied  by  any  representations,  however 
comminatory,  addressed  to  a  Government  as  helplessly  in- 
competent itself,  and  indeed  as  powerless,  as  was  Kerensky's 
Provisional  Government.  They  must  also  surely  have  been 
able  to  foresee  the  fate  that  was  in  store  for  Russia  unless 
she  were  rescued  in  time  by  the  negotiation  of  a  general 
peace. 

Why,  then,  was  this  obvious  conclusion  not  drawn  and 
acted  upon  instead  of  attempts  being  continued  to  push 
Russia  farther  down  the  road  leading  infallibly  to  her  down- 
fall and  ruin  ?  The  game  of  high  politics  on  the  chessboard 
of  Europe  not  being  played  on  altruistic  lines,  the  rescue, 
pure  and  simple,  of  Russia — her  staying  any  longer  in  the  war 
having  become  manifestly  improbable,  not  to  say  impossible — 
could  evidently  never  be  either  a  motive  or  an  aim  of  the 
policy  of  the  Allies,  unless  such  a  rescue  could  serve  their 
permanent  interests  aside  from  the  strategic  requirements 
of  the  moment. 

In  order  to  find  a  plausible  answer  to  the  above  query 
it  will  be  necessary  to  cast  a  cursory  glance  at  the  history  of 
the  relations  which  have  existed  between  Russia  and  the  rest 
of  Europe  all  through  the  last  two  centuries.  On  these  pages 
I  can,  of  course,  but  briefly  refer  to  the  main  feature 
characteristic  of  these  relations.  But  to  my  American  readers, 
who,  I  take  it,  are  as  a  rule  as  little  acquainted  with  the 
intricacies  of  European  politics  as  Europeans  are  with 
American  political  affairs,  I  would  recommend  the  perusal 
of  the  chapter  headed  "  Fear  of  Russia  "  in  Mr.  Oliver  M. 
Sayler's  very  interesting  book,  Russia,  White  or  Red.  Except 
where  he  seems  to  be  leaning  towards  a  sympathetic  view 


278        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

of  the  Utopian  doctrines  of  Socialism  and  its  offspring, 
Bolshevism — a  mental  attitude  apparently  expected  of  young 
writers  of  liberal  tendencies — or  where  he  sacrifices  to  the 
no  less  obligatory  traditional  ritual  of  haughty  scorn  of 
"  Tsardom,"  or  "  White  Russia  "  as  "a  ghastly  spectre  of 
human  slavery,"  commonly  observed  by  people  whose  only 
knowledge  of  Russia  is  derived  from  the  propaganda  literature 
spread  abroad  by  Russian  revolutionaries  and  their  foreign 
sympathizers — the  author  presents  a  succinct,  but  sufficiently 
illuminating  explanation  of  the  historical  causes  which  have 
determined  from  time  to  time,  as  circumstances  would  have 
seemed  to  require,  the  attitude  toward  Russia  of  Great 
Britain  and  France  as  well  as  Germany.  He  also  points 
to  the  United  States  as  the  only  great  nation  with  a  view- 
point sufficiently  disinterested  and  detached  to  observe 
and  acknowledge  the  facts  of  the  situation  in  Russia  fearlessly 
and  honestly,  and  adds  on  page  255  of  his  book  :  "  we  have  not 
blamed  her  and  cursed  her  for  her  downfall,"  This,  I  think, 
the  Russian  people  will  remember  when  the  awakening  from 
the  present  nightmare  shall  have  come. 

In  the  opening  paragraph  of  the  above-mentioned  chapter 
of  his  book  Mr.  Sayler  says  : 

Fear  of  Russia  has  been  the  consistent  attitude  of  every  country 
in  Europe  ever  since  she  emerged  as  a  World  Power  under  Peter 
the  Great  and  Catherine  in  the  eighteenth  century.  Distrust 
of  the  motives  of  the  great  white  autocracy  of  tlie  Nortli  and 
anxiety  as  to  what  pose  her  changing  and  irresponsible  will  would 
assume  in  the  face  of  important  crises  have  put  Great  Britain  and 
France,  Prussia  and  later  the  German  Empire,  Austria  and  Turkey 
and  Scandinavia,  eternally  on  their  guard.  At  one  time  they  have 
sought  her  favour,  and  then  again  they  have  patched  up  alliances 
to  offset  a  possible  change  of  heart  of  the  Bear. 

These  few  sentences  express  truthfully  the  viewpoint 
from  which,  ever  since  her  entry  into  the  family  of  European 
nations,  Russia  has  been  regarded  by  the  other  Powers. 
Thanks  to  the  overshadowing  size  of  her  territory  and  to 
the  overwhelming  numerical  superiority  of  her  population, 
Russia  loomed  too  large  on  the  field  of  world  politics  not  to 
be  either  feared  as  a  potential  enemy  or  courted  as  a  possible 
ally.  At  the  same  time,  in  spite  of  the  many  lovable  qualities 
which  attracted  to  the  Russian  people  sincere  sympathies 


THE   ALLIES   AND   RUSSIA  279 

from  those  foreigners  who  were  living  in  their  midst  or  who 
were  under  the  charm  of  their  literature  and  their  art,  Russia 
as  a  State  and  on  account  of  her  political  and  cultural  back- 
wardness was  at  bottom  an  object  of  ill-concealed  antipathy, 
not  to  use  a  harsher  term,  to  open  foe  and  pretended  friend 
alike. 

A  realization,  therefore,  of  the  true  character  of  the  other 
Powers'  relations  to  Russia  should  have  guided  the  policies 
of  her  statesmen  if  she  had  possessed  any  worthy  of  that 
name.  It  was  evidently  Alexander  Ill's  intuitive  compre- 
hension of  it  that  caused  him  to  break  loose  from  the  alliance 
of  the  Three  Emperors  and  to  remain,  until  within  two  years 
of  the  close  of  his  reign,  unfettered  by  any  international 
political  obligations  of  any  kind.  Thanks  to  this  wise  policy, 
Russia  under  his  reign  had  reached  the  zenith  of  her  power  and 
credit  and  had  become  the  arbiter  of  the  world's  peace,  since 
as  long  as  she  was  not  committed  to  the  support  of  either  side 
no  one  Power  could  have  attempted  the  formidable  risk  of 
starting  a  general  war  in  Europe.  But  by  descending  into 
the  arena  and  joining  one  of  the  sides  in  the  perennial 
struggle  for  military  supremacy  on  the  Continent  of  Europe, 
Russia  rendered  such  a  war  not  only  possible,  but  unavoid- 
able, unless  the  ruling  powers  in  all  the  countries  concerned 
were  to  undergo  a  fundamental  change  in  their  psychology, 
of  which  change  not  the  faintest  indication  was  then,  nor  is 
to  this  hour,  perceptible  to  the  eye  of  an  unbiased 
observer. 

It  was  but  the  logical  outcome  of  this  fatal  departure 
from  the  Emperor  Alexander  Ill's  original,  wise  and  patriotic 
policy  that  Russia  should  have  been  involved  in  the  cata- 
strophe of  the  World  War,  for  a  participation  in  which  she  had 
no  justifiable  cause  and  was  glaringly  unprepared,  and  unfit 
materially  as  well  as  morally.  Nor  was  it  to  be  wondered 
at  that,  given  the  true  character  of  the  relations  to  her  of 
friend  and  foe  alike,  the  undoing  and  dismemberment  of  Russia 
should  have  become  the  object  of  the  policy,  first  of  her 
enemies,  and  after  their  failure  to  effect  it,  of  her  Allies,  as 
soon  as  they  perceived  that  her  active  and  fruitfully  utilizable 
participation  in  the  war  and  in  their  plans  for  its  ultimate 
settlement  was  no  longer  to  be  expected,  or  had,  indeed, 
become  impossible. 


280         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

That  this  settlement,  as  regards  Russia,  should  have 
taken  the  form  of  a  vivisection  practised  by  her  Allies  on 
the  agonizing  chief  victim  of  the  World  War  by  carving  out 
of  her  writhing  body  a  number  of  independent  republics 
to  form  a  "  barrier  "  to  satisfy  their  hatreds,  their  vengeance 
and  their  fears,  and,  moreover,  of  a  pound  of  flesh  in  the  shape 
of  Bessarabia  made  over  for  all  time,  without  Russia's  consent 
even  having  been  reserved,  to  Roumania  as  a  gratification  or 
a  bribe — all  this  might  have  been  expected,  and,  however 
disastrous  to  our  unfortunate  country,  could,  in  a  world  such 
as  it  is  and  always  has  been,  hardly  be  said  to  furnish  sufficient 
ground  for  just  complaints  on  the  part  of  so-called  statesmen, 
party  leaders,  politicians,  writers,  with  the  deluded  herd 
of  their  followers  from  the  ranks  of  the  "  Intelligentzia," 
who,  by  their  policies,  have  themselves  all  along  been  digging 
the  grave  of  their  country.  But  a  day  will  come  when  a 
resurrected  nation  will  with  undying  gratitude  remember 
that  the  only  voice  that  was  raised  in  protest  against  the 
iniquity  of  such  a  settlement  was  the  voice  of  the  United 
States,  the  voice  of  the  ever-generous  American  people. 

There  was,  however,  another  possible  point  of  view  from 
which  the  Allies  might  have  looked  upon  the  situation  created 
by  the  Russian  Revolution — the  point  of  view  not  only  of 
statesmanship,  but  also  of  plain  business  interests.  That 
Russia,  once  started  on  the  down  grade  of  revolutionary 
anarchy,  could  not  be  arrested  and  would  go  from  bad  to 
worse,  until  the  very  bottom  of  destruction  and  ruin  was 
reached,  must  have  been  sufficiently  evident  to  every  un- 
biased observer.  It  must  have  been  no  less  evident  to  any 
reflecting  mind  that  the  destruction  of  the  political  and  social 
fabric  of  the  Russian  State  would  leave  in  the  structure  of 
the  economic  life  of  Europe — if  ever  it  was  to  be  resurrected 
after  the  general  ruin  wrought  by  the  World  War — an  enormous 
void  that  nothing  could  fill,  not  to  mention  that  the  only 
possible  security  for  the  ultimate  recovery  of  the  billions  of 
money  loaned  to  Russia  before  and  during  the  war  would 
have  been  the  maintenance  of  the  Russian  State  as  an  un- 
impaired political  entity. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  the  plainest  considerations 
of  enlightened  selfishness  should  have  dictated  to  the  Allies 
the  only  possible  policy  that  could  have  saved  Russia  from 


■  f 


IMPORTANCE   OF   PEACE  281 

the  catastrophe  whose  ultimate  consequences  would  be  bound 
to  affect  most  injuriously  their  own  obvious  interests. 

But  the  question  of  an  early  peace,  or  war  to  the  bitter 
end,  had  acquired,  in  connection  with  the  underlying  meaning 
of  the  Russian  Revolution,  a  momentous  importance,  over- 
shadowing all  considerations  of  traditional  statesmanship 
and  national  self-interest.  This  meaning  of  the  Revolution, 
which  war  propaganda,  by  its  shallow  interpretation,  was 
doing  its  best  to  obscure,  carried  nevertheless  a  solemn 
warning  to  the  ruling  classes  in  all  belligerent  countries, 
inasmuch  as  it  meant  the  beginning  of  the  awakening  of  the 
toiling  masses  which  compose  the  overwhelming  majority 
of  the  people  of  every  country  to  a  realization  of  the  fact 
that  the  war  and  its  indefinite  prolongation  had  been  and 
was  being  forced  on  them  by  their  rulers  in  the  pursuit  of 
tempting  phantoms  of  power,  of  hegemony,  of  prestige, 
of  revenge — which  meant  nothing  to  them  simply  as  men  and 
women,  but  for  the  pursuit  of  which  they  were  made  to  pay 
with  the  lives  of  millions  of  their  sons  and  brothers,  with 
millions  of  ruined  homes  and  with  all  the  untold  misery  and 
suffering  wrought  by  a  war  on  such  a  gigantic  scale.  It 
further  m.eant  that  when  the  day  of  their  final  awakening 
should  have  dawned  upon  the  masses  they  would  make  it  a 
day  of  reckoning  with  their  rulers  and  that  the  fratricidal 
war  between  the  nations  might  resolve  itself  into  a  fratricidal 
and  suicidal  war  between  the  "  masses  "  and  the  "  classes  " 
within  the  nations. 

To  this  warning,  unmistakably  conveyed  in  the  meaning 
of  the  events  which  had  taken  place  in  Russia  and  were  soon 
to  lead  to  the  tragic  developments  the  world  has  since  been 
witnessing  in  horror  and  dismay,  the  author  of  these 
reminiscences  attempted  to  call  attention  in  the  open  letter 
addressed,  in  July  1917,  to  an  American  friend  then  in 
Petrograd,  in  the  hope  of  being  able  to  secure  its  publication 
in  the  American  Press, 

A  similar  warning  in  regard  to  the  dangerous  character 
of  the  policy  of  "  war  to  the  bitter  end  "  had  been  expressed, 
as  early  as  two  years  before  the  advent  of  the  Russian  Revolu- 
tion, by  the  author  of  a  diary  kept  in  the  year  1915,  parts 
of  which  have  seen  the  light  of  day  in  recent  issues  of  a  well- 
known  London  weekly  paper.     These  are  the  truly  prophetic 


282         FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

words  written  on  March  23,  1915,  by  the  distinguished  author 
of  this  diary,  who  hides  his  name  under  the  initials  F.  W.  H.  : 

Statesmanship  has  no  right  to  contemplate  war  to  the  bitter 
end.  The  time  may  be  near  when  it  will  be  possible  to  consult 
the  needs  of  humanity  as  well  as  to  secure  our  war  aims.  If  such 
an  opportunity  is  lost,  the  war  will  not  go  on  for  ever.  It  will 
end  in  revolutionary  chaos,  beginning  no  one  can  say  where,  and 
ending  no  one  can  say  how. 

To  suppose  for  a  moment  that  such  grave  considerations 
could  have  failed  to  occupy  most  seriously  the  minds  of  the 
leading  statesman  in  all  belligerent  countries,  on  both  sides, 
would  imply  an  undeserved  reflection  on  their  intelligence 
as  well  as  on  their  patriotism.  Nor  could  it  be  supposed 
that  the  Allied  Governments,  with  all  the  ample  means  of 
gathering  information  at  their  disposal,  were  not  fully  aware 
of  the  fact — since  placed  beyond  any  doubt  by  the  publication 
of  the  various  Documents  and  Statements  relating  to  Peace 
Proposals  and  War  Aims^  December  igi6— November  1918, 
with  an  introduction  by  G.  Lowes  Dickinson — that  Germany 
in  the  spring  of  1917  had  already  reached  the  limit  of  her 
strength,  a  fact  which,  as  Count  Czernin,  the  Austrian  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  his  secret  report  to  his  Sovereign  of 
April  2,  1917,  avers,  "  responsible  leaders  in  Berlin  did  not 
seek  to  deny,"  and  that  consequently  the  powerful  currents 
in  favour  of  peace  were  countered  solely  by  the  desperate 
determination  of  the  militarists  in  power  to  make  only  a 
victorious  peace.  In  regard  to  this,  G.  Lowes  Dickinson 
remarks  that  it  "  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  estimating  the 
policy  of  the  Allied  Governments,  for  their  attitude  would 
react  on  the  state  of  parties  in  Germany,  would  strengthen 
the  peace  elements  if  it  were  conciliatory,  and,  if  otherwise, 
play  into  the  hands  of  the  militarists." 

Be  that  as  it  may,  it  was  plain  that  conditions  were 
favourable  for  the  initiation  of  negotiations  aiming  at  the 
conclusion  of  a  general  peace  and  that,  in  the  absolutely 
desperate  position  in  which  Russia  found  herself,  it  was  down- 
right madness  not  to  make  at  least  an  attempt  to  induce  the 
Allies  to  enter  upon  joint  negotiations  to  that  effect. 

In  the  prevailing  helpless  bewilderment  the  Kerensky 
Government  seem  to  have  had  a  vague  inkling  of  the  necessity 
of   something   being   undertaken   in   that   sense,   but   were 


A  NEW  REVOLUTION  IMMINENT      283 

apparently  unable  to  understand  precisely  what  it  was  that 
should  be  done  and  how  to  attempt  to  do  it.  In  an  assembly , 
mainly  composed  of  members  of  the  Soviets  of  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Delegates,  convoked  by  Kerensky  under  the 
pretentious  and  peculiar  designation  of  "  Fore-Parliament," 
endless  discussions  took  place  as  to  the  instructions  to  be 
given  to  Russia's  representative  at  a  conference  expected 
to  be  held  in  Paris  by  the  Allied  Powers  for  the  revision 
of  so-called  war  aims.  Finally,  however,  it  was  announced 
that  the  conference  was  not  to  deal  with  the  terms  of  peace 
at  all. 

After  many  fruitless  attempts  at  obtaining  an  interview 
with  the  dictator  Kerensky  himself,  and  having  become 
convinced  with  intense  horror  and  despair  that  the  new 
revolution  was  imminent,  with  its  unavoidable  sequel  of 
anarchy  and  civil  war,  I  determined  to  make  one  last  effort 
to  obtain  a  hearing,  and  addressed  on  October  22nd  (4th 
November)  the  following  letter  to  one  of  the  Ministers,  a 
wealthy  manufacturer  and  a  gentleman  : 

"  I  approach  you.  Sir,  to  whom,  as  representative  of 
some  of  the  most  important  business  interests,  it  cannot 
possibly  be  indifferent  whether  our  country  is  entirely  ruined 
and  thrown  into  the  abyss  of  civil  war  and  anarchy  by  the 
policy  of  the  ideologues  of  '  War  at  any  cost  '  and  '  War 
until  a  final  victory,'  I  approach  you  with  the  request — 
nay,  I  implore  you  to  give  me  at  least  a  hearing  and  to  give 
me  a  chance  to  explain  to  you  the  considerations  derived 
from  the  experience  gained  by  long  years  of  participation 
in  affairs  of  State  and  negotiations  concerning  the  gravest 
interests  of  Russia,  which  lead  me  to  think  that  even  at  this 
late  hour  it  might  be  possible,  as  it  is  imperatively  required, 
to  reach  an  agreement  with  our  Allies  in  regard  to  the  earliest 
possible  beginning  of  peace  negotiations  with  the  enemy." 

No  answer  was  ever  returned  to  this  letter.  Three  days 
later  the  Government  was  overthrown,  and  the  Ministers — 
except  Kerensky,  who  had  sought  and  found  safety  in  timely 
flight — were  prisoners  in  the  fortress  of  St.  Peter  and  St.  Paul. 


CHAPTER  XL 

Bolshevism — Its  origin  and  dangers — Trotzky's  statement — German  influ- 
ence— We  escape  from  Russia — At  Murmansk — Admiral  Kemp — 
Visit  to  Berlin — Conditions  there — Privy  Councillor  Kriege — At  Stock- 
holm— Reflections — The  end. 

The  sinister  meaning  to  the  whole  world  of  that  fatal  date, 
October  25th,  old  style,  or  November  7th,  new  style,  of  the 
year  19 17,  the  date  that  marked  the  passing  of  Russia  as 
a  civilized  State,  docs  not  seem  as  yet  to  be  fully  realized. 
The  world  is  still  too  much  under  the  influence  of  war  psychosis 
to  look  upon  events  of  the  recent  past  from  any  other  point 
of  view  than  that  of  their  relationship  to  the  late  international 
contest,  or  rather  to  the  international  contest  ended  only 
in  appearance.  Thus  the  advent  of  Bolshevism  as  a  world 
power,  which  dates  from  that  fatal  day,  has  so  far  seemingly 
failed  to  be  comprehended  in  all  its  ominous  significance. 
Nor  has  the  real  meaning  of  its  appearance  in  Russia  been 
sufficiently  dissociated  as  it  should  have  been  from  the 
coincident  circumstance  that  the  journey  to  Russia  of  Lenin 
and  other  leaders  of  Bolshevism  had  been  facilitated  by  the 
German  Government  and  that  their  pockets  had  been  filled 
with  German  gold,  just  as  in  1894  our  revolutionary  parties 
had  been  financed  by  Japan,  and  that  the  result  of  their 
activities  had  substantially  benefited  the  military  situation 
of  Germany. 

Of  all  the  misunderstandings  and  misrepresentations  of  Bolshevik 
Russia  (says  Mr.  Sayler  in  Russia,  White  or  Red),  the  one  which  is 
least  creditable  to  an  intelligent  world  is  that  which  has  identified 
Lenin  and  his  counsellors  with  German  Imperial  power.  Germany 
did  not  invent  Bolshevism  in  order  to  disrupt  Russia.  Bolshevism 
is  a  definite  social  programme,  as  definite  as  the  programme  of  m.ilitary 
imperialism  of  the  HohenzoUerns  and  utterly  incompatible  with  it. 
.  .  .  Germany  simply  saw  in  Bolshevism  a  means  of  keeping  her 
Eastern  neighbour  temporarily  impotent  in  a  military  way,  and  for 

284 


BOLSHEVISM  285 

the  sake  of  this  gain  she  was  wilUng  to  take  the  desperate  chance 
of  revolution  spreading  to  her  own  masses.  Lenin,  on  the  other 
hand,  felt  that  he  could  afford  to  take  aid  from  Germany  and 
execute  German  orders  outwardly  for  the  opportunity  which  peace 
would  give  him  to  flood  the  German  proletariat  with  revolutionary 
propaganda.  It  was  simply  a  case  of  two  desperate  and  uncom- 
promising enemies,  each  playing  with  fire  to  defeat  the  will  of  the 
other.  Wilhelm  was  pitted  against  Lenin  in  deadly  combat,  and 
Lenin,  with  the  aid  of  Foch,  won. 

It  will  hardly  be  denied  that  Bolshevism — that  is  to  say, 
Marxian  Communism — is  but  the  logically  developed  extreme 
form  of  Socialism,  that  most  dangerous  delusion  which  has 
ever  swayed  the  minds  of  mankind  :  delusion,  because  its 
aim — the  elimination  from  the  social  life  of  the  human  race 
of  the  inequality  of  conditions  borne  of  the  natural  inequality 
of  men  and  of  the  development  of  civilization  from  its  very 
inception  among  them — is  unattainable  save  by  a  return 
to  primaeval  barbarism  ;  dangerous,  because,  in  the  pursuit 
of  its  Utopia,  it  aims  at  the  destruction  of  the  very  founda- 
tions on  which  rests  the  structure  of  civilized  society  and 
because  it  panders  to  and  thrives  on  the  basest  instincts 
of  the  human  soul,  the  instincts  of  envy  and  of  hate.  The 
advent  to  power  of  Bolshevism  meant  the  opening  of  a 
relentless  warfare  against  the  social  system  as  it  has  been 
gradually  evolved  through  the  ages  from  the  historical 
development  of  civilization  among  men — in  other  words, 
against  the  present-day  "  Capitalistic,"  or,  rather,  to  use  a 
more  comprehensive  term,  "  Bourgeois  "  Society.  If  there 
could  ever  have  been  any  doubt  as  to  the  reality  of  the 
ambitious,  all-embracing  and  sinister  aims  of  Bolshevism, 
such  doubt  should  be  set  at  rest  by  the  unequivocal  defence 
of  Red  Terrorism,  in  a  statement  issued,  it  seems  by  Trotzky, 
on  October  5,  1920,  reproduced  in  translation  in  the  Sunday 
edition  of  the  New  York  Herald  of  November  21st,  in  which, 
among  other  startlingly  outspoken  assertions,  he  is  made 
to  say  : 

The  Bourgeoisie  in  the  present  epoch  is  a  sinking  class.  It  no 
longer  plays  an  essential  part  in  production,  but,  by  its  imperialist 
methods  of  acquisition,  it  ruins  the  world's  economic  order  and  ruins 
human  civilization.  Nevertheless,  the  tenacity  of  the  Bourgeoisie 
is  colossal.     It  hangs  on  and  does  not  want  to  go.     By  this  very  fact 


286        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

it  threatens  to  drag  all  society  with  it  over  the  precipice.  The 
Bourgeoisie  must  be  torn  out,  cut  off.  The  Red  Terror  is  an  instru- 
ment used  against  a  class  doomed  to  go  under  and  that  does  not  want 
to  go  under. 

And  he  concludes  : 


If,  even  before  the  war,  it  was  sheer  Utopianism  to  expect  that 
the  expropriation  of  the  propertied  classes  could  be  carried  out 
quietly  and  painlessly,  without  risings,  armed  conflicts,  attempts  at 
counter-revolution  and  harsh  repressions,  the  situation  created  by 
the  imperialistic  war  will  render  doubly  and  trebly  fierce  that  near 
and  unavoidable  civil  strife  of  which  there  can  be  one,  and  only  one, 
termination — the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat. 

The  World  War  has  furnished  the  opportunity  for  the 
successful  inauguration  of  the  campaign  the  ultimate  aim  of 
which  is  so  grandiloquently  and  brazenly  set  forth  in  Trotzky's 
statement.  The  assault  was  primarily  directed  against  the 
social  fortress,  so  fatally  divided  against  itself,  at  its  weakest 
front — the  Russian  Bourgeois  Society,  weakest  numerically 
as  well  as  morally,  and  hardly  able  or  even  resolved  to  attempt 
to  defend  itself.  The  fatal  outcome  of  this  assault  the  world 
is  witnessing  to-day  without  perhaps  realizing  to  its  full 
extent  its  menace  to  civilization  and  the  dangerous  nature 
of  the  attraction  which  the  Russian  proletariat's  triumph 
might  possess  in  the  eyes  of  the  proletariat  in  more  advanced 
and  more  happily  situated  countries.  For  it  should  not  be  lost 
sight  of  that  the  armature  of  the  proud  and  imposing  edifice  of 
bourgeois  society  has  for  years  been  subjected  to  a  weakening 
process  from  within  by  some  of  its  own  deluded  inhabitants 
and  been  eaten  into  by  the  canker  of  doubt  of  its  solidity 
and  lack  of  faith  in  the  righteousness  of  its  very  foundations. 
As  Alfred  Noyes  has  it :  "It  may  be  said  with  the  utmost 
seriousness  that  the  intellectual  Bolshevism  which  has  been 
prevalent  during  the  last  fifty  years  has  been  more  responsible 
for  both  the  Great  War  and  for  the  present  peril  of  civilization, 
than  has  yet  been  properly  realized.  You  cannot  treat  all 
the  laws  that  keep  us  from  chaos  as  if  they  were  scraps  of  paper 
without  a  terrible  reckoning  ;  but  this  is  what  the  intellectuals 
have  been  doing  for  half  a  century  in  their  novels,  plays  and 
poems." 


A   PESSIMISTIC   VIEW  287 

A  no  less  pessimistic  view  of  the  situation  is  expressed 
by  another  distinguished  writer  in  a  recent  article  in  the 
English  Review  : 

The  human  world  (writes  Mr.  Robert  BrifEault)  is  suffering  to-day 
from  the  crumbhng  of  the  very  foundations  on  which  it  has  been 
built.  Broadly  and  fundamentally  regarded — and  it  is  the  broadest 
and  most  fundamental  view  alone  that  can  avail  us  in  our  present 
need — the  situation  is  this  :  The  human  world  in  all  its  aspects,  poli- 
tical, social,  etliical,  spiritual,  aesthetic,  has  been  built  upon  fictitious 
conventions,  once  held  sacred,  held  at  the  worst  to  be  expedient  and 
convenient.  Those  conventions  are  to-day  no  longer  believed.  That, 
and  no  less,  is  the  appalling  gravity  of  the  situation.  The  very  ground 
upon  which  the  world  stood  is  cracking  and  sagging  beneath  it.  .  .  . 
The  unrealities  upon  which  the  human  world  was  founded  were  for 
a  long  time  pragmatically  true  ;  they  were  not,  indeed,  believed 
because  they  "  worked,"  but  they  "  worked "  because  they  were 
believed.  .  .  .  But  when  the  multitudinous,  essential  and  funda- 
mental foundations  of  the  world  which  they  are  called  upon  to  carry 
on  have  become  unveracities  to  the  multitude  the  brealdng-point  is 
reached.     And  we  have  reached  that  breaking-point. 

And,  as  between  the  Bolshevists  and  the  Bourgeoise, 
the  author  seems  to  think  the  Bolshevists  will  win  "because 
they  have  the  motive  power,  belief  in  their  ideal,  which  our 
bourgeois  civilization  has  not." 

The  ill-omened  character  of  the  moral  atmosphere  in 
which  European  mankind  breathed  in  the  period  preceding 
the  World  War  was  aggravated  by  the  recklessness  with  which 
the  propertied  classes  were  wont  to  flaunt  their  boundless 
luxury  and  extravagance  in  the  faces  of  the  sullen  masses 
seething  with  discontent,  envy  and  class  hatred.  The 
ominously  growing  and  sinister  current  of  popular  feeling  was, 
indeed,  for  a  time  diverted  by  the  outbreak  of  the  war  into 
the  supposedly  safer  channel  of  international  hatred.  But — 
and  here  I  must  again  refer  to  the  above-mentioned  statement 
by  Trotzky  in  which  he  quotes  from  an  article,  written  by 
himself  five  years  ago,  the  following  comments  : 

Imperialism  tore  society  by  force  out  of  its  state  of  unstable  equili- 
brium. It  burst  open  the  lock-gates  with  which  Social  Democracy 
had  dammed  up  the  flood  of  proletarian  revolutionary  energy  and 
directed  that  flood  into  its  course.  This  monstrous  historical  experi- 
ment, which  at  one  blow  broke  the  Socialist  Internationale,  is  the 
bearer  at  the  same  time  of  mortal  danger  to  bourgeois  society  itself. 


288        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

The  hammer  has  been  wrung  from  the  hands  of  the  worker  and  re- 
placed by  the  sword.  The  worker,  bound  hand  and  foot  by  the 
apparatus  of  the  capitahst  economic  system,  is  suddenly  torn  away 
from  all  this  and  taught  to  put  collective  interests  higher  than  his 
domestic  happiness,  than  his  very  life.  With  the  arms  made  by  him- 
self in  his  hands,  the  worker  is  placed  in  a  situation  where  the  political 
fate  of  the  State  depends  directly  upon  him.  Those  who  in  normal 
times  oppressed  and  despised  him  now  flatter  him  and  try  to  curry 
favour.  At  the  same  time  he  comes  into  intimate  contact  with  those 
very  cannon  which,  according  to  Lassalle,  form  the  keystone  of  the 
constitution. 

Even  if  the  advanced  among  the  workers  were  theoretically  aware 
of  the  fact  that  force  is  the  midwife  of  right,  their  political  thinking 
nevertheless  remained  permeated  with  the  spirit  of  possibilism  and 
accommodation  to  bourgeois  legality.  Now  the  worker  is  learning  in 
practice  to  despise  this  legality  and  to  destroy  it  by  force.  The  static 
attitude  of  mind  gives  way  to  the  dynamic.  Heavy  artillery  thunders 
the  idea  into  his  head  that  in  cases  where  it  is  impossible  to  go  round 
an  obstacle  the  possibility  remains  of  smashing  it.  Almost  the  whole 
adult  male  population  has  been  put  through  this  school  of  war,  fearful 
in  its  social  realism,  that  is  creating  a  new  human  type. 

The  clenched  fist  of  iron  necessity  is  now  raised  above  all  the 
norms  of  bourgeois  society — over  its  law,  its  morality  and  its  religion. 
"  Necessity  knows  no  law,"  said  the  German  Chancellor  on  August  4, 
191 4.  Monarchs  came  down  into  the  market-places  in  order  to 
accuse  each  other  of  lying,  after  the  manner  of  fishwives.  Govern- 
ments trampled  on  the  obligations  they  had  solemnly  recognized, and 
the  National  Church  chained  its  Lord  God,  like  a  convict,  to  the 
national  cannon. 

Is  it  not  obvious  that  such  conditions  must  give  rise  to  profound 
changes  in  working-class  psychology  and  radically  cure  the  workmen 
of  the  hypnosis  of  legality  which  was  cast  upon  them  during  a  period 
of  political  stagnation  ?  The  propertied  classes  will  soon,  to  their 
horror,  have  the  occasion  to  convince  themselves  of  this. 

The  proletariat,  graduates  of  the  school  of  war,  will  feel  the  need 
of  force  at  the  first  serious  obstacle  they  meet  within  their  own 
countries.  "  Necessity  knows  no  law  "  ;  they  will  throw  that  phrase 
in  the  faces  of  those  who  try  to  stop  them  with  the  laws  of  bourgeois 
legality.  And  the  terrible  economic  distress  which  will  gradually 
appear  during  the  war,  and  especially  after  its  end,  will  drive  the 
masses  to  break  many  and  many  laws. 

It  would  have  been  impossible,  it  would  seem,  to  have 
expressed  in  more  lucid,  more  convincing  and  at  the  same 
time  truly  prophetic  terms  a  solemn  warning  against  the 
monstrous  folly  of  the  suicidal  internecine  war  between 
the  leading  nations  of  Europe  under  the  inspiration  and 
leadership    of    their    ruling    bourgeois    classes ;     a    warning 


THE   WORLD'S  NEW  DRAMA  289 

propounded  to  the  unbelieving  bourgeois  society  of  all  nations 
five  years  ago  by  the  ablest  leader  of  its  most  dangerous 
enemy,  the  International  Proletariat  ;  a  warning,  of  course, 
not  intended  as  such,  every  word  of  which,  however,  would 
have  been  worthy  of  being  weighed  with  the  most  thoughtful 
care  and  which,  as  far  as  unhappy  Russia  is  concerned,  has 
already  come  true. 

This  warning,  at  the  time — five  years  ago — when  it  was 
published,  had,  indeed,  been  penned  by  an  obscure  political 
exile,  a  Russian  Jew,  whose  writings,  if  they  happened  to 
be  noticed  at  all,  were  probably  classified  as  ordinary  Socialist 
propaganda  and  accordingly  given  but  little  attention. 
Nor  could  it  have  been  foreseen  that  the  day  was  near  when 
the  obscure  political  exile  would  become  one  of  the  two 
usurping  autocrats  who  hold  in  the  grip  of  their  sanguinary 
tyranny  the  greatest  of  all  European  countries  and  a  nation 
of  still  some  130  to  150  million  people,  and  wield  a  power  with 
which  the  proudest  Governments  are  compelled  to  reckon. 
But  the  predictions  he  uttered  in  1915  in  regard  to  the 
dangerous  influence  which  the  indefinite  prolongation  of 
the  war  was  bound  to  exercise  on  the  psychology  of  the 
millions  of  human  beings  who  were  shedding  their  blood  on 
the  battlefields  of  Europe  were  based  on  a  reasoning  the 
soundness  of  which  no  statesmanship,  however  spurious, 
could  fail  to  perceive  nor  could  afford  to  question.  War 
psychosis  may  have  blinded  the  rulers  of  all  the  belligerent 
nations  to  the  existence  of  this  danger,  or  have  caused  it  to 
be  held  to  be  too  remote,  or  its  gravity  to  be  underrated. 
However,  the  seizure  of  power  in  Russia  by  the  Bolsheviks 
should  have  opened  their  eyes  not  only  to  the  fact  that,  as 
far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  the  international  war  was 
definitively  and  irrevocably  closed  and  turned  into  a  class 
war  inside  the  nation,  but  also  to  the  deeper  meaning  for  the 
rest  of  the  world  of  this  portentous  event. 

The  curtain  had  risen  on  the  first  act  of  the  world's  coming 
new  drama,  the  moving  forces  of  which  had  been  slowly 
gathering  and  maturing  in  the  course  of  the  last  century 
and  which  were  now  to  open  the  decisive  struggle  between 
the  present  so-called  capitalistic  or  bourgeois  civilization  and 
Bolshevism  bent  on  the  destruction  of  its  very  foundations — 
a  fight  to  the  bitter  end,  to  conquer  or  to  perish. 

VOL.    II  19 


290        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

Bolshevism,  or  what  was  practically  the  same  thing 
under  other  names,  had  thrice  before  attempted  to  raise 
its  sinister  head  :  in  the  French  Revolution  of  1848  and  the 
Paris  Commune  in  1871,  and  in  Russia  in  1906.  All  three 
attempts  have  failed :  in  France  because  the  structure 
of  bourgeois  society  proved  solid  enough  to  withstand  any 
assault  by  the  forces  of  destruction  and  the  bourgeoisie  had 
spirit  and  determination  enough  to  inflict  on  its  assailants 
a  crushing  defeat ;  in  Russia  because  the  bulk  of  the  Army 
having  remained  faithful  to  its  oath,  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment succeeded  in  propping  up  the  tottering  edifice  of  the 
State,  so  as  to  make  it  last  some  years  longer.  But  now 
Bolshevism,  having  established  in  Russia  its  own  autocracy 
of  a  sanguinary  tyrannical  type,  such  as  much-decried 
Tsarism  never  even  had  dreamed  of,  and  holding  absolute 
command  of  all  the  remaining  and  still  immense  resources 
of  what  had  been  a  colossal  and  prosperous  Empire,  had 
secured  a  formidable  base  from  which  to  launch  forth  its 
brazen  defiance  to  the  world  and  its  insidious  propaganda 
of  ruthless  class  warfare  against  bourgeois  society  fatally 
enfeebled  by  having  been  for  more  than  three  years  engaged 
with  suicidal  frenzy  in  an  internecine  war  for  military  and 
political  supremacy  in  Europe. 

Under  these  conditions  Bolshevism  was  bound  to  become 
a  most  serious  menace  to  the  civilized  world,  not  so  much  on 
account  of  its  attempts  at  putting  into  practical  operation  the 
unworkable  Utopian  doctrines  of  Socialism  or  Communism 
— the  unavoidable  and  disastrous  results  of  which  could 
only  be  helpful  in  disillusioning  the  deluded  believers  in  these 
doctrines — as  because  their  success  in  ousting  the  bourgeoisie 
and  usurping  all  the  powers  of  the  State  could  not  but  exercise 
a  powerfully  tempting  fascination  on  the  minds  of  the 
proletariat  of  other  countries,  ignorant  of  the  real  condition 
of  things  in  Russia.  In  proclaiming  to  the  world  their 
provocative  summons,  "  Proletarians  of  all  countries,  unite  !  " 
the  Bolsheviks  could  point  to  their  own  triumphant  achieve- 
ment inviting  imitation. 

Bolshevism  as  a  world  movement  had  become  a  most 
serious  menace  to  the  whole  system  of  our  present-day 
civilization,  and  as  such  should  have  been  recognized  as  the 
common  enemy  of  all.     To  put  it  down  by  a  united  effort 


THE   MENACE   OF   BOLSHEVISM        291 

in  the  common  interest  before  it  had  acquired  any  further 
momentum  would,  one  should  think,  have  been  the  part  of 
wisdom.  As  long,  however,  as  the  World  War,  which  was 
undermining  and  ruining  perhaps  for  generations  the  pros- 
perity of  the  bourgeois-governed  countries  engaged  in  it,  was 
suffered  to  continue,  no  effectual  effort  at  combating 
Bolshevism  could  be  thought  of,  since  it  was  the  war  itself 
that  had  enabled  Bolshevism  to  raise  its  head  and  to  thrive 
on  the  discontent  and  despair  of  the  warring  peoples  which 
it  brought  in  its  train. 

Purblind  war  psychosis  alone  could  imagine  that  the 
fundamental  object  of  Bolshevism  was  to  promote  German 
imperialistic  aims  because  some  of  its  leaders  were  supposed 
to  have  been,  or  had  actually  been,  suborned  with  German 
gold.  Bolshevism  was  pursuing  an  openly  proclaimed  and 
much  more  dangerous  aim  than  assisting  the  success  of 
German  arms,  or  else  the  defeat  of  Germany  would  have 
settled  its  fate  as  well.  But,  far  from  this  having  been  the 
case,  we  see  now  that  the  total  collapse  of  Germany  and  her 
associates  has  only  served  to  increase  the  menace  of 
Bolshevism  by  widening  the  circle  where  its  propaganda 
may  count  upon  a  receptive  mood  among  peoples  reduced 
to  the  extreme  of  abasement  and  despair  and  embittered 
by  their  long-borne  suffering  and  misery,  for  which  they 
hold  their  ruling  classes  responsible. 

Nor  was  the  hope  of  German  militarists  and  Russia- 
haters,  of  being  able  to  secure  the  dismemberment  and  final 
elimination  of  Russia  as  a  potent  factor  in  world  politics, 
by  feloniously  compounding  with  Bolshevism,  based  on  any 
sounder  comprehension  of  the  reality  of  the  situation  created 
by  the  advent  of  Bolshevism  as  the  de  facto  Government  of 
a  great  country  and  its  consequent  growth  as  a  formidable 
menace  to  the  civilized  world. 

One  would  think  that  it  would  have  been  sufficiently  clear 
to  the  rulers  of  all  the  countries  engaged  in  the  World  War, 
on  both  sides,  that  there  was  only  one  way  to  meet  the 
common  danger  threatening  them  all  and  to  deal  effectively 
and  decisively  once  for  all  with  the  menace  of  Bolshevism, 
and  that  was  the  immediate  conclusion  of  peace  between 
the  belligerents  and  their  armed  intervention,  jointly  or  by 
mandate  to  one  of  them,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  the  disarmed 


292        FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

people  of  Russia  to  depose  the  Bolshevist  usurpers  before  they 
had  time  to  organize  their  Army,  and  to  re-establish  a  civilized 
Government  of  their  own  choice. 

What  stood  in  the  way  of  the  adoption  of  such  a  policy, 
so  evidently  suited  to  the  real  interests  of  all  concerned  and, 
indeed,  of  civilization  itself,  was,  on  both  sides,  the  determina- 
tion of  the  militaristically  thinking  elements  predominating 
among  the  rulers  of  the  belligerent  countries  not  to  terminate 
the  war  otherwise  than  by  a  "  knock-out  blow  "  dealt  to  the 
adversary,  and  by  a  peace  by  dictation,  and  furthermore 
on  one  side  the  hatred  and  fear  of  Germany,  and  on  the  other 
the  hatred  and  fear  of  Russia. 

The  failure  to  adopt  such  a  policy  in  obedience  to  the 
dictates,  not  of  sentiment,  but  of  reason  and  statesmanship, 
has  led  to  results  which  the  world  is  contemplating  to-day 
in  sorrow  and  consternation. 

As  far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  it  was  plain  from  the 
moment  of  the  unopposed  seizure  of  power  by  the  Bolsheviks 
that  her  fate  was  sealed  unless  something  could  be  done  to 
enable  those  elements  which  constituted  the  still  existing 
nucleus  of  the  political  apparatus  of  the  former  State  to 
re-establish  a  Government  of  law  and  order — that  is  to  say, 
the  Monarchy — which  alone  could  have  saved  the  country 
from  disruption  and  anarchy.  That  was  still  possible  as  long 
as  that  nucleus  had  not  been  definitively  destroyed  or  dispersed 
and  the  Red  Army  which  the  Bolsheviks  were  trying  to  raise 
for  the  consolidation  of  their  power  was  still  in  the  initial 
stage  of  its  organization.  But  it  was  no  less  plain  that  these 
elements  could  not  by  any  possibility  come  forward  to  any 
serious  purpose  unless  they  had  the  support  of  an  armed  force 
to  rely  on.  Such  an  armed  force  could  only  come  from  the 
outside,  since  the  National  Army,  having  been  disbanded, 
or  rather  having  disbanded  itself,  no  longer  existed  as  a  fighting 
force  and  its  remnants  could  not  be  relied  on  for  the  support 
of  law  and  order  no  more  than  for  opposition  to  a  foreign 
invasion.  What  was  needed,  consequently,  for  the  salvation 
of  the  country — if  indeed  its  salvation  was  considered  desirable 
— was  the  conclusion  with  the  least  possible  delay  of  a  general 
peace  and  an  agreement  between  the  former  belligerents  to 
assist  in  the  re-establishment  of  the  Russian  Empire  in  the  only 
way  in  which  such  assistance  could  effectually  be  rendered. 


A  FURTHER  EFFORT  FOR  PEACE     293 

Such  a  solution  might  have  commended  itself  in  the  interest 
of  the  reorganization  of  the  community  of  European  States 
on  a  basis  rendering  possible  their  peaceable  coexistence 
in  the  future.  Under  existing  conditions,  however,  in  the 
all-pervading  atmosphere  of  war  psychosis,  the  salvation  of 
Russia  was  evidently  no  concern  of  friend  or  foe,  nor  even 
of  those  Russians  in  whose  eyes  loyalty  to  the  Allies  possessed 
a  claim  to  their  allegiance  superior  to  that  of  their  own 
country's  vital  interests  and  very  existence.  Any  hope, 
therefore,  based  on  the  possibility  of  such  a  solution  was 
manifestly  doomed  to  disappointment.  And  yet  it  was  the 
only  hope  left  to  those — and  they  were  not  as  few  as 
indifference  to  the  fate  of  the  Russian  people  was  inclined 
to  suppose — to  whom  the  salvation  of  their  country  meant 
everything  and  primed  every  other  consideration.  It  was 
the  straw  at  which  a  drowning  man  would  clutch  before 
sinking  to  his  doom. 

But  the  pursuit  of  this  only  remaining  hope  was  possible 
only  if  an  organ  could  be  found  to  plead  the  cause  of  Russia's 
salvation.  There  existed  no  longer  any  power  in  Russia 
entitled  to  delegate  to  anyone  due  authority  to  speak  in  her 
name.  Nor  was  it  possible  under  the  regime  of  terrorism 
established  by  the  Bolsheviks  for  any  political  organization, 
or  group  of  people,  to  meet  for  the  purpose  of  discussing 
the  situation  and  of  empowering  anyone  to  act  as  their  spokes- 
man abroad. 

Such  were  the  conditions  existing  when,  being  determined 
not  to  leave  a  stone  unturned  in  the  fight  for  peace  and  for 
my  country's  salvation,  I  made  up  my  mind  to  undertake 
the  self-imposed  mission  of  placing  myself  in  contact  with 
both  sides  in  the  contest,  as  well  as  with  the  neutral  Powers, 
in  an  endeavour  to  discover  a  way  in  which  the  initiation  of 
peace  negotiations  might  be  brought  about.  I  was,  of  course, 
fully  aware  of  the  quixotic  nature  and  hopelessness  of  such 
an  undertaking,  as  well  as  of  the  probable  obloquy, 
contemptible  suspicions  and  even  ridicule  to  which  I  exposed 
myself  in  doing,  nevertheless,  what  I  considered  to  be  my 
sacred  duty  by  my  unfortunate  country.  I  must  own, 
however,  that  I  was  somewhat  astonished  when,  having 
through  the  kind  and  unremitting  efforts  of  the  United  States 
Minister  at  Stockholm,  Mr.  Ira  Nelson  Morris,  an  old  friend 


294        FORTY   YEARS   OF    DIPLOMACY 

of  happier  days  in  America,  obtained  permission  to  have 
my  passports  vised  for  the  journey  to  New  York,  I  found  that 
I  was,  by  order  of  the  Russian  Minister  at  Stockholm,  refused 
by  the  Russian  Consulate-General  passports  for  myself  and 
family  on  the  plea  that  I  was  suspected  of  being  a  Bolshevist 
agent,  and  that  I  had  been  visiting  Berlin  in  the  course  of 
the  summer  of  1918,  and  furthermore  I  found  that  the  per- 
mission already  granted  to  have  my  papers  vised  at  the 
American  Consulate-General  had  suddenly  been  revoked 
by  cabled  orders  from  Washington,  presumably  in  consequence 
of  some  denvmciation  to  the  Inter-Allicd  Passport  Control 
emanating  from  the  same  Russian  source.  This  permission 
was  restored  some  days  later,  thanks  to  a  renewed  inter- 
cession in  my  favour  by  Mr.  Morris,  who  stood  by  me  in  this 
matter  as  a  faithful  friend,  a  broad-minded  statesman  and 
a  true  gentleman. 

The  story  of  our  flight  from  Russia  and  my  subsequent 
movements  I  told  in  a  long  letter  addressed  from  Stockholm 
to  an  old  friend  and  former  colleague,  with  whose  consent 
I  reproduce  it  below  : 

Grand  Hotel,  Stockholm, 

December  30,   191 8. 
January  26,   1919. 
My  Dear  Lord  Bryce, 

I  am  extremely  sorry  our  correspondence  should  have  suffered 
such  a  very  long  interruption  owing  to  conditions  beyond  our  control. 
I  wrote  to  you  shortly  after  our  arrival  here,  but  perhaps  my  letter 
never  reached  you.  So  I  shall  begin  by  telling  you  again  in  as  few 
words  as  possible  the  long  story  of  our  escape  from  that  hell  on  earth 
which  calls  itself  Petrograd.  As  soon  as  things  began  to  look  abso- 
lutely desperate  I  began  to  prepare  for  our  flight.  The  difficulties 
in  the  way  were  very  great  indeed.  After  several  enforced  post- 
ponements we  got  off  at  last  on  the  9th  of  Ma},-^ — I  mean  myself, 
wife  and  daughter  and  two  old  devoted  servants.  Six  days  later  we 
reached  Murmansk  safe  and  sound  but  half  starved,  as  the  provisions 
we  had  with  us  were  beginning  to  give  out.  There  we  were  compara- 
tively safe,  as  the  local  Bolshevik  authorities  were  sufficiently  cowed 
by  the  presence  in  port  of  some  English  men-of-war  and  some  English 
and  French  soldiers  on  shore.  But  on  arrival  we  found  that  the  only 
Russian  steamer  that  had  been  plying  between  Murmansk  and  the 
Norwegian  port  Vardo  had  been  sunk  that  very  morning  by  some 
German  submarine  and  all  chances  of  getting  away  seemed  to  be  gone 
for  God  knows  how  long.  There  were  some  3,000  to  4,000  foreign 
refugees  encamped  there  waiting  for  steamers  to  take  them  to  England. 
To  return  would  have  meant  the  risk  of  arrest  and  possibly  imprison- 


FLIGHT   FROM   RUSSIA  295 

ment  as  hostages,  an  awful  fate  from  which  we  had  just  escaped.  To 
remain,  at  Murmansk  was  equally  out  of  the  question,  as  there  was 
no  shelter  to  be  found  except  in  some  international  sleeping-cars 
detained  there  through  the  breakdown  of  a  bridge  over  the  Kola  River, 
which  we  had  just  crossed  on  foot  over  some  temporary  scaffolding. 
In  this  very  serious  plight  it  occurred  to  me  to  write  to  Rear- Admiral 
Kemp,  who  was  then  on  board  his  flagship,  and  to  explain  to  him 
quite  frankly  that  my  object  in  being  so  anxious  to  leave  the  country 
was  not  only  to  seek  safety  in  flight  for  me  and  mine,  but  also  to  try 
to  utilize  whatever  political  credit  may  be  accorded  to  me  abroad  on 
account  of  my  long  service  in  diplomacy,  in  an  endeavour  to  find  out 
by  placing  myself  in  contact  with  both  sides  whether  it  would  not 
be  possible  to  discover  some  common  ground  upon  which  both  sides 
might  agree  to  come  together  with  a  view  to  initiate  negotiations  for 
the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  because  I  felt  convinced  that  the 
only  possible  salvation  for  my  unhappy  country,  the  only  possible 
way  of  preventing  her  sinking  with  every  month  ever  deeper  into 
the  sanguinary  mire  of  anarchy  and  civil  war,  would  have  been  the 
earliest  possible  conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  and  that  I  requested 
to  be  allowed  to  come  on  board  his  ship  for  the  purpose  of  giving  him 
fuller  explanations,  as  I  desired  particularly  to  avoid  his  being  under 
any  misapprehension  as  to  my  plans.  He  replied  immediately  by 
a  short  note,  which  I  shall  ever  treasure  most  highly,  as  it  is  so  truly 
characteristic  of  the  spirit  of  an  English  sailor  and  gentleman.  I 
transcribe  it  here  textually  : 

"  I  will  do  everything  I  can  to  help  you  and  will  come  to  see  you 
to-day  at  5  p.m.     Your  letter  has  much  touched  mc." 

I  asked  him,  of  course,  not  to  take  the  trouble  to  call  on  us,  as  I 
really  had  no  place  in  our  car  where  I  could  receive  him  and  have 
a  private  talk  with  him.  But  come  he  would,  and  he  had  even  put 
on  for  the  occasion  a  Russian  Order  which,  under  existing  circum- 
stances, he  could  hardly  have  had  any  satisfaction  in  wearing.  You 
might  call  this  a  very  small  matter  indeed,  but  the  fine  delicacy  of 
feeling  which  prompted  this  action  touched  us  deeply.  In  short, 
nothing  could  have  exceeded  the  courtesy  and  kindness  he  showed  us 
during  our  stay  at  Murmansk — not  to  mention  his  generosity  in 
keeping  us  provided  with  bread  and  sugar  and  other  things  of  prime 
necessity  for  keeping  body  and  soul  together,  as  our  supply  had  given 
out  and  nothing  could  be  had  for  love  nor  money  in  that  God-forsaken 
place.  Three  days  later  he  had  occasion  to  send  off  an  English  high 
official,  Mr.  de  Candaule,  a  most  charming  gentleman  with  whom 
I  had  endless  most  interesting  conversations  during  our  six  days' 
sail  down  the  beautiful  coast  of  NorAvay,  and  the  British  Consul  from 
Rostov-on-the-Don,  whose  state-room  I  shared  on  the  Norwegian 
steamer  from  Vardo.  The  Admiral  availed  himself  of  this  occasion 
to  send  us  off  to  Vardo,  my  party  and  a  family  of  French  refugees, 
on  a  little  Russian  naval  vessel  which  he  had  commandeered  for  the 
purpose,  convoyed  by  two  English  trawlers,  on  one  of  which  went 
our  English  official  fellow-travellers.     So  we  felt  entirely  safe  both 


296        FORTY   YEARS   OF   DIPLOMACY 

from  possible  attacks  by  German  submarines  and  from  any  moles- 
tation  by   the   most   forbidding-looking   Bolshevik   commissary   who 
accompanied  us  on  the  Russian  vessel.     But  final  relief  we  only  felt 
when  we  set  foot  on  the  deck  of  the  Norwegian  steamer  and  realized 
that  after  months  of  weary  waiting  between  hope  and  despair  we 
had  at  last  definitely  escaped  from  the  unhappy  country  of  our  birth 
and  devoted  affection  which  a  lot  of  criminal  bandits  and  demented 
fanatics  had  turned  into  a  prison,  a  lunatic  asylum  and  a  slaughter- 
house.    The  day  after  the  Admiral's  visit  to  our  sleeping-car  I  lunched 
with  him  on  board  his  flagship,  and  after  luncheon  had  a  long  and 
exhaustive  exchange  of  views  with  him.     He  evidently  realized  that 
I  was  merely  doing  my  duty  as  a  Russian  patriot  in  attempting  a 
task  which,  howsoever  hopeless  it  might  appear,  I  held  to  be  bound 
to  undertake  in  order  to  help  saving  what  still  could  be  saved  from 
my  country's  wreck  brought  about  by  the  war  and  the  Revolution, 
just  as  I  fully  understood  that  he  was  only  doing  his  duty  as  an 
English  patriot  in  working  with  might  and  main  for  a  continuation 
of  the  war  in  the  interest  of  his  country  whatsoever  might  become 
of  mine.     We  parted  as  friends,  and  he  came  to  see  us  off  on  board 
ship  the  morning  we  sailed.     His  hand  was  the  last  I  shook  on  leaving 
my  country  for  God  only  knows  how  long ;  perchance  for  ever.     As 
soon  as  we  reached  here,  on  the  29th  of  May,  after  a  twenty  days' 
journey,   I  was  most  anxious  to  get  into   touch  with  the    represen- 
tatives of  the  Entente  Powers.     Fortunately  I  found  here  two  old 
acquaintances    from   happier   times   in    America — Sir    Esme    Howard 
and  Mr.  Ira  Nelson  Morris — and  lost  no  time  in  acquainting  them 
with  my  plans  as  well  as,  a  little  later  on,  the  French  Minister,  Mr. 
Thiebaut.     I  handed  all  of  them  short  memoranda  on  the  subject 
with  the  request  to  submit  them  to  their  respective  Governments. 
It  was  not  before  the  end  of  June  that  I  secured  at  last  through  the 
German  Minister  here  his  Government's  consent  to  my  visiting  Berlin. 
Baron   Lucius   seemed   to   be   personally   very  much   opposed   to  his 
Government's  policy  in  their  dealings  with  the  Bolsheviks,  and  pro- 
bably thought  that  my  presence  in  Berlin  might  contribute  towards 
opening  their  eyes  in  regard  to  the  dangerous  character  of  that  policy. 
Be  that  as  it   may,   he    succeeded,   although   apparently  only   after 
prolonged  negotiations  between  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  Army  Head- 
quarters,   in   securing   for   me   the   necessary   permits.     I   arrived   in 
Berlin   at  an   interesting   moment,   in  the   midst  of  the   Kuehlmann 
crisis.     The   Foreign   Department   treated   me  with   formal  courtesy 
but  with  great  reserve,  so  that,  barring  a  few  minutes'  exchange  of 
social  amenities  with  Kuehlmann,  an  old  colleague  of  former  days 
in  Washington,  I  never  even  set  my  eyes  on  Hintze  nor  the  Chancellor. 
This,  however,  did  not  prevent  my  gaining  a  pretty  good  insight  into 
the  inner  workings  of  their  diplomatic  kitchen,  which  did  not  strike 
me  as  in  any  way  superior  to  our  own  institution  of  the  same  kind 
as  it  was  in  my  day.     No  difficulties  whatever  were  placed  in  the 
way  of  my  perfectly  free  intercourse  with  prominent  personalities  in 
political,    financial,    literary   or   journalistic   circles.     No   watch   was 


VISIT   TO   BERLIN  297 

kept  over  my  movements,  and  I  was  perfectly  free  to  observe  the 
conditions  of  things  and,  so  to  speak,  to  feel  the  pulse  of  the  people  in 
any  way  accessible  to  a  foreigner  knowing  the  language  of  the  country 
well  enough  so  as  to  pass  in  a  crowd  unobserved  and  undetected. 
I  could  talk  to  you  by  the  hour  about  all  the  interesting  things  I  had 
occasion  to  observe  and  will  not  fail  to  do  so  if  ever  again  I  have  the 
good  fortune  to  meet  you  over  a  cup  of  tea  at  the  Athenaeum.  For 
the  present  I'll  have  to  limit  myself  to  saying  that  the  impressions 
I  carried  away  from  Berlin  after  a  few  weeks'  sojourn  were,  briefly 
summarized,  as  follows  : 

The  Emperor  as  an  active  factor  in  politics  had  vanished  from 
the  scene. 

All  power,  military  as  well  as  political,  was  concentrated  in  the 
hands  of  General  Ludendorff,  the  actual  dictator  of  Germany. 

Such  credit  as  the  military  caste,  junkerdom  and  "  All-deutsch- 
dom  "  ever  enjoyed  in  the  popular  mind  was  entirely  gone,  broken 
down  under  the  weight  of  utter  ruin  and  bitter  disillusion  as  the  only 
fruits  of  so  many  years  of  patriotically  borne  hardship  and  suffering. 

All  the  people,  from  the  highest  down  to  the  lowest,  were  heartily 
sick  of  the  war  and  were  sighing  for  peace. 

The  great  majority  of  the  people  were  ready  for  peace  at  any 
price  short  of  dishonour  and  destruction  of  their  country. 

The  remaining  minority  were  ready  for  acceptance  of  any  terms 
of  peace  satisfying  the  essential  and  just  demands  of  the  Allies 
covered  by  the  principles  proclaimed  by  President  Wilson. 

This   would   likewise   be  the   position   to   which   the   Government 
would  be  compelled  to  come  down  by  pressure  from  below,   peace 
egotiations  having  been  set  on  foot  for  good. 

The  Government  were  quite  sincere  in  their  official  declarations 
3xcept  that  they  did  not  go  as  far  as  they  were  actually  prepared 
to  go,  such  reticence  being  due  either  to  the  belief  that  that  was  the 
most  skilful  way  of  playing  their  hands  or  else  to  weak-kneed  sub- 
iervience  to  the  small  but  noisy  band  of  "  All-deutsch  "  fanatics  and 
to  the  Ludendorff  clique  at   Army  Headquarters. 

The  dismissal  of  Kuehlmann  cannot  be  held  to  be  a  case  in  point 
showing  the  necessity  of  such  subservience,  because,  as  I  was  being 
assured  from  all  sides,  that,  had  he  but  bravely  stuck  to  his  guns 
instead  of  meekly  recanting  the  very  next  day  after  his  famous  oj^^,"'^, 
he  would  have  had  behind  him  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
nation,  he  would  have  become  the  most  popular  man  in  the  country, 
and  would  have  made  his  position  unassailable  or  been  promoted  to 
that  of  Chancellor. 

My  own  personal  conclusion  drawn  from  these  impressions  gathered 
during  my  several  weeks'  stay  in  Berlin  confirmed  me  in  the  con- 
viction I  had  held  ever  since  December  191 6  and  had  been  expressing 
in  open  letters,  articles  in  the  newspapers  when  possible,  and  several 
pamphlets  over  my  signature  ever  since  the  spring  of  1917,  namely, 
that  the  war  could  have  been  ended  and  peace  be  had  at  any  time 
on   conditioris   entirely   satisfactory   to   our   coalition,    Germany   not 


298        FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

being  in  a  position,  quite  independently  of  the  military  situation,  to 
avoid  the  acceptance  of  any  such  lernis. 

Such  a  peace  would,  of  course,  have  been  a  peace  of  conciliation 
reached  by  negotiation,  and  not  a  peace  of  dictation.  Which  of  the 
two  would  have  been  a  better  one  I  shall  not  attempt  to  discuss. 

The  future  will  show  whether  the  result  of  the  World  War,  as  it 
appears  nbw,  viz.  the  rise  and  growth  of  "  Bolshevism  "  with  the 
consequent  extinction  of  Russia  as  a  political  entity,  the  destruction 
of  three  great  Empires  with  a  population  of  more  than  three  hundred 
millions,  their  utter  abasement,  their  threatened  beggaring  and 
economic  enslavement,  and,  last  but  not  least,  what  may  be  termed 
the  "Balkanization"  of  Eastern  Ern'ope — whether  all  this  will  have 
been  conducive  to  bringing  about  the  elimination  of  war  as  the  only 
means  of  settling  differences  of  real  moment  between  nations  or 
whether  it  will  merely  have  prepared  the  ground  for  a  series  of  new 
and  perhaps  still  more  terrible  wars  in  the  future. 

The  mission  I  had  volunteered  to  undertake  had  failed.  This 
result  of  apparently  so  quixotic  an  enterprise  was  to  have  been  fore- 
seen. Indeed,  I  had  not  failed  to  foresee  and  discount  in  advance 
its  almost  certain  failure.  But  neither  this  nor  any  consideration 
of  my  personal  ease  and  quietude  of  any  apprehension  of  misinter- 
pretation of  my  motives  or  obloquy  by  the  ignorant  and  the  malevolent 
would  have  deterred  me  from  doing  what  I  held  to  be  a  sacred  duty 
by  my  coimtry  which  no  one  else  would  have  been  in  a  position  to 
undertake. 

But  I  had  still  another  duty  to  perform,  no  less  sacred  and  even 
more  urgent,  that  of  saving  the  unfortunate  city  of  my  home  from 
the  awful  fate  in  store  for  her  vmless  armed  help  were  to  appear  in 
time.  Now,  it  is  self-evident  that  such  help,  to  which  we  might  have 
had  some  claim,  could  irot  by  any  conceivable  possibility  be  rendered 
the  doomed  city  by  our  Allies.  Nothing  remained,  therefore,  but  to 
seek  such  assistance  from  the  enemy  to  whom  it  would  have  been 
an  easy  matter  to  occupy  Petersburg  with  their  troops,  of  whom  they 
had  a  more  than  ample  number  stationed  at  Narva  and  at  Pskoff, 
within  two  days'  march  from  the  capital.  With  this  end  in  view  I 
returned  to  Berlin.  The  difficulties  I  had  to  contend  with  there  were 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  whole  plan  of  Germany's  insane  policy  in 
regard  to  Bolshevistic  Russia  had  been  fathered  by  a  group  of  fanatic 
Russia-haters  having  at  their  head  a  certain  Priv}^  Councillor  Kriege, 
the  most  influential  member  of  the  Foreign  Office  Staff,  one  of  those 
pestilential  doctrinaires  of  "  Macht  Politik  "  who,  in  no  lesser  degree 
than  the  military  caste  and  junkerdom  and  "  AU-deutsch  "  demagogy, 
have  been  guilty  of  bringing  down  upon  their  country  the  catastrophe 
of  her  inglorious  collapse.  This  policy,  however,  had  been  endorsed 
by  General  Ludendorff  evidently  from  purely  strategic  motives  and 
was  being  pursued  by  him  with  his  usual  ruthlessncss.  There  seems 
to  be  no  doubt  about  all  the  proceedings  at  Brest-Litovsk  having 
been  directly  inspired  by  and  carried  out  under  categoric  orders  of 
that  all-powerful  dictator  of  Germany.     Although  the  whole  of  this 


HORRORS   OF  BOLSHEVISM  299 

so-called  "  Ost  Politik  "  was  openly  condemned  by  the  leading  organs 
of  the  Conservative  as  well  as  of  the  Liberal  and  even  the  Socialist 
parties,  and  the  Government's  dealings  with  Russian  Bolshevism  were 
spoken  of  by  the  better  elements  with  unconcealed  loathing,  the 
Government  could  not  be  brought  to  break  openly  and  categorically 
with  the  Bolshevistic  usurpers  of  power  in  Russia  with  whom  they 
had  concluded  that  shameful  "  supplementary  treaty,"  signed  by 
Kriege  and  Von  Hintze,  about  the  division,  of  the  stolen  goods  (the 
gold  reserve  of  the  Bank  of  Russia),  It  was  not  before  a  couple  of 
days  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  that  they  picked  up  at 
last  courage  enough  to  order  the  expulsion  of  that  man  Joffe  who 
had  been  masquerading  as  representative  of  Russia  in  the  house 
which  was  formerly  the  Russian  Embassy,  and  which  he  seems  to 
have  had  converted  into  a  kind  of  headquarters  of  the  German  revo- 
lutionists. When  the  great  collapse  of  Germany  occurred  it  became 
evident  that  no  help  for  unfortunate  Petersburg  could  any  longer 
be  expected  to  come  from  that  quarter,  and  1  returned  to  Stockholm, 
having  given  up  all  hope  of  any  effectual  help  arriving  in  time  to 
rescue  the  seven  or  eight  hundred  thousand  unfortunate  inhabitants 
still  remaining  in  the  doomed  city  from  the  awful  fate  in  store  for 
them.  What  that  will  mean  let  me  illustrate  by  an,  example.  A 
friend  of  mine,  a  wealthy  widow,  who  escaped  from  that  hell  on  earth 
son;e  time  ago,  thanks  to  the  energy  an,d  exertions  of  that  grand  old 
man.  General  Brandstrom,  the  Swedish  Minister  to  whom  so  many 
unfortunates  owe  their  escape,  was  obliged  on  leaving  Petersburg 
to  separate  herself  from  her  private  secretary,  a  charming  English 
girl  to  whom  she  was  warmly  attached,  because  that  brave  and 
high-minded  young  lady  would  not  abandon  her  old  father,  a 
formerly  very  wealthy  English  merchant  settled  there  for  fifty  years 
and  now,  having  lost  some  years  ago  all  his  fortune  and  latterly  every 
possible  means  of  earning  a  livelihood,  entirely  dependent  on  his 
daughter's  support.  Yesterday — I  am  writing  these  lines  on  January 
nth — my  friend  received  from  her  former  secretary  a  letter  brought 
here  by  some  fugitive  in  which  she  tells  the  harrowing  tale  of  how 
she  had  just  closed  the  eyes  of  her  poor  old  father  and  his  brother, 
who  had  been  slowly  dying  of  starvation  amidst  terrible  sufferings, 
she  herself  being  hardly  able  to  stand  up  and  move  about.  Now, 
that  is  merely  one  case  in  many  thousands,  not  to  mention  the 
thousands  of  "  hostages,"  among  them,  maybe,  some  of  my  personal 
friends,  who  are  being  slowly  starved  to  death  in  Bolshevist  prisons 
in  daily  fear  of  summary  execution.  So  you  may  imagine  how  deeply 
I  feel  about  all  this.  It  is  a  great  pity  that  the  whole  truth  about 
the  real  condition  of  things  in  Russia  does  not  seem  to  be  known  nor 
understood  abroad.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  proud  assurance  that 
"  Bolshevism  is  the  disease  of  defeated  nations  "  is  based  on  a  very 
superficial  view  of  Bolshevism  and  the  deep-lying  causes  of  its  rise 
and  sudden  growth.  It  is  not  the  fact  that  defeat  produces  this 
disease.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  the  introduction  and  the  spread 
of  the  deadly  infection  of  Bolshevism,  among  the  armed  forces  of  both 


300        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

nations  which  caused  the  defeat  first  of  Russia  and  then  of  Germany. 
The  former  view  is  just  as  erroneous  as  was  the  conception  so  long 
prevalent  in  Allied  countries  of  the  true  meaning  of  the  Russian 
Revolution. 

"When  Dr.   E.   J.   Dillon,  in  his  remarkable  book,  The  Eclipse  of 
Russia,  page  17,  describes  the  history  of  the  Russian  Revolution  as 
the  "  tale  of  a  fatal  psychological  error  and  its  sequel,"  he  is  im- 
questionably  right.     He  is  no  less  right  when  he  says  that  the  "  blast 
that  destroyed  the  Monarchy  and  shattered  the  nation  came  directly 
from,  the  Duma  leaders  "  in  whose  supposedly  competent  judgment 
those  who — as  Dr.  Dillon  seems  to  think — "  aided  and  abetted  them  " 
must   have   placed   greater   confidence   than   it   deserved.     But   then 
theirs  was  merely  the  "  blast,"  catastrophically  fatal,  indeed,  in  its 
consequences,  but  prompted  by  motives  the  very  opposite  of  those 
which   swayed  the  mutinous  soldiers   and   sailors   and   revolutionary 
workmen  who  actually  achieved  the  overthrow  of  the  Government. 
Besides  its  true  underlying  meaning  as  a  revolt  of  the  people  against 
the  war,  the  Russian  Revolution  carried,  however,  a  still  wider  mean- 
ing, to  which  I  cannot  help  referring  here  again,  going  far  beyond 
the  confines  of  Russia.     "  It  meant  the  beginning  of  the  awakening 
of  the  toiUng  masses,  who  constitute  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
the  people  of  every  country,  to  a  realization  of  the  fact  that  this  war 
— as  indeed  might  be  said  of  most  wars  since  history  began— had 
been  forced  on  them  by  their  rulers  as  an  outcome  of  policies  which 
to  the  ruling  classes  represent  the  tempting  phantoms  of  Glory,  of 
Hegemony,  of  Prestige,  of  Revenge,  but  which  to  the  masses  present 
themselves  merely  as  shibboleths  devoid  of  meaning  in  terms  of  the 
life  of  plain  men  and  women,   for  the  pursuit  of  which  they  have, 
however,  to  pay  with  the  lives  of  milHons  of  their  sons  and  brothers, 
with  millions  of  ruined  homes,  and  with  all  the  untold  misery  and 
suffering   that   could   never   be   compensated   by   the    most   crushing 
victory.     It  further  meant  that  when  the  day  of  their  final  awakening 
shall  have  dawned  upon  the  masses  they  will  make  a  day  of  reckoning 
with  their  rulers,  and  that  this  fratricidal  war  between  the  nations 
may  resolve  itself  into   a  fratricidal   and   suicidal  war  between  the 
masses  and  the  classes  within  the  nations." 

The  part  of  wisdom,  it  would  seem,  would  have  been  to  have 
heeded  the  warning  before  it  was  too  late. 

It  was  the  failure  to  have  done  so  that  has  delivered  Russia  into 
the  hands  of  "  Bolshevism  "  with  its  social  anarchy,  civil  war  and 
utter  ruin  and  destruction  of  the  social  and  political  fabric  of  the 
State,  because  it  enabled  the  Bolshevist  leaders  to  assure  themselves 
of  the  unfiinching  support  of  the  Army  and  Navy  by  promising  them 
immediate  peace.  Germany,  it  would  seem,  is  now  being  overtaken 
by  a  similar  fate,  hastened  on  by  the  insane  poHcy  of  her  rulers  in 
regard  to  Bolshevistic  Russia. 

The  phenomenal  ease  and  rapidity  with  which  Soldiers'  and  Work- 
men's Soviets  on  the  Russian  model  succeeded  in  usurping  power 
in  many  places  in  Germany  cannot  be  said  to  bode  any  good  to  any- 


PROBLEM   OF   RUSSIA'S   FUTURE       301 

body  for  the  future.  These  events  demonstrate  the  exceedingly- 
dangerous  character  of  the  fascinations  which  the  successful  establish- 
ment of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  in  Russia  seems  to  exercise 
over  the  popular  mind  ignorant  of  the  unspeakably  wretched  con- 
dition to  which  triumphant  Bolshevism  has  reduced  a  once  great 
and  prosperous  nation. 

The  problem  of  the  immediate  future  of  Russia  is  one  of  unex- 
ampled difliculty.  Its  sinister  import  should  never  be  lost  sight  of, 
and  its  solution  is  urgently  required  in  the  common  interest  of  civilized 
mankind,  since,  if  Bolshevism  be  not  now  extirpated  root  and  branch, 
and  if  it  be  suffered  to  spread  any  farther,  it  might  ultimately  come 
to  mean  the  doom  of  our  race  and  civilization.  The  task  of  seeking 
such  a  solution  should  be  approached  in  a  spirit  entirely  free  from 
partisanship  and  from  the  passions  of  international  hatred  bred  by 
the  World  War.  Nothing  could  be  more  fatal  in  the  present  crisis 
in  the  country's  history,  when  the  very  existence  of  the  nation  hangs 
in  the  balance,  than  the  failure  to  recognize  that  it  is  the  paramount, 
the  sacred  duty  of  every  true  patriot  to  be  neither  pro-Entente  nor 
pro-German,  but  above  all  and  exclusively  pro-Russian.  A  case  in 
point  is  presented  by  the  fate  that  seems  to  be  overtaking  the 
Ukraina,  the  most  fertile,  the  richest  in  natural  resources  of  every 
kind,  the  most  prosperous  part  of  European  Russia,  which  had 
escaped  the  infliction  of  Bolshevism  owing  to  the  timely  assistance 
of  German  troops  whose  aid  had  been  invoked  by  the  Ukranian 
nationalist  Rada.  This  help  was,  of  course,  rendered  from  purely 
selfish  motives,  in  the  hope,  never  fully  realized,  of  a  temporary 
exploitation  of  the  agricultural  resources  of  the  Ukraina  for  feeding 
the  German  people,  but  it  unquestionably  saved  the  country  from 
Bolshevism.  It  was  this  assistance  also  which  enabled  General 
Skoropadsky,  a  most  loyal  patriot,  gifted  with  a  statesman's  insight 
and  undaunted  courage,  to  seize  the  reins  of  power  at  a  most  critical 
moment,  to  revive  the  ancient  historic  institution  of  the  hetmanate, 
to  organize  a  free  Government  on  liberal  lines  guaranteeing  law  and 
order,  safety  of  life  and  property  and  all  the  conditions  of  civilized 
existence,  to  the  shelter  of  which  flocked  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
unhappy  fugitives  from  Bolshevist  Russia ;  in  a  word,  to  save 
for  civilization  this  large  part  of  European  Russia,  about  a  quarter 
of  its  surface,  with  some  thirty  million  inhabitants,  as  a  nucleus  on 
the  foundation  of  which,  with  the  shattered  parts  of  what  was  once  the 
Empire  of  Russia,  the  reunited  country  might  some  day  have  been 
reconstructed  as  a  political  entity.  It  would  seem  that  a  man  who 
had  achieved  so  much  in  so  short  a  period  of  time  and  under  such 
exceptional  difficulties  might  have  counted  on  the  unflinching  support 
of  all  true  patriots.  Such  support,  however,  he  did  not  only  not 
find  where  he  had  every  right  to  expect  it,  but  he  was  being  run  down 
and  criticized  by  the  very  people  who  had  found  shelter  under  his 
Government;  he  was  proclaimed  a  "  pro-German  "  ;  his  visit  to  the 
German  Emperor  was  incriminated  to  him  as  an  act  of  treason  in 
regard  to  the  Entente  Powers,  who,  even  if  they  had  wished  to,  could 


302         FORTY   YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

not  possibly  have  extended  to  the  Ukraina  the  assistance  which  alone 
had  enabled  him  to  achieve  what  he  had  accomplished  in  organizing 
the  country  as  a  civilized  State  ;  pressure  had  been  put  on  him  in 
order  to  cause  him  to  reverse  his  wise  and  cautious  policy  in  regard 
to  the  Ukrainian  Nationalist  Party  and  their  dream  of  an  Ukraina 
as  an  entirely  self-contained  State  absolutely  independent  and  separate 
from  Russia  and  to  prematurely  and  openly  break  with  that  party, 
thereby  placing  a  most  powerful  weapon  in  the  hands  of  the  Socialist 
demagogue  Petlura,  who  was  aiming  at  the  realization  of  that  very 
dream.  The  result  has  been  the  overthrow  of  the  hetman's  Govern- 
ment, the  installation  of  a  socialistic  regime  under  a  so-called 
"  directorate,"  and  the  opening  of  the  door  to  the  advent  in  the  near 
future,  if  it  has  not  already  taken  place,  of  "  Bolshevism  "  in  the 
only  part  of  what  was  once  the  Empire  of  Russia  so  far  left  standing 
erect  as  a  civilized  community.  Thus  have  our  politicians  given  us 
a  fresh  proof  of  their  hopeless  incompetence  and  unfitness  to  be  the 
leaders  of  the  nation.  And  now — I  am  writing  these  lines  on  the 
2ist  of  January — a  post-mortem  inquest  is  apparently  being  held  by 
the  Entente  Powers  on  the  dead  body  of  Russia,  the  chief  victim  of 
the  World  War,  expert  evidence  being  furnished  by  some  foreign 
diplomats  and  perhaps  likewise  by  the  former  agents  and  the  adherents 
of  the  various  Governments,  Imperial  as  well  as  Republican,  and  of 
the  various  parties  whom  all  Russians,  who  still  have  kept  the  faculty 
of  logical  thinking,  know  to  have  been  and  whom  the  Russian  people 
instinctively  feel  to  have  been  the  gravediggers  of  their  country. 

So  this  is  the  end  of  the  country  of  my  birth  to  whose  service  I 
have  devoted  a  lifetime  of  unstinted  effort  in  the  cause  of  justice, 
of  reason  and  of  truth.  You  may  imagine  what  my  feelings  have 
been  all  the  time  during  the  last  reign  and  the  Revolution,  being 
condemned  to  stand  by  in  impotent  rage,  a  helpless  witness  of  my 
country's  gradual  undoing  and  final  downfall  and  ruin  brought  about 
by  the  insane  foreign  and  domestic  policy  which  I  have  been  all  along 
persistently  opposing  by  word  and  pen  to  the  best  of  my  ability. 

The  only  glimmer  of  hope  I  could  discern  now  would  be  in  the 
evolution  out  of  the  present  chaos  of  a  military  dictatorship,  such 
as  must  always  be  the  outcome  of  a  prolonged  state  of  anarchy,  if 
the  teachings  of  history  are  to  be  believed.  Some  indications  of  the 
possibility  of  a  similar  development  are  already  discernible.  Admiral 
Koltchak,  the  head  of  the  Siberian  Government,  having  of  late  secured 
the  adhesion  or  submission  to  his  authority  of  Generals  Denikin  and 
Krasnoff  of  the  Don  Cossacks,  has  begun  to  use  in  liis  public  utterances 
the  language  of  a  dictator  conscious  of  his  power  and  determined  to 
render  his  will  supreme.  The  task  awaiting  him  is  one  of  colossal 
magnitude  and  unequalled  difficulty.  To  cope  with  it  successfully 
will  require  a  giant's  strength,  the  strength  of  a  Napoleon  or  a  Peter 
the  Great.  God  grant  that  this  strength  be  given  him,  and  he  will 
become  the  saviour  of  his  country. 

I  was  much  interested  in  a  notice  I  saw  the  other  day  in  some 
newspaper  to  the  effect  that  President  Wilson  had  received  you  with 


PROBLEM   OF   BOLSHEVISM  303 

Lord  Grey,  the  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  and  Mr.  Gilbert  Murray 
as  representatives  of  the  Union  for  tlie  Promotion  of  a  League  of 
Nations.  You  know  how  earnestly  I  am,  heart  and  soul,  in  sympathy 
with  the  aim  the  Union  pursues.  There  indeed  lies  unquestionably 
the  best  hope  for  the  future  of  mankind.  But  are  we  really  getting 
now  much  nearer  the  realization  of  our  ideal  ?  President  Wilson,  in 
his  great  speech  in  Rome,  called  attention  to  what  seems  to  me  to 
be  the  really  crucial  point — the  need  of  a  new  international  psychology. 
Now,  the  World  War,  just  as  it  has  been  an  outcome  of,  so  also  has 
it  intensified  the  old  traditional  international  psychology  of  distrust, 
of  hatred  and  of  revenge.  One  would,  it  strikes  me,  really  be  embar- 
rassed to  discover  at  present  any  indication  of  an  abatement  of  the 
influence  of  this  old  psychology.  Mr.  Gilbert  Murray,  in  lus  admir- 
able preface  to  the  English  edition  of  his  volume  Faith,  Way  and 
Policy,  says  :  "  The  war-mood  is  one  thing,  and  the  settlement-mood 
is  another."  From  what  one  can  gather  from  Press  accounts  of  the 
atmosphere  surrounding  the  Paris  Conference,  the  war-mood  would 
seem  to  be  still  rather  dominant  there.  It  could  hardly  fail  to  shape 
the  mental  attitude  of  some  at  least  of  the  members  of  the  Conference 
in  a  sense  rather  inconsistent  with  President  Wilson's  conception  of 
what  a  League  of  Nations  should  be.  And  then,  such  a  League  would 
not  be  complete  if  it  did  not  include  Russia  with  her  population 
of  still  some  120  to  130  millions,  without  Poland  and  Finland.  But 
who  can  tell  when  and  how  Russia  will  reappear  reconstituted  as 
a  political  entity  and  able  to  resume  her  place  in  the  family  of  nations 
and  her  status  as  one  of  the  Great  Powers  ? 

Furthermore,  there  is  the  formidable  problem  of  "  Bolshevism," 
which  cannot  be  got  out  of  the  way  by  simply  ignoring  it  and  declaring 
Bolshevism  to  be  a  disease  of  defeated  nations  from  which  victor 
nations  are  immune.  If  one  goes  to  the  bottom  of  things,  what,  after 
all,  is  Bolshevism  but  the  outbreak  in  a  violent  form  of  the  chronic 
incurable  disease  with  which  all  civilized  mankind  is  and  always  will 
remain  afflicted — the  everlasting  strife  between  those  who  "  have  " 
and  those  who  "  have  not,"  Incurable,  because  there  is  not  and 
there  never  can  be  a  sufficiency  of  the  good  things  of  this  world  to 
go  round  and  therefore  their  enjoyment  will  always  be  limited  to 
an  infinitely  small  minority,  whereas  the  thirst  for  such  enjoyment 
among  the  great  majority  will  constantly  grow  as  the  difference 
between  the  luxury  and  comfort  of  the  few  and  the  want  and  misery 
of  the  many  becomes  even  greater  and  more  glaring.  Discontent 
with,  at  best,  the  narrow  limitations  of  a  life  condemned  to  incessant 
toil,  joyless  monotony  and  anxious  insecurity,  such  as  always  must 
and  will  be  the  lot  of  the  great  majority  of  mankind,  envy  of  the  more 
fortunate  and  consequent  class  hatred — these  are  the  germs  of  the 
disease.  They  are  present  everywhere.  Their  lying  dormant  for 
the  time  being  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  their  bearing  fruit 
some  day.  That  fruit  will  be  Bolshevism,  probably  not  in  such  a 
savage  form  as  in  Russia,  but  nevertheless  ominously  threatening  to 
modern   civilization.     Then   will   become   evident  even  to   the   most 


304        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

purblind  fanatic  of  international  strife  the  supreme  folly  which  led 
the  ruling  classes  of  the  leading  nations  to  waste  untold  milliards  of 
their  peoples'  wealth  on  gigantic  armaments  and  a  fratricidal  war  of 
mutual  extermination  instead  of  devoting  be  it  even  a  small  part 
only  of  the  colossal  treasure  thus  wasted  to  the  bettering  as  much 
as  possible  of  the  lot  and  the  lightening  of  the  burden  of  the  toiling 
masses — the  only  possible  way  of  preventing  the  rise  and  growth  of 
revolutionary  Socialism  and  its  offspring  :    Bolshevism  and  Anarchy. 

It  is  too  late  in  the  day  now  to  waste  time  in  deploring  the  folly 
that  favoured  the  rise  and  growth  of  Bolshevism.  The  problem  of 
how  to  deal  with  it  stares  us  in  the  face  now.  Not  Russia  alone,  or 
Germany,  but  all  civilized  mankind.  One  thing  is  certain,  and  it 
is  this  :  the  problem  of  Bolshevism  can  only  be  solved  by  all  civilized 
mankind — I  mean  all,  and  therefore  not  excluding  Germany — acting 
in  concert  to  put  it  down  with  the  strong  arm.  It  was  the  suicidal 
feud  between  the  ruling  classes  of  the  leading  nations  that  created 
the  opportunity  for  Bolshevism  to  raise  its  head.  The  continuance 
of  that  feud,  whether  in  the  shape  of  active  military  operations  or  of 
diplomatic  or  economic  warfare,  is  sure  to  favour  its  growth.  There- 
fore the  earliest  possible  conclusion  of  a  general  peace  and  that  a 
peace  of  reconciliation,  is  a  prerequisite  to  a  successful  repression 
of  Bolshevism.  The  ruling  classes  of  all  nations  are  a  minority,  but 
they  have  a  sacred  duty  to  perform,  not  towards  themselves,  which 
would  be  merely  acting  in  self-defence,  but  towards  their  peoples, 
because  the  triumph  of  Bolshevism  would  mean  the  utter  ruin  not 
only  of  the  classes  but  of  the  masses  themselves  as  well.  That  is 
the  lesson  the  installation  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  in 
Russia  is  teaching  the  world. 

Taken  all  in  all,  the  prospect  for  the  future  does  not  seem  to  be 
a  cheerful  one,  and  the  era  of  peace  on  earth  and  goodwill  among 
mankind  appears  to  be  as  far  remote  as  ever. 

Much,  however,  would  be  gained  if,  after  the  awful  experience 
through  which  we  are  passing,  mankind  would  come  to  comprehend 
at  last  the  sinister  and  fatal  fallacy  of  the  famous  dictum  :  "If  you 
wish  for  peace,  prepare  for  war."  We  have  seen  to  what  has  led  the 
endeavour  to  secure  peace  by  preparing  for  war  by  means  of  powerful 
alliances  and  formidable,  ever-growing  armaments.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  two  great  nations  to  whom  of  right  should  belong  the  un- 
disputed leadership  of  mankind  have  shown  the  world  how,  not  only 
war,  but  any  danger  of  war,  may  be  avoided  successfully  by  preparing, 
not  for  war,  but  for  peace.  Ever  since  the  conclusion  of  the  con- 
vention of  1817  the  boundary  line  of  some  three  thousand  miles 
dividing  their  territories  on  the  continent  of  North  America  has 
remained  absolutely  defenceless  on  either  side  and  the  two  nations 
have  enjoyed  the  blessings  of  a  century  of  uninterrupted  peace, 
although  on  at  least  two  occasions  friction  has  arisen  between  them 
such  as  would  have  led  most  probably  to  an  armed  conflict  between 
them  if  they  had  had  in  their  respective  capitals  such  institutions 
as  "  Grand  General  Staffs  "  on  the  European  model,  with  pigeon-holes 


THE  ONLY  HOPE  FOR  THE  FUTURE  305 

full  of  elaborate  plans  of  campaign  for  the  invasion  of  their  neighbour's 
dominions. 

To  anyone  who  doubts  the  possibility  of  such  permanent  peace,  as 
human  nature  ever  will  allow  of,  being  secured  by  the  abolition  of 
compulsory  military  service  and  by  the  reduction  of  the  size  of  perma- 
nent professional  armies  to  such  dimensions  as  would  be  required  for 
maintaining  order  in  the  interior — to  anyone  who  entertains  such 
doubts  it  will  be  sufficient  to  point  to  the  shining  example  set  the 
world  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  of  America. 

That  is  where  would  lie  the  only  hope  for  the  future  of  mankind. 

Yours  very  sincerely, 

R.  R. 

My  self-imposed  mission,  a  forlorn  hope,  had  failed,  as 
I  had  fully  expected.  And  yet  its  aim  was  one  that  might 
have  enlisted  sympathy  rather  than  deserved  disapproval, 
and  its  success — had  it  been  possible — might  have  benefited 
the  world.  But  the  world  was  not,  nor  does  it  seem  to  be 
even  now,  ripe  for  real  peace. 

In  winding  up  these  reminiscences  of  a  long  life  spent  in 
the  devoted  service  of  my  country,  a  tragic  victim  of  the 
Moloch  of  war,  I  may,  perhaps  with  propriety,  venture  to 
quote,  from  the  concluding  pages  of  the  chapter  entitled 
"  What  Men  Died  For,"  the  lofty  language  of  some  of  the 
passages  in  which  Sir  Philip  Gibbs,  in  his  wonderful  book 
Now  It  Can  be  Told,  has  had  the  noble  courage  to  give  the 
world  the  unvarnished  truth  : 

In  each  nation,  even  in  Germany,  there  were  men  and  women 
who  saw  the  folly  of  the  war  and  the  crime  of  it,  and  desired  to  end 
it  by  some  act  of  renunciation  and  repentance,  and  by  some  uplifting 
of  the  peoples'  spirit  to  vault  the  frontiers  of  hatred  and  the  barbed 
wire  which  hedged  in  patriotism.  Some  of  them  were  put  in  prison. 
Most  of  them  saw  the  impossibility  of  counteracting  the  forces  of 
insanity  which  had  made  the  world  mad,  and  kept  silent,  hiding  their 
thoughts  and  brooding  over  them.  The  leaders  of  the  nations  con- 
tinued to  use  mob  passion  as  their  argument  and  justification,  excited 
it  anew  when  its  fires  burned  low,  focused  it  upon  definite  objectives 
and  gave  it  a  sense  of  righteousness  by  the  high-sounding  watchwords 
of  liberty,  justice,  honour  and  retribution.  .  .  .  The  peoples  shared 
the  blame  of  their  rulers  because  they  were  not  nobler  than  their 
rulers.  They  cannot  now  plead  ignorance  or  betrayal  by  false  ideals 
which  duped  them,  because  character  does  not  depend  on  knowledge, 
and  it  was  the  character  of  European  peoples  which  failed  in  the  crisis 
of  the  world's  fate,  so  that  they  followed  the  call  back  of  the  beast 
of  the  jungle  rather  than  the  voice  of  the  Crucified  One  whom  they 
VOL.  II  20 


306        FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 

pretended  to  adore.  ...  Or  is  war  the  law  of  human  Ufe  ?  Is  there 
something  more  powerful  than  Kaisers  and  castes  which  drives  masses 
of  men  against  other  masses  in  death  struggles  which  they  do  not 
understand  ?  Are  we  really  poor  beasts  in  the  jungle,  striving  by 
tooth  and  claw,  high  velocity  and  poison  gas,  for  the  survival  of  the 
fittest  in  an  endless  conflict  ?  .  .  . 

The  world  will  not  accept  that  message  of  despair  ;  and  millions 
of  men  to-day  who  went  through  the  agony  of  the  war  are  inspired 
by  the  humble  beUef  that  humanity  may  be  cured  of  its  cruelty  and 
stupidity  and  that  a  brotherhood  of  peoples  more  powerful  than  a 
League  of  Nations  may  be  founded  in  the  world  after  its  present 
sickness  and  out  of  the  conflict  of  its  anarchy.  .  .  .  We  have  seen 
too  much  blood.  We  want  to  wipe  it  out  of  our  eyes  and  souls.  Let 
ns  have  Peace. 


INDEX  OF  NAMES— VOL.   II 


Aehrenthal,  Baron,  15 

Akimoff,  Mr.,  142 

Alexander  I,  43-7,  55,  64,  76,  90, 

132,  135,  138.  251 
Alexander  II,  27,  32-3,  44-5,  91, 

114,  132,  155,  251 
Alexander    III,    33,    45,    47,    57, 

119,   132,  138,  279 
Alexandra,    Empress,     112,     153, 

201-3,  222 
Alexeeff,  General,  213,  222,  224 
Asquith,  Mr.,  217 
Avelan,  Admiral,  135 

Bariatinsky,  Prince,  141 
Bernhardi,  General,  157 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  158 
Bismarck,  65,  67,  106,  156 
Bobrikov,  General,  46,  134 
de  Boisdeffre,  General,  1 16 
Brandstrom,  General,  299 
Briffault,  Mr.  Robert,  287 
Broussiloff,  General,  219 
Bryce,  Lord,  294 
BuUard,  Mr.  A.,  157 

Campbell-Bannerman,  Sir  H.,  20 
le  Candaiile,  Mr.,  295 
Canterbury,  Archbishop  of,  303 
Castlereagh,  Lord,  55 
Catherine  the  Great,  43,  47,  90, 

loo-i 
Chamberlain,  Houston,  S.,  156 
Constantine,  Grand  Duke,  31,  44 
Crosley,  Mrs.,  252 
Czernin,  Count,  256,  257,  282 

Dekhtiareff,  Lieutenant,  244 
Delcasse,  117 


Denikin,  General,  302 

Dickinson,  Mr.  G.  Lowes,  256,  282- 

Dillon,  Dr.  E.  J.,  201,  225,   234. 

254.  265,  300 
Disraeh,  65 
Doumergue,  Mr.,  231 
Durnorvo,  Mr.,  10 

Ferrero,  146 

Franz  Ferdinand,  Archduke,  162, 

188 
Fredericksz,  Count,  210-12 

George  V,  King,  216-17 
Gibbs,  Sir  Philip,  305 
de  Giers,  Mr.,  117,  120 
de  Gobineau,  Count,  156 
Golitz^Ti,  Prince,  231 
Goremykin,  Mr.,   13,   14,   17,   150 

et  seq.,  164,  170,  205 
Gorki,  Maxim,  257,  259,  269 
Gortschakofif,  Prince,  65,  91,' 105, 

155 
Grey,    Sir    E.    (Lord),    168,  'i92> 

303 
Grippenberg,  General,  135 
Gustave  IV,  King,  45 
Gutchkoff,  Mr.,  242,  266 

Haldane,  Lord,  158,  159 
Hamilton,  General  Sir  Ian,  75 
Hartwig,  Mr.,  129 
Hertzenstein,  Mr.,  14 
von  Hintze,  296-9 
H(irst),  Mr.  F.  W.,  282 
Howard,  Sir  Esme,  296 

Iswolsky,  Mr.,  11,  13,  19,  20,  24,. 
28,  48,  80-1,  235,  268 


307 


308 


FORTY  YEARS   OF  DIPLOMACY 


Jaures,  167 

Jellicoe,  Admiral,  216 

Jofie,  299 

Karamzine,  138 

Katkoff,  114 

Kemp,  Admiral,  295 

Kerensky,  81,  109,  152-3,  220, 
232  et  seq.,  248,  253-4,  262-3, 
266,  270  et  seq.,  282-3 

Kokovtsefi,  Count,  80,  108-9, 
150,   162 

Koltchak,  Admiral,  302 

Korniloff,  General,  260  et  seq. 

KrasnofE,  General,  302 

Kriege,  Herr,  298-9 

Krivosheiii,  Mr.,  40 

von  Kuehlmann,  296-7 

Laboulaye,  Mr.,  120 

Lansing,  Mr.,  227,  274 

Law,  Mr.  Bonar,  239 

Lenin,  276,  284-5 

Lobanoff,  Prince,  109 

Loreburn,    Lord,    87,    118,     124, 

166-9 
Lowicz,  Princess,  44 
LudendorfE,  General,  297-8 
Lucius,  Baron,  296 
LwofE,  Prince,  220,  233,  253,  263, 

271 

Mannerheim,  General,  135 
Marie,  Empress,  112,  132 
Meshtchersky,  Prince,  150 
Metternich,  55 

Meyer,  Mr.  von  L.,  11,  14-16,  18 
Michael  Nicolawitch,  Grand  Duke, 

141 
Michael,  Grand  Duke,  234 
Miliukoff,    Professor,    13,    24,    48, 

81,    206,    215,    233,    235,    263, 

266,  271,  273 
Milner,  Lord,  231 
Mohrenheim,  Baron,  117 
-de  Montebello,  Mr.,  117 
Montenegro,  Prince  of,  82 
Morris,  Mr.  Ira  Nelson,  293-4,  296 
Mouravieff,  Count,  117 


Muromtseff,  Professor,  19 
Murray,    Professor    Gilbert,    145, 
303 

Napoleon  III,  54,  56,  63-4,  66 
Nicholas    I,   31,    45,    64,    90,   132, 

251 

Nicholas  II,  9  et  seq.,  24-5,  34,  45, 
76,  90,  108-9,  112,  118,  137, 
150,  153,  161-2,  164-5,  170  ^' 
seq.,  180,  187  et  seq.,  201-3, 
210-12,  234,  250 

Nicholas,  Grand  Duke,  179,  182, 
202-3 

Noyes,  Alfred,  2 86 

Obrucheff,  General,  116 

Paul,  Emperor,  43,  178 

Peter  the  Great,  43,  47,  90,  100, 

138.  254 
Petlura,  302 
Plehanoff,  276 

PokroflEsky,  Mr.,  220,  227  et  seq. 
Possiette,  Admiral,  135 
ProtopopofE,  Mr.,   214,   222,   231, 

233 

Rada,  301 

Rasputin,  202,  222,  231 

Redesdale,  Lord,  65 

Ribot,  Mr.,  117 

Riedigers,  General,  135 

Rodicheff,  24 

Rodzianko,  151,  205,  233,  266 

Roosevelt,  President,  161,  185-6 

Root,  Mr.,  237 

Savinkoflf,  276 

Sayler,  Mr.  Oliver,  277-8,  284 

Sazonoff,  Mr.,  80,  130,  158,  171-2, 

188,  193,  211-12,  213,221,  235, 

250,  268 
Scialoya,  Signor,  23 1 
Seyn,  General,  i8i 
ShingareflE,  Mr.,  215 
Skoropadsky,  General,  301 
SoukhomhnofiE,  General,  155,  160, 

163,  171-2,  188,  197,  202 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


309 


Stolypin,  Count,  13,  14,  16,  19, 
23,  27-8,  29,  30.  34-6,  39  et 
seq.,  80,   149 

Stone,  Mr.  Melville  E.,  240 

Stuermer,  Mr.  Boris,  205-6,  220, 
222,  225,  227 

Svenhufvud,  Mr.,  135 

Talleyrand,  55,  123 
TatistcheflE,  General,  170-1 
Terestchenko,  Mr.,  81,  236-7,  260, 

262-3,  271,  273  ei  seq. 
Thiebaut,  Mr.,  296 
von  Tirpitz,  Admiral,  158 
TrepofE,  Mr.,  276,  285.  287 
Trepoff,  General,  16 
Trotzky,  276,  285,  287 

Vinogradoff,  Professor,  15 
Vladiinir,  Grand  Duchess,  153 


Whitton,  Mr.  F.  S.,  179 

Wilcox,     Mr.     E.     H.,     35,     38, 

173,     198,     204-5,     233.     262, 

276 
William  I,  Kaiser,  114 
William  II,  Kaiser,  112,  ijo  et  seq., 

189,  192,  297 
Wilson,    President,    59,    62,    196, 

209,  227,  272,  302-3 
Wilton,  Mr.  Robert,  240 
Witte,  Count,  10,  16,  41,  80,  141, 

161,  240 
WorontzofE,  Prince,  141 
Worontzoff  -  Dashkoff ,      Cou  nt, 

141 

Yanouchkevitch,  General,  171-2 
Yudenitch,  General,  212,  219 

Zajonczek,  General,  44 


i 


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